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ABSTRACT 
Thailand’s Relations with the GCC States: An Analysis of State and Non-State 
Actors 
 
The aim of this research is to assess the potential role that Muslim-related private sector 
associations in Thailand can play in the international relations between Thailand and the 
Gulf states.  The overall objective of the research is to investigate the nature and future 
direction of Thai-Gulf states relations through observing the way the state and the non-
state actors each interacts with players in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States 
and how the overall interactions shape Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States.  The 
hypothesis of the research is that despite limited resources and identity attached to it, the 
Thai state will continue to play a dominant role in Thailand‘s relations with the GCC 
States, while the role of non-state actors will increase. The relations will expand more 
rapidly and efficiently if the state allows greater intervention from the non-state actors in 
some areas of interactions which are traditionally conducted by states. 
 
In order to prove the hypothesis, the author depends on multiples Internatinal Relations 
(IR) theories, and uses a newly constructed model, based on James Rosenau‘s Two 
World of World Politics Model.  The Universe of World Politics Model, like that of 
Rosenau, highlights the existence of the state-centric and the multi-centric spheres; 
however, it takes Rosanau‘s model further by recognising the significance of external 
environments that affect relations, including culture and the role of globalisation.  
Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States are studied in two folds: one through the 
dynamism within state-to-state interactions, and another through dynamism among 
private sector associations in Thailand.  The overlapping area where state and non-state 
spheres intercept, plus culture and the role of globalisation, is the focus of this research.  
It brings to light the position of private sector associations in Thailand‘s relations with 
the GCC States in the contemporary world and in the future. The non-state actors 
selected in this research are both private sector associations: one is local, the Thai 
Islamic Trade and Industrial Association (TITIA), another is a branch of foreign private 
sector association, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY).  The data was 
collected through primary sources and unstructured interviews with individuals from 
both the Thai government and private sector associations that are used as case studies.  
 
The research indicates that the hypothesis suggesting the greater role for private sector 
associations in Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States cannot be absolutely 
guaranteed; an increased involvement of private sector associations is less likely in these 
relations.  The findings show that both of the private sector associations used in the case 
studies are reluctant, if not unwilling to act as proxies for the government in Thailand‘s 
relations with the GCC States.  Such unwillingness is based on the associations‘ 
characteristics as well as the boundary that the government has created to prevent these 
associations from too much intervening in international relations, which has traditionally 
been viewed as state affairs.  The findings highlight both the government‘s intentional 
and unintentional barriers for the participation of these private sector associations, 
including legal bodies and common practices among government officers.  
 
 iii 
DECLARATION 
I hereby declare that the work presented in this thesis is my original work.  All the 
materials presented in the thesis that are not my own work have carefully been 
acknowledged.  None of the materials in this thesis has been submitted for any other 
degrees at this or any other university.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
COPYRIGHT 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author.  No quotation from it should be 
published in any form without the author‘s written consent.  Should consent be granted, 
the information obtained from this thesis should be acknowledged properly.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
DEDICATION 
 
To my parents, Sawai and Jongjit Limlikit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This thesis could not have been completed without the support, kindness and 
encouragement of many people.  A few pages would not be enough to put all of them 
here, but I here endeavour to express my appreciation to those who have significantly 
contributed to the completion of this work. 
 
Firstly, I am grateful for to the support of my supervisor, Professor Anoush Ehteshami, 
the Dean of Internationalisation at Durham University, for his guidance throughout my 
research.  I am also indebted to Dr. John Williams, Senior Lecturer at the School of 
Government and International Affairs (SGIA) at Durham University for his invaluable 
advice on the theory of International Relations.  I also wish to express my gratitude to Dr. 
Mehmet Asutay, Lecturer at the SGIA for his support and encouragement.  My thanks 
also go to Professor Rodney Wilson at the SGIA for his advice on research planning.  In 
addition, I would like to express my appreciation to Dr. Christopher Davidson, who has 
provided me with encouragement and advice on research management.  I am also 
indebted to Professor Stephen D. Martin, for his generosity and for his insightful 
comments on my work.  I am also grateful to Professor Mohammad Bakir Alwan at 
Tufts University for his encouragement and advice for my pursuit of PhD.   
 
I would also like to extend my thanks to the officers and staff at Josephine Butler 
College, who have made my life in Durham like a home away from home where I 
cherished every minute of my experience there.  My special thanks go to Mr. Adrian 
Simpson, the Principal of Josephine Butler College, for his kind advice and constant 
encouragement for my research planning.  I also deeply appreciate the generosity, 
invaluable guidance, and encouragement from Dr. Jill Tidmarsh, Senior Tutor at 
Josephine Butler College and her husband, Ian, who have always been there for me for 
academic, professional and welfare support.   
 
I would like to express my gratitude for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand for 
the financial support.  In addition, I am grateful for advice and administrative assistance 
 vii 
from officers at the Office of Educational Affairs, at the Royal Thai Embassy in London.  
I also want to express my gratitude for the generosity and intellectual discussion 
provided by Professor Jaran Maluleem of the Faculty of Political Sciences at Thammasat 
University, Thailand.  I am also indebted for Mr. Anirut Smutkojorn, the President of the 
Thai Islamic Trade and Industrial Association (TITIA), who kindly allowed me to 
explore and participate in the function of the organisation over which he presides.  In 
addition, the research cannot be completed without insightful interviews given by the 
generous staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bangkok, the staff at the Thai 
Islamic Trade and Industrial Association (TITIA) in Bangkok, Thailand, and those at the 
World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) in Thailand.  
 
Mostly my thanks go to those dearest to me who have always been there during both the 
good and bad days of my PhD studies.  I would like to express my gratitude to my 
family, particularly my father, Sawai, and my mother, Jongjit, who have always been 
supportive and inspiring in my pursuit of knowledge and who have worked hard to 
provide the best education I could have as a child.  My thanks also go to my husband, 
Javier, for his understanding, patience, and support of me throughout my PhD years.   
 
Last but not least acknowledgement goes out for the support, encouragement, and 
friendship I have found from my friends in Durham.  My thanks go to my SGIA friends, 
especially Arlene Taylor, Lucia Fangalua and Suleiman Elik who have always provided 
good advice and support.  I also thank Mrs. Kwanjai Martin, my lovely friend who has 
always calmed me down and provided me with encouragement.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................. ii 
DECLARATION ........................................................................................................................................ iii 
COPYRIGHT ............................................................................................................................................. iv 
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................................. v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................................................... vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................................... xi 
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................................. xii 
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................................... xiv 
LIST OF MAPS ......................................................................................................................................... xv 
 
PART 1         CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND ................................................ 1 
 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 2 
1. BACKGROUND AND ISSUES ........................................................................................................ 2 
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES ........................................................................... 4 
3. HYPOTHESIS ................................................................................................................................... 6 
4. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY ...................................................................................... 8 
5. LITERATURE SURVEY ................................................................................................................. 9 
6. METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................................................... 26 
7. THE ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY .................................................................................... 42 
8. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................ 43 
 
CHAPTER 1    CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT .......................................................................................... 46 
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 46 
2. RELEVANT IR THEORIES AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ..................................... 46 
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................. 100 
4. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 113 
 
CHAPTER 2    THAILAND’S RELATIONS WITH THE GCC STATES: 1950-1997 .................... 116 
1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 116 
2. HISTORICAL CONTACTS BETWEEN THAIS AND ARABS .............................................. 117 
3. MUSLIMS IN THAILAND .......................................................................................................... 119 
4. THAI-GULF PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RELATIONS ................................................................. 134 
5. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GCC-THAI DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND KEY ISSUES 
FOR INTERACTIONS........................................................................................................................... 137 
6 SIGNIFICANT TRANSNATIONAL FACTORS THAT AFFECTED THE INTERACTIONS
 147 
7 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 149 
 
PART 2             STATE REALM ........................................................................................................... 151 
 
CHAPTER 3        THAILAND-GULF STATES RELATIONS 1997-2001 ........................................ 153 
1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 153 
 ix 
2. THAILAND’S FOREIGN RELATIONS UNDER CHUAN ...................................................... 154 
3. KEY DRIVING FORCES—AN ASSESSMENT ........................................................................ 162 
4. NATURE OF RELATIONS WITH THE GCC STATES .......................................................... 173 
5. BILATERAL STATE RELATIONS ........................................................................................... 176 
6. THAILAND-INTERGOVERNMENT RELATIONS ................................................................ 194 
7. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 201 
 
CHAPTER 4        THAILAND-GULF STATES RELATIONS—2001-2006 ..................................... 203 
1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 203 
2. THAILAND’S FOREIGN RELATIONS UNDER THAKSIN .................................................. 204 
3. KEY DRIVING FORCES ............................................................................................................. 214 
4. THE NATURE OF RELATIONS ................................................................................................ 223 
5. BILATERAL STATE RELATIONS ........................................................................................... 228 
6. THAILAND-INTERGOVERNMENT RELATIONS ................................................................ 245 
7. THE CHUAN AND THAKSIN GOVERNMENTS: A COMPARISON .................................. 251 
8. THE WEAKNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT ........................................................................... 255 
9. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 258 
 
PART 3                   NON-STATE REALM ........................................................................................... 262 
 
CHAPTER 5          THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MUSLIM-RELATED PRIVATE SECTOR 
ASSOCIATIONS IN THAILAND—CASE OF TITIA ....................................................................... 264 
1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 264 
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE SECTOR IN THAILAND .......................................... 265 
3. SPECIALISED PRIVATE SECTOR ASSOCIATION—THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TITIA 
AND ITS INITIATIVES DURING THE CHUAN ERA ..................................................................... 272 
4. THE ROLE OF TITIA UNDER THAKSIN ADMINISTRATION .......................................... 278 
5. THE ‘WORLD OF MUSLIMS’ 2007 CONFERENCE ............................................................. 280 
6. TITIA’S POTENTIAL ROLE AND UNDERLYING FACTORS ............................................ 284 
7. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TITIA AND THE GOVERNMENT ............................... 286 
8. THE FUTURE OF TITIA ............................................................................................................. 287 
9. TITIA’S POTENTIAL ROLE IN THAILAND’S RELATIONS WITH THE GCC STATES
 295 
10.    CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 298 
 
CHAPTER 6           THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOREIGN MUSLIM-RELATED PRIVATE 
SECTOR ASSOCIATIONS IN THAILAND—CASE OF WAMY .................................................... 301 
1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 301 
2. FOREIGN PRIVATE SECTOR ASSOCIATIONS IN THAILAND........................................ 303 
3. WAMY THAILAND—THE ESTABLISHMENT AND ITS INITIATIVES........................... 304 
4. RELATIONS WITH OTHER PRIVATE SECTOR ASSOCIATIONS ................................... 308 
5. RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL MUSLIM ORGANISATIONS........ 311 
6. WAMY UNDER THE CHUAN AND THAKSIN ADMINISTRATIONS ............................... 315 
7. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WAMY AND THE GOVERNMENT ............................ 315 
8. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE STRENGTH OF WAMY .................................. 318 
9. THE FUTURE OF WAMY .......................................................................................................... 320 
10.     THE ROLE OF WAMY IN THAI-SAUDI RELATIONS ........................................................ 323 
 x 
11.  THE ROLE OF WAMY IN THAILAND’S RELATIONS WITH THE GCC STATES ........... 324 
12.   WAMY AND TITIA COMPARED ............................................................................................... 325 
13.  CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................. 329 
 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................ 334 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................... 359 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ACD  Asian Cooperation Dialogue 
AMED Asia-Middle East Dialogue 
APEC  Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation  
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
BOI  Board of Investment  
CICOT Central Islamic Committee of Thailand  
GCC  Gulf Cooperation Council 
ICCI  Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
IDB  Islamic Development Bank 
IOR-ARC  Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation  
ISESCO Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
MFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MOC  Ministry of Commerce 
MOL   Ministry of Labour 
OIC  Organisation of the Islamic Conference 
OPEC  Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
TCEB  Thailand Convention and Exhibition Bureau 
TITIA  Thai Islamic Trade and Industry Association 
UNWTO World Tourism Organisation  
WAMY World Assembly of Muslim Youth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Rosenau‘s Evolution of the Two Worlds of Politics ...................................... 110 
Figure 2: Thai-Gulf relations Model, based on Rosenau‘s Two Worlds of World Politics, 
added with external environments ........................................................................... 111 
Figure 3: Thailand‘s Relations with the GCC States ..................................................... 112 
Figure 4: Total Unemployment in Thailand 1971-1980 ................................................ 136 
Figure 5: Number of Thai Labor Migrants to the Middle East 1975-1980 .................... 136 
Figure 6: Southeast Asian Export to the Middle East 1950-1980 (by each Southeast 
Asian country) ......................................................................................................... 145 
Figure 7: Thai Labour Migrants to the Middle East ...................................................... 149 
Figure 8: Thailand‘s Crude Oil Production, Consumption and Net Import (1980-2005)
 ................................................................................................................................. 162 
Figure 9: Thailand‘s Top Ten Sources of Imported Crude Oil 1991 (in percentage) .... 163 
Figure 10: Thailand‘s Top Ten Sources of Imported Crude Oil 1997 (in percentages) 163 
Figure 11: Thailand‘s Top Ten Sources of Imported Crude Oil 2000 ........................... 164 
Figure 12: Thailand‘s Trade with the GCC States 1995-2001 ....................................... 168 
Figure 13: Import-Export to Saudi Arabia 1995-2001 ................................................... 178 
Figure 14: The Number of Thai workers that attempted to work in selected GCC States 
1997-2001 ................................................................................................................ 180 
Figure 15: Comparison between UAE and Oman‘s Import-Export to Thailand 1995-
2001 ......................................................................................................................... 192 
Figure 16: Percentage of Tourists from Selected Middle Eastern Countries Coming to 
Thailand 1997-2001 ................................................................................................ 193 
 xiii 
Figure 17: Thailand‘s GDP Growth in Selected Years between 1995 and 2005 ........... 208 
Figure 18: Thailand‘s Trade between 1994 and 2005 .................................................... 210 
Figure 19: Trade between Thailand and the GCC States 2000-2005............................. 216 
Figure 20: Thailand‘s Export to each GCC State 1997-2005 ........................................ 217 
Figure 21: Number of Tourists from Middle East coming to Thailand 1997-2005 ....... 226 
Figure 22: Thailand‘s Trade with Saudi Arabia 1997-2005 .......................................... 230 
Figure 23 : Thailand‘s Trade with Qatar 1997-2005 ..................................................... 235 
Figure 24: Thailand‘s Trade with Qatar and Bahrain, a Comparison 1997-2005 .......... 235 
Figure 25: Thailand‘s Trade with Kuwait 2001-2007.................................................... 237 
Figure 26: Thailand‘s Export to Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain 2001-2007 ....................... 238 
Figure 27: Number of Kuwaiti Tourists Visiting Thailand 1997-2005 ......................... 239 
Figure 28: Thailand‘s Export to Oman 1997-2005 ........................................................ 241 
Figure 29: The Number of Omani Tourists to Thailand in Selected Years ................... 242 
Figure 30: The Differences in Managing Procedures between the Government and 
Private Sector .......................................................................................................... 268 
Figure 31: Top Ten Sources of Thailand's Crude Oil Import 2008 (by percentage share)
 ................................................................................................................................. 350 
Figure 32: The Percentage of each GCC State's Investment in Thailand (from Total GCC 
Investment in Thailand), as of 2008 ........................................................................ 352 
 xiv 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Religion Ratios, Based on the 2000 Census in Thailand ................................. 128 
Table 2: Religion Ratios in Thailand by Region, Based on the 2000 Census ............... 129 
Table 3: Number of Mosques Registered by Region ..................................................... 129 
Table 4: Legal Bodies Relevant to Muslims in Thailand ............................................... 130 
Table 5: Selected High Level State Visits between Thailand and the GCC States ........ 144 
Table 6: Trade between Thailand and Individual GCC State 1995-2001 ($ million) .... 166 
Table 7: Thailand‘s Trade with the Aggregate GCC States 1995-2001 ($ million) ...... 168 
Table 8: Thailand‘s Top Ten Crude Oil Import Sources between 1997 and 2005 ........ 214 
Table 9: Thailand‘s Trade with the GCC States between 2005 and 2007 ..................... 217 
Table 10: ACD Membership of the GCC States and Year of Membership ................... 219 
Table 11: Selected Examples of the ACD's Areas of Cooperation in which Some GCC 
States are Involved .................................................................................................. 219 
Table 12: The Pledge that some Affected Countries Received from the GCC States in 
2004-2005 ($)* ........................................................................................................ 227 
Table 13: Number of Incidents in the Southern Thai Conflict 2004-2006 .................... 246 
Table 14: Comparison of the Chuan and Thaksin Administrations ............................... 251 
Table 15: Number and Types of Business of TITIA Members ..................................... 274 
Table 16: Some Selected WAMY Offices Worldwide .................................................. 310 
Table 17: Comparison of TITIA and WAMY ............................................................... 331 
Table 18: Export Structure to the GCC States in Selected Years (USD Million) ......... 349 
 
 xv 
LIST OF MAPS 
Map 1: Middle East and North African Region .............................................................. xvi 
Map 2: Thailand ............................................................................................................ xvii 
Map 3: Ethnic Groups in Thailand ............................................................................... xviii 
Map 4: The World‘s Muslim Distribution ...................................................................... xix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xvi 
Map 1: Middle East and North African Region  
 
Source:  Central Intelligence Agency (2004), the Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of 
Texas at Austin  
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east.html (Last accessed  26 March, 2009). 
 xvii 
Map 2: Thailand   
 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency (2002), the Perry-Castañeda Library, Map Collection, University of 
Texas at Austin 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/thailand.html (Last accessed 26 March 2009).  
 
 xviii 
Map 3: Ethnic Groups in Thailand  
 
 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency (1974), the Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of 
Texas at Austin.  
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ (Last accessed 26 March 2009).
  xix 
Map 4: The World’s Muslim Distribution   
 
 
 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency (1995): The Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection  
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/world.html   (Last accessed 26 March 2009)
Part 1                                                Prelude to Thailand‘s Relations with the GCC States 
 
 1 
PART 1 
 
CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND 
 
Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States between 1997 and 2006 can be considered as 
one of the most interesting periods in the relations between the two sides.  Since the 
establishment of relations, this period has shown to be one of the most active, where 
many initiatives and activities have been launched and increased.   The lack of literature 
that studies and records the transformation of relations during this period is the 
motivation for this research.  With the increase in the number and role of non-state 
actors in Thailand, it is particularly interesting to pair the concepts relevant to non-state 
actors with a traditional state-centric approach to examine Thailand‘s relations with the 
GCC States.  The preliminary question to answer concerns how the research should be 
designed and to what extent the existing literature and background information can 
support the execution of the research. 
 
The purpose of part 1 is therefore to provide the framework for how this research has 
been designed.  In addition to explaining the aim and objectives of the research, it seeks 
to examine the research background, which consists of a discussion of the contribution 
of the research, relevant literature, methodology and the organisation of the research.  It 
also discusses the theoretical framework and model used to conceptualise the 
understanding of information obtained.  In order to understand the nature of Thailand‘s 
relations with the GCC States at the period under study, which is between 1997 and 
2006, a historical background of Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States is provided.  
It is intended that the information obtained from part 1 will help equip readers with the 
theoretical concepts needed to analyse and understand the empirical content in part 2.  
 
  Introduction 
 2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. BACKGROUND AND ISSUES  
The rationale for this study is based on the view that, first, Thailand‘s relationship with 
the Gulf states has been understudied despite potentially active political and trade 
relations, not the least of which are the active interactions between Muslims in the two 
regions; second, little had been studied about the role of transnationalism and civil 
society in the international relations of Southeast Asian states; even less so in the case of 
Thailand, where there are large numbers of non-state actors, yet the role of these actors 
in international relations has received little attention. 
 
The Middle East had long been considered peripheral in Thai foreign policy; there are 
several reasons for such view.
1
  First, in the past, there was little contact between Thais 
and Arabs due to a lack of political and social compatibility. Second, the Middle East 
countries had not been significant trade partners with Thailand; most of the countries 
were poor and lack business and social attraction.  Not until some countries in this 
region started to export oil, accumulate wealth, increase imports and build up more 
infrastructures did the Thais recognise them as hubs for labour migration, potential 
markets and oil sellers.  Third, since there was a lack of interest and motivation to 
develop further relations, there were insufficient mechanisms to facilitate 
communications between Thailand and the Middle East region, both in terms of 
transportation and human resources.  Lastly, much of the effort to develop international 
relations had been placed on traditional diplomatic and trade partners, which were the 
Western Hemisphere, East and Southeast Asian nations; thus there was lack of 
motivation to train or recruit staff with knowledge in the Middle East.   
 
Not until Thailand started importing oil from the Middle East, as well as exporting Thai 
goods and labour migrants to the Arab states that started accumulating wealth from oil 
did Thailand begin to give more attention to the region.  There was an urge on 
Thailand‘s part to expand new markets and diplomatic relations to the region.  The 
                                                          
1
 An interview with a scholar from Chulalongkorn University, Thailand. September 2008.  
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 3 
problem encountered once the Middle East came under the spotlight was the lack of staff 
and mechanisms that would facilitate the relations between Thailand and the Middle 
East.  The study of the Middle East in Thailand, which has been small in number, has 
been done through an attempt of aggregately explaining the whole region, rather than 
specifying sub-areas. The outcome was that these studies have been so broad that they 
have not sufficiently provided an in-depth explanation, nor can they make it clear the 
vast differences among sub-regions and countries of the Middle East.  The same can be 
said about policy making and application. Unfortunately, Thailand‘s foreign policy that 
is relevant to the Middle East fails to recognise the differences, politically and 
economically, among countries within the region.  One same policy is applied to the 
whole region, despite differences between the oil-rich GCC States, Iran, Iraq, the Levant 
and North Africa.  Worse is that one of the most relevant policies, the Look West Policy, 
extends to cover Africa and South Asian regions; thus, not only does it dilute attention to 
the region, but also tips the balance more towards South Asia.   
 
Within meagre and diluted attention given to the Middle East, the Gulf States do not 
receive as much attention as they deserve from both the academic and policy-making 
realms. While standing out among all the Middle East states in terms of trade value, 
number of labour migrants, relationship among Muslims and oil trade with Thailand, the 
GCC States are still treated with indifference and receive similar attention as others in 
the Middle East whose connections are not as significant.  
 
Studying about relations with the Middle East and the GCC States, like other parts of the 
world, necessitate international relations theory.  In Thailand, most of the research in 
this field has been done through conventional International Relations (IR) theory, in 
which state-centric concept of IR has been the preferred approach; thus a great deal of 
IR research in Thailand has been conducted using realism, pluralism and neorealism.  In 
the contemporary international politics, however, non-state actors and civil society have 
increasingly become prominent as additional players.  In the case of Thailand‘s relations 
with the GCC States is no exception; in addition to relations between governments of the 
two regions, there has been an increase in the interactions among businessmen, trade 
  Introduction 
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association, non-government organisations and the general public.  In the attempt to 
study the nature of international relations between Thailand and the GCC States, 
therefore, it is important to embrace both state-centric aspects of the relations, as well as 
the non-state aspect.  Pluralism, transnationalism and postinternationalism are alternative 
IR contexts that provide an explanation for the role of non-state actors, thus broadening 
the interpretation of the overall picture of relations.  Thus the author of this thesis is 
motivated by applying part of Rosenau‘s model that highlights the co-existence of state-
centric and multi-centric (non-state) worlds to examine Thailand-GCC States relations 
and seek to find an alternative explanation to the role of additional actors within the 
system. 
 
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
As noted, while recently Thailand needs to expand diplomatic relations to the Middle 
East region, particularly the GCC States, where most of its Middle East revenues come 
from, the country struggled to find resources, both facilities and human resources, to 
respond to the urge to develop the relations. To address the problem over the lack of 
research, particularly that devoted to the Gulf region, this research aims to investigate 
the nature, trend and future direction of Thai-Gulf states relations through observing the 
role of the government and private sector.  The research focuses largely on the 
interaction processes between the state and non-state spheres, with particular attention 
given to the role of transnationalism and non-state actors.  The research includes the 
following objectives:  
 
1. To provide explanations of the nature of inter-state relations between Thailand 
and the GCC States through state-centric, pluralist and postinternational 
approaches, which provides a mechanism for the understanding of traditional 
diplomacy and international relations.  
  
 This objective can be achieved through examining the historical development of 
Thailand‘s relationship with the GCC States under two prime ministerships: that 
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of Chuan Leekpai and that of Thaksin Shinawatra. The state-centric, pluralist and 
postinternational concepts will be useful in achieving this objective. 
 
2. To identify significant non-state actors, transnational movements and impacts of 
globalisation, with some links to the Middle East and the GCC States that affect 
the Thai state in the contemporary world and the ways in which these actors 
affect international relations with the GCC States. 
 
 This objective can be achieved through looking at significant international 
relations phenomena and actors within them that are relevant to the Middle East, 
the GCC States and Thailand within the period under study; the outcomes of the 
impacts are also recorded and incorporated into the analysis.  In addition, key 
actors within the events will be noted down and identified.  The concepts of 
pluralism, transnationalism, and postinternaitonalism will be used to achieve this 
objective.  
 
3. To provide an explanation on the development and the roles of some non-state 
actors relevant to Thailand‘s relationship with the Muslim world and the GCC 
States; and to provide an analysis of ways in which these transnational 
movements and non-state actors assert their influence and identity. In addition, to 
provide a prediction of future roles of relevant non-state actors in Thailand‘s 
international relations with the GCC States. 
  
 To achieve this objective, the concept of non-state actor will be used to examine 
selected Muslim-related non-state actors in Thailand‘s relationship with the 
Muslim world; with small, non-state associations such as the Thai Islamic Trade 
and Industrial Association (TITIA) and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth 
(WAMY) Thailand office being examined in particular. Observations on the 
characteristics of these non-state actors will be noted and then examined through 
pluralism, functionalism, postinternationalism, and constructivism concepts.  
  Introduction 
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4. To apply the understanding of the relations between the Thai government and 
Muslim-related private sector associations in Thailand to evaluate the role and 
potential that small non-state actors will have greater role in Thailand‘s 
international relations, and the possibility that the non-state actors will act as a 
proxy for the government in the realm of Thailand‘s relationship with the GCC 
States.  
  
 To achieve this objective, case studies of TITIA and WAMY will be evaluated 
for their capability to manage international interaction on its own, as well as will 
be used to examined how this non-state actor interact with the government. The 
outcome of the evaluation will also reveal whether the small, non-state actor is 
willing to act as the proxy for the government.  
 
5. To identify the most appropriate IR theories and theoretical framework for the 
understanding of Thailand‘s relationship with the GCC States, taking account of 
the changes in tradition of Thailand‘s foreign policy outlook, as well as the 
changes in the nature of contemporary international politics.   
  
 This will be achieved through evaluating the proposed theoretical model: the 
combination among the state-centric, pluralist, and postinternational approaches 
to see how well it can be used to explain Thailand‘s relationship with the GCC 
States.  Other relevant theoretical concepts will also be thoroughly evaluated to 
see their significance and applicability to Thailand‘s relationship with the GCC 
States.   
 
3. HYPOTHESIS 
While there is a good potential for greater development in international relations, the 
progress in moving toward greater relations has been slow.  The lack of political and 
cultural, and identity compatibilities are key obstacles which have led Thailand and the 
GCC States to not cross paths.  The government, in particular, finds limitations in 
developing closer relations with the GCC States in many ways; being labelled as a 
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Buddhist state is one of the reasons that limit Thailand‘s ability to move closer to these 
countries.   
 
This research hypothesised that while the government has limitations in developing 
greater relations with the GCC States, private organisations in Thailand can be used 
instead to drive the dynamism in the relations.  These non-state actors can become more 
involved in international relations; and the nature of their involvement can be through 
the role of proxies.  With less identity obstacles, the Muslim private sector associations 
will be able to facilitate greater state relations and also relations at popular and private 
sector levels, thus creating more dynamism within Thailand‘s relations with the GCC 
States.  
 
The relations between Thailand and the GCC States have traditionally been led by 
popular relations, i.e. Muslim and Labour relations; and later states came in to facilitate 
the process of the popular interactions while began to establish the mechanisms of state 
relations.  While civil society in Thailand has been developed and strengthened itself, it 
has the capacity to move further to manage larger tasks. This research hypothesises that 
the future relations between Thailand and the GCC States will be largely influenced by 
the state, with increased role of civil society.  The future of Thailand‘s relations with the 
GCC States can be in the form of task sharing between state and civil society in 
international relations.  One of the possibilities among Thailand‘s relations with the 
GCC States is the tasks shared between the Thai government and the Muslim-related 
private sector associations; these private sector associations are at a greater advantage 
because of their identity and the networks they have developed with the Muslim world. 
 
Considering the content of hypothesis, it can be seen that this research can potentially 
contribute to the academic field in many ways; the contribution of this study is therefore 
discussed in greater detail in the next section.   
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4. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
Overall, this research is intended as a contribution to the field of international relations, 
particularly in the sub-field of Southeast Asian-Gulf States Studies.  The most 
significant contribution of this research is that this research is the first of its kind to 
examine the in-depth relations between Thailand and the Gulf States, as well as the 
Muslim world, with special attention given to the role of private sector associations and 
transnationalism.  
 
This research will add knowledge to the field of international relations between 
Southeast Asia and the Gulf States, where only a small amount of research exists. Exists 
in even smaller amount is the research that specifically concerns Thailand‘s  relations 
with the Gulf States. Second, this research provides a broader view to understand the 
nature of relationship between these two sides in the contemporary period, where the 
role of states in international interactions has been challenged by the emergence of 
transnational societies, enterprises and organisations.  
 
Methodology wise, this research seeks to incorporate the combined analytical tools, 
consisting of state-centric, pluralist, transnational and postinternational approaches, as 
well as the recognition of cultural influences in international relations practices.  This is 
significant because the traditional methods used to examine Thailand‘s international 
relations are largely state-centric, mainly focusing on the role of state-to-state relations.  
This research will therefore answer to changes in the nature of Thailand‘s relationship 
with the GCC States, where non-state actors and other functional agendas have become 
increasingly significant. And thus it will provide the explanation in the context that 
differs from most of the existing literature since there is very little research to date that 
focuses on the growing roles of non-governmental, local organisations in international 
relations, particularly that of the Southeast Asia region and Thailand.  
 
The further implication of this research is that it can potentially be great use for the 
examination of other small states‘ relations that share similar characteristics to 
Thailand‘s relationship with Gulf States. Such a relationship is characterised by being 
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traditionally managed largely by state, but later is joined by emerging non-state actors. 
This research will be useful for scholars, diplomats and civil servants in understanding 
the changing context of international relations, which are more complex due to a greater 
number of actors and agendas; there will be the need to understand the role of these 
actors and how they contribute to traditional state-to-state relations.  Scholars who are 
interested in international relations, particularly in South-South relations, the small states 
that emerged after the Cold War, and developing nations may benefit from the 
methodology and analysis in this research. 
 
To support the hypothesis, surveying and commenting on the existence of relevant 
works is useful; in doing so, the research structure and methodology can be formulated.  
Therefore, the next section will discuss the literature survey.  
 
5. LITERATURE SURVEY 
5.1 General Observation of Literature on Thai-GCC States Relations  
The preliminary examination of current research on Thailand‘s relationship with the 
GCC States reveals that there are very little literatures relevant to Thailand‘s relationship 
with the GCC States.  Reich and Silverburgh‘s Asian States’ Relations with the Middle 
East and North Africa: A Bibliography, 1950-1993,
2
 which provides extensive detail on 
literatures about Asia‘s relations with the Middle East and North Africa, has very few 
notes on Thailand; and there has been no update on the bibliographic book on the topic 
about Asian states‘ relations with the Middle East and North Africa ever since.  The 
preliminary survey additionally reveals other crucial facts, which influence way this 
research is going to be constructed empirically as follows in the subsequent sections. 
 
5.1.1 Directly Relevant Literatures on Thailand-GCC States Relations 
The survey shows that there is no literature that is directly relevant to Thailand‘s 
relationship with the GCC States in any aspect, be it political, economic or social 
relations.  The research that has been done in Thai is largely focus on the study of the 
                                                          
2 See Sanford Silverburg and Bernard Reich, Asian States‘s Relations with the Middle East and North 
Africa: A Bibliography, 1950-1993 (Metuchen, N.J., London: Scarecrow Press, 1994). 
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Middle East per se;
;
 and scholars do not make connection to its relations with Thailand.
 3
  
Some literature slightly discusses the relations as part of the context of Southeast Asia-
Middle East relations or the GCC–ASEAN relations.4  In addition, there was some 
discussion about Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States in the context of the role of 
Islam in Southeast Asia and the relationship between Thailand and Organisation of 
Islamic Conference.
5
   
 
5.1.2 Existing Literature in the Contemporary Period 
With the exception of agendas on terrorism and unrests in the southernmost provinces, 
which can be linked with the GCC States, most of the literatures on Thailand‘s 
relationship with the GCC States and the Middle East are not up-to-date.  During the 
1980s and 1990s there was a number of research on Islam in Thailand; and during the 
late 1990s and early 2005, there were some studies on Thailand‘s relationship with the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference.
6
  Some research topics dwell on recurring issues 
during that periods and the interests fade once the issues have been resolved.  This can 
be seen through the research on Thai labour migrants to the Middle East, which received 
much attention in the 1970s and 1980s; but the interest declined around the 1990s after 
the diplomatic strain between Thailand and Saudi Arabia, one of the biggest employers 
of Thai labourers in the Middle East.  
 
5.2 Existing Literature on Foreign Policy of Thailand 
The survey of literature on the foreign policy of Thailand reveals that there have been a 
good number of research projects conducted on this area by both Thai and Western 
scholars. The development of foreign policy in Thailand has long been studied; most of 
the studies emphasise the nature of the Thai state‘s behaviour in key periods, i.e. during 
and after the Vietnam War, the change in administrations‘ foreign policy, or key 
regional phenomena.  With a wide ranging focus and a vast time span, the literature 
                                                          
3
 For example, see Jaran Maluleem, OIC and the Muslim World (Bangkok, Thailand: Thailand Research 
Fund, 2007). 
4
 See J. C Parrenas, The GCC and the Development of ASEAN (Abu Dhabi Emirates Center for Strategic 
Studies and Research, 1998). 
5
 See Maluleem, OIC and the Muslim World.  
6
 Ibid. 
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survey on foreign policy of Thailand can be classified according to time periods, 
governmental administrations, or the key historical events.   
 
5.2.1 Literature on Thailand’s Foreign Policy in General 
There are several research projects on Thailand‘s foreign policy, which can be classified 
according to certain periods.  Scholars researching the Thai foreign policy during mid 
1960s to 1980s argue that the policy had been largely shaped by perceived external 
threats, particularly threats from neighbouring countries; therefore, much of the research 
on foreign policy during this period focused mainly on the issue of security, particularly 
the prevention of the spread of communism from China, Vietnam, and Laos, and 
maintaining a good relationship with the United States for protection.  Singh, for 
example, suggests Thailand‘s foreign policy during 1960s changed from the traditional 
policy of neutrality to leaning toward external powers for protection.
 7
   Thailand‘s 
decision to seek a security guarantee from major powers can be seen in Thailand‘s active 
role in the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954.
8
 
Another expert on Thai foreign policy, Sukhri, argues in the same direction by 
suggesting the nature of threat Thailand perceived from the spread of communism from 
neighbouring countries; this, according to Sukhri, led Thailand to develop greater 
relations with the United States.
9
  The tradition of Thailand‘s alliance with the United 
States began with Thailand allowing the establishment of the US military bases from 
1961-1975, and with Thailand becoming one of the big recipients of US economic aid 
program. 
10
   
 
At the end of the Cold War, much of the research project on Thai foreign policy have 
been focused on the effect of global economy and globalisation to the foreign policy and 
on Thailand‘s role in the regional and global community.  The work of Kusuma 
Snitwongse suggests the nature of the Thai foreign policy during the Chuan and Thaksin 
                                                          
7
 L. P. Singh, ―Thai Foreign Policy: The Current Phrase,‖ Asian Survey 3, no.11 (1963), pp. 535-543. 
8
 Ibid, pp. 535.   
9
 A. Suhrki, ―Smaller-Nation Diplomacy: Thailand's Current Dilemmas.‖ Asian Survey, 11. no.5 (1971), 
pp. 429-444. 
10
 Ibid, pp. 432.  
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administrations.
11
  Kusuma‘s key argument is the dilemmas the two administrations 
faced in conducting their foreign policies, particularly with regards to attention to the 
country‘s principle or national interest.  What Snitwongse did was examine the changes 
in Thailand‘s foreign policy under the two administrations and comment on the 
expanded and improved in relations between Thailand and regional and global powers, 
i.e. US, China and Japan.  According to Kusuma, under the Chuan government, Thai 
foreign policy expanded to include several parts of the world as well as international 
organisations.  In his conclusion, Kusuma comments on the nature of the Thaksin‘s 
administration foreign policy, and notes the potential use of business as a driving force 
for foreign policy.   
 
From the survey, one can see the transformation of research interest in Thailand‘s 
foreign policy.  Scholars have been keeping up with the key events that affect Thailand‘s 
foreign policy.  One weakness of the existing research is that so much of the attention 
has been given to the traditional sphere of diplomatic relations, i.e. ASEAN, the United 
States or Europe.  There are very rare, almost non-existent research projects that seek to 
examine the potential or nature of Thailand‘s foreign policy toward other global regions.  
While the current literature on Thailand‘s foreign policy has provided a good overview 
of the development and nature of foreign policy during different periods, there is a lack 
of literature that provides knowledge in the field of Thailand‘s foreign policy toward 
different global regions, asides from the country‘s traditional allies or neighbouring 
countries, this weakness can be found in the discussion on the lack of literature of 
Thailand‘s relations toward the GCC States in the next section.  
 
5.2.2 Literature on Foreign Policy of Thailand toward the GCC States 
While there have been a good number of research projects focusing on Thailand‘s 
foreign policy toward the Western Hemisphere and to other Asian states, the survey of 
literature suggests that there is no research that specifically focuses on Thailand‘s 
foreign policy toward the GCC States.  This may be based on the fact that Thai foreign 
policy toward the region has been integrated into the larger context of Thailand‘s foreign 
                                                          
11
 Kusuma Snitwongse, ―Thai Foreign Policy in the Global Age: Principle or Profit?,‖ Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 23, no. 2 (2001).  
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policy toward the Middle East.  So far, there has been no literature that examines such 
foreign policy in-depth.  Most of the existing relevant literature solely focuses on the 
nature of relations, particularly in terms of trade and labour policy, not the body of 
foreign policy per se.  
 
5.3 Existing Literature on Foreign Policy of the GCC States 
5.3.1 Literature on GCC States foreign policy in General 
The literature survey shows that there have been a large number of research projects on 
the development and foreign relations between the GCC States and the rest of the 
world.
12
  Most of the existing literature focuses largely on the issues of oil and stability 
of the Gulf States, where scholars highlight the nature of the GCC States in terms of 
small size, limited manpower in military and oil-based economy; recognising the issues 
at stake, scholars working on GCC foreign policy seek to examine the topic over 
security and relations between GCC States and global powers.
13
   
 
So far, there are very few books that focus solely on foreign policy of the GCC States, 
for as noted, most of the research projects that have been done provide a broad overview 
of GCC foreign relations, but not the analysis of the foreign policy making decision and 
the determinants of the foreign policy per se.  Two research projects that are directly 
relevant to the foreign policy of the GCC States are that of Abdulla Baabood and Hassan 
Hamdan Al-Alkim.   
 
In his work, Baabood explains the pattern of GCC foreign policy.  His analysis, unlike 
other literature that focuses on GCC foreign policy and relations from external and 
                                                          
12
 For example, see Gary Sick and Lawrence G. Potter, ed., The Persian Gulf and the Millennium: Essay 
in Politics, Economy, Security and Religion (New York: St.Martin Press, 1997); John Sandwick, ed., The 
Gulf Cooperation Council: Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview, 1987); J.E. Peterson and Richard Sindelar III, ed., Crosscurrent in the Gulf: Arab, Regional and 
Global Interests (London: Routledge, 1988).  
13 For literature on GCC States‘security see Gregory Gause, ―The Political Economy of National Security 
in the GCC States,‖ in The Persian Gulf at the Millennium, ed. Gary G. Sick and Lawrence G. Potter 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); Barry Rubin, ―The Persian Gulf after the Cold War: Old Pattern; 
New Era.‖ MERIA 3, no. 2 (1999).  For literature on the influence of oil to the GCC States see, Jill Crystal, 
Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995).  
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material factors like oil, largely focuses on the role of domestic political, economic and 
personal components of the GCC foreign policy.
14
  Baabood suggests several internal 
factors that influence the nature of GCC foreign policy, including the institutional 
framework in GCC foreign policy making, socio historical factors like Muslim identity 
and tribal culture, economic factors like oil based-economy.  These internal factors, 
when combined with external factors, have shaped the pattern of GCC foreign policy, 
which Baabood suggests as ―not strong enough to direct regional and international 
politics of their own.‖ 15   Baabood‘s view GCC foreign policy has been ―cautious, 
conservative, and pragmatic,‖ with the aim of preserving the status quo.16   
 
Baabood‘s work provides a good in-depth knowledge to the nature of the GCC foreign 
policy making process.  Prior to his analysis, Baabood provides sufficient background 
information over how foreign policy is made and agreed in the GCC States.  His analysis 
also incorporates background information of the GCC foreign policy making process to 
discuss the strength and weakness of the policy; such information allows one to 
understand the underlying rationale of GCC foreign policies and the way in which these 
policies affect states‘ behaviour in international relations.   
 
While Baabood provides good background information and analysis to GCC foreign 
policy, Al-Alkim‘s work focuses instead on the determinants of GCC foreign policy; his 
work therefore does not directly focus on the pattern of GCC foreign policy making and 
process, but instead focuses on historical background, the role of different factors that 
shape the foreign policy.
17
  Different determinants, both internal and external, allow Al-
Alkim to discuss the challenge to the GCC States‘ foreign policy in the future.   
 
The geographical location and possession of oil have led to a good number of research 
projects on GCC States‘ foreign relations.  However, it is interesting to see that there are 
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 Abdulla Baabood, ―Dynamics and Determinants of the GCC States‘ Foreign Policy, with Special 
Reference to the EU,‖ in Analyzing the Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe, ed. 
Gerd Nonneman (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 146. 
15
 Ibid, pp. 158.  
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 Ibid.  
17
 Hassan Hamdan Al-Alkim, The GCC States in an Unstable World: Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Small 
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very few books that discuss the pattern of the GCC foreign policy per se; even less 
research has been done on the pattern of GCC States‘ foreign policy toward different 
regions of the world, particularly in the case of foreign policy toward Asia and Thailand, 
as will be discussed in the next section.  
 
5.3.2 Literature on Foreign Policy of the GCC States toward Thailand 
The survey of literature on foreign policy of the GCC States toward Thailand reveals 
that there is no literature on the topic.  The most relevant literature which does exist, and 
which is rare, discusses the Gulf States‘ foreign policy toward Asia.  So far, the research 
on the Gulf State‘s Looking East Policy has been the main discussion point within the 
foreign policy of the GCC States toward Asia.  The survey of literature also suggests 
that the GCC States‘s foreign policy toward Asia is a recent phenomenon; the Looking 
East Policy came under the spotlight only in the 1990s.  
 
The Gulf Yearbook has been the significant source for updated development on Gulf 
States.  In the 2005-2006 volume there is a section that discusses the development and 
future of the Gulf States‘ Looking East Policy.18  According to the author, Abdullah Al-
Madani, the Gulf States have achieved a lot, politically and economically, in their 
attempts to strengthen relations with Asia.  However, he notes that there are a lot of 
opportunities for the Gulf States to benefit from Asia, but these have either not been 
exploited or the process to do so has been slow.
19
  The weakness of the Looking East 
Policy, according to Al-Madani, is that it gives so much attention to the economic sphere, 
while other spheres that have potential to strengthen the relations between the two sides 
i.e. educational, scientific, academic human resources cooperation, do not receive 
sufficient attention.
20
   
 
While it may be possible to examine the role of bigger trade associations that are 
involved with Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States, the rationale for choosing 
                                                          
18
 Abdullah Al-Madani, ―The Gulf and the Policy Of ―Looking East‖,‖ in The Gulf Yearbook 2005-2006, 
ed. Abdulaziz Al-Sager (Dubai, UAE: The Gulf Research Center, 2006), pp. 297-305. 
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TITIA and WAMY is based on the consideration of identity and expertise, which are 
significant factors, and in this sense both TITIA and WAMY therefore offer more 
advantages than other associations.  While the Thai Chamber of Commerce has the 
section and staff that interacts with the GCC States, the overall objectives and focus of 
the organizations are geographically broad.  In addition, the Thai Chamber of Commerce 
does not possess Muslim identity, in-depth knowledge and connection with the GCC 
States as much as TITIA and WAMY.  The latter organizations solely focus on the 
Muslim world and their Muslim identity and knowledge have made their organizational 
profile fit suitable with the research project.  The role of the Thai Chamber of 
Commerce and other non-Muslim private sector associations in Thailand‘s relations with 
the GCC States will be worth examining, but doing so can be another research on its 
own.    
 
5.4 Conceptualisation of Thai-GCC Inter-State Relations   
5.4.1 Economic Explanations 
a. Asymmetrical Economic Dependence Arguments 
Asymmetrical economic dependence is one of the key arguments in Thailand‘s 
relationship with the GCC States.  This argument points out that Southeast Asian states 
depend on the GCC States more than vice versa.  Such claim is based on Southeast 
Asia‘s dependence on oil, revenues from oil and labour remittances from the GCC 
States; therefore it characterises the region‘s relationship with the GCC region and the 
Middle East.  While the majority of literature proposing this argument does not directly 
place Thailand at the centre of its discussion, the argument does have implications for 
Thailand.  
 
Soo Ann et al published papers on economic relations between the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia delivered during the International Conference on Economic Relations 
between West Asia and Southeast Asia in Singapore in 1997; Economic Relations 
between West Asia and Southeast Asia highlights the significance of oil and petrodollars 
on Asian development and on the cooperation between the two regions.
21
  In the volume, 
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 Lee Soo Ann, ed., Economic Relations between West Asia and Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of 
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several scholars agree that the oil-rich West Asian states should help facilitate the 
economic development of the Southeast Asian states through their oil revenues.  Mel 
Chor suggests that this will strengthen the non-oil states‘ economies and enable them to 
pay off the debt from oil purchases.
22
  In the same volume, Dhanapalan agrees with 
Chor; he suggests the need for more financial institutions in West Asia, notably in the 
Gulf states, to facilitate financial flow and administer loans for Asian development.
23
  
On the significance of Western Asian oil to Southeast Asia, Changkasiri suggests that 
the Southeast Asian states must aim for regional and interregional cooperation in the 
field of petroleum, as well as to ensure the supply of oil and to minimise its cost.
24
 
 
Two decades has passed since the conference in Singapore, and the economic 
significance of the oil-producing states has become obvious, not only to Southeast Asia, 
but to the world. Financial institutions and off-shore banking have been established in 
Dubai and Bahrain.  The discourses of the economic relations between the Middle East 
and Southeast Asia have altered to lean toward interdependence or mutual interest from 
the previous focus on asymmetrical dependency.  However, such agenda continues to 
exist because the demand for oil from Southeast Asian states such as Thailand and 
Singapore remains the same if not higher.  In 2004 Rodney Wilson discussed historical, 
institutional, financial and people-to-people links between ASEAN and the GCC.  He 
then uses these links to compare and contrast the nature of the two regions, which later 
allowed him to predict the future of the economic relations between ASEAN and the 
GCC.  According to Wilson, the market force and political development will continue to 
shape the nature of the economic relations between the two sides.
25
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b. Trade-highlighted Arguments 
Instead of focusing on economic dependency, some scholars choose to focus on the 
benefit gained from Thailand‘s trade with the GCC States.  Their argument is that trade 
largely defines Thailand‘s relationship with the Middle East, thus both the governments 
and private sectors must encourage trade and manufacturing for export to the Middle 
East.  The majority of scholars who believe that trade defines international relations 
between Thailand and the GCC States are government scholars, i.e. from the Ministry of 
Commerce.  An example of the their publication is The Promotion of Thai Products to 
the Middle East during Gulf War, produced by the Department of Export at the Ministry 
of Commerce of Thailand, to inform Thai manufacturers of opportunity of Thai goods in 
the Middle East countries during the Gulf war.
26
  Another example is The Prospect for 
the Expansion of Thailand's Trade and Investment with the Middle East Countries, 
written by the Department of Foreign Trade at the Ministry of Commerce; the report 
suggests trade opportunities in the Middle East market for Thai products.  Also in the 
report is the formation about demands as well as political and economic conditions of 
each Middle Eastern market; the book concludes by pointing out that support should be 
provided to the Thai manufacturers in terms of country information, trade profile and 
trade law in each of the Middle East country.
27
  
 
There are a few problems concerning the existing research that uses economic factors to 
explain Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States.  First, economic relations between the 
two regions are largely subjected to political conditions, both domestically and 
internationally. Even though most of the scholars in the previous studies have shown 
their awareness of the impact of political factors on economic relations, little has been 
incorporated into their discussion.  Therefore, without incorporating political factors into 
the analysis, an accurate explanation cannot be done.  Second, almost all these 
arguments ignore other factors, the environment, and actors, which have become 
influential in economic relations, including the emergence of the halal market in many 
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Southeast Asian countries, Islamic Diasporas, media and September 11, all of which 
have impacts on supply and demand of goods from both sides.  Third, the research 
projects that use ASEAN-GCC or Southeast Asian-Middle East trade as case studies are 
virtually too broad; this is because each ASEAN state is at a different level of economic 
development, as well as having a different degrees of dependency on oil.  Placing a 
generalised explanation on a group of states will only give a partial picture, while a more 
in-depth and accurate explanation can be obtained through a case-by-case analysis.   
 
In sum, there is some research that uses economic factors to explain Thailand‘s 
relationship with the GCC States.  Their explanations, however, cannot provide a whole 
picture of the relationship because it fails to take into consideration new agendas, 
including emerging actors, new environments and technology.  The nature of Middle 
East and Southeast Asian economies, which are closely linked to politics, necessitates 
the incorporation of political aspects into the analysis, thereby yielding a more holistic 
picture of the relations.  
 
5.4.2 Politically Based Arguments 
Politically based arguments involve diplomatic, political and security agendas.  A key 
argument is that the relations between the two interacting states have been forged by the 
need for protection and political benefit from superpowers.  In this research, relevant 
work includes that of Koch, who suggests that the close ties with the United States 
through regional security protection have drawn the GCC and Asian states together.
28
  
Goh Chok Tong argues in the same direction, pointing out that the relationship between 
Southeast Asian and GCC States has been long developed and has been strengthened by 
mutual benefits, economically and politically, particularly since they are strategically 
significant to each other.
29
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While recognising the influence of Western superpowers within the region, there is the 
need to recognise the influence of regional powers, including Japan, China, India and 
Singapore.  Some previous studies therefore proposed the regionalist perspective, 
suggesting that regional impacts define the nature of the relationship between Southeast 
Asian countries and the Middle East and the GCC States.  Regional impacts range from 
the role of regional powers to regional grouping.  Regional grouping wise, Parrenas 
suggests that there are political, economic and social benefits from the cooperation 
between GCC and ASEAN; this is because there are a lot of shared similarities and 
complementary political and economic bases.
30
  This is relevant to Thailand, because as 
part of ASEAN Thailand follows the trend of regional cooperation between ASEAN and 
the GCC States, where both sides see the benefit of joint political and economic projects.   
 
Examining institutional linkages has been proposed by several scholars as a mean to 
explore Thailand‘s relationship with the GCC States.  The proponents in this field 
suggest that membership in international organisations helps enable Thailand to develop 
greater relations with the GCC States and the Muslim world.  Jaran Maluleem suggests 
that the underlying reason for Thailand‘s membership with the Organisation of Islamic 
Conference (OIC) is due to the urge for Thailand to exert itself in the global Muslim 
state community.  According to Maluleem, being members has facilitated the 
relationship with the OIC members, including the GCC States through greater 
opportunities for jointed projects and meetings.
31
  
 
While the existing studies on political relations between Thailand and the GCC States 
reflect the authors‘ attempts to identify issues at stake and to demonstrate how relations 
are developed and maintained, the problem with these previous studies is that their 
contents are not directly relevant to the key questions of the research.  As noted, most of 
the studies relevant to Thailand‘s political relations with the GCC States are part of a 
greater geographically based study, particularly the Middle East-Asia, ASEAN-GCC 
studies; and there are very few literatures on the bilateral relations between individual 
ASEAN countries and the GCC States.  Collective studies do not provide in-depth 
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information, however, nor do they allow an accurate analysis.  The relationship between 
individual ASEAN countries with the GCC States, for example, must be analysed case-
by-case; this is because the factors that influence the bilateral relations of each ASEAN 
or GCC States are different; for example, Malaysia and Indonesia‘s political relations 
with the GCC States are partially influenced by Islam, while GCC States‘ relationship 
with Thailand and Philippines are traditionally influenced by the United States.   
 
In sum, the existing literatures that explore Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States 
using political factors are usually part of the greater discussion on greater geographical 
and group relations.  The weaknesses of the literature are that they are too broad.  
Observing the region per se cannot allow scholars to identify significant factors like 
Islam and the pressure of superpowers.  The study of an individual ASEAN country with 
the GCC States, a study that is until now very rare, will therefore be useful. 
 
5.5   Conceptualisation of Thai-GCC Non-State Relations  
While little research discusses the impact of state mechanisms to Thailand‘s relationship 
with the GCC States, there is more literature on the impact of non-states actors, agendas 
and Islam in the relations.  The key argument proposed by scholars in this field is that 
non-state actors and agendas are as significant as state actors; indeed, in the case of 
Thailand, these scholars suggest that the non-state mechanisms are the driving forces for 
greater state interactions.  Therefore, the analysis of Thailand‘s relations with the GCC 
States should begin through examining non-state mechanisms.  
 
5.5.1 People-to-people Relations 
Labour migration has been a vital source of revenue to the Thai economy.  With regard 
to Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States, labour migration is the early and very 
important agenda that preceded diplomatic relations between Thailand and the GCC 
States.  Researchers on Thai worker migrants to the Middle East argue that labour 
migration is a stimulant to Thailand‘s relationship with the GCC States.  Most of the 
research on Thai labour migration to the Middle East provides the information on 
procedures and protection for the Thai workers in the Middle East, particularly the GCC 
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States, as well as suggests the channels through which Thailand can cooperate with the 
GCC States to improve their welfare in the Middle East.  Much of this research has been 
conducted by scholars at the Ministry of Labour; for example, Rananantha describes the 
relationship between Thai labour migration to the Middle East and Thailand‘s economic 
stability.
32
  His argument is that worker migration has benefited Thailand in terms of 
revenue; at the same time, the government must strengthen its measures to protect these 
workers both pre-departure and in the host countries, which are largely the GCC States.   
 
Surarat and Srinontha narrate their first hand experience of supporting migrant workers 
from Thailand in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf war.
33
  Both authors suggest that the 
government should increase measures to support Thai workers in the Gulf, both through 
giving greater information to the workers, and through cooperating with Gulf States‘ 
authorities in providing protection for these workers.  In addition, they suggest that 
greater knowledge about the Gulf should be provided to Thai government officers whose 
work is relevant to the Middle East.  From the academic side, Chiengkul examines the 
nature of Thai workers in the Arab world, particularly the attitude of these workers and 
how the remittances are spent when the workers comes back.  Chiengkul argues that the 
measures should be developed to support these workers, not only when they are abroad, 
but also when they come back.
34
  
 
The studies of worker migration from Thailand to the Middle East faded from 
researchers‘ attention after the mid-1990s.  This is due to the drastic reduction of Thai 
workers being hired and having their working permits approved after the diplomatic 
strain between Thailand and Saudi Arabia, one of the most important hubs for Thai 
migrant workers.   
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5.5.2 Islam  
While the research on labour migration to the Gulf has been viewed as comparatively 
less relevant to the contemporary Thai-GCC States relations, the topic on Islamic 
connections between Thailand and the Gulf, and the greater part of the Muslim world 
continues to attract scholars.  Interactions among Muslims in Thailand and in the GCC 
States dated before formal interstate relations.  Hajj, the annual pilgrimage of Muslims, 
in particular, has drawn people of the two worlds together.  In one of his works focusing 
on Islam in Thailand, Scupin discusses the significance of hajj for the Thai Muslims.  He 
points out that throughout history, hajj has affected the socioeconomic status of Thai 
Muslims.  The improvements in transportation from Thailand to Mecca have enabled 
more Muslims to attend hajj with lower costs.
35
  His work has elucidated the historical 
part of the hajj in Thailand, which is considered to be one of the earliest interactions 
between the Thais and the Arabs in the contemporary period.  
 
In addition to hajj some scholars have attempted to explore the relationship between 
Muslims in Southeast Asia and in the Middle East.  One of the key scholars in this field 
is Fred Von der Mehden, who argues that there are different levels of relationship among 
the ASEAN countries with the Middle East.  He thinks that contrary to general 
speculation, Islamic connections play a marginal role in the preference in economic and 
political connections between ASEAN countries and the Middle East.  The non-Muslim 
countries like Thailand and Philippines are as much chosen as investment and economic 
destinations for Arabs as Malaysia and Indonesia.
36
 
 
Similar to Von der Mehden, Jaran Maluleem in The Pattern of Relationship between 
Thailand and the Muslim World explores the relationship between Thai Muslims and 
Muslims in the rest of the world.
37
  His methods include exploring attitudes of the Thai 
Muslims with Muslims in selected countries in the Middle East and South Asia.  His 
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arguments is that the Thai Muslims are well connected with the Muslims in the rest of 
the world; as it can be seen through dynamic movements of Muslims and Muslim 
organisations in Thailand against Palestinian cause, Salman Rushdie‘s Satanic Verses 
protest.
38
  Maluleem‘s survey on attitudes of Thai Muslims toward Muslims in the rest 
of the world reveals a combination of positive and negative attitudes.  His conclusion is 
that there are significant relations between Muslims in Thailand and in the rest of the 
world, particularly in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, with the Middle East playing 
an important role as key educational providers to Thai Muslims.
39
   
 
In sum, it is clear that there has been a comparatively fair amount of research done on 
Islam and labour migration from Thailand to the GCC States.  As noted, migration 
between Thailand and the Middle East has become less active.  However, the discussion 
about the role of the Islamic connection between Muslims in Thailand and the rest of the 
Muslim world is still active, indeed, even more active than in the past.  
 
In contemporary Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States, there have been several 
newly emerging issues which the previous studies do not cover, including transnational 
Islamic links, the international linkages among non-state actors and private sector 
associations and foundations.  Therefore, the survey reveals that additional research can 
be done to add to the field of non-state factors in Thai-GCC States relations.  
 
5.6   Bridging of State and Non-State Factors  
The previous discussions indicate that existing studies about Thailand‘s relationship 
with the GCC States are either solely state-centric or based on a non-state agenda.  This 
final discussion will identify literatures that observe the interactions between the state 
and non-state actors among these states.  While a few researchers have been interested in 
conducting research that examines dynamisms between state and non-state actors, there 
has been little research projects that reflect empirical research on the topic.  Even less to 
no existent is the research that examines the interactions between state and non-state 
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actors in South East Asian States, where states have traditionally been viewed as major 
players in international affairs.      
 
One of the most recent works that examine the role of state and non-state actors in world 
politics is the work of Smith et al.
40
   The authors examine and assess the nature of 
transnational violence and terrorism in Southeast Asia.  The authors attempt to insert 
nontraditional issues like transnational violence, into the study of Southeast Asian 
security.  Thailand was included into small parts of the discussions, under the topic of 
the linkage between Southern militant groups and the international terrorist network.  
Most of the authors tend to believe that there was not much relationship between the 
Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand and international terrorist groups.
41
  However, 
one of the authors, Zachary Abuza, notes that a military officer in Thailand claims that 
the Thai government believes that there have been ―countries in the Middle East provid 
[ing] training, education, and financial support for fundamentalist groups in the south [of 
Thailand].‖42 
 
McCargo, on the other hand, criticises the previous work in its attempt to link Thailand 
with Islamic violence and the global war on terror.  Specifically, McCargo was against 
the claim that Muslim insurgency in the south of Thailand is part of ―a pan-Southeast 
Asian network of radical Islamic violence.‖43  In McCargo‘s work, the involvement of 
Middle Eastern states has been reduced to a marginal level.  In his view, the Southern 
insurgency was primarily driven by domestic issues marked by conflicts among different 
elite, political and local groups; in addition, the conflict can be accounted by the urge to 
regain political rights and justice of the Malay Muslims in the southern provinces.
44
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In sum, there are very few empirical studies that bridge the state-centric and non-state 
agenda.   Most studies focus on the topics of transnational movements.  Such rarity 
reflects the need for further studies that bridge state-centric and multi-centric views 
together in order to understand the complexity of contemporary world politics in which 
there are more agendas. This requires applying combined tools for analysis on such 
topics as the nature of transnational Islamic associations and Thailand and networks of 
professional personnel between Thailand and the Middle East; both of these topics have 
an impact on non-state and state actors, particularly in terms of state security and the 
enhanced global Muslim ummah.  The literature survey has shown that so far that there 
has been no consideration of these topics.  
 
While the theoretical research on interactions between state and non-state actors 
emerged through postinternational concept in IR, the modest amount of empirical 
research has been conducted.  With the scarcity of existing research and relevant 
materials, it is important to design a research methodology that is suitable not only to the 
empirical and theoretical content of the research, but also with the way that the 
information can be obtained; such topics will be discussed in the next section on 
methodology.  
 
6. METHODOLOGY  
6.1   Methodology 
In conducting this research, a qualitative empirical research technique has been 
employed.  A quantitative method was ruled out as a choice due to the nature of the 
research that explores the development of state relations and relations among private 
sector associations. Considering the framework of the research approach, the qualitative 
method can yield a more descriptive nature that will allow greater flexibility to present 
the analytical outcomes which are expected to be less systemic than quantitative 
outcome.   
 
Methods wise, a combination of approaches has been used, including the use of semi-
structured interviews, participant observation, and historical analysis.  The choice of 
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multiple methods is based on a consideration of the way that information is kept and 
recorded, as well as the recent emergence of private sector associations at the time of 
research. As a result, a single method is not sufficient to bring enough materials for the 
analysis.  This is because Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States have just received 
more attention recently; thus there was a lack of written records on the topic from both 
the government and private sector.  It was not until recently that some Thai government 
agencies began to keep written records in computer format; prior to that the information 
and data needed for analysis was scattered around in different sources and some 
information was missing.  At the beginning of the research, therefore, it was difficult 
tracing where the hard copies of the records were kept; in the case that there was no 
written record, it was necessary to perform semi-structured interviews with relevant 
government staff.  In addition, the nature of relations that this research was interested in, 
i.e. the people-to-people relations between the two regions, is naturally not formally 
recorded.   
 
The other benefit of semi-structured interviews is the ability to capture the opinions and 
comments of the staff, which are insightful and valuable to the research.  Also, the 
relations between private sector associations and their counterparts in the Muslim world 
have just begun and they became active during the year when the research started, thus it 
was a good opportunity to directly observe it.  Checking the media coverage over 
historical events helped to obtain greater information, checked public opinion of the 
events, and balanced the data obtained from the interview and participant observation.   
 
With Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States being poorly recorded and computerised 
at the outset of the research, with the relations between private sector associations in 
Thailand and the Muslim world just taking off, the combined method is useful in that it 
increases the potential to gather the most information, thus enabling a more complete 
picture of Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States.  The next section will explain in 
detail how each approach was pursued while in the field. 
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6.1.1 Analytical procedure 
In order to analyse the data, the author divided the analysis into two main groups: state 
interactions and private sector associations.  The state-centric and non-state worlds were 
then examined alongside to see the way they interact, using historical data and data from 
interview and participant observation.  To analyse the nature of state relations, the author 
of this research looked at the development in three aspects: political, economic and 
social relations.  From the information obtained, a trend is developed to reflect 
contemporary development and project future relations.   
 
As for the trend on economic relations, the values of imports and exports and the 
percentage of oil purchased from the GCC States is combined with descriptive data 
gained from interview and media coverage.  Such data is significant in that it reflects 
dependency on and the motivation for greater interactions between Thailand and the 
GCC States. As for political trends, the agreements signed between Thailand and each 
GCC State, the availability of embassies and the frequency and content of state visits 
received as much attention as the result from the interviews; these data enable the author 
to project the picture of political relations and the longevity of such relations.  The trend 
in social relations helps identify the level of popular interaction, including the 
knowledge and perceptions among the Thais and the Arabs. The trend is constructed 
from looking at the number of GCC tourists coming to Thailand and the level of cultural 
and educational cooperation between Thailand and the GCC States. These activities 
contribute to bringing about a good understanding among each other.   
 
In the case of private sector association, the overall pictures and trend on the 
development of the organisations are constructed and analysed in the same way as the 
case of interstate relations.  However, most of the information obtained from examining 
private sector associations is from participant observation.  To construct the trend, the 
size of organisations, the funding sources, the activities organised, and the relations to 
the Thai government are taken into consideration; this is because these factors help 
reflect the development and the future of the organisation and their readiness to act as 
proxies for the government.   
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While putting together different kinds of data allowed the author of this research to 
create the trend in relations and enabled her to predict the future of Thailand‘s relations 
with the GCC States, putting together the trend in interstate relations and in the 
development in relations between the private sector associations with the GCC States 
enabled the author to answer the key research question over the possibility of private 
sector associations becoming the government‘s proxies in Thailand-GCC States relations.   
 
The case studies presented in this research are the two periods of Thai prime 
ministerships: Chuan Leekpai and Thaksin Chinnawatra.  The Chuan administration 
(1997-2001) is highlighted here because it is seen as the era when Thailand‘s relations 
with the Middle East and the Muslim world were well developed, while under the 
Thaksin‘s administration (2001-2006), trade promotion and the violence in the Muslim 
south of Thailand have made the Thai relationship with the Muslim world an interesting 
case study.   
 
A bit more elaboration should be given to the private sector associations selected as case 
studies.  The associations chosen here are private sector associations that operate in 
Thailand: the Thai Islamic Trade and Industrial Association (TITIA) and the World 
Assembly of Muslim Youths (WAMY).  The primary justification for selecting these 
two associations is based on the criteria that, first, the organisations are based in 
Thailand and widely accepted there; second, that they are transnational in nature; and 
third, that they are actively engaging with the Middle East and the Muslim World, of 
which GCC States are a part.  The two organisations in the case studies are associations 
that interact with their overseas counterparts although their oversea interactions are 
based on different issues.  WAMY‘s transnational interaction is largely based on its 
interaction with its headquarters and the WAMY office worldwide; while TITIA‘s 
transnational interaction is largely based on its relations with foreign organisations 
within the ICCI and the OIC member states.  Both associations link their members with 
Muslims outside Thailand. While these associations both promote the international 
Islamic network, they are at different levels and have differing focuses. The 
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transnational-ness of the two organisations will help to elucidate the ways in which the 
Thai state handles transnationalism in addition to having to handle non-state state actors.   
 
TITIA is a private sector association, based in Bangkok, which focuses largely on 
promoting trade between Thai Muslim entrepreneurs with their counterparts in the 
Muslim world.  WAMY is the Thai branch of the Saudi Arabian-headquartered 
organisation that focuses on the development of Muslim youths in Thailand. The 
underlying explanation for selecting the two associations as case studies is based on the 
need to highlight the relations between private sector associations of different natures in 
Thailand and the Thai government.  This is because the author believes that the nature of 
dependency and the willingness to interact with the government differ between local 
private sector associations and foreign private sector associations.  Lumping local and 
foreign private sector associations as the same will not provide a precise result on the 
relations between private sector associations and the government, this is because the 
author fails to recognise if the differences in the organisations define the nature of the 
relations.   
 
Despite being relevant to the Muslim world and having strong connections with 
Muslims in Thailand, TITIA and WAMY are different in terms of status within Thailand, 
their overall goals, their relationships with the government, and their implication to 
Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States.  While greater details on each association will 
be provided in the latter part of the thesis, it is important to provide a brief overview of 
the associations here to help justify why they were chosen.   
 
In terms of status, TITIA is recognised as a local private sector association.  More 
specifically, it is a trade association registered according to the Trade Association Act 
B.E. 2509 (1966).  As local private sector association, TITIA is subjected to less 
scrutiny from the government and its focus on national security; this is because it is 
perceived to conform to the regulations required by the Act.  TITIA‘s goal is trade-
oriented, with an aim to draw Muslim entrepreneurs in Thailand to interact with 
entrepreneurs in the Muslim world in different kinds of trade.  Its goals and activities 
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have drawn cooperation from overseas counterparts and from private sector associations 
in Thailand; a lot of them are larger, long established private sector associations like the 
Thai Chamber of Commerce.   
 
As for WAMY, its status is recognised as foreign private sector association that operates 
in Thailand.  Its existence is, however, not formally recognised by the government as the 
organisation has not been successful in the application process set forth by the Rule of 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare on the Entry of Foreign Private Organisations 
to Operate in Thailand B.E 2541 (1998).
45
  The government requires that a registering 
foreign organisation has to submit the document that demonstrates the legitimacy of the 
headquarters in its establishment.  WAMY headquarters could not provide the document 
in support of WAMY Thailand; this is because in Saudi Arabia, an organisation is 
considered de jure legitimate if it is established or supported by the Royal Family, thus 
there is no document of such nature, unlike organisations in the West, which the state 
regularly provides the document for the registered organisation.
46
  With this regard, 
WAMY Thailand has no document to provide, and so it is not officially registered.  
Perhaps the other factor that can explain why WAMY has not been able to register is 
because of distrust from the government‘s part.  WAMY is considered by some 
government offices as a radical Muslim organisation; therefore, the decision to allow it 
to be registered has been delayed.  Even though its existence has not been approved 
legally, WAMY has been widely accepted in Thailand at popular level and by several 
government offices.  This can be seen by its support for the government‘s sub-units in 
several official functions, e.g. as interpreters for during state visits of Arab leaders and 
as staff of the World Scout Camp.
47
 In addition, WAMY has been able to attract much 
support from Thai Muslims throughout Thailand.  
 
Being a foreign private sector association, WAMY should have been bound by different 
legal bodies than as a local private sector association; the most relevant legal body is the 
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noted Rule of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare on the Entry of Foreign Private 
Organisation to Operate in Thailand B.E 2541 (1998).
48
  It is subjected to greater 
scrutiny due to concerns over national security.  WAMY‘s focus is Muslim youth 
development and its additional activities are to provide support for local Muslim NGOs 
in Thailand.  Tied with the headquarters in Saudi Arabia, WAMY receives full support 
and funding, thus, making it comparatively more financially independent than TITIA.  
Asides from relations with its headquarters, WAMY Thailand has developed strong 
relations with several domestic Muslim organisations.  Not many of these organisations 
are closely connected with the government.   
 
Should there be the need for the government to interact with private sector associations; 
local private sector associations like TITIA will be selected first.  This is because the 
government is more familiar with the organisations and its network; and because TITIA 
is legally recognised as a trade association, which is perceived as being more appropriate 
to interact with.  On TITIA‘s part, the trade network will be enhanced by support from 
the government; when combined with the fact that TITIA is less financially independent, 
and considering the network it has with the Thai Chamber of Commerce, it will be more 
willing to develop relations with the government.   
 
While it may be possible to examine the role of bigger trade association that are 
involved with Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States, the rationale for choosing 
TITIA and WAMY is based on the consideration on identity and expertise, which are 
significant factors TITIA and WAMY are at more advantageous than other associations.  
While the Thai Chamber of Commerce has the section and staff that interacts with the 
GCC States, the overall objectives and focus of the organizations are geographically 
broad.  In addition, the Thai Chamber of Commerce does not possess Muslim identity, 
in-depth knowledge and connection with the GCC States as much as TITIA and WAMY.  
The latter organizations solely focus on the Muslim world and their Muslim identity and 
knowledge have made their organizational profile fit suitable with the research project.  
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The role of the Thai Chamber of Commerce and other non-Muslim private sector 
associations in Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States will be worth examining, but 
doing so can be another research on its own.    
 
6.2   Data collection  
6.2.1 Semi-structured interview 
There are two key reasons why semi-structured interview had been selected as one of the 
data collection techniques.  The first reason is a lack of documents or written records on 
the relations between Thailand and the GCC States, unlike in the case of Thailand‘s 
relations with the Western hemisphere where written records on the nature of relations 
have usually been kept.  With the lack of written records, there is a need to rely on the 
oral accounts of people who used to be or have been involved with Thailand-GCC States 
relations.  Since there have already been several linkages between Thailand‘s relations 
with the GCC States, people who are involved in the relations scatter around according 
to the nature of their linkage; in order to assure that the entire picture of the relations is 
obtained, it is necessary to arrange interviews with people from a wide range of 
profession and state/non-state spheres.  
 
The second reason for interviewing a wide range of people is due to the need to balance 
opinions and points of view.  Concentrating the interview with only certain groups of 
people can mislead the information, and omitting certain groups of interviewees, i.e. 
members of the private sector associations may mean omitting important pieces of 
information which could be valuable to the analysis.  In addition, without diversifying 
interviewees, there is the risk of an inaccurate account; this is because of the significance 
of representation, where most staff would like to present their organisations in positive 
ways.  For example, government staff are less likely to mention any accounts that 
discredit their organisations due to organisational pressure and sense of belonging.  The 
third reason for diversifying sources of interviewees is due to the need to highlight the 
areas in which interviewees do feel comfortable and more at ease answering questions.  
While government and private sector staff are keener to provide facts and points of view 
based on their involvement, academics are more at ease in providing academically 
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leaning points of view and are capable of analysing and criticising the nature of relations 
more freely.   
 
Interviews have been conducted with 20 people from both the state and non-state 
spheres.  Interviewees from the state sphere are diplomats from Thailand‘s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, political and economic analysts from the embassies of the GCC States 
in Bangkok, and scholars from Thailand‘s leading universities—Thammasat University 
and Chulalongkorn University.  Interviewees from the non-state sphere are executive 
members and staffs from the two private sector associations used as case studies—
TITIA and WAMY. Detailed information on the interviewees can be seen below: 
 
Detailed information of interviewees  
State Realm 
 Dr. Jaran Maluleem, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Political 
Sciences, Thammmasat University, Bangkok, Thailand. 
 Eight officers at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Thai Government.  
 Two scholars at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand. 
 Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, Former Foreign Minister of Thailand. 
 His Excellency the Ambassador of UAE at the UAE Embassy, Thailand.  
 Two political analysts at the Qatar Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand  
 Letter answering interview question from the Saudi Charge d‘affair at the Saudi 
Embassy in Bangkok.  
 
Non-State Realm 
 Mr. Anirut Smutkojorn, President to the Thai Islamic Trade and Industrial 
Association 
 One staff from the Thai Islamic Trade and Industrial Association 
 Two staff from the World Assembly of Muslim Youths (WAMY) 
 Mr. Nitipoom Naowarat, leading journalist on foreign affairs in Thai Rath 
Newspaper.  
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It can be seen that the number of interviewees from the state realm is larger than that 
from the non-state realm.  This is because of the availability of the staff in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and in the embassies of the GCC States in Thailand; it was much 
easier to locate staff from these organisations.  In addition, considering that state sphere 
in focus covers greater number of organisations compared to the non-state sphere that 
covers only two private sector associations under study, it is justified to see that the 
number of interviewees in the state sphere is larger. Selection of interviewees is based 
on their involvement in Thailand‘s relations with the GCC StatesGCC States, as well as 
their expertise in the areas.  Selection is done through direct contact with the officials 
within relevant organisations and then through the snowball-referring scheme.   
 
Three important limitations should be noted here regarding the interviews.  One is that 
most of the government officials, particularly those from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
prefer their names to be undisclosed.  Therefore, this research seeks to reserve their 
rights and does not identify them. In addition, some staff in private sector associations 
were reluctant to give an interview; this is partly due to distrust of staff toward outsiders.  
The last limitation was the time constraints of interviewees due to their position and 
responsibility, making it difficult for interviewees to answer all of the interview 
questions.  It was therefore necessary for the author to be selective in asking questions, 
restricting them to their relevance to the interviewees.  The interviewees‘ responses were 
then used in connection with the responses from other interviews to create a larger 
picture.  
 
The questions used to interview were not similar, and were designed to suit the 
interviewees‘ position and responsibility, as well as their expertise and past experience.  
The questions were intended to be open-ended, giving the interviewees the highest 
possibilities to reply. Key questions include: 
 The nature of their organisations (i.e. governmental units, private sectors 
associations), and their relations with the GCC States and other domestic 
organisations 
 Their views over the nature of Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States, 
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 The nature of Thailand‘s foreign policy toward the GCC States and their 
comment, 
 The future of Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States,  
 The factors that influence the relations between Thailand and the GCC States, 
 The impact of GCC policy on the relations, Thailand‘s relations to the Muslim 
world and its impact on Thai-GCC States relations 
 The comment on the role of private sector associations in international relations 
 
In conclusion, the semi-structured interviews allow the author to see the overall image of 
Thai-GCC States relations through firsthand experience of those involved.  This method 
proved particularly useful because as there is not much written information on the 
subject some information could only be gained through interview. 
 
6.2.2 Surveys of Newspapers, Government Records and Speeches 
The historical analysis was conducted in this research through the data gathered from 
newspaper articles, government documents and publications.   The newspapers chosen to 
study here were Thailand‘s daily English newspapers, the Bangkok Post and the Nation. 
Additional information which reflects attitudes and the structure of relations was also 
obtained from Thai newspapers, where selection was based on ranking of popularity.  
Therefore, Thairath, Daily News and Matichon, ranked on the top. Popularity of these 
newspapers reflects the better news quality and a greater chance of accuracy. In 
Thailand, most newspapers receive news regarding foreign policy and relations directly 
from the Department of Information in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which regularly 
holds press conferences on Thailand‘s foreign relations; therefore, newspapers provide a 
good reflection of government discourse. 
 
Analysing the news content is an important tool to reveal the effects of states, and the 
outcomes of state interaction. As one learns that the state actor is an abstract and 
unobservable phenomenon, however, the effect of the state actor can be seen through the 
mechanisms being driven by such structure including the government‘s policies and 
actions. Media is the tool that reveals the state‘s affects, i.e. the result of the interaction 
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and the state‘s attitude. In addition, frequency of certain topics in the newspaper can 
reflect two main factors. First, the frequency of the news can show the level of 
interactions as a great deal of significant interactions will appear more often in news; 
thus the observation of the frequency of certain news over time can show the level of 
interaction. Second, the frequency of the news can show the level of popularity, interest, 
and significance; after all, newspapers try to sell news that people would like to know 
more and news that benefits the country. The frequency of certain terms can reveal 
prevailing attitudes, the environment in which states interact, and thus will help define 
political culture states are embedded.  
 
In this research, the author divided news into three groups; the division corresponded to 
the year each foreign minister stayed in the office. The analysis was done through 
looking at the frequency of news, and certain terms, which highlighted significance. 
Each group will reveal the level of interaction between Thailand and the Gulf, the issues 
of interest and the perception and feeling Thailand has had towards the Gulf States. 
Comparing across three groups of news help reveal the trends, including state‘s attention, 
prevailing identity, interest and perception.  
 
In addition to newspapers, this research also sought to gather information from 
government publications and official gazettes, including Thailand‘s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Ministry of Commerce‘s publication.  In Thailand, several government 
agencies produce and circulate journals and magazines to promote their work and inform 
staff.  In this research the Foreign Ministry of Thailand‘s Buakaew Magazine, which is 
issued fortnightly, was examined.   Buakaew is generally distributed to Thailand‘s Royal 
Embassy worldwide, as well as circulated within the Foreign Ministry. Generally the 
magazine provides information about the foreign ministry‘s activities and developments 
in international relations between Thailand and other states; therefore information about 
state visits, agreement signings and the launching of new cooperation was obtainable.  
The magazine was very useful in exploring activities the occurred between Thailand and 
the GCC States.   
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Speech and statements delivered by key governmental figures are the other source for 
analysis. Much of international relations theory can be reflected through the statements, 
though checking whether the administrations actually behaved in the way they claimed 
is challenging and also worth theoretical analysis. Both governmental discourses and 
behaviours were checked to see how they corresponded to international theories.  
 
6.2.3 Participant Observation 
Participant observation was another method used in this research to obtain information 
for analysis.  As noted, while information on the role of the governments and 
international organisations can be obtained through written sources like newspapers, the 
information regarding the role of private organisations in Thailand rarely appears in 
written sources.  Part of the reason is that some associations have not become well 
known and their activities are held rather exclusively which does not attract much 
attention from journalists and key governmental agencies. Therefore, interview and 
participant observation in private sector associations helped obtaining some information.  
The author therefore has interviewed the staff of these organisations and asked for 
permission to participate in the activities of selected associations. During the period of 
June-September 2007, the Thai Islamic Trade and Industrial Association (TITIA) was 
preparing to host the 2
nd
 International Islamic Economic, Cultural and Tourism 
Conference and the World of Muslims Exhibition 2007 with other government and 
public agencies in Thailand. The author was granted permission from the President of 
TITIA to participate in a TITIA meeting and preparation for the event, as well as to 
observe the organisation and management within the organisation.  
 
Participant observation is a useful method for this research in that in addition to 
revealing the nature of the local private organisations, which do not appear much on 
written data, it provides an insight into relations between that organisation and the 
government and private organisations it interacts with.  Participant observation also 
allowed the author to meet additional targeted interviewers, including government 
representatives, the local private organisations staff, and the overseas transnational 
organisation members.  
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The conduct of participant observation in this research helped construct a more complete 
picture of the non-state actor world, which once more provides a unique aspect to the 
research.  This is because not only there were very few events organised by the private 
sector associations prior to this research, but also few researchers had been able to 
participate and able to learn more about the process and players within the events.  The 
elements of trust, familiarity and connections are needed for the researcher to be able to 
obtain more insight and to participate in the exclusive events.  Fortunately, in the case of 
TITIA, the author of this research has been familiar with the work of TITIA since 2003 
during a Ministry of Foreign Affairs internship; therefore, it was not difficult to become 
part of the preparation teams, to be able to attend almost all meetings and to interview 
relevant individuals involving in the events.  The existing familiarity with the committee 
and staff had helped facilitate the participant observation and as a result, the information 
gained from the observation and the participation is more detailed, more insightful and 
more accurate.    
 
While it is clear that the novelty and lack of information on the Muslim-related private 
sector in Thailand have made other methods difficult, participant observation fills in the 
gap.  In addition to filling the gap that other methods fail to achieve, the conduct of 
participant observation has been useful in several ways.  The participant observation in 
this research is guaranteed to provide more information than many other sources; this is 
due to the author‘s ability to develop trust and support from the organisations.  Thus 
information presented in the research is up-to-date and accurate and it facilitates further 
analysis.  
 
6.3  The Parameters of the Study  
6.3.1 Scope and Limits 
As discussed, this research aims to explore the nature of Thailand‘s relations with the 
GCC States through examining the role of private sector associations in engaging in the 
interactions between the two sides.  There are a few limitations that need to be clarified 
beforehand.   
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While the research discusses the role of non-state actors, one cannot deny the wide range 
of non-state actors that exist in Thailand.  In order to set limits or scopes of the research 
private sector associations are the only one type of non-state actors that will be focused 
on.  This is because the Muslim private sector associations in Thailand have shown an 
interesting development in terms of their relations with the GCC States and the Muslim 
world.  The nature of the scope and limit of the research may have shifted to include a 
case study of Thai-Arab multinational companies and how it affects Thailand‘s relations 
with the GCC States had there been an increase in the interactions between the 
multinational companies of the two countries.   
 
While the limitation of the case study might have been changed had there been more 
dynamism between Thai-Arab multinational companies, the decision to limit the 
argument to the question of task-sharing between state and private sector associations 
has been clear: state-centric view is insufficient, and there is the need to find additional 
theories to support it.  Making the state irrelevant to this research is not the task that this 
research aims to achieve.  It is naturally undeniable that states reserve most of the right 
in managing security and foreign affairs, the question regarding the intervention of non-
state actors should be posed regarding the involvement not the change in authority.  
Thus the author‘s explanation and analysis is to demonstrate the nature and capacity of 
private sector associations in Thailand, and to suggest that their role may increase to a 
sharing task with states.  These associations will complement the role of states in 
international interactions with some parts of the world, where states find limits in shared 
knowledge, identities or norms. In other words, non-state actors can act as proxies where 
the government finds limits in further developing relations; those limits can include 
political conflict or identity issues.  
 
While there are several prominent global political incidents that took place during the 
period under study, the author intends to limit the scope of the research by refraining 
from discussing in great detail some of the incidents took place under the period of study 
including 9/11 incident and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  While these incidents 
clearly affected the relations between Thailand and the GCC States, in-depth discussion 
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on these topics may divert the focus of the research topics, which largely compares the 
nature of state relations and private sector associations in Thai-GCC States relations, and 
will add to the length of the research.   
 
6.3.2 Timeframe 
The period between 1997 and 2006, which is being focused in this research covers three 
terms of administration.
49
  The period between 1997 and 2001 the government was run 
by Chuan Leekpai‘s administration; and between 2001 and 2006 by Thaksin 
Chinnawatra‘s administration.  Thaksin‘s administration last for one term and one year 
prior to coup d‘etate took him out of power.  Some discussions may be made in the 
period following the 2006 coup d‘etat, where the legacy of the Thaksin‘s government 
still played an important role in Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States.  There are 
different agenda within the three different administrations, as can be seen through the 
later-discussed policy statements, statements addressed in key events and press releases. 
Foreign policy, which is partly derived from domestic politics, differs in focus and thus 
result in the way Thailand portray herself and behaves in international stage.  
 
The period under the two administrations is significant in Thailand‘s relations with the 
GCC States for several reasons. One is that the incidents that took place within these two 
administrations had some impact to Thailand‘s relationship with the GCC States, these 
include the Asian Economic crisis, Thailand‘s being granted as OIC observing member, 
9/11 incident, and the unrest in Southern Thailand.  The other reason is that, under 
Chuan, the relations with the GCC States were considered to have progressed more than 
before; and that the government agencies became more aware of the significance of the 
GCC States and the Middle East region.  Thus one can consider this period to be one of 
the golden ages for Thai-GCC States relations.  Under Thaksin‘s administration, tension 
between the government and Muslims in the south placed a challenge between Thailand 
and the Muslim world.  The position of Thailand in the Arab world and in the GCC 
States, as well as the government‘s attitude towards the region was different from the 
previous government.  Therefore, the content of the relations, as well as domestic 
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politics during the two administrations help reveal the nature of state relations, and to 
see state-centric mechanisms within this relations which had been perceived and 
implemented differently.    
 
It is also important to recognise foreign ministers under these particular administrations. 
Under Chuan, whose administration lasted four years, the foreign ministry was under 
Surin Pitsuwan. Under Thaksin, who won general election twice, thus had two sets of 
cabinets; in the first cabinet, Surakiat Satianrathai was foreign minister while in the later 
cabinet, the position was handed to Kantithee Supamonkol.  
 
7. THE ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY 
This research is divided into three parts and six chapters.  Part one consists of a 
theoretical and literature review.  Part two discusses the state-centric realm, where 
nature and issues within state-to-state relations, including the affect of transnationalism, 
globalism and non-state actors on state, will be examined.  In this part, theoretical 
concepts including state-centric realism, the role of transnationalism, globalisation, and 
constructivism on state will be used to examine the Thai state and how it resists the force 
of the globalised world.  The third section is the non-state and transnational actors‘ 
realm.  Attention will be devoted to the development and role of non-state actors within 
Thailand, as well as the potential of the private sector associations as the complementing 
or undermining the existence of states.  In this part, a case study will be provided to 
demonstrate the influence of the non-state actor on the Thai state, and how the state 
responds to the organisation. The outcome of the two latter parts will allow us to revisit 
the theoretical concepts proposed in the first part, and justify how useful and practical 
the concepts are. Even more significantly, the outcome of the second and third parts will 
help us to be able to understand the nature of Thailand‘s relationship with the GCC 
States through a non-state centric approach, broadening the understanding of 
international relations in this region.  
 
This introduction provides general information on the rationale and objectives, the 
methodology, the limits and the significance of the research; it also provides the results 
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of literature review on topics relevant to Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States.  
Chapter one provides an overview of theoretical concepts and models that are significant 
to the examination of Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States; it also identifies the 
direction of the theoretical debate in this research.  Chapter two provides a descriptive 
background of Thailand‘s relationship with the Gulf States and the Arab world prior to 
the period under study. Chapters three and four provide the empirical examination on the 
state-centric realm, where they explain the nature of the Chuan and Thaksin 
administrations, as well as provide the analysis on the impacts of transnational and non-
state actors on the Thai state under these two prime ministerships. Comparisons and 
analysis will be made based on these two chapters over how each government sought to 
resist those impacts and maintain its existence. 
 
Chapter five and six discuss the development of private sector associations in Thailand 
and the potential for them to be more involved in Thailand-GCC States relations.  
Empirical study of the private sector associations, with special attention given to the 
Thai Islamic Trade and Industrial Association (TITIA) is examined. Chapter five 
provides a detailed examination of the development of TITIA and other non-state actors 
relevant to Thailand‘s relationship with the GCC States and the Muslim world, analysis 
on the capacity of these organisations will be discussed. Chapter six provides an 
examination and analysis of the capacity of WAMY through its role as a key host in the 
2
nd
 International Islamic Economic, Cultural and Tourism Conference and The World of 
Muslims Exhibition 2007 in Bangkok.  Ultimately the conclusion provides the overall 
picture of the research as well as recommendations for further study.  
 
8. CONCLUSION 
The main aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the research, whose rationale 
originated from the urge to explore in depth the relations between Thailand and the GCC 
States.  While the GCC States have increasingly become more significant to Thailand, 
particularly in terms of trade, tourism and political alliances on the international stage, 
the development and contemporary nature of relations has been understudied.  Thus the 
aim of the research is to bring more attention to such relations, with the focus on the role 
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of state and non-state actors involving in the process.  The key research question in this 
research is whether there is a possibility that the Muslim-related private sector 
associations, who are more flexible in their organisational structure and share Islamic 
identity with the GCC States, can become more involved in Thailand‘s relations with the 
GCC States.  With such key question the objectives and hypothesis have been set forth 
to direct the research process.   
 
A survey of literature discussed in this chapter indicates the rarity of what is available 
directly on the topic of Thailand‘s relationship with the GCC States.  The available 
literature relevant to Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States do not provide the in-
depth study about the topic, for most of them are part of a greater geographical analysis.  
What they provide is still insufficient for the understanding of international relations; 
they do not provide mechanisms for the understanding of contextual Thai-GCC States 
relations. In addition, in the study of contemporary world politics, it is crucial to apply 
both state-centric and non-state approaches to the analysis.  This particularly applies to 
the observation of the relationship between Thailand and the GCC States because while 
the Thai state claims an almost monopolistic authority to administer international 
relations with the GCC States, Islam and people-to-people relations can be seen as 
preceding state relations and sometimes helping to define the nature of government 
relations.  
 
In order to conduct the research, qualitative methodology has been employed.  
Combined research methods, including semi-structured interviews, historical analysis, 
and participant observation, were considered best suited in light of the nature of 
Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States, which are rather recent; thus there has not 
been much written record and computerised data.   
 
Choosing a suitable timeframe and limits was crucial in managing and controlling the 
research project.  The timeframe chosen was the period between 1997 and 2006, 
covering three administrations and two prime ministers.  The limit of the research is to 
explore the potential involvement of private sector associations in international relations 
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between Thailand and the GCC States; it does not claim that non-state actors will 
replace traditional state agencies; rather it provides alternative picture of how future 
Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States will be if the state and non-state actors share 
tasks. 
 
Considering the rationale for the research, that the field of Thailand‘s relations with the 
GCC States in the contemporary has been understudied, the contribution of this research 
can be seen in many aspects.  With regards to the project design and case study, 
choosing Thailand as a case study, as well as choosing to focus on the role of non-state 
actors in international relations provides a good framework for the future research about 
modern international relations among small states.  In addition, this research focuses on 
non-state actors and provides an interesting case study for the further research as the 
development of civil society in Southeast Asian states is rather recent. In terms of the 
theoretical framework, this research provides an alternative to traditional IR theories by 
combining state-centric, pluralism and postinternationalism, with the focus of non-state 
actors.  Method wise, although the examination of the bifurcated world has been 
proposed before, it is rare that it has been tested by applying it to real cases.  Thus, the 
uniqueness in terms of case study selection, the concepts used, and the methods, as noted, 
will provide an inspiration for further research projects and contribute to the field.   
 
The next chapter will provide the conceptual context for the current scholarship.  It will 
help identify the contribution of this research and to locate it within the intellectual 
context.   
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CHAPTER 1 
CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to identify relevant theoretical concepts needed to understand 
the nature of Thailand-GCC States relations.  In addition, it seeks to create a proper 
model equipped with theoretical framework that facilitates the understanding of the 
relations, based on the empirical findings.  Choosing relevant theories that could help 
understand the empirical findings is a challenging task.  This chapter seeks to explore 
the two realms of theories, the state-centric and pluralist views. The state-centric view is 
useful to understand the inter-state relations; it also yields a better understanding of the 
resilience of the state in the contemporary world. 
 
This chapter seeks to explain the key concepts used in this research, particularly state-
centric, pluralist and postinternational views.  It also includes additional theoretical 
concepts that should be taken into consideration when examining international relations: 
constructivism, global context, and the role of individuals.  Then the author introduces 
the work of James Rosenau, whose proposals and models will be employed to develop 
this research‘s theoretical framework and model.  The last part of the section briefly 
explains how the models will be incorporated into the empirical study of Thai-GCC 
States relations, and between the GCC States and private sector associations in Thailand.   
 
2. RELEVANT IR THEORIES AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1   State-Centric Realm 
2.1.1 State-Centric Approach 
a. Definition and Explanation 
At the outset, it is important to provide a definition for the term state being discussed 
here.  According to Owen, there are two meanings that define state.  The first meaning 
refers to ―sovereign political entities,‖50 and the second meaning refers to the ―set of 
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institutions and practices which combines administrative, judicial, rule-making and 
coercive powers.‖51  This research seeks to define state, using the combination of the 
two meanings of state suggested by Owen.  Thus a state is a ―sovereign political entities 
within which exist administrative, judicial, and coercive power.‖  Placing states as the 
core analytical part has been a traditional practice in conventional international relations 
study.  A state-centric view had been developed alongside the establishment of the 
contemporary ―state‖ concept and the recognised significance of sovereignty, with the 
signing of the Treaty of Westphalia.  According to Garnett, ―Westphalia has provided 
the basic paradigm for understanding the international politics for three hundred and 
fifty years.‖52   
 
As noted by Owen, the notion of sovereignty has been considered a crucial component 
of the understanding of state.  Willetts soundly defines sovereignty that it is ―the 
condition of a state being free from any higher legal authority.  It is related to, but 
distinct from the condition of a government being free from any external political 
constraints.‖53  To other scholars54 the significance of ―sovereignty‖ is reflected in their 
discussions on the role of states and state-centric approach for the understanding of 
international politics.  One may argue, however, that the recognition of the role of state 
predates Westphalia.  This is because prior to such phenomena there exists already a 
state-like community namely empire and polity as can be seen through Thucydides‘ 
Peloponesian War, where much attention has been given to the nature of state and inter-
state relations. 
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b. The Nature of a State-Centric Approach 
In a state-centric view, states are viewed as the prime actors within the international 
system, thus outcomes and international relations phenomena are viewed as the results 
of state-to-state interactions.  Proponents of state-centric concepts perceive that the 
sources of state power come both from material factors, i.e. forces, and economic 
resources.  A state‘s power can be measured through its ability to acquire military 
capability, economic interests, loyalty from their citizens, and the ability to influence the 
outcome of international relations.  Non-state actors are placed in secondary stances; this 
is because their roles are largely defined by the environment set by states.
55
  With states 
playing the central role in the international system, the core agendas are highly state-
related; thus, the agenda circle around the survival of states, particularly security and 
diplomacy.  
 
While several IR theories focus on state as main source of argument, leading them to be 
considered as state-centric, realism demonstrates well the nature of state-centric view.  It 
is important to recognise, however, that realism cannot be directly translated into state-
centrism.  Realism‘s general tenets include the claims that 1) states are the principal 
actors within international system, and that they are rational actors;
56
 2) security and 
foreign relations are perceived as vital factors for states‘ survival, thus making diplomats 
and military key personnel within international interactions;
57
 3) states struggle to 
maximise and safeguard their security and national interests; and 4) other aspects 
additional to security and foreign policy are considered to be the external environment 
where states interact, thus, are placed secondary to the core of realism.
58
 
 
To Garnett, the nature of sovereignty provides three paradigms for the understanding of 
international relations, including ―the sovereign equality of the member states under 
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international law, the significance of power and interest as guides to state policy, and the 
comparative nature of the political arena in which the balance of power is the major 
regulating mechanism.‖59  These paradigms provide a conceptual foundation for the 
state-centric approach, enabling scholars wishing to understand inter-state relations to 
treat all sovereign states as equal, and direct that the focus of the study should be power 
and interest, as they are at the core of states‘ activities.  While sovereign equality should 
be treated the same, the power each state has is not, therefore, maintaining security and 
negotiating for national interests is the nature of state interactions.  Such characteristic of 
state-centric can be summarised through Halliday‘s explanation that it is a focus on 
―actions of states‖ and on ways in which they are ―able to dominate and control relations 
between different societies.‖  Therefore, a ―state-centric approach allowed for the 
discussion of war, diplomacy, international agreements…‖60 
 
c. Proponents 
In championing the state-centric view, proponents point out that states, which are the 
core analytical factors, have endured changes in international politics.  Thus the 
mechanism used to explain such enduring units is therefore always needed, making it 
resilient.  Realism, for example, has been a useful tool for the understanding of 
international politics throughout history; it has never been considered obsolete.  Pro 
state-centric scholars point out the need to use realism to explain wars and conflicts, 
which even though decrease in number, have never disappeared.  
 
So far, there is no other alternative proved as resilient as states, even with changes 
brought by globalisation.  To Krasner, ―there is no evidence that globalisation has 
systematically undermined state control or led to the homogenisation of policies and 
structures.‖61  Denying the resilience of state is a rare phenomenon.  In 1970, Keohane 
and Nye, who had sought alternative actors to states and suggested the emerging 
significance of transnational relations and the non-state actors, predicted that the role of 
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states as key actors in world politics might be eroded and undermined by non-state 
actors.
62
  Two decades later the two scholars admitted that states had been more resilient 
than they expected; thus, instead of ignoring them and finding alternatives to them, ones 
should incorporate states into the attempt in understanding international politics.
63
 
 
A state-centric view is therefore necessary as long as states exist.  The retreat of states, 
which would shake the analytical tools as well, has so far been less likely.  The 
proponents of the state-centric view recognise this fact, and use the resilience of state as 
the key argument to support their view: if state is resilient, so will be state apparatuses 
used to examine state relations. 
 
d. Criticisms  
The criticisms over the insufficiency of the state-centric view are not new. Criticisms of 
the view come from several scholars.  According to Halliday, a state-centric view alone 
might not be able to provide sufficient explanation to the international politics.
 64
  This is 
because the state-centric approach may fail to capture the significance of non-state 
actors and their international interactions, both among themselves and with states, that 
maybe significant to the understanding of world politics.
65
  
 
Willet points out that the problem of the state-centric approach lies in the way that the 
―state‖ is being defined.66  States can be thought of as a legal person, country, or the 
government apparatus.  In choosing state-centric as a concept to explain IR phenomenon, 
one has to be clear which definition of state will fit with the nature of the analysis.  If 
scholars fail to define the concept of state that they want to focus on, the analysis can be 
too broad and does not provide sufficient explanation.  Lacking sensitivity to the size, 
power and economic resources from one country to the other is also another challenging 
issue of the state-centric view.  Although sovereign states are bound by international law 
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to be equal, in reality international politics are constrained by difference in military 
capability and economic power.   
 
Several authors including Beeson and Strange soundly point out that studying the 
authority, rather than sovereignty, which is one of the highlight of state-centrism, 
provides a more useful framework for understanding international relations in which he 
believes actors consist of more than just states, and these actors increasingly determine 
the political and economic outcomes of the systems.
67
  The question of authority versus 
sovereignty, which has been widely discussed in the contemporary international politics, 
suggests the constraint in that sovereignty is not the only factor that affects the system 
but also the authority that can influence the outcome of the system.  Unlike sovereignty, 
the sources of authority in international politics are broader, and include different actors, 
including multinational companies, international organisations, and social groups.  Thus 
a state-centric focus on sovereignty is not broad enough to cover contemporary 
international politics.  
 
The criticism from the pluralist school is that the state-centric view excludes other 
components of international relations, i.e. non-state actors, international organisations 
and individuals.  It does not have the sufficient mechanism to understand new actors and 
issues that recently became significant in contemporary international relations, including 
issues on environment, technology, human rights, organised crime and terrorism. 
 
As early as the 1940s, David Mitrany, the founder of functionalist theory, accounted that 
focusing solely on international politics--diplomacy, power and security--prevents states 
from benefiting from functional cooperation.  For Mitrany, other functional agendas are 
equally important with the political agenda.  Prioritising the political agenda prevents 
states from effectively cooperating on other agendas which can potentially spill over to 
improve political relations.   
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Liberal transnationalists like Keohane and Nye see the obsoleteness of the state-centric 
view in that it excludes non-state and transnational actors.
68
  These actors have 
increasingly become significant, and can potentially determine the outcome of 
contemporary international relations, thus they should be incorporated into an 
understanding of world politics.  Skjelsbaek (1972) argues in the same direction that in 
the contemporary world, a state-centric view cannot explain all aspects of international 
politics; states find themselves having limited ability to penetrate and manage some 
fields while non-state agencies can fare better and have as much or even more influence 
over international politics.
69
  Constructivists, on the other hand, point out the needs to 
understand the significance of ideological aspects like norms and identity, stating that 
such concepts are lacking in state-centric view (Katzenstein 1996, Wendt 1999).
70
   
 
There are also criticisms on the state apparatus, including security and diplomacy.  In 
modern international relations, wars and conflicts are less relevant; or when they became 
relevant, diplomacy cannot prevent or lessen their intensity.  The criticisms over state 
apparatus open the new gate to a new way of diplomacy, which embrace non-state actors 
and international institutions
71
 as an alternative solution for problems within 
international politics.  
 
The critics of state-centric views also draw attention to the challenges that states are 
facing in the contemporary world.  As the focus of the analysis, the survival and strength 
of states is significant.  Thus, there is a strong link between the state-centric view and 
the challenge modern states encounter.  The survival as well as the changes in states will 
determine the durability of the state-centric view.  The challenges contemporary states 
are facing are discussed in the next section. 
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2.1.2 States in a Globalised World 
The end of the Cold War and forces of globalisation have led states to be challenged in 
different ways.  The challenges came from changes in the environment, actors and 
factors related to states.  This section seeks to identify the challenges states face, as well 
as how states counter those challenges. 
 
a. The Ways in Which States Can be Challenged 
Challenge to States’ Sovereignty 
It cannot be denied that sovereignty is one of the most important elements for states.  
This is because sovereignty defines a state‘s right not only to exist, but to also exercise 
power over its own internal affairs and to be accepted externally.  Sovereignty defines a 
state‘s legitimacy to function domestically with its own citizens as well as legitimacy to 
be accepted and respected within the international political environment.  The 20
th
 
century world politics have seen the sovereignty of states under threat in several ways, 
including states‘ losing the ability to control the clearly defined boundaries and identity.  
Demarcated territory and state identity restrict external intervention and grant states 
authority to manage their own domestic affairs.  In the globalised world, the flow of 
information, people and material sources occur so rapidly and on such a large scale that 
states find themselves unable to control and counter these cross-border flows.  In terms 
of identity, the flow of information and communication have encouraged the 
solidification of ethnicity and non-state group identity, i.e. diasporas, that can draw away 
a state‘s legitimacy and the loyalty that a state used to enjoy from their citizens.  Thus 
the sense of nation-state, which most states have been trying to cultivate, has been 
challenged by these deterritorised boundaries. 
 
Another challenge to modern states is the potential loss of legitimacy, which is 
collectively acknowledged by state‘s exercising authority and power.  In the past, the 
ability for a state to protect its citizens has easily contributed to the legitimacy of states.  
However, in the modern world, the question of legitimacy has been raised more often.  
States‘ attempting to manage domestic affairs are sometimes questioned i.e. the case that 
states harm or fail to protect their citizens; and such behaviours do affect the legitimacy 
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of states; such phenomenon has led states to be criticised and undermined by external 
players, including other states or groups of states.  In addition, as legitimacy is also 
rooted in loyalty to people, states are also threatened by the increased skills individuals 
have obtained, which have affected their relations with states.  According to Rosenau 
once individuals have become more skilful and have obtained more knowledge, they 
depend less on the state and have greater potential to find the alternative agency to  
states
 72
 or to states other than their own.   
 
Challenge from the Emergence of Other Alternative Institutions 
Another significant element of state sovereignty also includes state‘s authority.  
Traditionally, as states are the legitimate exerciser of military and man power, therefore, 
it is perceived that traditional states are equipped both with sovereignty and authority; in 
addition, states are perceived as accumulating wealth and are heavily in charge of trade 
and economic development.  In the modern world, when threats from other states is less 
likely, and when other agendas i.e. trade, human rights, or environmental problems have 
become more significant, states‘ authority tends to be perceived as shifting to additional 
players.   The question of sovereignty vs. authority has not so much been a debate in the 
past because both notions had been admitted as firmly guard by states.  In the modern 
world, however, other institutions have emerged and tend to have as much capacity to 
challenge the tasks once belonging to states.  Examples of these alternative institutions 
include multi-national companies, non-government organisations, and international 
organisations.  
 
The emergence of non-state actors threatens the way that states exercise their authority 
and policy making.  This can be seen through the emergence of human rights 
movements that question states‘ behaviour.  For states to cooperate with non-state actors 
can be complicated, and states‘ policies might ―go awry,‖ as claimed by Cusimano.73  
Several difficulties that states encounter in dealing with these problems include the 
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states‘ lack of mechanisms to deal with them, as well as the nature of the transsovereign 
problem, which is rooted both domestically and internationally.
74
   
 
With the challenges that states face in the contemporary world, most states, in their 
attempt to maintain their existence and not to be replaced by alternative institutions, 
have shown to adjust themselves to counter these changes, as will be discussed in the 
next section. 
 
b. How States Adjust Themselves to Challenges  
As mentioned, globalisation and recent changes in international politics, i.e. the end of 
the Cold War, have brought about some challenges to modern states.  As noted, states 
have been viewed as resilient mechanisms and so far there has been no alternative that 
can be proved as effective as states.  However, with non-state actors becoming more 
powerful and efficient, there exists the possibility that states‘ authority or functions may 
be shifted to these non-state actors.  Therefore, it is understandable why states have been 
adjusting themselves to counter the challenges.  
 
There are several ways for states to maintain sovereignty and to address challenges in 
the globalised world.  According to Cusimano one of the ways states have done is to 
downsize and decentralise themselves in order to allow non-state actors to take over 
some functions that used to belong to states.
75
  To many scholars, leaving some of the 
responsibilities for non-state actors is useful for states, since it allows states to be 
responsible for fewer burdens, thus making them more focused.  Leaving some 
responsibilities to non-state actors also enables states to handle newly emerging agendas.   
 
c. Surviving the Emergences of Some Non-State Actors and Transnationalism 
In order to resist the proliferation of non-state actors and transnationalism, which can 
potentially threaten states‘ sovereignty, states try to strengthen law and control over 
borders and markets.
76
  To control and limit the role of non-state actors, states also try to 
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strengthen law and regulations over private sector, non-governmental organisations, and 
private groups.  To control the flow of people, goods or ideas, states also increase state-
to-state cooperation and enlist non-state actors to help with the problems.
77
  States also 
resist non-state actors through such methods as the banning of funding, claiming that the 
activities of the organisations are contradictory with traditional values, and that the 
actors are results of external interferences.
78
  
 
As non-state actors and transnational movements can project both positive and negative 
effects, states take into consideration such facts.  Those that destabilise states‘ existence 
have been resisted while those whose goals correspond and benefit states are being 
adjusted into and interacted with. Adjusting themselves and coordinating with non-state 
actors is the mechanism that helps to increases states‘ legitimacy and allows them to 
adjust themselves to the nature of contemporary world politics.  The example of states‘ 
adopting characteristics of non-state and transnational actors can be found through the 
extreme, when states themselves establish state-run NGOs, which are sometimes called 
GRINGOs,
79
 or uphold some of the values promoted by some of these NGOs, including 
environmental protection or human rights promotions.  
 
In summary, it can be seen that states counter changes in the contemporary world and 
changes resulted from emergences of non-state actors in two ways: one is to evolve and 
adjust themselves to fit with the changes, and the other is to resist those changes and the 
influence of non-state actors. 
 
Trying to understand international interactions and relationships between states in the 
contemporary world using the state-centric approach alone cannot yield a holistic picture.  
One of the main reasons is obsoleteness, that the theory does not have sufficient 
analytical tools that can explain changes and agendas in modern international politics.  
Second is that the framework of a state-centric view is narrowly defined, thus excluding 
some actors and environments that are not state-related, though maybe significant to the 
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analysis.  However, proponents of the state-centric view still insist that international 
phenomenon still need states as a theoretical tool, i.e. military and diplomacy continue to 
function and are largely influential to international politics.  Since the argument over the 
resilience of states is still valid, it is impractical to abandon the state-centric view.  What 
should be focused on therefore is the search for additional concepts that can fulfil what 
is lacking in the state-centric view.   
 
2.2 Pluralism 
2.2.1 Nature and Explanation of the Pluralist Approach 
Pluralism is rooted in liberal concept within International Relations, it is commonly 
recognised so due to its several variances.
80
  However, the root of pluralism is still 
mostly based on liberal concept. Therefore, to understand pluralism, it is worth 
examining the nature of liberalism.   
 
According to Timothy Dunne, liberalism is ―an umbrella term‖ which refers to a concept 
that rejects ―the realist view of the primacy of the state and the coherence of the state-as-
actor.‖81  Instead, liberalism is ―an ideology whose central concern is the liberty of 
individual...the state must always be the servant of the collective will, not the 
master…‖82 With its highlight on individual, liberalism also emphasises the importance 
of individual freedom and ideas; for liberals, war is unnecessary and can be avoided.  In 
addition, according to Steve and Baylis, liberals are sceptical about the idea that state is 
the only main actor in world politics, but they do not deny its significance; to liberals, 
there are other players that are as important in world politics.
83
  For liberals, cooperation 
among states is important.  Steve and Baylis provide a summary picture of world politics 
according to liberal idea as follows: 
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The picture of world politics that results from the liberal view is of a 
complex system of bargaining between many different types of actors.  
Military force is still important but the liberal agenda is not as restricted 
as is the realist one.  Liberals see national interests in much more than 
military terms, and stress the importance of economic, environmental, 
and technological issues.  Order in world politics emerges not from a 
balance of power but from the interactions between many layers of 
governing arrangements. 
84
 
 
From the description of liberalism above, which can be applied to understand pluralism, 
it is clear that pluralism does not abandon the significance of states; however, the 
concept is broadened to accommodate other actors and ideas.  For pluralism, conflicts 
can occur; that‘s why liberals maintain that the military is still important.  However, the 
means to avoid conflict and war can be done through using other agendas and key 
players beside states. It can be seen that pluralism is more receptive to progress and 
changes in world politics more than realism.  This is because its conceptual bases, which 
promote ideas and individual freedom, can accommodate changes i.e. technology, 
globalisation or emergence of new non-state actors.  Ultimately, it can be noted that 
pluralists emphasise cooperation; interestingly and ironically, one of the reasons for 
diversity within pluralism has to do with the means by which cooperation can be 
attained.  
 
In summary, the pluralist view provides an alternative way to understand international 
politics, starting from the number and influence of actors within the system; the key 
agendas, which result in the contents and process within the international system.  In 
terms of number of players, pluralists suggest multiple players, thus the significance and 
supremacy of state has been reduced and distributed other players.  The increase in 
number of players corresponds to greater diversity of the agendas within the 
international system; thus pluralism allows greater flexibility for the analysis of the 
environment of international politics in the modern world.   
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As noted, there are differences among pluralists; each cluster provides different 
explanations for international politics.  The differences are largely subjected to key 
elements they believe to encourage cooperation, including actors, the environment or 
ideas.
85
   
 
2.2.2 Selected Variances of Pluralism 
An increase in new international relations agendas and actors, as well as the less 
likeliness of war and conflicts with increasing attempts among states to cooperate, has 
made pluralism one of the most appropriate approaches to investigate international 
politics.  As noted, pluralism is a broad concept but has stemmed out into different 
variances because pluralists provide different explanation to how cooperation can be 
achieved. It is important therefore to discuss some variances of pluralism, which are 
closely relevant to the discussion in this research.   
 
Since the large part of this research concerns the role of non-state actors, particularly 
organisations, in encouraging greater interactions and cooperation, liberal 
institutionalism is very relevant.  Tim Dunne provides an explanation of the 
transformation of the concept, pointing out that at the beginning liberal institutionalism 
focuses on the role of international institutions in carrying out the tasks a state cannot 
undertake; however, by early 1970 the attention to only international institutions was 
added by additional non-state institutions, including transnational cooperation and non-
government organisations
. 86
 According to Dunne, in the 1980s there was the 
transformation of liberal institutionalism to neo-liberal institutionalism; there are a few 
differences between liberal institutionalism and its new version.  Among those 
differences include the role of actor, neo-liberal institutionalists, led by Robert Keohane, 
believe that while non-state institutions are important, they are still subordinate to 
states.
87
   The other difference neoliberal-institutionalists seek to point out concerns the 
motivation for states to cooperate; to them, states make decision to interact with other 
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state with ―absolute gain‖ as key goal; thus it does not matter ―if another state will gain 
more from the interaction.‖88 
 
The significance of liberal institutionalism is the emphasis on additional actors in the 
international system.  The move to embrace additional non-state actors and accepting the 
resilience and undeniable dominant role of states reflect the practicality of the concept.  
Therefore, liberal institutionalism and its neo relative are suitable and able to provide a 
considerably broad understanding of international relations.   
 
While liberal institutionalism provides an explanation largely on the role of actors in 
international relations, with particular emphasis on states and organisations, it does not 
provide a sufficient explanation on the overall environment of international politics, 
which also consists of smaller units, including individuals, companies and movements.  
Liberal internationalism fulfils this gap by emphasising on the role of interactions 
among these smaller units in promoting international relations.  Liberal internationalists 
believe that ―contact between the peoples of the world, through commerce or travel, will 
facilitate a more pacific form of international relations.‖89  The transformation of liberal 
internationalism also took place in 1990s, with the ideas that conflicts can be avoided 
among liberal states; liberal democracy is therefore promoted.   
 
In this research, the essence of liberal internationalism concentrates on the promotion of 
the interactions among people through different means including trade, tourism, 
education and cultural promotion.  Unlike liberal institutionalism, the focus is given to 
the micro-unit i.e. individuals and small companies.  This concept therefore assures that 
most of the components, both micro and macro units, in the international system are 
taken into consideration.   
 
The noted two variances of pluralism, as noted, helps provide an explanation for 
additional actors and agendas within international politics; thus there is already some 
explanation for actors and components of the system.  Questions arise, however, over 
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additional explanations as to how these actors are related to one another within the 
system of international relations.  With changes in international politics, where new 
actors and agendas emerge, there is a need for concepts that can help explain the pattern 
of relations among these actors.  
 
Complex interdependence, as proposed by Keohane and Nye, offers the view of global 
politics differently through the then-predominant realist view; the world politics with ―a 
minor role of force, less dominance of security issues, and multiple transnational 
contacts,‖90 and to see ―how asymmetrical economic interdependence could add another 
instrument in traditional realist struggles for power.‖91  According to the two scholars, 
there are four main characteristics of complex interdependence, including multiple 
channels, increased linkage among states and non-state actors, absence of hierarchy 
among issues, and minor role of military force.
92
 
 
To complex interdependence scholars, multiple channels refer to the condition in which 
international interactions consist of actors from various sectors. The example provided 
by Keohane and Nye included the direct interactions between bureaucrats in different 
countries over the tasks they have in common, the interactions among nongovernment 
elites in meetings or conference related to their business, and the interactions among 
multinational enterprises.
93
  The absence of hierarchy among issues means foreign 
affairs agenda, which used to place military security as top agenda, is broaden and 
becomes more diverse.
94
  Several other issues besides security can become vital to the 
national interest, and require as much attention. Therefore, instead of looking the 
military agenda as a deeply embedded foundation of the foreign agenda, the complex 
interdependence concept horizontally lays down various issues on equal ground, 
pointing out that any issues can be significant to international relations, as any can affect 
national interests and affect the country‘s security.  
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While traditional IR theorists claim that military force is crucial to national power, 
Keohane and Nye point out that in complex interdependence, threats among countries 
will decline to almost nonexistent, thus reducing the need for military force.
95
  This 
point corresponds to the previous claim that the complex interdependence concept 
demonstrates the absence of hierarchy among issues.  Increased linkages among actors 
are the outcome of multiple channels and the broadened global issues.  According to 
Keohane and Nye, the intertwining of diverse issues, combined with the diminished 
influence of military and security concerns, restrain major powers from threatening 
smaller states for fear of the spill over effect to other issues.  With this regard, there is 
less hierarchy within the international system.  Complex interdependence also 
encourages the boundary-crossing interconnections between bureaucratic governmental 
institutions, local organisations, private organisations, or the multinational enterprises 
which then stimulate the increased establishment of transnational and transgovernmental 
relation. 
 
Complex interdependence is being discussed separately here to highlight its principles 
that emphasise the nature of relations among actors, particularly the pattern of 
dependence and interactions, which is more specific than what is provided by neoliberal 
institutionalism. The nature of relations among actors come in the form of more 
dependence, where military is no more the only source of dependence among states and 
non-state actors anymore.  The concept of complex interdependence should be 
considered as an appropriate additional explanatory tool for the relationship among 
actors within the system.  The highlight of complex interdependence is that it 
accommodates new environments in international relations, where the security issue is 
less dominant, transnational actors emerged, and the international relations can be done 
through multiple channels.   
 
While the two variances of pluralism have identified actors and the ideas attached to 
them and complex interdependence has set the stage by explaining the pattern of 
relations among these actors, the remaining explanation needed is on the motivations in 
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which these actors interact and why these actors and the issues they bring to the table 
can promote international relations more efficiently than what has been done solely by 
states.  Functionalism can provide an explanation on such a nature because it seeks to 
promote international interactions based on functional issues.   
 
The key argument of functionalists is that states should seek to cooperate on functional 
issues with other states while trying to avoid the complication of political and 
bureaucratic processes.
96
  According to David Mitrany, the pioneer of functionalism, 
certain issues can be managed through international arrangement without the 
involvement of the political federation.
97
  Mitrany suggests that this form of cooperation 
bypasses the issues of formal sovereignty.  The outcome of functional cooperation does 
not only yield mutual benefits in issues at stake, it can spill over to enhance the political 
agenda that states have toward one another.  
 
Joseph Nye further explained Mitrany‘s argument known as the ―Form follows function‖, 
principle.
98
 The first explanation is that ―cooperation will only work if it is focused on 
particular and specific activities which are currently performed by states but which 
would be performed more effectively in some wider context.‖99 The second point is that 
―the form which such cooperation takes should be determined by the nature of the 
function in question, thus for some functions a global institution will be appropriate 
while for other regional, or even local, institutions are all that is necessary.‖100  
 
The essence of functionalism is therefore based on the attempt to reduce the focus on the 
central government and distribute greater responsibility to sub-government units, and 
other non-state agencies.  The expertise and efficiency of the governmental sub-units 
and the non-state agencies is the key that functionalists argue that international 
cooperation and international agendas can be achieved in more efficiently without delay.   
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Therefore, the motivation for actors to interact in the new environment can be explained 
through the functionalist perspective that with their functional focus, international 
cooperation and tasks can be achieved easier than relying on the state alone. 
 
So far, we have identified actors, which have been broadened to cover non-state actors 
and individuals, while states are admittedly continuing to be dominant players within 
international relations.  We also have identified the environment and nature of the 
system, in which actors interact through increased contacts, through more linkages, 
multiple channels and a less conflict-prone environment.  We also have seen that the 
nature of the interaction between actors can be a more functional focus, where not every 
task has to be handled by central government and that the governmental sub-units or 
non-state actors can function better to get the tasks done.  Therefore, it can be seen that 
from the pluralism umbrella we have obtained sufficient concepts to explain the nature 
of world politics.  The next part provides additional explanations on the value of 
pluralism and the criticisms on the concept.   
 
2.2.3 Pluralism’s accommodation of Non-State Actors 
The liberal tradition of international relations has long promoted and accommodated the 
explanatory mechanism for the emergence and increased role of non-state actors in 
international relations.  It is therefore worthwhile noting the contribution of non-state 
actors in international politics within the discussion of pluralism.   
 
The role of non-state actors has, undeniably, become visible in international politics.  
Ranging from small non-government organisations to larger multinational companies, 
the contemporary international politics see that non-state actors have affected 
international relations in many ways.  It is not unusual to see that some non-state actors 
have become so powerful that they can affect states‘ behaviour and policy-making.  In 
addition, non-state actors can change international norms.  While in most cases, states 
continue to be important players within world politics, Risse-Kappen points out that 
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states still need non-state actors ―to achieve economic growth, to gain new policy-
relevant ideas, to create international institutions, and to monitor regime compliance.‖101   
Bringing non-state actors into the analysis is therefore important as the understanding of 
these actors and their roles provides a more complete picture of international politics.  
 
According to Willetts, non-state actors refer to ―any actor that is not a government.‖102  
Halliday suggests a broader and more specific definition of non-state actors, from 
traditionally heavily focusing on non-government organisation (NGO) during post-1960 
to ―encompass all that is non-state, i.e. business and banks, religious movements, social 
movements, and criminal organizations.‖ 103  Josselin and Wallace‘s definition of non-
state actors parallels with Halliday‘s definition.  For them, non-state actors also include 
the organisations that are ―largely or entirely autonomous from central government 
funding and control: emanating from civil society, or from the market economy, or from 
political impulses beyond state control and direction;‖ and that are ―operating as or 
participating in networks which extend across the boundaries of two or more states—
thus engaging in ‗transnational‘ relations, linking political systems, economies, 
societies;‖ and lastly that are ―acting in ways which affect political outcomes, either 
within one  more states or within international institutions—either purposefully or semi-
purposefully, either as their primary objective or as one aspect of their activities.‖104 
 
One crucial factor to keep in mind when examine non-state actors is the way these actors 
are defined.  The term non-state actor is so broad that it covers diverse kinds of 
organisations.  The term being so broad and ambiguous has been made more difficult 
with the growing number of non-state actors in the international relations environment. 
The differences among these non-state actors yield different impacts to international 
relations; thus without specifying the type of non-state actor to be studied, it is difficult 
to obtain a precise analysis and understanding.  Therefore, in analysing the role of these 
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actors in international relations, one of the first tasks should be clarifying the type of 
non-state actors that will be examined and analysing them according to their specific 
characteristic.  Such a way can help limit the scope of analysis and avoid the confusion 
rooted in the linkages among non-state actors, i.e. between non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and inter-governmental organisations (INGOs),
105
 between the 
multinational companies and the private sector associations, or between the diasporas 
and ethnic movements. 
 
This research is interested in the definition provided by Josselin and Wallace, which is 
broad and embraces wide ranges of organisations that exist within domestic and 
international circle.  The case studies of non-state actors in this research are selected 
with this definition in mind: they are largely autonomous from the Thai government, 
they operate in transnational network, and their behaviours have impacts on political 
outcome within state or international institutions.  
 
In terms of the impacts of non-state actors on states, it is not unusual to see close 
relations between some states and non-state actors. Many non-state actors are still 
dependent on state funding, and are willing to serve as conduits for the foreign policy of 
their government.
106
  As discussed, some non-states actors are even controlled and 
partially funded by the government.  The role of non-state actors on states can be 
divided into their negative and positive impacts.   
 
On a positive side, the non-state actors provide support to states by covering the tasks 
states do not do or fail to do.  These organisations undertake the roles that states find 
themselves being limited from or bound by legislation or rules that they have set up for 
themselves.
107
  In addition, these organisations also lower the cost incurred to the 
government.  Being more flexible than the government, non-states actors can manage 
the interactions more efficiently than the government.  According to Halliday, the way 
non-state actors affect states is through the ―good causes‖ these agencies use to influence 
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states‘ activities; a good example of this is human rights, with the work of Amnesty 
International, OXFAM, etc.
108
  These non-state actors are also partially responsible for 
bringing technology and financial flow into contemporary international politics.   
 
The negative impacts of non-state actors to the state include threat of the likelihood that 
the governments fail to monitor or control international interactions initiated by non-
state actors, in which some of the projects can threaten national security.  On well-being, 
as discussed before, some illegitimate non-state actors, i.e. insurgent groups and 
religious movements, can undermine state security.  In addition, when the governments 
fail to monitor the multi-channel interactions run by these non-government actors, there 
is always a risk of conflicts among the actors, or their agreement may contradict the 
governments‘ policy.  Other negative impacts include the possibility that the 
proliferation of non-state actors can draw away people‘s loyalty to states if those non-
state actors can respond to their needs more efficiently.   
 
Most of the sceptics on increase attention to non-state actors come mostly from the 
proponents of state-centric view.  One criticism on placing much attention to these 
actors is based on the fear of increased complexity of the international relations system, 
which has traditionally been simplified by highlighting only the network of state 
relations.  Considering a large number of non-state actors existing within the system, 
plus differences in their characteristics and focuses, it makes analysis even more difficult.  
In addition, sceptics point out the overemphasis of non-state actors; their argument is 
that the emergence of these organisations is not a phenomena.
109
  To them, non-state 
actors have existed long before and as their effect on international relations was not 
significant, they had not received much attention. Another argument takes into 
consideration the question of high-low politics; sceptics on the influence of non-state 
actors point out that these actors, despite their increased influence in international 
relations, do not affect high politics, which are the notion of security and war, which are 
considered to be the core of state relations.
110
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To counter these criticisms, one significance solution is to recognise the limit of state-
centric approach and how broader view like pluralism can help understand international 
politics better.  The contemporary world sees the necessity in concepts that can 
accommodate changes; and this research points out that pluralism and complex 
interdependence are suitable tools to explain this environment.  The principles of 
complex interdependence and pluralism emphasise more diverse agendas with no 
hierarchy on the agenda, as well as the reduced significance of the military.  Therefore, 
the question of high-low politics can be tackled by regarding the low politics as equally 
important.  As for the argument over the overemphasis of the non-state actors, it is 
important to recognise the nature of contemporary international relations, which has 
been fostered by globalisation; the impact of these actors on international relations has 
been aggravated by changes in sense of time and space, thus bringing about the more 
severe degree of ways in which they affect international relations.   
 
The advocates for the increased emphasis on non-state actors highlight their long 
existence and ability to handle transsovereign problems.  Looking at their historical 
development, Halliday suggests the significance of non-state actors, pointing out that the 
existence of non-state actors predates the establishment of state.  Such a proposal is 
contrary to the perception people have, that NGOs, MNCs, ethnic groups and so on are 
recent phenomena.  According to Halliday, the state is a ―recent creation‖ and before the 
existence of states the society had been managed by the non-state entities.
111
  Thus in the 
world prior to the establishment of states, non-state actors had been functioning.  These 
actors have shown to evolve through time in world politics; and they have been able to 
resist changes even longer than states.  
 
Another proponent of the non-state actor, Cusimano, highlights the ability of non-state 
actors in handling transsovereign problem, which cannot be controlled alone by states, 
and unilateral relations alone could not solve it either.  Participation of the non-state 
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actors is important; therefore, the coordination among state and these non-state actors in 
resolving the problem is important.
112
  
 
In summary, to understand contemporary world politics, it is important to understand the 
nature and significance of non-state actors.  Inevitably, these actors have been crucial 
players in the system.  There is a close relationship among, state, transnational and non-
state actors.  It is therefore important to take into consideration such combinations. 
 
2.2.4 Transnationalism 
The concept of transnationalism came under spotlight in the 1970s through the work of 
Keohane and Nye in Transnational Relations and World Politic; however, the two 
authors point out that such a concept preceded their work with the proposals of several 
scholars, including Rosenau, Raymond, Kaiser, Menderhausen, and Jessup.
113
  Josseline, 
on the other hand, argues that the development of transnational relations can be traced 
even earlier since Mitrany‘s work in 1940 and the work of Karl Deutsch‘s pluralist 
notion of transnational linkage.
114
  The transnational movement concept during 1970s 
emerged out of a group of scholars interested in the ―interaction between governments 
and transnational societies and in transnational coalitions among subunits of 
government.‖115  With changes in global socio-economy, resulting from globalisation 
and changes in international politics such as the Cold War, 9/11, and the spread of the 
global terrorist network, the research on transnational forces received greater attention, 
particularly through the context of the relations between transnational forces and states 
in international politics.
116
   
 
According to Keohane and Nye, transnational interaction is ―the movement of tangible 
or intangible items across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a 
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government or an intergovernment organization.‖ 117   To Thomas Risse-Kappen, 
transnational relations are defined as ―regular interactions across national boundaries 
when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national 
government or an intergovernmental organization.‖ 118   Both Keohane and Nye and 
Risse-Kappen, in addition to emphasising cross-border interactions, focus on the content 
of the actor: that there must be at least one non-state actor within the process of such 
interaction.  Fred Halliday, upon discussing transnational movements as challenges to 
the Middle East states, defines transnational forces as, ―those which beyond the domain 
of the state as normally construed, influence the policies of states and their outcome.‖119   
 
Anthony McGrew, who discusses the affect of globalisation on the state, defines 
transnational civil society as ―a political arena in which citizens and private interests 
collaborate across borders to advance their mutual goals or to bring governments and the 
formal institutions of global governance to account for their activities.‖120  Through their 
edited book on the global politics of the Asia Pacific, Remy Davidson et al, defines 
transnational actor as ―an exceptionally broad range of activities and organisation 
including labour unions, industrial groups, the media or environmental lobbyists.
121
  
Transnational actors also include non-state actors such as private citizens living in 
different states connected through private, rather than government channels.
122
  
 
From the above definitions, we can summarise the essence of transnationalism according 
to the nature of actors, activities, location and effects within transnational forces.  In 
terms of actors, the noted scholars point out that in transnationalism, the significant 
actors are those of non-state nature.  This leads to the activities and issues at stake, that 
most of the agendas will cover a broader range of issues aside from politics.  In terms of 
location, it is clear that ―transnational‖ means cross-borders, where actors from more 
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than one state are involved in the activities.  Finally, the outcomes of the activities do 
not only affect the actors, but also the government and greater parts of the society. 
 
a. The Nature of the Transnational Approach 
According to Keohane and Nye, transnational approach facilitates the understanding of 
interstate relations; it allows one to see additional factors that affect states and 
environment within which states interact.
123
  According to transnationalists, two agendas 
are main concerns of the transnational approach: the organisations within transnational 
interactions, and the effects of transnational relations on interstate politics.
124
  Thomas 
Risse-Kappen takes a more narrowly defined approach, suggesting that transnational 
relations should be used to examine ―how the inter-state world interacts with the society 
world of transnational relations.‖ 125   James Rosenau shares a similar interest; he 
examines the interactions between the state-centric world and the multi-centric world, 
which includes transnational interactions, which has been promoted as individuals have 
obtained greater skills due largely to globalisation (greater detail on Rosenau‘s proposal 
will be discussed later in this chapter).
126
  To sum, transnational approach is used to 
examine the nature of transnational actors and their relationship to states, as well as how 
states accommodate or resist these transnational actors.  
 
With an increased interest in transnational movements, it may be suitable to provide 
examples of existing researches on transnational movements.  The study of 
transnationalism started of by the work of, as noted, Keohane and Nye et al, in their 
book, Transnational Relations and World Politics, Risse-Kappen followed the lead by 
producing Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-States Actors, Domestic 
Structures and International Institutions.  In addition, there are other significant 
researches by other scholars, including Peter Bell who researches the role of the Ford 
Foundation on the US.  Ian Vallier and David Ryall conduct research on the role of the 
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Roman Catholic Church.
127
  More contemporary are those exploring transnational 
movements include Stephen Flynn who researches Global Drug Trade, David Long 
whose research is on Countering Terrorism, Katerina Dalacoura whose research is on the 
Islamist Movement, and Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen whose research is on the Diaspora.
128
  
In addition, transnationalism has been discussed by Halliday, through five case studies 
of transnational movement in the Middle East, including the Diaspora, Islamism, 
political violence, nationalism and culture and media. 
 
From the above list, it can be seen that the work on transnational movement in 
international politics has been broad; non-state actors used as case studies range from 
multinational companies to religious movements, Diasporas and illegitimate movements 
like drug trades. In explaining about transnational actors in global politics, Willetts 
categorises these actors as transnational companies, non-legitimate groups and liberation 
movements, non-governmental organisations, and international organisations.
129
  These 
previous works have shown also the trend in international politics, where certain non-
state actors become more visible and increase their effect on the international 
environment. 
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Transnational movements are worth examining because the characteristics of these 
movements have shown the potential to challenge states.  The developing process of a 
transnational movement, starting from establishing itself to developing networks across 
the border, means that each movement consists of strong foundation, ranging from 
skilled individuals, good technological advancement, cultural knowledge and cross-
border connections.  In some areas, therefore, it is likely that these organisations can 
undertake the same tasks as a state does; and they are powerful enough to affect states 
and their policy decision, financially or politically.   
 
In examining transnational movements, it is crucial to pay attention to the nature of the 
organisation, its aim, objectives and activities, as well as how it functions; this will show 
how they differ from the government.  In addition, it is worthwhile examining the nature 
of these organisations with other organisation across border, the component that allow 
transnationalness; whether the motivation is based on cultural or ethnic relations, 
financial relations or strategic planning. In this research, two transnational Muslim 
organisations are highlighted in this research, including WAMY and TITIA, as noted in 
brief detail at in the previous chapter. Prior to detailed discussions in the further chapters, 
it is worth noting concepts of transnational actors, whose functions closely relate to the 
organisations used as case studies in this research.  
 
International Muslim Networks 
The concept of international Muslim networks can suitably be used to describe the 
nature of WAMY. International Muslam networks are transnational movements of 
Muslims across boundaries.  Such movements cover non-state Muslim societies, 
foundations and charities, whose network involve Muslims in different parts of the 
world.  Therefore, their efforts are internationally based; according to Halliday, the 
transnationalism of such network is unquestionable.
130
  The geographical observation of 
most of the discussions on the Islamist movements usually start off in the Middle East, 
where non-state actors as well as states provide financial and ideological support for 
Muslim groups, both in the Middle East and the rest of the world. 
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International Muslim networks cover a whole range of international interactions among 
Muslims across national boundaries.  The actors within the networks include groups of 
Muslims, international Muslim NGOs, regional offices of Muslim organisations, 
international professional Muslim societies, and the Muslim inter-government 
organisations.  The international Muslim networks also cover the international Islamist 
movement or political Islam.  In the contemporary world politics, political Islam has 
received a lot of attention; it is therefore crucial to add a few notes to clarify the 
relevance of such group to the international Muslim network and to this research.  The 
discussion about international Islamist movement known as ―political Islam,‖ ―Islamist 
Movement,‖ or ―Islamism‖ usually connote militancy, violence and rebellion towards 
states.  According to Halliday, the common claim of Islamist movements is that they 
―reject the division of the Muslim world into different states and peoples; the state in its 
modern form is an alien, western creation and all Muslims share a common identity as 
members of the umma or community of believers.‖ 131   Katerina Dalacoura defines 
Islamism or political Islam as, ―the ideology that aims to reform society and politics 
along religious lines given in the Koran and Islamic legal and cultural traditions.‖132  
The Islamist movement, according to Dalacoura, help create multiple links, from social 
and cultural to terrorist and criminal ones, between members of societies, thus bypassing 
the governments.‖133 
 
The nature of the Islamist movement is therefore largely transnational and non-state.  
There are wide ranges of activities among these movements, ranging from violence to 
social efforts.  They are, heading, however, toward the same goal, to solidify the notion 
of ummah, or Muslim society.  As noted, the extreme means to achieve ummah, violence, 
terrorism receive much attention; while more peaceful, social-based effort to promote 
ummah is as important.  
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This research recognises both ends of the means to solidify ummah, but to help 
neutralise the attitude toward the notion of Islamic movement, the author intends to use 
the term ―international Muslim networks.‖  Such term will embraces all sorts of attempts 
to solidify worldwide Muslim under the ummah umbrella and transcend state boundaries.  
Therefore, both violet and terrorist acts, and the peaceful, cultural and social linkage 
between Muslim worldwide will be considered.  
 
International Private Sector Associations 
The organisational nature and functions of international private sector associations can 
suitably be used to describe TITIA. Private sector associations here refers to associations 
of individuals with specialised focuses and professional orientation, including trade 
unions, think-tanks, academic groups, professional associations, trade associations, and 
industrial associations.  Unlike a non-governmental organisation (NGO), whose nature is 
non-profit and public oriented, the private sector associations are sometimes profit-
seeking and their aims are largely geared toward fulfilling members, committees and 
partners.  However, unlike multi-national companies, whose goal is the companies‘ 
benefit, the aims of private sector associations are, as noted, for the benefit of their 
members; and it is by nature not organised and structured as a company.  The 
transnational characteristics of private sector associations is that despite the fact that the 
organisations are local, most of them have relations with foreign counterparts and 
regularly interact at the international level.  
 
Skjelsbaek‘s explanation helps elucidate why some private sector associations may want 
to become transnational.  One of the reasons is the lack of resources that satisfy their 
members and fulfil the organisations‘ objectives. 134  Therefore, the associations seek 
cooperation from external agencies that share the same principles or similar type of 
benefits.  In addition, specialisation and identity groupings have become one of the key 
motivations for association to interact across the boundaries.  According to Skjelsbaek: 
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As economic and technological development proceeds, specialisation 
ensures with the result that some categories of persons, groups, or 
industries are no longer large enough to constitute functional 
communities that can satisfy their member‘s needs. Functional 
communities are hardly less important to people now than earlier, and, if 
they cannot be organized satisfactorily on the national level, the logical 
procedure, particularly with relatively decreasing communication and 
transportation costs, is to make them transnational.
135
 
 
The nature of non-state actors can be identified by their relationship with states, their 
focus, and their activities.
136
  The globalised world has facilitated the way private sector 
associations can interact with their foreign counterparts, as well as with international 
organisations and other states.  Shared goals and objectives have urged these 
associations to cooperate and initiate activities and projects.  Functional cooperation of 
these private sectors associations has sometimes affected both positively and negatively, 
international relations, particularly state relations.  Sometimes the initiatives from these 
associations have political ramifications, and help define the foreign policy of a state.  
The case studies of how these private sector associations affect states and vice versa will 
be discussed and analysed in the later part of the research.   
 
b. Impact of Transnationalism on States and How States Respond 
As noted, the impact of transnationalism on states can be both positive and negative.  On 
the positive side, transnationalism increases dialogues among different parties within the 
international sphere.  Increased people-to-people relations lead to a better cultural 
understanding and greater exchanges of knowledge among people and staff of different 
states.  In addition, multiple linkages established by these transnational groups help 
provide network for states in different fields, thus increase states‘efficiency in handling 
their tasks.  A good example can be seen through the Indian Ocean Tsunami incident of 
2005, when different transnational networks joined with states and state agencies in 
providing support to those affected.  In addition, the transnational connections among 
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people, companies and associations can spill over to benefit states; this can be seen 
through increased revenues from tourism, GDP and GNP from the multi-national 
corporations (MNCs), as well as economic and social development from international 
associations and NGOs.  Some transnational actors from one country, i.e. the United 
States, can be so powerful that it can affect the policy of the other states, as pointed out 
by Keohane and Nye.
137
  In addition, the emergence of non-state actors in the 
transnational context opens the possibility for these actors to act as mediators or 
stimulate greater relations between states.  
 
On the negative side, transnational movements can challenge state security.  This can be 
seen through the proliferation of transnational terrorist networks, drugs and arms trade in 
the contemporary international politics.  In addition, the transnational network of ethnic 
and religious fundamentalists can also threaten the sovereignty of states.  As noted, some 
transnational movements can alter the citizen‘s loyalty from the traditional domain–
states--to other agencies, i.e. ethnic or religious movements. As much as the 
transnational actors can benefit the interstate relations, it can also undermine it.  There is 
also the issue in that transnational movements are being supported by a state or group in 
order to undermine other state‘s sovereignty.  
 
Proponents of the transnationalism embrace transnationalism as a tool to broaden the 
ability to explain international phenomena.  This is because the state-centric view does 
not provide a sufficient explanation for an increasingly complex international politics, as 
reflected by Skjelsbaek, who writes that the ―interstate model has become too simplistic 
as a result of new development in the global system… The interstate model is especially 
unfit for projections and predictions about the future.‖ 138   According to Halliday, 
transnationalism ―allows discussion of the way in which a non-state and transnational 
perspective may enhance, or revise, conventional views of the IR and politics of the 
region.‖139  In a similar direction, Willetts points out that the better understanding of 
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international relations can be obtained through analysing the relations between the 
governments and many other actors from each country.
140
 
 
Critics raise the issue of complexity in analysing international politics using the 
transnational approach.  The increase in the number of actors, resources and alliances 
has made transnationalism appear complicated.  Such a discussion can be reflected 
through Scott, who suggests the problems that could occur when there is an increased 
transaction flows in world politics including the broader and more closely linked 
international problems, and that as the number of problems increases, the international 
system will become increasingly fragile and the costs of keeping the system operating 
will escalate.
141
  
 
As noted, the key content of the transnational movement consists of non-state actors.  
The next section seeks to discuss the characteristics and roles of these non-state actors. 
 
2.2.5 Proponents of pluralism 
Proponents of pluralism usually point out the ability to capture factors and actors that are 
neglected or placed secondary by states as one of the virtues of the concept.  Pluralism 
can provide sufficient analytical tools to explain changes in contemporary world politics, 
which the state-centric approach has the limit.  It has become apparent that some non-
state actors have become significant in world politics, the concept that can explain the 
behaviour and the influence of such actors will therefore be practical, either by its own, 
or combine it with other international relations theories.  
  
Another virtue of pluralism is that it helps to reflect the role of non-state actors and 
additional agendas that states can achieve efficiently while avoiding the political context.  
Pluralism provides the tool to reflect ways in which non-political agendas can be solved 
through other non-state actors and that some of the international outcomes can be 
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achieved through other non-state actors, which the conventional state-centric theory fails 
to recognise.  
 
2.2.6 Criticisms 
Criticisms of pluralism are what realists and statists use to defend their arguments.  In 
particular, statists point out that pluralists may have over-exaggerated the role of non-
state actors.  They point out the situation in the contemporary world where conflicts and 
threats still exists.  Such facts question liberal institutionists‘ claims over the effective 
role of international institutions in reducing conflict and giving way to peace.  For them 
the pluralist view is too optimistic.
142
  Another criticism is based on the nature of the 
concept, which embraces non-state actors into the analysis.  Critics point out that 
pluralists neglect the structure of the system; by increasing the number of players in the 
system, it is even more difficult and complicated.  On contrary, in state-centric realism, 
the analytical structure is more manageable, thus facilitating scholars to better explain 
the international relations phenomenon.
143
  
 
Another critic highlights that the pluralists avoid and exclude the question of war and 
peace.  John Mearsheimer claims that liberal institutionalism only ―made modest claims 
about the impact of institutions, and steer clear of war and peace issues, focusing instead 
on the less ambitious task of explaining economic cooperation.‖144 
 
In sum, pluralism is viewed as providing a broad concept that covers the areas that had 
been neglected by statists.  The concept is divided into smaller groups, each with 
different highlights.  The proponents of pluralism point out its being suitable to modern 
international politics, where there emerges additional actors and agendas that the state-
centric view has a limited ability to explain.  The critics of pluralism, on the other hand, 
point out that pluralism is too optimistic and that it avoids reflecting the reality of 
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international politics.  This research aims to explore the influence of non state actors and 
agendas, therefore it seeks to combine state-centric with pluralist approaches.   
 
While the state-centric view and pluralism are the two main pillars of this research, there 
is the need for additional concepts to provide additional explanations on the general 
environment in international politics.  With the emergence of non-state actors, which 
have been empowered by the outcome of globalisation, additional concept that 
accommodates the increased participation of these actors should be included.  The next 
section examines the nature of postinternationalism, which is particularly useful for the 
understanding of the contemporary international politics.  
 
2.3 Postinternationalism—Combining Transnationalism, Non-State Actors, and 
Globalisation 
2.3.1 Postinternaitonalism defined and explained 
So far, globalisation, transnationalism, and non-state actors have been discussed 
individually.  The end of 1990s and early 2000 saw the emergence of the 
postinternationalist concept, largely inspired by the work of James Rosenau, particularly 
through a series of his three books.
145
  Postinternationalism highlights the challenges 
states face and the potential of emerging transnational and local non-state actors, which 
have been empowered by globalisation.  It was inspired by Rosenau‘s view that the state 
should be treated ―as only one of several types of collective ―macro actors‖—subgroups, 
transnational organisations, leaderless publics, and movements—and has itself become 
―less coherent and effective.‖146  
 
According to Mansbach, postinternationalism consists of six features, including the 
skills and participation explosion, the changing nature of security, the decline of 
inside/outside and the consequences they have to the state, the revolutions in time and 
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space, fragmegration, and global governance.
147
  These features are closely linked to one 
another; knowing the linkage of these features leads to a better understanding of the 
nature of postinternationalism.  The acquisition of new skills and knowledge of 
individuals have shaped the expectation they have on states; at the same time, such 
changes affect global security and the economy in ways that states find difficult to 
respond to, thus state authority is increasingly questioned.  Such phenomena gives way 
to an increase in the roles of non-state groups; which then leads to Rosenau‘s 
explanation of the divergence between government and governance. The term 
‗fragmegration‘ is particularly unique, and was coined by Rosenau to describe the 
condition of the postinternational world order in which centralising and decentralising 
processes constantly occur.
148
  Ferguson and Mansbach have interpreted Rosenau‘s 
argument by viewing the sovereign state as "increasingly porous and routinely 
transcended by all the major current of globalisation.‖149 As for non-state actors, for 
postinternationalists the analysis must be in the account of ―the influence and 
interactions of state and nonstate actors, powerful social movements and emerging civil 
societies, proliferating transnational and global interdependence issues associated with 
technological change, globalisation of capital, markets, production, and labour, as well 
as environmental degradation, evolving norms, and conflicting value system.‖150 
 
Interestingly, postinternationalists accepted the essences of some IR theoretical concepts.  
Mansbach and Ferguson make it clear that the significance of states as claimed by 
realism/neorealism is acknowledged, despite their supremacy being rejected; at the same 
time postinternationalists agree with some constructivist and post-modernist arguments 
over the significance of the social construction of global politics, including the aspect of 
identities as ―promoting interests and conditioning human behaviours.‖151 Therefore, the 
questions raised by postinternationalists that differentiate them from realists are more 
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concerned with governance than government, and relate more to authority than 
sovereignty.   
 
In his article the Postinternational Challenge to Foreign Policy: Signposting ‘Plus Non-
State’ Politics,152 Alan Chong enlisted five postinternationalist scholars who highlight 
the significance of non-state actors in contemporary international politics, these include 
the works of Hobbs et al , Falk, Gills, O‘Brien et al, and Wallace and Daphne.153 The 
work of Daphne and Wallace has been noted before in the non-state actor section; it 
highlights the relevance between non-state actors and how their influence can be linked 
to the postinternationalist global order.  According to Chong, postinternationalists agree 
that globalisation has empowered micro-units, individuals and organisations, thus giving 
them greater opportunity to become more involved in the areas that states find 
themselves less capable to cope with in a more complex international environment.  
Chong‘s article also leans toward postinternationalist aspect by pointing out that the 
challenges to state-centric view in globalisation context will appear in ―amorphous form 
of cross-border and omni-direction politicisation of policymaking by political players of 
all shapes and competences.‖154   
 
Most postinternationalists, including Rosenau himself, agreed that postinternationalism 
is not a theory, it is only a paradigm that explores the transition of global politics.
155
  
However, it can be seen that scholars have been pushing the postinternationalist 
paradigm forward by emphasising its practicality and how the concept can be applied.  
The postinternationalist suggestions for the theoretical framework will be discussed 
                                                          
152
 Alan Chong, ―The Post-International Challenge to Foreign Policy: Signposting ‗Plus Non-State‘ 
Politics,‖ Review of International Studies 28 (2002). 
153
 For more detail see Richard Falk, Predatory Globalization: A Critique (Oxford: Polity Press, 1999), 
Barry K. Gills, ed., Globalization and the Politics of Resistance (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), Heidi 
Hobbs, ed., Pondering Postinternationalism: A Paradigm for the Twenty-First Century (Albany, New 
York: State University of New York Press, 2000), Daphne Josselin, and William Wallace, ed., Non-State 
Actors in World Politics (Basingstoke:Palgrave, 2001), Anne Marie Goetz, Robert O'Brien, Jan Aart 
Scholte, Marc Williams, Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global 
Social Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
154
 Chong, ―The Postinternational Challenge to Foreign Policy: Signposting ‗Plus Non-State‘ Politics,‖ pp. 
784. 
155
 For example of the argument, see Karns, ―Postinternational Politics and the Growing Glomerations of 
Global Governance,‖ pp. 39.  
Chapter 1                                                           Intellectual Context and Literature Survey 
 
 83 
more in the following section; for now however, it is important to explore the critical 
praise of postinternationalism.   
 
2.3.2  Postinternationalism and Globalisation 
As noted, globalisation has been recognised by postinternationalists as one of the key 
driving forces for changes in world politics.  This is because globalisation affected both 
macro and micro actors, state, non-state actors and collective individuals. The 
contemporary outcomes of international relations among these actors are rooted in 
globalised effects, i.e. improvement in telecommunication, connections across borders 
and increased flow in materials and ideas in international stage.  Postinternaitonalists 
highlights the role of globalisation in improving individuals‘ skills, thus enabling them 
to participate more in international politics.  It is therefore worthwhile noting the nature 
of globalisation in the discussion of postinternationalism.   
 
According to Smith and Baylis, globalisation means ―the process of increasing 
interconnectedness between societies such that events in one part of the world more and 
more have effects on peoples and societies far away.‖156  
 
Scholte takes the question of border and state territory to highlight his definition of 
globalisation.  He defines globalisation as ―process whereby many social relations 
become relatively delinked from territorial geography, so that human lives are 
increasingly played out in the world as a single place.‖157  The delinked relations, which 
suggested by Scholte, therefore have direct consequence to the stability of state, whose 
one key component is territory.  To enhance his discussion, Scholte selects other 
scholars‘ explanations of globalisation, including the comment of Cox, who believes that 
the characteristics of globalisation should include ―the internationalizing of production, 
the new international division of labour, new migratory movements from South to North, 
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the new competitive environment that accelerates these processes, and the 
internationalizing of the state…making states into agencies of the globalizing world.‖158 
 
From the definitions above, therefore, globalisation involves the notion of transcending 
territories as well as the increase of people‘s interconnectness.  State boundaries have 
become blurry as there has been an increase in interactions and transaction among 
people across the borders.  The improvement of technology also makes physical contact 
also significant while making the electronic source more convenient and rapid 
alternatives.  Globalisation has made people‘s perceptions on space and time change.  
Greater spaces can be covered with less time; in addition, advancement in 
communication and other types of technology makes travelling and physical interactions 
easier, on the other hand, making it less necessary thanks to the widespread nature of 
internet, emails and good logistic services.  Communications and information spread 
quickly through news broadcast, television and diverse kinds of media; such changes can 
affect people‘s ideology and even change the perceptions they used to have about 
institutions they strongly believe in.  According to Scholte, globalisation manifests itself 
through communication, organisations, environment, production, military and much 
more.
159
  Apparently, the proliferation of transnational interactions and non-state actors 
is one obvious outcome of globalisation.  
 
According to Scholte, differentiating between ‗internationalisation‘ and ‗globalisation‘ is 
necessary.  He implies that international realm emphasises the recognition of bordered 
states, and the interactions among people suggests border crossing; on the other hand 
global sphere emphasises the transborder network.
160
  Scholte also suggests that 
―international links (for example, trade in cocoa) require people to cross considerable 
distances comparatively long time intervals, while global connections (for example, 
satellite newscasts) are effectively distance-less and instantaneous.‖  Keeping this 
distinction clear will be useful for the further effort in understanding the state-centric 
and pluralist worlds of world politics.  
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Considering the definition and nature, globalisation is important concept to the 
understanding of international politics.  For the state-centric view, globalisation has a 
direct impact because the phenomenon has challenged states‘ sovereignty and the ability 
to rely on a state-centric view as a core analytical tool.  As for pluralism, globalisation 
provides a contextual background where states, non-state actors and transnational 
movements interact; most of these actors can be arguably viewed as the outcome of 
globalisation.  For constructivists, the constitutive effects between states and 
globalisation provide a better understanding of international politics.
161
 
 
In summary, incorporating globalisation into international relations theory will provide a 
better understanding of contemporary international politics.  The next section discusses 
the effect of globalisation on international relations.  
 
a. Impact of Globalisation on International Relations 
The impacts of globalisation on international relations have been greatly discussed 
among scholars in different fields.  The impacts of globalisation on states have been well 
elaborated by Scholte, who discussed the durability of state sovereignty in the globalised 
world.  
 
According to Scholte, globalisation can affect states in three major ways: First is the 
impact of the conflict between the nature of sovereign state and globalisation over space, 
more specifically, the border. Sovereign states are territorially bounded.  This means that, 
―In order for governments to exercise total and exclusive authority over a specified 
territorial domain, events must occur at territorial locations, and jurisdictions must be 
separated by clearly demarcated territorial borders.‖162  The problem is that by the nature 
of globalisation, with borderless characteristics, the states‘ ability to control is reduced, 
as pointed out by Scholte, ―with globalisation, social relations acquire a host of 
supraterritorial qualities, and borders are transcended with a deluge of electronic and 
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other flows, crucial preconditions for effective sovereignty no longer prevail.‖ 163  
Second is that under the impact of globalisation several developments in which states 
find it difficult to control has emerged.  These developments include technological tools, 
international trade, or transnational companies, all of which have challenged states‘ 
sovereignty.
164
  Third issue is that globalisation has undermined the cultural and 
psychological pattern people have over sovereignty.
165
  Such phenomenon also threatens 
state sovereignty. 
 
Scholte‘s discussion can be expanded to see the outcome of these impacts.  First, the 
borderless information and communication and the inability of states to control it can 
negatively affects state security.  This is because states fail to monitor and control the 
spread of anti-state behaviours like terrorism, nationalism or secessionism.  Second, the 
proliferation of non-state actors and transnational movements can benefit states by 
taking over some of the states‘ burdens, but these actors and movements can also 
threaten states‘ security because not all of them are legitimate or operate decent tasks i.e. 
mafia, international drug trafficking.  Third, the loosening of cultural and psychological 
underpinning of sovereignty can trigger ethnic loyalty and religious fundamentalism, 
which can potentially overshadow national loyalty, thus threatening national security.  
 
While the above discussions emphasise the negative impact of globalisation on states, 
not all are negative.  Indeed, there are positive outcomes of globalisation on the state, 
including the increased in dialogue among states and people, greater people-to-people 
relations and good understanding among one another, and lastly, as Scholte points out, 
globalisation ―may have reduced the chances of major interstate war.‖166 
 
The nature of Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States is closely relevant to 
globalisation.  An increased interconnection between the government, as well as the 
interconnections between Thai Muslims and Muslims in the GCC, is facilitated by 
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globalisation.  In addition, non-state actors, which are key players in this regard, are the 
partial outcome of globalisation.  It is therefore very appropriate to incorporate this 
concept into the theoretical framework. 
 
2.3.3 The Significance of Individuals in Foreign Policy-Making and World 
Politics 
The contribution of individuals into international relations can be considered in two 
ways, first in terms of the contribution of individuals‘ skills into stimulating 
international interactions, and second in terms of the influence of individuals‘ 
characteristics, charismatic and personal connections in foreign policy-making, as 
practice in some cultural context.   
 
a. The Role of Increased Skill Individuals in World Politics 
The emphasis on individual skills in international relations has been greatly emphasised 
by postinternationalists.  In 1997, the work of James Rosenau and W. Michael Fagen 
highlights the increased skills individuals have obtained, which enable them to 
participate in politics more actively and efficiently.
 167
  In his research, the authors 
hypothesise that the advancement in worldwide education and the expansion of 
communication technologies are factors that have led people to be more competent 
participants in world politics.
168
  With greater accommodation from education and 
technologies, individuals have become ―more analytically competent, emotionally 
capable and politically effective in assessing events, developing alternatives, and 
execute effective political actions.‖169  The findings led Rosenau and Fagen to believe 
that improved education and telecommunication technologies, which constantly expand, 
have affected the relations between individuals and politics in channelling people to be 
more committed to democratic and free market ideology, and to be more active in 
collective action.
170
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A few years later, Rosenau‘s three books, Turbulence in World Politics, Along the 
Domestic-Foreign Frontier, and Distant Proximities
171
, which laid foundation to 
postinternationalism, stimulated Rosenau to observe the increase skills and capabilities 
of individuals, which he called the ―skill revolution.‖172  Rosenau believes that such 
phenomena have allowed individuals to participate more in world politics.  The 
participation comes in several forms; but in the three books, there was limit in which 
Rosenau was unable to devote much time on discussing in details on how and under 
what forms individuals affect world politics.   
 
Not until 2008 that Rosenau published work that gives most attention to the role of 
individuals.  Rosenau‘s proposed postinternationalism, as it has been noted before, 
devotes much attention to the contribution of individuals in world politics.  With 
postinternationalism being established, in his latest book, People Count! Networked 
Individuals in Global Politics, published in 2008 Rosenau turned to devote himself to 
examine the role individuals play in contemporary world politics.  He suggests that 
attention should be paid to individuals, which are players at the micro level, in addition 
to attention given to organisations and collectivise.  According to Rosenau: 
 
…it is misleading to think of world affairs as being driven exclusively by 
large collectivities such as governments, corporations, universities, 
churches, and the like.  Such macro organizations are surely central to the 
course of events, but so are people at the micro level.  They have become 
important in a variety of ways, from individuals whose reputations, 
accomplishments, and positions enhance their public judgements to 
people who collectively share an organization‘s policies that are 
publicised for others to consider.
173
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Rosenau and Fagen‘s argument, as well as Rosenau‘s latest books correspond to the 
political circumstances in Thailand and developing countries.  There has been an 
improvement and, in the case of Thailand, the expansion of standard educational 
requirement for citizens; therefore, compared to the past, people have acquired greater 
ability to participate and comment on politics, both domestically and internationally.   In 
addition, the greater availability of scholarships and funding has allowed government 
officials and the public to be trained, thus enabling them to acquire skills needed to work 
and make decisions more efficiently.  The major parts of policy-making and decisions in 
developing countries are the outcome of greater trainings, exchanges of knowledge and 
expertise that have led to a more precise and target-oriented decisions.   
 
In addition, the development in education has brought about some confidence among the 
population and encouraged the emergence of a new social class and ideology that can 
challenge government functions.  David Martin Jones has suggested phenomena of such 
nature occurring in Asia Pacific countries, where there has been the emergence of a 
more educated middle class, who have participated in civil society to challenge their 
governments.
174
  Similar phenomenon can be said about Thailand: as basic education has 
been enforced and made higher, individuals have been more politically, economically 
and socially active.  Individuals in Thailand have become more responsive to news and 
policy-making decisions.   
 
b. The Linkage between Cultural Context and the Role of Individuals in International 
Relations 
In addition to the increased skills that individuals have acquired, which have enabled 
them to participate in world politics more efficiently, the role of individuals in 
international politics has much to do with identity and cultural context in which the 
individuals are a part.  There is a close relationship between the identity and cultural 
context; in some cultures, individual charismatic and attached identity play an important 
role in defining the outcome of the interactions.  Undeniably, there are prevalent 
examples of how the charismatic of leaders and policy makers shaped outcome of 
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international relations.  In the modern world, in addition, there has been an increased 
importance given to shared identity, which has been used as tool for negotiation and 
political bargaining.  Therefore, in the contemporary world, personal diplomacy, 
personal connections, informal meeting and personal acquaintance should be counted as 
valid factors that affect the outcome of international politics.  It is, however, important to 
observe that while the increased skills individuals obtained have affected international 
relations all over the world, the role of personal diplomacy and personal connections in 
world politics only have been more dominant only in some political culture, particularly 
in Asia and the Middle East.  Shared identity, personality and familiarity among policy 
makers have facilitated the political process; the example is shown in the comment made 
by Gerd Nonneman on GCC States‘ diplomatic style.  
 
In the case of the GCC and its members there is arguably a further factor at 
work, relating to the nature of these states and prevailing ‗style‘ of 
diplomacy. This is the fact that they remain largely autocratic, if 
benevolent, regimes run by a small circle of royal figures who by and large 
conceive of international relations and diplomacy in a deeply personal way, 
and at the same time are not wont to delegate large amounts of authority to 
officials in important international negotiations…It also explains a 
preference for bilateral, personal diplomacy with leaders of corresponding 
seniority.
175
 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that conventional diplomacy has been developed alongside 
with personal diplomacy and acquaintance among policy makers.  While Western 
scholars have come to accept that charismatic leaders can rally popular support for 
multiple national purposes, in some Asia and the Middle East, the importance of 
individuals goes further than charismatic to include the notion of shared religions, 
interest, expertise and personal acquaintance.  Therefore, the successes in some 
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international relations in this part of the world are sometimes accounted partially for 
specific individuals who have driven the dynamism of the relations.   
 
2.3.4  Criticisms of postinternationalism 
Despite its potential capacity in providing explanations for international phenomenon, 
especially where conventional IR theories find limitations, postinternationalism has 
received comparatively little attention from scholars.  According to Joseph Lepgold, this 
lack of attention is due to the fact that postinternationalism is ―framed too 
unconditionally: the prevailing empirical conditions that must obtain for the propositions 
to hold are imprecisely or only implicitly laid out.‖ 176  To be more specific, Lepgold 
points out two key weaknesses, including, firstly, that the links between post-
internaitonalism and its relative concept, pluralism, are unclear; secondly, the 
postinternationalist assertions suggested by Rosenau are too unconditional.
177
  As a 
result, Lepgold points out that postinternationalism ―encourages unproductive debates 
with opposing schools of thought and leads neither to a progressive research program 
nor a cumulative body of propositions and empirical evidence.‖178  To Lepgold, there is 
the need to refine the paradigm to be more specific and precise.
179
 
 
Reflecting Lepgold‘s criticism, it is clear that what has been proposed by 
postinternationalists is not entirely new; instead, the concept‘s contribution is how it 
makes sense of combination of existing IR concepts.  Overlaps are visible; thus Lepgold 
is quite right in his contention that postinternationalism lacks solid argument of its own.  
It is recognised that postinternationalist arguments are based on other IR concepts.  
However, to solidify such arguments, it is important to highlight the contributions within 
those existing arguments; this seems to be missing or less specified. 
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Despite being on the receiving end of various criticisms, postinternationalism also has a 
number of virtues; these will be discussed in the next section.  
 
2.3.5  Proponents 
One of the virtues of postinternationalism is its practicality; the concept has fused 
together the essences of other existing concepts to make sense of international relations. 
The practicality of postinternationalism is most obvious as it continues to include states 
as vital players; thus the concept maintains the balance between state-centrism and 
pluralism, with recognition of how changes affect the international relations 
environment. While it is clear that the role of the state cannot be ignored in 
contemporary international politics; one of the obvious virtues of postinternationalism, 
according to Moreno, is that it provides a paradigm for scholars who aim to move 
beyond the state-as-prime actor concept, thereby enabling them to examine new agendas 
taking place in world politics.
180
 As it incorporates the essences of several IR theoretical 
concepts, i.e. realism, constructivism, and post-modernism, postinternationalism can 
also adequately accommodate the complexities of contemporary international relations 
and function better in providing explanation.   
 
In addition to practicality, another key contribution of postinternationalism is its 
initiative in molding together the micro and macro level of analysis.
181
  Despite 
recognising that there have been strong connections between the micro and macro 
political factors in contemporary world politics, explaining the connections through 
theoretical concepts has been challenging; this is because there are very few IR concepts 
that attempt to link the two levels together.  The essence of postinternationalism, which 
accepts both the crucial roles of state and individuals, clearly attempts to bring about the 
connections between these two factors.   
 
An additional virtue of postinternationalism is its highlight on individuals.  
Postinternationalism explores the influence of increased skills among individuals and 
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suggests how such phenomenon can affect changes in world politics.  In contrast, other 
IR concepts have paid scant attention to this area.
182
   
 
In summary, considering the concepts discussed in the previous sections, it is evident 
that postinternationalism can be utilised to best describe the theoretical trend of this 
research, which accepts the significance but also recognises the weaknesses and 
limitations of states in contemporary international politics; at the same time the research 
highlights the empowerment of non-state actors, be it as organisations or groups of 
individuals.  The empowerment of these non-state actors have changed the nature of 
international relations and affected the way states regard their own role and those of 
non-state actors.  The way states react to these non-state actors differ; in addition to 
being subjected to the type of states‘ policy and nature of non-state actors, it also 
depends on identity and cultural factors attached to states and non-state actors. In this 
regard, additional concepts, constructivism and cultural studies, are worth discussing and 
should be incorporated into the theoretical framework.  The next section therefore 
discusses the impact of constructivism and cultural influence on international relations.  
 
2.4 Constructivism 
According to Alexander Wendt, constructivism is, ―a structural theory of the 
international system which makes the following core claims: 1. states are the principal 
units of analysis for international political theory, 2. the key structures in the state 
system are intersubjective, rather than material, 3. state identities and interests are in 
important part constructed by these social structures rather than given exogenously to 
the system by human nature or domestic politics.‖183  Dale Copeland also points out 
three tenets of constructivism, including: the constructivists‘ view of global politics as 
guided by intersubjective dimension of knowledge, emphasising the role of shared ideas 
in shaping and constraining state behaviour; and the constructivists‘ view that ideational 
structure has a constitutive effect on states, thus influencing the way states define their 
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interests and identities in the process of interacting; and ideational structure and agent 
co-constitute and co-determine each other.
184
 
 
It is evident that state is a key analytical unit for some constructivists.  To claim that all 
constructivism is state-centric in nature is going too far.  It is true that the state is used as 
the unit of analysis for most constructivists, however the difference between state-
centric and constructivist views may be argued through the question of source of state 
behaviour.  Constructivists are interested in the way that ideational factors affect states‘ 
behaviours and state systems, not the states themselves that are the sources of 
behaviours and outcome within international system as state-centrists claim.  The 
difference between  realism and constructivism may help elucidate such an argument; 
the essence of constructivism is more ideational rather than material capabilities, which 
are where realism have used as sources of argument for security, self-interest and 
conflict.  Constructivists share basic concepts, which can be summarised in the 
description of Wendt that: 
 
The character of international life is determined by the beliefs and 
expectations that states have about each other, and these are constituted 
largely by social rather than material structures. This does not mean that 
material power and interests are unimportant, but rather that their 
meaning and effects depend on the social structure of the system.…185 
 
Therefore, if one is to take a constructivist approach in viewing international politics, the 
primary agreement is that one recognises the contribution of social factors in 
international politics.  The acceptance of material distribution within the international 
structure might vary in degree, as it is inherent in the divergence between constructivists 
who believe that international politics is constructed by ideas ‗all the way down‘ and 
Alexander Wendt who believes that international politics is constructed in a large part by 
ideational factors and in certain part by material structure. 
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2.4.1 The Role of Constructivism in Analysing IR 
In international politics, constructivists emphasise the significance of shared ideas and 
its affects on identities and interests in constructing international politics.
186
  They 
examine the way norms, identity, interests, culture and ideology influence the 
construction of international politics.  To constructivists, the interplay among ideational 
factors, shared ideas, identities, norms, culture, ideology and interests reveals other 
aspects of reality that material factors fail to capture, thus allowing them to explain 
international systems in ways that other schools of thoughts cannot. 
 
Corresponding to their perception that international politics is socially constructed, 
constructivists view identity and interests as being constructed through the process of 
state interactions, rather than exogenously given.
187
  To them, the significance of 
identities is that, in addition to helping define the nature of state interactions, they define 
actors‘ interests in the process of interactions. 188   Such a perception enables 
constructivists to broaden the interpretation and the understanding of international 
politics.  This is contrary to neorealism that assumes that all units in global politics have 
only one meaningful identity, that of self-interest states.
189
  Constructivists do not accept 
the notion of pre-given interests.  As identities depend on different environments, 
interests, which are the product of identities, are also subjected to the environment and 
thus do not have single form.
190
  In the case where there is a change in international 
politics, the ability to interpret and make sense of situation will be greater and more 
flexible.  With broader and more diverse meanings, there is greater possibility of 
understanding and interpreting the international phenomenon.  
 
2.4.2  Examples and Applications 
The way Wendt defines constructivism and the nature of his arguments suggests that the 
state is at the centre of analysis.  On the contrary, Copeland‘s explanation broadly 
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defines the nature of constructivism that tries to explore the role of other non-state actors 
in constructing international politics. Thus there is difference of focus among 
constructivists, particularly the degree of attention given to states and the rest of the 
system.  In addition to researchers looking at how intersubjective knowledge and norms 
affect the state, other researchers have explored the impacts of norms, identities and 
cultures of other actors in constructing international politics.  This includes the works of 
Marta Finnemore on the role of norms and international institutions on international 
politics, Katzenstein on norms, ideas and identity in international security, and Onuf on 
the role of rules in international politics.  
 
2.4.3 The Role of Culture in Foreign Policy-Making and World Politics 
According to Simon Murden, the building block of culture consists of ―an awareness of 
common language, ethnicity, history, religion, and landscape.‖191  Murden also points 
out that among these components; religion is the key influence on culture.
192
  The study 
of culture in international relations, according to Murden, has received greater attention 
at the end of the Cold War.
193
   
 
The concept of culture is broad, and scholars take advantage of such a fact by choosing 
cultural aspects that serve their purposes.  Cultural concepts being used to analyse 
international relations, therefore, can be found to differ from one to another.  For this 
research, the definition of culture will be quite flexible; what will be focused more is 
what culture consists of, which will use Murden‘s claim that it includes languages, 
ethnicity, history, religion, and landscape, which culminate to define human practices, 
values and ways of life. 
 
According to Murden, it is worthwhile thinking about the influence of culture in 
international relations; for him, ―Culture can help us understand why humans act in the 
way they do, and what similarities and differences exist amongst them.  The world is 
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divided into distinct communities, and taxonomy of belonging and exclusion is the vital 
job that cultural analysis can undertake.‖194   
 
Understanding the way globalisation affects global culture assists us to understand 
contemporary world politics where the impacts of multiculturalism in international 
societies, the role of religious revivalism, and the resistance of local citizens against the 
influence of changes resulted from external influences have become prevalent.   
 
The example of culture being incorporated into foreign policy can be shown through the 
work of Hudson, who argues that culture has been incorporated as one of the variable for 
national policy, under the 1940 and 1950s‘ national characteristic studies. 195  
Unfortunately, such projects had received strong criticisms over their methodological, 
theoretical and moral approaches
196
and had disappeared from the academic scene.  It has 
been picked up again in 1997 through Hudson et al.‘s Culture and Foreign policy (1997) 
in which the scholars examine the ―interface between the study of culture and the study 
of foreign policy.‖197  
 
The influence of culture in policy-making can be very well reflected in Asia and 
the Middle East.  While culture is less visible in foreign-policy making in Europe 
and North America, tradition and culture play a big role in bureaucratic systems 
in countries like Thailand and the GCC States.  Traditional perception and values 
can sometimes be reflected in foreign policy choices.  Therefore, in examining 
Asia and Middle East‘s contribution and role in international politics, culture is 
an important agenda that must be taken under consideration. 
 
2.4.4 Proponents 
Most proponents of constructivism share a common ground that ideational factors play 
as significant role, or more, as material factors in shaping international relations. These 
                                                          
194
 Ibid.  
195
 Valerie M. Hudson, ed., Culture and Foreign Policy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1997), 
pp. 3. 
196
 Ibid, pp. 4. 
197
Ibid, pp. 9. 
Chapter 1                                                           Intellectual Context and Literature Survey 
 
 98 
proponents usually point out the changes in contemporary international relations, which 
need explanatory mechanisms in addition to conventional IR theories.  One virtue of 
constructivism, according to its proponents is that it offers a more flexible, wider 
contextual understanding of international politics than conventional IR theorists.  Such 
views can be summarised through John Ruggie‘s words that ―the understanding of 
identity and interest will broaden the narrow theoretical confine to the field and allow 
constructivists to incorporate the intersubjective bases of social action and social order 
to the understanding of international politics.‖198 
 
Another factor the proponents of constructivism use to promote the concept is the ability 
to explain the international relations phenomena in way that other concepts cannot.  One 
of the most prevalent examples raised to support such a claim is the end of the Cold War, 
which they claim traditional IR theories, i.e. realism and pluralism, cannot fully 
explain.
199
  Thus it can be seen that the use of constructivism as an examining tools is 
appropriate to contemporary international politics; it greatly responds to the newly 
emerged factors, which have begun to play crucial roles in a way that never happened 
before in the past, thus making conventional IR sufficiently capable of explaining 
international politics.  
  
Another significance of constructivism is the suitability of the concept to contemporary 
international politics.  Many of international phenomena that has taken place in the 
current world politics can be explained with ideational factors, namely ethnic conflicts, 
regional groupings, and emergences of some international norms.  Proponents of 
constructivism use this concept to explain the nature of ongoing phenomena and, at the 
same time, the observation of how the world politics is constantly constructed allows 
them to be able to look into the future which they believe is constantly changing.   
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2.4.5 Criticisms 
One of the questions posed by critics of constructivism is the issue over the practicality 
of the concept, which appear too abstract to them.  Such questions have been taken on 
board by some constructivists and the concept has been adjusted to reflect a more 
realistic approach to international relations.  Such can be seen between the difference 
between the mainstream constructivists and the work of Wendt, who have incorporated 
the neorealist concept of international relations, which do not totally abandon the 
influence of states and material components in international politics.  Another criticism 
of constructivism comes from the question over the construction of argument and the 
unit of analysis.   
 
Jeffrey Checkel suggests that constructivists are sometimes unable to define and limit 
the boundary of their argument; in addition, they lack of detailed explanation on 
component of social construction, which is the core of their argument.  Checkel also 
highlights constructivists‘ failure to highlight the micro-unit of analysis.200 To Checkel, 
many constructivists fail to explicitly define constructivism, thus making it difficult to 
set limit how much their constructivist view covers. In the attacking the lack of focus on 
micro-level analysis, Checkel suggests that constructivists seek to address the 
components of social construction, namely the actors and mechanisms within social 
construction.  In addition, Checkel highlights constructivists‘ failure to accentuate the 
micro level foundation, particularly the issue of individual agency.  To him, while 
constructivists are good at explaining macro foundations of behaviour and identity 
(norm and social context), they are weak in explaining how norms connect with agents 
on the micro level.
201
 
 
Over all, most of the criticism constructivists have received has been concentrated on 
applicability.  Interestingly, it can be seen that there has been constant development in 
methodology, and analytical mechanisms within constructivism.  The past work on 
constructivism has been concentrated on theoretical content, while more constructivists 
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have applied constructivist to the real world.  Wendt‘s work, for example, is considered 
to be heavily theoretical and philosophical, thus it is not surprising that questions of 
applicability arise.  The development of constructivism is yet to continue, with 
constructivists constantly adjusting the concept to accommodate the reality.  At the 
moment, the essence of the concept, particularly the focus on the ideational factors in 
international politics, is already useful and can be used to accommodate the 
understanding of current world politics.  
 
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
With the complexity in the contemporary international politics, a single concept is not 
sufficient to explain it.  Multiple concepts that can address different aspect of 
international politics are necessary; the need of multiple concepts also lie on the fact that 
each concept has the weaknesses which leave a vacuum for further explanation.  The 
weaknesses and strengths in each of the concept can be summarised as follows. 
 
The strength of the state-centric view can be reflected through the resilience of states in 
the contemporary world, thus the mechanisms used to explore states continue to be 
important.  The weakness of the state-centric view is that theory is not entirely adjusted 
to the contemporary international politics, where it fails to capture the new international 
agenda and actors. 
 
Such weakness gives way to pluralism, whose strength can be seen through the 
weakness of state-centric view.  In contrast to the state-centric view, pluralism embraces 
more actors and acknowledges wider agendas in international relations, thus facilitating 
a greater understanding of international politics.  Weakness of pluralism is the 
complexity the theory creates, based on great numbers of players and issues involved.  
The strengths and weaknesses of state-centric view and pluralism can therefore be 
complemented with each other.   
 
The interest to examine the dynamism of state and non-state actors has culminated in 
applying postinternational concept and model; as it can be seen that this thesis has 
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shown the development in thought process and recognition of each IR theories, from 
state-centrism, to pluralism and ultimately postinternationalism, which embraces the 
essence of the latter two theories.    
 
To be able to understand the holistic picture of the international politics, the combination 
of these two concepts must be supported by the strength of other IR theories.  
Constructivism helps highlight cultural, norms and the essence of identity, while an 
understanding of the globalisation, in addition to be significant part of postinternational 
argument, allows greater understanding of the environment within international relations.  
The contribution of culture and individuals help understand the policy-making decision.  
Putting all these concepts together crates a strong and appropriate analytical tool than 
using one sole concept.  Some concepts like constructivism can appear too philosophical 
and difficult to apply when used alone, but when paired with strong conventional IR 
theories like state-centric and multi-centric, the theories complement and strengthen one 
another.   
 
That transnational forces have an impact on states is certain; indeed, transnationalism is 
significant part of pluralist and postinternational analysis.  The interesting agenda is to 
what extent these forces affect states and how much states allow such intervention.  As 
noted, the proponents of the state-centric view point out the significance of states, that 
they have been the most important and in some way defined the environment in which 
non-state actors behave domestically and internationally.
202
  With such a claim, taking 
state-centric out of international relations analysis might mean removing a big piece of 
the jigsaw, which will help making sense of the whole of international politics.  The 
crucial questions, recommended by Keohane and Nye, lie not on transnational relations 
or the state-centric view per se, rather lie in the combination of both concepts, as they 
claim that, ―It is not interesting to exclude traditional state behaviour and then study the 
residual only. What is interesting is the contamination of interstate relations by 
transnational relations.‖203  Such a claim hints at the potential use of the combination 
between the state-centric view and transnationalism.  The prospect of using the 
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combined concept has been taken further and had been adapted into the model of Two 
Worlds of World politics, which will be discussed in the next section.  
 
3.1   Rosenau’s Two Worlds Theory 
James Rosenau‘s explanations and models are used as a key theoretical framework and 
model in this research because they are seen as the most relevant framework for this 
research project.  Through his work in The Turbulence in World Politics, Rosenau 
explains the nature of contemporary and future world politics through looking at the 
existence and the overlap of the state-centric and the multi-centric worlds, along with the 
influence from the increase in individuals‘ skills. 204   In this research, Rosenau‘s 
argument on the role of individuals in international politics is not going to be focused in 
the theoretical model; however, it will be part of the discussion on the role of individuals 
and culture in foreign-policy making process.  
 
In his work, the state-centric world is termed as the ―sovereignty-bound actors‖, while 
the multi-centric world is termed as the ―sovereignty-free actors.‖  Through observing 
and interpreting the dynamism within each world and the dynamism resulted from the 
interactions between the two worlds, Rosenau points out that the interactions among 
actors in the state-centric world is based largely on reciprocity; on the other hand, the 
process of interactions among actors in the multi-centric world resembles cascades.
205
  
The cascading pattern of process within the multi-centric world has an effect on the 
state-centric world.  According to Rosenau, the overlaps of the two worlds can have both 
antagonistic and friendly natures.  Actors from one side regularly cross to the other side 
for different purposes, including for diplomatic negotiations, expertise, general support, 
resolution of disputes and so on.
206
  The examples Rosenau provides are those that show 
the intervention of non-state actors in state-centric world, including the involvement of 
Jewish organisations in the U.S. in the talks between the U.S. and the PLO
207
 and the 
cooperation between a government of one state such as China and a U.S. university.
208
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There are three parameters for Rosenau‘s argument: the structural parameter (the 
bifurcation of world politics); the relational parameter (the question over authority 
compliance among actors); and the micro-level parameter (the role of individuals and 
their skills).
209
  This research focuses on the three parameters, however, the model, 
which will be discussed in the further section devotes largely on the first structural 
parameter, the bifurcation of world politics.  This is because the bifurcated world 
concept helps accentuate the relations between the state and non-state actors within 
Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States, thus leads to better understanding the nature 
of the relations, with the question over the potential involvement of the private sectors 
associations.  
 
3.2 Proposed Theoretical Framework 
Incorporating Rosenau‘s Two Worlds Concept into the research project to show the 
interactions between the government and the non-government actors requires identifying 
proper actors within each world.  The state-centric world consists of the Thai and the 
GCC governments, as well as the states in the Muslim world, while the multi-centric 
world consists of private sector associations.  The multi-centric world in this research 
largely consists of private sector associations and individuals.  Aside from attention 
given to state and non-state actors, transnational concept is crucial because of the 
characteristic of the private sector associations in the research are transnational.  
Rosenau also recognises the transnational nature of non-state actors and how it can 
affect state-centric world.   
 
In examining the world politics, Rosenau suggests a crucial guideline to avoid being 
bogged down by traditional IR concept and less motivated in exploring new sources of 
explanation.  Rosenau called this phenomenon as being in the ―conceptual jail.‖ 210  
According to Rosenau, sometimes the conceptual tools students of IR are familiar with 
become the obstacles for them to understand the reality in world politics; this is because 
students are channelled to regard concepts and phenomenon through a traditional lens.  
While there is a virtue in recognising IR concepts in their analysis, fixing too much on 
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these concepts limit the students‘ ability to understand new phenomena for which 
traditional concepts cannot provide a sufficient explanation.  Rosenau‘s guideline to 
avoid the conceptual jail are useful for this research in that they allow the author not to 
dwell in the traditional view and to be less influenced by the tendency to treat IR 
concepts in a more relaxed yet reality-based manner that is suitable to contemporary 
world politics.  There are five key conceptual guidelines, including:
211
 
 
1. Suspend a tendency to attribute actors’ status in terms of sovereignty 
and resources, proceeding instead to identify actors by first locating the 
authority structure out of which their action emanates and then clarify 
how the structures shape the consequences that flow from their exercise 
of authority. 
 
2.  Having traced actions and reactions to structures of authority, cease 
attempting to rank these structures in a hierarchical order of 
importance ; instead, acknowledge that importance attaches to all those 
who have authority to initiate and sustain actions that extend beyond the 
boundaries of countries.  
 
3. Having accepted that sub-national and supranational sovereignty-free 
actors can be as relevant as sovereignty-bound actors, render all of them 
comparable on the same analytic plane by conceiving of whole systems 
and subsystems as the cast of characters at the macro level who, along 
with individuals at the micro level, act out global dramas. 
 
4. By-pass defining interdependence in terms of overlapping needs and 
wants by conceiving of it as existing whenever two or more whole systems 
and /or subsystems have one more of the same issues on their agendas.  
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5. Forego a preoccupation with the locus of final authority, the existence 
of sovereignty, and the capacity to enforce decisions, and focus instead 
on how outcomes are produced and /or controlled.  
 
3.3.1 The Coexistence and Overlap of the State and Non-state Spheres 
Rosenau begins his research project through examining the state-centric and the multi-
centric world separately.  He notes that each world has its own dynamism and 
characteristics.  The state-centric world is considered to be more coherent; and the 
interactions among its actors are comparatively more formal and hierarchical than the 
multi-centric world.
212
  On the other hand, the interactions among actors in the multi-
centric world are comparatively more temporary, susceptible to change; but they are less 
constrained by power differentials, formal authority and established institutions.
213
  The 
multi-centric world consists of different players, namely business firms, political parties, 
ethnic groups etc.
214
  On the other hand, the state-centric world consists of states with 
different kinds of governments.    
 
It is the overlap between the state-centric and the multi-centric worlds that is the focus of 
this research.  Rosenau points out the need for the two worlds to overlap.  Such overlaps 
can yield both positive and negative outcomes, as he said, ―…despite the fact that 
relations between actors in the two worlds can be mired in intense conflict, they do need 
each other.  Their goals may differ, but the structures and dynamics of postinternational 
politics are such that neither can sustain forward movement without some dependence 
on and cooperation with the other.‖215  To Rosenau, states have limited ability to handle 
some of the contemporary agendas, and thus the support from the non-state actors is 
significant.  The interactions between the two worlds can be difficult in some cases; one 
of the difficulties noted by Rosenau is the limitation states set for themselves, which 
sometimes make it problematic to interact with non state actors.  Based on his 
observation, Rosenau assigns the rules underlying the conduct of actors from the two 
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worlds.  Such rules are significant for this research since they enlist the factors that 
should be observed on the conducts of state and non-state actors when they interact.  The 
rules are separated into two folds, one for the states, and the other are for non-state 
players, as seen in the following: 
 
Rosenau’s Decision Rules Underlying the Conduct of Sovereignty-Bound Actors 
(SBAs) in the Multi-Centric world
216
  
 
1. SBAs yield jurisdiction, fully or partially, to transnational sovereignty-free 
actors when 
a. governments are paralyzed by prior commitments and sovereignty-free 
actors may be able to break the stalemate; 
b. the initiatives of sovereignty-free actors do not intrude upon prior 
commitment and may yield desirable results; 
c. there are advantages in a new course of action, but a public commitment to it 
prior to a demonstration of its merit runs the risk of public opposition; 
d. an issue has acquired such momentum in a particular direction that to 
attempt to curb the involvement of sovereignty-free actors is to risk 
unacceptable consequences in other policy areas. 
 
2. SBAs allows domestic demands to take precedence over external requirements 
when 
a. the domestic economy stagnates; 
b. a major subsystem becomes agitated; 
c. domestic opinion coalesces around a specific perspective; 
d. internal strife threatens governmental effectiveness. 
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3. SBAs respond to or seek out relations with sovereignty-free collectivities abroad 
when 
a. they seek to bring pressure on governments abroad and the collectivities are 
seen as having influence on them 
b. they are under pressures to do so from domestic groups at home; 
c. they perceive the foreign actors as helpful in building a policy consensus at 
home; 
d. they seek to increase their share of a foreign market. 
 
4. SBAs coordinate both with other states and with sovereignty-free actors abroad 
when 
a. a sudden crises occur in the world economy, the physical environment, or the 
social world that bear immediately upon the welfare of private groups in 
several countries. 
 
5. SBAs coordinate with other states as a means of moving more freely in the multi-
centric world when 
a. their governments agree on a course to follow, but one or more are severely 
restrained by the opposition of domestic groups; 
b. transnational interactions among sovereignty-free actors begin to impinge 
upon the stability of two or more governments. 
 
6. SBAs avoid contacts in the multi-centric world when 
a. their involvement would catch them up in cascades that run counter to their 
values and policies; 
b. to do so would be to set precedents for future contacts that are deemed risky.  
 
7. SBAs initiate covert policies and actions when 
a. the desired outcome of international situations cannot be achieved under the 
norms of the multi-centric system; 
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b. sovereignty-free actors have goals or resources that cannot be mobilized 
through conventional diplomatic channels or by accepted practices in the 
multi-centric world.  
 
Source: James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity. pp. 
307-308.  
 
Rosenau’s Decision Rule Underlying the Conduct of Sovereignty-Free Actors 
(SFAs) in the State-centric World
217
  
 
1. SFAs seek to strengthen their relations with states by 
a. defending the legitimacy of their organizational status and the worthiness 
of their activities and values; 
b. avoiding a reputation as an ineffective or unreliable transnational actors; 
c. demonstrating as often as possible a capacity to act independently of the 
state in which their headquarters are located; 
d. expanding their membership as widely as possible among citizens and 
organizations abroad and establishing local affiliates through which 
those in other countries can work; 
e. intruding themselves into situations where their values and competence 
can affect the course of events; 
f. maintaining a multiplicity of ties to other transnational actors in their 
own and related fields.  
 
2. SFAs seek to enhance their internal coherence by 
a. offering support, financial as well as moral where possible, to affiliates 
and counterparts abroad whenever the latter are embroiled in conflicts; 
b. avoiding situation that requires their membership to attach a higher 
priority to their transnational than their national loyalties; 
c. stressing their transnational ties and the benefits derived from them; 
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d. resisting efforts by governments to narrow the scope of their activities. 
 
3. SFAs seek to strengthen their relations with the state in which they have their 
headquarters by 
a. establishing a multiplicity of links to states and counterparts abroad, 
thereby increasing the costs to the host state for any effort to curb their 
activities; 
b. publicizing the contributions their transnational activities make to the 
welfare of communities in the host state.  
Source: James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity, pp. 
307-308.  
 
3.3   The Model  
To better understand the interactions between the state and non-state actors, a model is 
being created based on Rosenau‘s Two Worlds of World Politics.  Figure 1 is the model 
proposed by Rosenau on the evolution of the two worlds of world politics.  The 
contemporary global politics can be seen in the right end of the figure, where there is the 
separation of the two worlds, with diverse subgroups and actors within.  It is this area 
that this research seeks to focus.  The proposed model in this research takes Rosenau‘s 
model further by accentuating the influence of globalisation, culture and norms on the 
interactions of the two worlds.  Additional concepts are incorporated into examining 
actors in the model.  This is to correspond with the relations between Thailand and the 
GCC States, where ideational notions like culture, identities, norms and personalities 
partially determine the outcomes of the relations; thus they must be incorporated into the 
model.  The design of the model therefore has been done by using far end bit of 
Rosenau‘s Two Worlds Concept in figure 1, plus the additional environments being 
added into the model, as shown in figure 2.  The outcome is the model that can be seen 
in figure 2. Ultimately figure 3 illustrates the development of concepts and analytical 
process adapted from IR concepts discussed and Rosenau‘s proposed model.  
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Figure 1: Rosenau’s Evolution of the Two Worlds of Politics 
 
Source: James Rosenau (1990) in Turbulence in World Politics. Pp. 110.  
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Figure 2: Thai-Gulf relations Model, based on Rosenau’s Two Worlds of World 
Politics, added with external environments  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author-created model based on Rosenau‘s bifurcated world model. (October 2008). 
 
 The model proposed for the interactions of governments and non-government actors in 
Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States therefore can be seen as incorporating 
Rosenau‘s Two Worlds Model.  Thailand and the GCC States are considered within the 
state realm, and are set in different circles to illustrate the interactions between the two 
sides.  The third circle illustrates the realm of non-state actors, consisting of various 
types of non-state actors, including NGOs, corporations, international organizations, 
private sector associations, and individuals. States have different functional organs that 
need interactions with their external counterparts, thus emerge the state-to-state relations.  
Additionally, non-state actors have their own dynamism; there are constant interactions 
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actors‘ realm. Non-state actors can be seen as acting as channels that link the state 
circles together. The chance that the Thai state, the GCC States and the non-state actors 
will join together, as can be illustrated by the overlap of the three circles, should be 
increased by the increased participation of individuals and non-state actors in 
international politics.  The networks of interactions are dynamic and exist within the 
globalisation context, centre-peripheral structure and influence from ideational factors.   
 
While the model in figure 2 helps understand the coexistence of the two worlds and their 
overlap, the model proposed in figure 3 summarises the development in the view of 
international politics, which motivates the need to examine the dynamism of state and 
non-state actors.  
 
Figure 3: Thailand’s Relations with the GCC States  
State-Centric view with contributions of individuals                        Pluralist view with multiple actors and complex relations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author-created diagram to compare state-centric and pluralist view of international relations.  
 
The above diagram shows the two views of Thailand‘s relations with the GCC states.  
The first diagram shows the state-centric approach, depicting the early part of Thailand‘s 
relations with the GCC states. The second diagram illustrates a more complex system 
where greater numbers of non-state actors emerged, particularly in the form of private 
sector associations, business groups, or Muslims movements.   From a postinternational 
perspective, globalisation and increased skills have encouraged individuals to be more 
Thailand GCC states 
Individuals Individuals 
Thailand 
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Individuals  
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proactive in international affairs; in addition, individuals are more confident to bypass 
the government in the interaction process, thus greater transnational movements occur.   
 
In addition to highlighting the increasing significance of non-state actors and 
globalisation, the second diagram also highlights levels of analysis.  Rosenau‘s 
postinternationalism highlights the role of individuals; it is worth noting that collective 
individuals should be analysed as the outcome of increased skills and political activeness.  
Diagram two therefore clarifies the potential question over micro-macro relations.  
While postinternationalism focuses on individuals as micro level, versus state as macro 
level, this model seeks to highlight the middle unit of analysis.  Going back to figure 1, 
in the multi-centric world, the non-state organisations have been recognised already; 
however, the individuals were not presented in the model.  What diagram two therefore 
does is simply combine all level of analysis together; thus it seeks to bring together 
individuals, collective individuals, and state agents into the model of interactions.   
 
4. CONCLUSION  
The main aims of this chapter were to reflect on the theoretical concepts and existing 
studies that are significant to the research on Thailand‘s relationship with the GCC 
States, and to show the linkages among these concepts. The significant theories being 
reviewed include the state-centric, pluralist and postinternational views, as well as the 
role of globalisation, constructivism culture and individuals.  The theories have strengths 
and weaknesses, which ultimately complement one another.  Two key theories, the state-
centric and pluralist views, are being elaborated.  While the state-centric views should be 
incorporated to understand inter-state relations, it should be complemented with pluralist 
views, considering that in the complicate contemporary world politics the non-state 
actors undeniable become significant.   
 
 While the concepts have been examined individually, it is important to recognise how 
they are being related in this research.   The differences among the concepts mean they 
complement one another, thus strengthening the theoretical framework and model.  As 
noted, state-centrism does not sufficiently provide explanatory mechanisms to non-states 
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actors, while pluralism does; therefore in this research, state-centrism and pluralism 
complement each other for the project that examines both the state and non-state actors 
in international relations.  In addition, the change in international systems and actors, 
resulting from globalisation, has led to the need for additional concepts that provides 
explanation to empowered actors and changed environment.  Postinternationalism takes 
into consideration such change and applies the understanding to both state and non-state 
actors in a way that state-centrism and pluralism cannot.  The linkages among 
postinternationalism, state-centrism and pluralism are the focuses on the actors who 
have been shaped by the outcome of globalisation.  While the three concepts share the 
focus on actors and their environments within the international system, the concepts fail 
to capture the ideational factors that have become significant in contemporary 
international relations, i.e. norms, ideas and culture.  Constructivism has been discussed 
in the attempt to recognise the role of cultures and identity in mind.  Therefore, the 
linkages of the first three main concepts, state-centrism, pluralism and 
postinternationalism, therefore, are that they focus on actors and how they are affected 
by the changes in the environment; they do not, however, explain how ideational factors, 
caused by the environment, affect the international system.  Thus constructivism fills the 
gap and helps fulfil the task of the research project.  
 
A model that incorporates both the state-centric and multi-centric worlds is suitable for 
the research project.  Thus, Rosenau‘s Theory of Two Worlds has been useful for the 
construction of a new model proposed in this research.  The Universe of Global Politics 
takes Rosenau‘s model further by focusing on the contemporary world politics and 
including additional components, constructivism, globalisation, culture and individuals 
into it.  The model will be used to explain the case study of this research, Thailand‘s 
relationship with the GCC States, in the next chapter. 
 
By limiting the observation to bilateral relations between Thailand and the GCC States, 
as well as the relationship between Thailand‘s non-state actors with their counterparts in 
the GCC States, it will be easier to capture the dynamism of the relationship between 
Thailand and the GCC States.  Also, by inserting selected IR theoretical concepts--state-
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centric, pluralist, postinternational and transnational concepts--into the observation, it 
will be possible to identify issues at stake of the relations and will lead to a further 
analysis on the role of state/non-state actors in Thailand and GCC State relations.  This 
research, therefore, provides a contribution on three aspects: on the role of state and non-
state actors in international relations separately, the dynamic interactions between 
state/non-state actors in international relations, and on the overall picture of Thailand‘s 
relations to the GCC States. 
 
The next chapter provides historical and empirical background, outlining Thailand‘s 
relations with the GCC states prior 1997, and the position of the Muslims in Thailand. It 
is a prelude to the discussion and analysis of the state-centric sphere, including 
Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States under the Chuan and Thaksin‘s administrations, 
which will be discussed in details in the further chapter.    
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CHAPTER 2 
THAILAND’S RELATIONS WITH THE GCC STATES: 1950-1997 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Although historical connections between the Thais and Arabs can be traced far back in 
history, particularly in terms of the history of Islam in Thailand and Southeast Asia, 
formal relations between Thailand and the majority of the GCC States had just been 
established in the late 1970s, after most of these states became independent. A glance at 
the background of Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States reveals that relationship at 
people level is one of the major driving mechanisms for state relations. The 
establishment of diplomatic relations has led to an increase in political and economic 
interactions between the two sides. Even when diplomatic relations had been established 
at the early stage, state interactions were rather modest while the people-to-people 
relations between the two sides were more active and significant, particularly in terms of 
the Islamic connection and increased labour migration to the Gulf.  
 
The major aim of this chapter is to provide a background of Thailand‘s relations with the 
GCC States between 1960 and 1997.  The nature of relations after 1997, which was the 
starting point of the Chuan Leekpai‘s administration, one of the periods being focused in 
this research, will be discussed in the further chapters.  Using 1960 as the starting point 
to examine background of the relations is based on the consideration that the first formal 
diplomatic relations between Thailand and the GCC States was made in 1957, with 
Saudi Arabia, and in 1963, with Kuwait.  From 1960, therefore, the government 
relations between Thailand and these two GCC States began to take shape and there are 
several factors and incidents that worth taking into consideration prior moving on to the 
focused timeframe. This background period had laid foundation and connection for 
Thailand‘s relations with other GCC States once they became independent in 1970s. The 
discussion on background in this chapter also notes historical connections between the 
Thais and the Arabs, as well as the historical information about Islam and Muslims in 
Thailand, which play crucial roles in shaping the relations between Muslims in Thailand 
and Muslims in the GCC States in the modern world.  
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The author‘s argument in this chapter is that at the early stage, Thailand‘s state relations 
with the GCC States was not as active as in the later period; although there were signs 
that showed the potential developing trend in increased level of interactions. At the early 
stage, governmental sub-units and their staff of both regions were hindered by lack of 
knowledge among each other, which leads to little incentive to explore and seek 
potential national interests.  The major part of incentive of governmental interactions 
came from the need of governmental support in people-to-people relations.  Though over 
time, more frequent interactions, which led to increased knowledge, more positive 
attitude, and spotted national interest, have led states to develop further network and 
interactions.  By 1997, when the new government took over the office, Thailand‘s 
relations with the GCC States were at the eve of rapid growth.  
 
The chapter begins with a brief overview of historical relations between Thailand and 
the Gulf, which can be traced back far beyond the independence of most of the GCC 
States. Then it moves on to provide an overview of contemporary relations, including 
both state-level and people-level relations. At this point, the author introduces the 
government system in dealing with foreign affairs, as well as the governmental units that 
frequently interact with the Gulf States.  The next section concerns Thailand‘s relations 
with individual GCC States and significant events that affect the nature of relations, and 
whose ramifications spread into the relationship in the later period.  The chapter ends by 
discussing the prevalent knowledge, perception and Thailand‘s understanding of her 
relationship with the GCC States during this period; this would provide a solid 
background for the understanding of further relations.  
 
2. HISTORICAL CONTACTS BETWEEN THAIS AND ARABS 
The historical account of contacts between the Thais and the Gulf Arabs is highlighted 
by interactions through trade and the spread of Islam in Southeast Asia.  Though 
diplomatic relations between Thailand and the Gulf states had been established only 
during the later half of the 20
th
 century, the relationship between the Thais and the 
Arabs
218
 can be traced ways back as far as the 8
th
 or 9
th
 century.
219
  Such contact can be 
                                                          
218
 Although it was unclear of what the origins were of the Arabs who had travelled along this trade route 
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seen integrated in a larger contact between the Arab world and Southeast Asia, including 
the areas which are Malaysia and Indonesia in today‘s world.  The evidence of such 
contact can be seen through ancient trade route from Western Asia to China, which 
includes areas around southern part of Thailand.  Colonel H. Yule, who investigates the 
sea-route to China from Western Asia, upon examining the records of Arab geographers 
and voyagers, points out that one of the seas that the Arab voyagers passed through was 
the Andaman Sea,
220
 which was on the Western side of Thailand‘s southern strip. 
 
In his studies of the Malay Islamic Hikayat, Ismail Hamid describes the introduction of 
Islam to the Malay Archipelago; Hamid, through examining the work of G.R. Tibbetts, 
identifies Srivijaya as an important area where Arab traders sought harbour for their 
merchant ships.
221
  It is known that this Srivijaya was within the Gulf of Siam area, and 
many towns in the eastern part of the Southern part of Thailand, around the provinces of 
Pattani and Yala today, were reported as being included under the Srivijaya Empire; thus 
it is likely that people who lived around those areas were familiar with the Arab 
merchants who sailed to trade.  While the arrival of Islam to Southeast Asia is still 
controversial among scholars, most scholars agreed that Islam had arrived and 
inhabitants of southern Thailand had converted into the religion by around the 13
th
-14
th
 
centuries.
222
 
 
Sailing through the upper part of the Gulf of Thailand, voyagers must have reached the 
Chao Praya delta, where the river could lead them to important trade cities in the Central 
Plain of Thailand.  Thai historians claim that as early as the Ayuttaya period (around the 
16-17
th
 century), there were Arabs and Persians setting up business and trade with the 
locals along the Chao Praya river.  In one area of Ayuttaya, there was an old settlement 
                                                                                                                                                                           
and reached Thailand, it is quite likely that they were from the Gulf region, as the route passed through 
Red Sea, and that places along the Gulf were thriving in trade, namely Basra, Oman, and Bahrain.  
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of Muslims which were believed to come from the Arab World and Persia.
223
  While the 
Persians who also reached Thailand during the Ayutthaya period played an important 
role in politics and the royal Siamese court,
224
 the Arabs were not as politically active 
and were only engaging in trades. In today‘s Thailand, there are a few Muslim families 
that can trace their genealogy to those Arab and Persian traders.
225
  
 
3. MUSLIMS IN THAILAND  
The historical account of Islam and Muslims in Thailand plays an important role in 
defining Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States as well as with the Muslim world.  
This is because the historical account of the settlements of Muslims in different parts of 
the country helps explain the nature of connections between these Muslims and with 
Muslims in the GCC States; as well, historical account also enables us to identify 
groupings of Muslims in Thailand, which differ in terms of ethnicity and languages. 
Such groupings define the demographic content of Muslims in the Muslim private sector 
associations in Thailand, and, as noted, a different level of interaction with Muslims in 
the rest of the world.   
 
3.1  The Classification of Muslims in Thailand 
The classification of Muslims in Thailand helps elucidate different groupings as well as 
helps to assess the level of integration of different Muslim groups to Thai society; in 
addition, different groups of Muslims also show different levels of connection with 
Muslims overseas and the solidarity of their communities.  Scholars on Muslims in 
Thailand use diverse means to categorise Muslims in Thailand.  Some categorise them 
according to historical and ethnic background, others categorise them according to 
location and the traditions they associate with, including languages spoken and the 
details of Islamic traditions that they follow.   
                                                          
223
 His Excellency Krugrij Pramoj, ―History of Muslims in Thailand‖ (Speech at Suan Kularb Wittayalai 
School, Bangkok, Thailand, 1958). 
224
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3.1.1 Language, Ethnicity, and Location 
An expert on Thai Muslims, Raymond Scupin, categorises Thai Muslims according to 
ethnicity and language used (Thai Muslims or Thai Islam, and Malay Muslims).
226
  
Anthropologist Angela Burr categorises them according to languages used (Thai-
speaking and Malay-speaking Muslims).
227
  Another anthropologist, Sarocha Darairajoo, 
incorporates geographical location, language spoken, and ethnic background in to the 
classification.
228
  The majority of Buddhist Thais identify Muslims according to 
geographical location, i.e. Muslim Pattani, Muslim Songkla, Muslim Nakorn (from 
Nakorn Sri Thammarat), and Muslim Krung Thep (from Bangkok).  More information is 
implied within such a description, including the language spoken, ethnicity, culture and 
tradition.  Imtiyaz Yusuf, in addition to using ethnicity and language as sources for the 
classification of Muslims, emphasises the question of Muslims‘ level of integration into 
Thai society.
229
  According to Yusuf, there are three groups of Muslims in Thailand.  
The first group is the ethnic Malay-speaking Muslims in the four southern provinces; the 
second group is the integrated ethnic Malays but Thai-speaking Muslims in Satun and 
the upper south of Thailand; the third group is the multi-ethnic integrated Thai-speaking 
Muslims who live mostly in the Central provinces and in the north and northeast of 
Thailand.
230
   
 
3.1.2 Old and New movements 
The movements of Islamic groups in Thailand can also be used to classify Muslims in 
Thailand.  Scholars like Scupin, Darairooju and Tan-Mullins
231
, discuss two distinct 
movements of Muslims in Thailand, the old and the new movement.  The old movement, 
known as kaum tau, is the group of Muslims that are largely influenced by local tradition 
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as well as the Sufi strain of Islam;
232
 and the new movement is known as kaum muda, 
which has largely been influenced by Malay Muslims who have undertaken study in the 
Arab world.
233
  The new school emphasises stricter practices and adherence to a 
perceived purer version of Islam.  Most of the local people, particularly Muslims in the 
villages, do not follow the new and stricter school of thought since the majority of 
people find the teachings and ideologies of the newer movement impractical and not 
fitting into their daily living. 
 
3.1.3 Islam and Muslims in Thailand—historical account 
According to Imtiyaz Yusuf, there are three channels in which Islam came to Thailand. 
The earliest arrival of Islam in Thailand was the Arab traders and preachers during 13 
and 14
th
 century, who settled to trade in the southern part of Thailand.
234
  The second 
group was the Persian, Arab, and Indian traders who went to Central Thailand during 
Sukhothai and Ayuttaya period, the Cham Muslims who came from Cambodia, as well 
as the Indonesian Muslims who fled the conquest of Indonesia by the Dutch.
235
  And the 
third group was the Indian, Bengali and Chinese Muslims that come to the Northern part 
of Thailand during 1870s and 1890s.
236
  Some Muslim traders began to settle in 
Thailand and during the Ayuttaya period, the Persian traders became dominant in the 
Thai court.
237
  Several Persian Muslims served in the Ayuttaya court, and until todays 
there are some families descended from these Persian traders.  Since the days of old 
Siam, there were two separate spheres of Muslims in Thailand, one are the Malay 
Muslims in the South and the other are the immigrated Muslims who settled largely in 
the central part of the country.   
 
As for Muslims in central Thailand, since the Ayuttaya period, there was the 
appointment of the Shaikh al-Islam as the head of Islamic community in Thailand and as 
advisor to the King in terms of Islamic affairs.  The position of Shaikh al-Islam, known 
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as Chularajmontri in Thai, though it had been practiced long before, was made official 
through the Islamic Patronage Act in 1945; the act reflects the government‘s intention to 
create the state institution that is responsible for Muslims affairs.
238
  Thus officially, 
Chularajmontri holds the highest position in the country‘s Islamic committees; he 
provides advice on Islamic agendas throughout Thailand.  The government has aimed to 
integrate Malay Muslims into the rest of the Muslim communities and into the Thai 
society itself.  Yusuf argues, however, that the office of the Chularjamontri receives 
little respect from the Malay Muslims who prefer to seek advice from local Ulema, 
known as ―tok guru.‖239 
 
a. The Incorporation of the Northern Malay Provinces into Thailand 
In 1906, the northern part of the Malay Peninsula, known as Pattani, consisted of seven 
provinces, Pattani, Yala, Sai Buri, Yaring, Nong Chik, Raman and Ra-ngae, were 
dissolved by the Siamese military to be united as Thailand‘s Monthol Pattani.240  Such a 
process turned the Malay Muslims in the areas into Thai citizens; these Muslims, 
however, still considered themselves as Malays more than Thais.  Such phenomenon 
suggests a circumstance when ethnicity plays a stronger role than citizenship.  With the 
change in the country‘s administration, Monthol Pattani was, in 1943, transformed into 
three provinces, which are Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat.   
 
b. The Thai Government and the Malay Muslims in the Deep South 
The cultural and ethnic attachment of the Malay Muslims has caused some concern to 
the Thai government, particularly the nationalist authorities, who have tried to promote 
the collective identity through the ―Three Pillars‖ consisting of the Nation, Religion and 
Monarchy.
241
  The governments in the past recognised that the Malay Muslims had a 
low level of integration into Thai society compared to other Muslim groups.  As noted, 
the Malay Muslims respect and seek support more from the local ulema (tok guru), and 
one of the government‘s concerns over Muslims seeking knowledge from the local 
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ulemas is that some of the ulemas were educated outside Thailand (i.e. Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, Pakistan, Malaysia) 
242
and their radical ideology and networks abroad can 
threaten national security.   
 
Within the interactions between the Thai government and Malay Muslims, each side has 
always regarded the other with suspicious eyes; the Thai government has been cautious 
about potential threat of national security from the Malay Muslims, while the latter have 
been cautious about the government wanting to pressure them to integrate into Thai 
community.  Some key incidents in the past also created the division between the Malay 
Muslims and the government.  Under the government of Prime Minister 
Pibunsongkhram during the 1940s, the Rattaniyom policy, which promoted Thai-
isation,
243
 the Muslims in the south faced religious oppression and discrimination.  
Several symbols and practices that signify being Malays, including speaking the Malay 
dialect and wearing sarongs, were prohibited.   
 
Even though the rattaniyom policy has been revoked in contemporary Thailand, Malay 
Muslims continue to be vigilant about the Thai government‘s policy.  The government, 
on the other hand, has tried to promote more religious freedom.  However, there are still 
the prevalent perceptions that the Malay Muslims do not benefit from the development 
plan and benefits that the government claims to provide.
244
  
 
3.2 Interactions between Muslims in Thailand and Muslims in the Middle East 
The relationship between Muslims in Thailand and Muslims in the Middle East has long 
been established.  Within the relations, socioeconomic status of Muslims in Thailand 
largely determines the level of relationship between these Muslims and the Arab world.  
Most of the time, the elite, intelligent and wealthy were those who had greater potential 
to develop a connection with the Middle East through scholarship and the hajj.  Each 
year, the revenue from oil allows Arab states to finance Islamic education for Southeast 
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Asian Muslims, including Muslims in southern Thailand.  These scholars go to study in 
the Arab world and many have returned to become religious teachers.  As for the hajj, in 
the past only the wealthy could afford to attend and usually wealthy Muslims are those 
living in Bangkok and in cities like Yala (Muang Yala) and Pattani (Muang Pattani). It 
was very difficult for local villagers to go on hajj as they already found it difficult to 
make ends meet; so the notion of hajj seemed to be out of question.  Nowadays, however, 
the cost of hajj has become much lower, and the government has helped facilitate the 
preparation and transportation, thus more Muslims in the South have been able to go.  
The greater detail of the interactions between Muslims in Thailand and Muslims in the 
GCC States is discussed further in the next section.   
 
3.2.1 Hajj 
The hajj is an essential ritual for Muslims. Unfortunately, little has been researched 
about the historical development of the hajj in Thailand. Knowledge about the hajj 
among Muslims of Thailand can, however, be understood through the study of the hajj 
among Muslims of Southeast Asia.  William R. Roff, through his research about 
Southeast Asian Islam in the 19
th
 century, points out that the only means for Southeast 
Asian Muslims to travel to Mecca was through ocean steamboats, usually from ports in 
Singapore.
245
  Although nothing about Muslims in Thailand had been mentioned, one 
can consider that Muslims in Thailand, particularly the Malay-Muslims in the South, had 
participated in the hajj; however, the number of Muslims from Thailand must have been 
very small.  The fact that these Muslims from Thailand spoke Malay, and identify 
themselves as ethnically Malay, it may be difficult to know that they were indeed from 
Thailand.  
 
Roff‘s explanation is well supported by Jaran Maluleem, who points out that in order to 
go to the hajj, Thai Muslims had to ―travel to Singapore, which took them 7 days by 
boat; then from Singapore, they had to travel by boat to Mecca, which took them 3-4 
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months.‖246  The time it took to travel there and back and the time that people generally 
stayed in Mecca meant the journey could take around 3 years.
247
  There was no need for 
a visa.  In later periods, even though there were some means of transportation for 
Muslims to go to the hajj from Thailand, people still preferred to travel through 
Malaysia or Singapore.  Many found that travelling from Thailand expensive and 
inconvenient.
248
 
 
Raymond Scupin, in his examination of the socioeconomic impact of the hajj on 
Muslims in Thailand, points out that it was not until the end of World War II that there 
was an increase in the number of pilgrims from Thailand.
249
 While the number of the 
pilgrims from Thailand was small, those who had gone on the hajj had returned and 
contributed significantly to the Muslim community of Thailand.  They had a chance to 
learn more about Islam; some of the pilgrims even stayed longer to study.
250
  Like many 
pilgrims from Southeast Asia, throughout their pilgrimage Thai pilgrims interacted with 
local people and Muslims from other parts of the world; in addition, they learned about 
Middle East culture. Therefore, for Thai Muslims, the hajj allowed Southeast Asian 
people to know more about the Gulf, which for them is the cradle of Islam.  For 
Thailand, the hajj had led the state to recognise the need to facilitate their Muslim 
citizens fulfilling their religious duties. The later part of this period shows that Thailand 
interacted with Saudi Arabia regularly over hajj-related issues; and the interactions 
spilled over to other agreements and allowed the two states to learn more about each 
other.   
 
In contemporary Thailand, the hajj has been formally supported by the government.  The 
Hajj Affairs Support Act of 2524 B.E (1981) establishes guidelines and regulations to 
facilitate and protect Thai Muslims before and during pilgrimage.  The Act lays down 
regulations and appoints a committee to work on hajj affairs.  Now hajj affairs are under 
the care of the Hajj Affairs Supporting Committee, at Department of Religion in the 
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Ministry of Culture.  The Committee is responsible for coordinating with different 
governments and private agencies relevant to Hajj affairs in Thailand to support Thai 
Muslims going on the hajj.  To prevent pilgrims from being cheated, the Act 
recommends that pilgrims purchase services from the hajj service providers who have 
been granted permission from and been registered with the government.  Each year, a 
representative from Thailand, usually a respectable Muslim, heads the country‘s official 
hajj delegation.
251
  The 2
nd
 volume of the Act, enacted in 2532 B.E. (1989), appoints the 
Shaikh al-Islam as the official leader of the hajj delegation each year.  If he cannot go, 
the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand and the Shaikh al-Islam have to suggest an 
appropriate individual and ask for approval from the cabinet.  
 
Due to limited space, Saudi Arabia‘s Ministry of Hajj sets the quota of the pilgrims in a 
country to 1% of number of Muslims in that country; the quota for Thailand is usually 
7000 pilgrims, but in some years the Department of Religious Affairs could negotiate 
with Saudi Arabia to increase the number of pilgrims.
252
 The pilgrims usually pay 
around 100,000 to 150,000 baht (around $ 2940-4410) to the registered private agency to 
take them to Mecca. According to Ladd Thomas, the number of Muslims participating in 
the hajj corresponds to economic cycles related to the rubber industry, if the rubber 
industry is doing well, more Muslims will take part in the hajj.
253
 This is because rubber 
plantation is the main source of income for the Malay Muslims, in addition to fishing.  
The revenue from rubber plantation, which is usually larger and more secure than that of 
fishing, is saved and used to finance hajj. The saving for hajj is therefore subjected to the 
price of rubber product and the production capacity that year.   The more the Malay 
Muslims can earn from rubber plantation, the faster and more convenient they can afford 
to go to hajj.  
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3.2.2 Education 
Islamic studies are areas in which Muslims in Thailand interact with the Gulf Arabs. 
Before 1945, there were some Arabs, mostly from Saudi Arabia, coming to preach and 
teach Islam in Southeast Asia; and some of them taught in Thailand.  The province of 
Pattani in southern Thailand has long been a famous source for traditional Islamic 
educational institute known as ―pohnoh.‖  The word comes from a Javi language, 
pondok, which once again comes from an Arabic word, fundook, meaning hotel.
254
  
Many teachers, the ―tok guru,‖ are either from Middle Eastern countries or are locals 
who received religious training in the Middle East, usually from Mecca or Medina in 
Saudi Arabia;
255
 and some of them are trained in nearby countries like Malaysia and 
Indonesia.  
 
For a long time, some wealthy Muslim families in Thailand usually sent their sons to 
study Islam in the Middle East.  Some of these Middle Eastern-educated religious 
scholars had come back to teach Islam to Muslims in Thailand, while others had become 
important figures in Islamic affairs in the country. Until today, most of the recent Shaikh 
al-Islam, were either educated or had connected to Islamic affairs in Saudi Arabia or 
from al-Azhar in Egypt.
256
   Seeking Islamic education in the Arab world can therefore 
be viewed as a means to secure a good future career for Muslims in Thailand. 
 
There are a good number of Thai Muslim students studying in the Gulf.
257
  Most of the 
students receive scholarships and/or funding from Gulf countries to go and study in the 
particular countries.
258
   According to the unofficial survey conducted by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Thailand and the Office of the Shaikh al-Islam, there are about 1700 
Thai Muslim students in Egypt, 200 in Saudi Arabia, 150 in Syria, 100 in Libya, 70-80 
in Sudan, 50 in Yemen, 20 in Iran and one in Lebanon.
259
  The number is not definite 
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because it is difficult to keep record since these students do not inform the government 
of their intention when they leave the country.  Indeed, receiving scholarships to study in 
the Islamic World, especially Saudi Arabia or Egypt, has been an ambition of many Thai 
Muslim students who study in Islamic schools in Thailand and do not want to compete 
in an annual nationwide examination to enter universities in Thailand.
260
  Many Muslim 
students feel that they are not proficient in the subjects tested, which include Thai and 
English languages, social studies and Thai history.  
 
As Muslim students usually spend several years studying in the Gulf, they have picked 
up some knowledge and traditional familiarity with the region. They have had firsthand 
experience with local people.  They are part significant groups of individuals that can 
provide a good overview about Thai-GCC people to people relations.   
 
3.3 The Position of Islam and Muslims in Thailand in the Contemporary Period 
3.3.1   Islam and Muslims in Thailand Today 
In contemporary Thailand, Muslims account for approximately 5% of the population; it 
is the second most popular religion in Thailand (see tables 1 and 2 below). While the 
religion accounts for only 5% of the population, in the south of Thailand, particularly in 
the three southernmost provinces, Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat, there are dense clusters 
of Muslims, 85% of all population in the areas.   
Table 1: Religion Ratios, Based on the 2000 Census in Thailand 
Religions Persons Percentage 
Buddhist 57324600 94.57 
Islam 2815900 4.65 
Christianity 438600 0.72 
Hunduism 2900 0.00 
Confucian 4900 0.01 
Others 19900 0.03 
No religion 6000 0.01 
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Don't know 4500 0.01 
Source: National Statistics Office, Thailand. 
Table 2: Religion Ratios in Thailand by Region, Based on the 2000 Census 
Region BKK Central North Northeast South  
Total 6320200 14101500 11367800 20759900 8067800 
Buddhist 
5972800 
(94.5%) 
13898900 
(98.6%) 
11106500 
(97.7%) 
20633600 
(99.4%) 
5712800 
(70.8%) 
Islam 
  274100  
(4.34%) 
    156400 
(1.1%) 
       2600 
(0.02%) 
     13500 
(0.07%) 
2345800 
(29.07%) 
Christianity 
    64400  
(1.02%) 
     41500 
(0.29%) 
     21600 
(0.19%) 
   110600 
(0.53%) 
      6100 
(0.07%) 
Source: National Statistics Office, Thailand. 
 
The density of Muslims in the south can be supported by looking at the number of 
mosques in the southernmost provinces in comparison to the rest of Thailand.  As of 
2009, the number of mosques in the four provinces in the south, Yala, Pattani, 
Narathiwat and Satun in total is much larger than the overall number of mosques in the 
rest of the country (see table 3). 
 
Table 3: Number of Mosques Registered by Region 
Bangkok 175 
Central 194 
Northeast 26 
Upper South 755 
West   118 
North 43 
Five southern province (Yala, Pattani, 
Narathiwat, Songklar, Satun) 
2331 
Source: Internal Security Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Interior, Royal Thai Government. 
http://58.97.43.150/islam/pdf_mussayid_report?action=showFirst (Last accessed 2 July 2009). 
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The contemporary Thailand sees an increase in the number of establishments of Muslim 
organisations with different purposes, including charity, youth development, and trade.  
There has been more development in connections among Muslims, including Muslim 
newspapers and Muslim radio stations.   
 
3.3.2  Relationship between Thai Muslims and the Thai Government 
While the majority of the Thai population is Buddhist, the Thai government claims to 
have good relations with all religions.  The constitution has guaranteed religious 
freedom and the King provides support to all religions despite his Buddhist affiliation.  
As Islam is the 2
nd
 most popular religion in Thailand, and there is a high density of 
Muslims in the south, the Thai state had issued several Acts relevant to Islam to 
facilitate Muslim affairs, in additional to the noted Hajj act.  The relevant acts are as 
shown in table 4.   
 
Table 4: Legal Bodies Relevant to Muslims in Thailand 
Year (B.E. /A.D.) Legal bodies 
2488/ 1945 The Islamic Patronage Act (Abrogated by*) 
2489/ 1946 Royal Act on the Use of Islamic Law in Pattani, Yala, 
Narathiwat, and Satun, concerns the right to use Islamic law 
concerning heritage and family affairs 
2490/ 1947 Muslim Mosque Act (Abrogated by*) 
2524/1981 and 2532 (volume2) Hajj Affairs Supporting Act 
2540/1997* The Act of the Administration of Islamic Organisation 
2545/2002 Islamic Bank of Thailand Act 
Source: http://www.thai2arab.com and the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand. 
 
The relationship between the government and Muslims in Thailand can be viewed in two 
sections, first, the support of Muslims and Islamic affairs in Thailand; second, the 
support of the interactions between Thai Muslims with Muslims in the rest of the 
Muslim world.  
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In terms of the support of Muslims and Islamic affairs in Thailand, aside from legal 
bodies that facilitate Muslim affairs, considering that there is a big cluster of Thai 
Muslims in the southernmost of Thailand, the government also provides a quota for 
Muslim youth to attend college in the form of scholarships.  The government also 
provides support for Thai Muslims who go on the hajj.  The Royal Decree on Private 
School of 1982 urges that the pondoks in Thailand convert into private schools that 
teach Islam and incorporate some secular subjects including Thai language into the 
curriculum.
261
  According to the government, the rationale for such change was that the 
quality of education pondoks offer was low.
262
  According to Uthai Dulyakasem, in 1971, 
426 out of 487 pondoks were registered as private school teaching Islam; however, there 
are some pondoks that have not converted and continued to operate in the traditional 
style.  Most of the students graduating from pondoks prefer to go study in the Middle 
East, considering their lack of fluency in Thai, and lack of strong secular knowledge 
compared to Thai-Buddhist students.  
 
In terms of the government support for the relationship between Thai Muslims and 
Muslims in the rest of the world, the Thai government sometimes acts as the mediator 
between Muslims in Thailand and the governments in the Muslim countries. As noted, 
many Muslim countries, particularly those in the GCC States, have been providing 
financial support for Islamic Affairs and scholarship in the south of Thailand, and the 
government has been facilitating the contacts between the two sides. The government, 
however, has played very limited role as a middleman in this relationship. Generally, the 
relationship between the Thai Muslim and their fellow Muslims abroad is rooted in 
people-to-people relations and it largely bypasses the government.  
 
The relations between the Thai government and the Muslims may have been viewed as 
developing in a positive direction.  However, despite the view that the government had 
paid greater attention to Muslim affairs through legal bodies relevant to Muslims, there 
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has been the criticism of these documents.  One of the distinguished criticisms is that of 
the former foreign minister, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan.  In his research paper focusing on the 
Thai government‘s policy aiming to promote the integration of Muslims into Thai 
society, Dr. Surin questions the efficiency of the legal acts and concludes that they are 
oriented to benefit the government more than to serve the Muslims.
263
  The legal bodies 
indeed worked as a means to allow the government to intervene, monitor and control 
Muslims in Thailand.  National security and the urge to unify the country are the core 
motivation of these legal acts, based on the traditional threat of resistance and 
secessionism of Muslims in the south.   
 
In sum, while one may see that there has been the growth in the government‘s attention 
and facilitation to Muslims, one of the criticisms and question concern the real intention 
of the government.  National security and national unification may be viewed as 
significant factor to take into consideration while designing the policy; however, it may 
not be the only factor that motivates the government to recognise the significance of 
Muslims in Thailand.  Thus there is a certain level of recognition of Muslims‘ existence; 
but at the same time, we should keep in mind of that traditional suspicion and the 
concern over national security are important.   
 
3.3.3 Relationship between Thai Muslims and the Muslim World 
As noted, there are some contacts between the Muslims in Thailand and the Muslims in 
the Arab world. However, the contacts are largely limited to Muslims in cities, 
particularly groups of wealthy merchants, who could afford going to hajj and send their 
children to study abroad, and to groups of scholars who had gone to study in the Arab 
world. The local villagers, who account for the majority of Muslims in Thailand, are not 
linked with the Middle East; they follow Malay and Sufism-oriented versions of Islam 
and they adhere to Malayu (Malay) preaching. In addition, their aspiration to follow the 
perceived ―authentic‖ version of Islam is limited. Von der Mehden‘s explanation 
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supports the claim that there is little link between the majority of Thai Muslims in the 
rural areas with Muslims in the Middle East, he points out that: 
 
Muslim minorities in the Philippines and Thailand have, for the most part, 
lived in regions outside the major centers of commerce and international 
interaction, both begin concentrated in rural areas of the far south of their 
respective countries. At the same time, the leadership of these minorities 
and those living in the capital cities did develop international interactions 
with fellow Muslims.
264
  
 
Therefore, only the ―leadership‖ has connection with Muslims outside their country, or 
even outside their communities; and the nature of relations between those who have 
contacts and their Muslim fellows is worth noting. 
 
While it is argued that the contacts between Muslims in Thailand and in the Middle East 
are limited to only the elite and scholars, one cannot deny the significance of those 
existing contacts. According to Von der Mehden, several Muslims in Thailand had gone 
to study in the Middle East, and in addition to Islamic studies, they received military 
training and return to Thailand with radical ideology in opposition to the government.  
Many of the Malay-Muslim separatist groups have received funding largely from Libya 
and Saudi Arabia.
265
   
 
In addition to the hajj and education in the Middle East, there are other channels of 
relations between Muslims in Thailand and in the Middle East.  The support from 
governments in the Muslim states, i.e. the GCC States, has helped enabled the Thai 
Muslims to be able to interact more with the Arab world; these supports include Saudi 
Arabia‘s sponsorship of Thai Muslims going to hajj and scholarships from the GCC 
States, i.e. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt, to study in the Arab world.  In addition, 
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philanthropists from the GCC States have been providing money for the construction of 
mosques and Islamic schools in Thailand.   
 
In sum, prior to 1997, Islam has been well established in Thailand.  Islamic affairs and 
interactions between Thai Muslims and Muslims in the Arab world has been one of the 
most significant part of Thailand‘s relationship with the GCC States, where interstate 
relations had just been developed.  The next section moves on to examine in greater 
detail the people-to-people relations between Thailand and the Gulf states, which is a 
significant aspect of Thailand-Gulf states relations before 1997.   
 
4. THAI-GULF PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RELATIONS  
People-to-people relations between Thailand and the Gulf states covers the areas in 
additional to the relations among Muslims in Thailand.  The relations between non-
Muslims from Thailand and the Arabs in the GCC States also exist in the forms of 
tourism and, as noted, labour migration.  Among these types of relations, tourism has 
been viewed as one of the most progressive areas of people-to-people relations. 
 
4.1 Tourism 
Tourism can be characterised as distinctive from other types of people-to-people 
relations between Thailand and the Gulf.  This is because while people on the Thai side 
are more active in making connections with the Gulf, in the case of tourism, the Gulf 
Arabs are keener to visit Thailand. Among the GCC countries, the UAE, Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia rate among the top GCC countries to visit Thailand.  The number of 
tourists coming to Thailand from Gulf countries is largely subjected to knowledge and 
promotion the Arabs have received about the country.  In the UAE, the Thai government, 
along with the Emirates Airline, has constantly been providing information and 
promoting tourism in Thailand.
266
  In addition, the number of tourists from the GCC to 
Thailand is also subjected to travel facility, particularly transportation and custom 
procedures.  In the case of UAE and Kuwait, which rank first and the second in terms of 
the number of tourists in the GCC, there are several direct flights from each country to 
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Thailand; and tourists from these countries receive visa exemption for trip no longer 
than 30 days.
267
  For Saudi tourists, there is no direct flight to Bangkok; in addition, 
tourists are expected to secure a visa upon arrival to Thailand for a stay that is no longer 
than 15 days.
268
  
 
The interest of Arab tourists, unlike tourists from other parts of the world, largely 
focused on leisure than cultural.  The majority of Arab tourists are keen on shopping, 
going to the beach and natural sightseeing. Tourism is one of the ways where citizens of 
the two sides can make direct contact with one another; at the same time, tourism is one 
of the easiest ways to pick up misperceptions and negative attitude among people of the 
two cultures. 
 
4.2 Labour migration 
The withdrawal of the U.S. military bases during the Vietnam War in 1975, plus slight 
economic recession in Thailand greatly affected a large number of workers in the 
military bases who had lost their jobs. Figure 3 below shows that after 1975, 
unemployment in Thailand tremendously increased; and part of those unemployed were 
those who had lost jobs from the withdrawal of the military bases.  Many of these 
workers were persuaded by their former American employers to go working in the 
Middle East.  In 1975, the first wave of 984 workers left for Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain.
269
  (See figure 4, below.) In the following years there has been an increase in 
the number of workers in the GCC States.  
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Figure 4: Total Unemployment in Thailand 1971-1980 
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Source: Graph created by the author from the data from International Labour Organisation 
LABORSTA INTERNET . http://laborsta.ilo.org/ (Last accessed 12 March, 2009). 
 
Figure 5: Number of Thai Labor Migrants to the Middle East 1975-1980 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data from Department of Labour, Royal Thai Government (1999). 
 
The graphs above show the relationship between unemployment rate in Thailand and the 
number of labour migration from Thailand to the Middle East.  One can see that from 
1977 onward, there has been high unemployment rate in Thailand.  In the same period, a 
large number of people have gone to work in the Middle East; particularly, in 1970 and 
1980, when unemployment was high in Thailand; the number of labour migrants to the 
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Middle East has also gone up.  Therefore, it can be seen that perhaps there is a 
relationship between the unemployment situation in Thailand and the number of labour 
migrants to the Middle East, particularly to the Gulf States. 
 
The need to provide protection and welfare for labour migrants urged the Thai 
government to develop more intimate diplomatic relations with the GCC.  The offices of 
Labour Affairs had been established in many GCC cities, including Kuwait City and 
Riyadh.  Indeed, it seems that one of the main reasons for the establishment of Royal 
Thai Embassies in the GCC countries was to take care of the Thai labour migrants in 
those countries.  Therefore, it may be fair to claim that during the pre-1997 era, labour 
migration is one of the channels that impel the governments of the two sides to develop 
greater relations.   
 
5. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GCC-THAI DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
AND KEY ISSUES FOR INTERACTIONS 
5.1 Bilateral Context: The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between 
Thailand and GCC States 
The overview of Thailand-GCC States relations may be characterised as indifferent at 
the beginning.  This is because the two sides do not have economic, political and social 
compatibilities.  Indeed, the development of trade, labour and even diplomatic relations 
with the majority of the GCC nations did not begin until the late 1970s to early 1980s 
(see index for further details).
270
  The establishment of Thai embassies and the 
embassies of each GCC State came some time after the establishment of diplomatic 
relations.   
 
The decision for Thailand to set up embassy in Saudi Arabia in 1950s came mainly from 
the need to guarantee the flow of Saudi oil to Thailand and from the need to take care of 
the welfare of Thai Muslims going to the hajj and of the large amount of labour migrants 
from Thailand.  Aside from people-to-people relations, there was not a high level of 
interactions between the two sides.  Thus there was the prevalent perception that the 
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diplomatic mission in the Middle East state was not significant.  When Thailand was 
facing an economic crisis during late 1990s, there was even a suggestion of closing some 
embassies in the Middle East.
271
  In 1979, a newspaper article, written by a foreign 
minister-to-be, Surin Pitsuwan, reflects the prevalent perception that the Middle East is 
peripheral in the government‘s agenda. He points out that: 
 
Among the nations of ASEAN, Thailand is the farthest behind in 
relations to the Middle East. Our diplomatic personnel should be of the 
best quality. Enough of these old and inefficient bureaucrats being sent to 
fill our embassies and consulates in the Arab world. It is no longer a ―low 
priority‖ region…What we need is the best minds the Foreign Ministry 
can recruit. And naturally, more embassies and consulates should be 
opened to promote trade and good will in the Middle Eastern capitals.
272
 
 
Part of the reason for little interest in the GCC state during this time is due to Thailand‘s 
lack of information about this part of the world.  In addition, there were very few 
personnel in Ministry of Foreign Affairs with expertise in the Middle East.  Therefore, 
during this time, aside from oil purchase, which played significant role in the relations, 
the two sides did not interact much, nor had there been much communication aside from 
Islamic connections and labour issues.  The relations can be seen as though there was a 
mutual perception of neutrality between the two sides.  
 
5.2 Political Relations  
Despite starting off with low level of political compatibility and interactions, there has 
been development in political relations between Thailand and the GCC States.  Such 
developments can be reflected through looking at Thailand‘s foreign policy relevant to 
the Middle East, the prevalent perception about the region that influences foreign policy-
making, as well as some incidents that resulted from foreign policy, all of which will be 
elaborated in the following section.  
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5.2.1 Thai Foreign Policy Prior 1997 
The development of Thailand‘s interest in the Middle East had a quiet start, with some 
intermitted spark of interest from the ministry of foreign affairs.  For example, in early 
1980s, under the Foreign Minister Sidhi Swetsila, Thailand started to explore potential 
development in international relations with other parts of the world.  More high-level 
state visits were paid to different regions.
273
  A good example is the Foreign Minister‘s 
visit to the Middle East for the first time in Thailand‘s history, as described by Cheow: 
 
In January 1985, Sidhi made inroads in the Middle East—the first time a 
Thai Foreign Minister visited this part of the world. Besides oil deals, the 
Middle East is also important for Thailand since hundred of Thai workers 
earn their living at construction sites in these Arab lands; for Bangkok, it 
is also essential to maintain good relations with these staunch anti-
communist kingdoms who condemn Hanoi for occupying Cambodia and 
who wish to cooperate with ASEAN in economic development. Besides, 
they are all allies to Washington and de facto members of anti-communist 
alliance.
274
  
 
Cheow summarised the new direction of Thailand‘s foreign policy during this period, 
based on Siddhi‘s speech.  He claims that the policy was based on the three principal 
dimensions, which are: strengthening the country‘s external and internal security; 
strengthening its external and internal economy; and increasing its influence on 
international politics to strengthen Thailand‘s national and economic security.275  Cheow 
himself describes Thailand‘s foreign policy during this period: 
 
Thailand is today embarking on a new foreign policy approach, based on 
initiative, novelty, and omnidirectional overtures; Bangkok seems to want 
to take its future into its own hands. It appears Thailand has left the era of 
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―solving crises on a day-to-day basis,‖ and is resolved to play a more 
global and active role in the international forum.
276
 
 
Thus, late 1980s sees Thailand reaching out for wider diplomatic horizon. It also shows 
that during this period, Thailand was more responsive to the broader view of world 
politics, and it recognised the greater impact of the international community on its 
national interests.  
 
Thailand‘s foreign policy toward the GCC States has always been included within 
Thailand‘s foreign policy toward the Middle East.  The policy has always been heavily 
influenced by the United States.  Surin Pitsuwan, in his newspaper article in 1979, called 
for Thailand‘s modification of foreign policy toward the Middle East; he points out that 
in order to counter the rise of oil prices, to maintain good will among the Third World 
countries and to contain the minority problem, Thailand should become less influenced 
by the United States and should reassess her Middle East policy. He points out that: 
 
…our policy has always been in line with the Americans, which is to say 
that Thailand has no Middle East policy of its own. The seemingly eternal 
Arab-Israeli conflicts have never been ‗a moral question‘ to Thai leaders, 
now or in the past. We recognized and supported Israel because the 
Americans do. We have never examined the facts and the real issues of 
the conflicts. We have never had to deal with the Arabs directly, because 
all we ever need from them is oil.
277
 
 
For Surin, the first step Thailand should take is to have a clearer position in the Arab-
Israel conflict, in which he strongly supports Thailand to establish relationship with the 
PLO, the move which, to him, would win hearts and minds of the Arab states.  
 
We should seize this opportunity while we know that the Arabs still need 
us. When we have no trump cards left in our hands, no more political or 
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diplomatic bargaining chips no more leverage to promote or protect our 
interest, the Arabs will have no incentive to reciprocate our initiative.
278
  
 
Thus before 1997, Thailand‘s foreign policy toward the Middle East is characterised as 
being influenced by the US, and it is based on indifferent attitude.  Although there were 
some sparks of interest under different foreign ministers, Middle East as a whole had 
been neglected and considered as peripheral area by Thai government officials.  
 
5.2.2 Foreign Policy and View Relevant to the Middle East—Case of Arab-
Israeli Conflict 
The Arab-Israeli crisis is one of the agenda that demonstrates a diverse view within 
ASEAN nations, depending largely on socioeconomic background of each ASEAN state.  
Malaysia and Indonesia, as Muslim nations, have been obliged to show their sympathy 
toward Palestine and stand for the Arab cause.  In the case of Thailand, at the beginning 
of the conflict a large number of Thai people had sympathy for Israelis.
 279
  However, the 
1956 war, which led to the closure of the Suez canal, affected Thailand in terms of trade 
as the price of imported goods increased; and starting from 1972, when the Arab 
countries raised the oil price, Thailand was affected economically and the country 
ultimately turned to recognise the PLO as a legitimate representative of the Palestinians 
at the same time it recognised the existence of Israel.  Officially, Thailand appeared to 
have a neutral stand.  The country‘s opinion on the Arab-Israeli conflict has rather been 
following the UN position; as seen by the explanation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
on the issue: 
 
In the United Nations, Thailand supports the Middle East Peace Process 
based on UNSC Resolution No. 242 (1967) and No. 338 (1973), urging 
Israel to withdraw its troops from all occupied territories, as well as the 
principle of land for peace. With respect to UNSC resolution No. 425 (1978) 
                                                          
278
 Ibid. 
279
 Sukhothai Thammathiraj University, Department of Political Sciences, Thailand and International 
Relations (Bangkok: Sukhothai Thammathiraj University Press, 1986), pp. 183.  
Chapter 2                                        Thailand‘s Relations with the GCC States: 1950-1997 
 
 142 
calling for Israel‘s withdrawal from Southern Lebanon, Thailand welcomes 
the withdrawal of Israeli troops out of Southern Lebanon in May of 2000.
280
  
 
Thailand‘s actions supported the United Nations Security Council resolutions over the 
conflict.  At the same time recognising both the PLO and Israel had created doubt about 
Thailand‘s stand over the issue. During mid 1970s the representative of the United Arab 
Republic even inquired Thailand Mission to the United Nation whether Thailand had 
any intention to cooperate militarily with Israel.
281
 Once the representative understood 
that Thailand wished to have neutral position in the issue, the potential conflict between 
Thailand and the UAR had been resolved.
 282
  
 
The underlying reason that Thailand took the neutral stand in the conflict had a lot to do 
with the country‘s foreign policy tradition, which tends to follow major powers or 
benefit-oriented sides. Thailand was very cautious in policy-making related to Arab-
Israeli conflict.  Considering that both Israel and Arab states had been good trade 
partners, and both areas host a great number of Thai workers, it is important that the 
country appears neutral. In addition, the sentiments of the Muslim minority in Southern 
Thailand, who supported the Palestinians, put pressure to the government in its stand.  
Thus projecting a neutral image seems to be the most suitable choice.   
 
5.2.3 Prevalent Perception about the Middle East 
Thailand had been aware of the existence and sovereignty of the GCC States since these 
countries became independent in 1970s.  Between late 1970s and early 1980s, 
diplomatic relations had been established with these GCC States.  In February 1977, the 
Thai Ministry of Foreign Affair‘s magazine‘s Saranrom, which circulated among Thai 
diplomats and the ministry‘s official offered an article about the Muslim countries and 
their groupings, which mentioned the Gulf states and the establishment of the OIC.
283
  It 
was very rare that the Middle East region made their way into Saranrom.  During the 
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1970s and 80s, Thailand had limited knowledge about the GCC States because of 
geographical distance and differences in culture, tradition and religion, which results in 
little research or report done about the regions, both from the government and academic 
sides.  Therefore, at the state level there were relatively few interactions in wider 
political and diplomatic issues which might enable the two sides to learn about one 
another better.  
 
The way Thailand understands its relationship with the Gulf, which resulted in its 
foreign policy and nature of interactions with these states, can be reflected in a speech 
given by Chaiwat Satha-Anand, who argued that Thailand was confused over the 
concept of unified nation-states. It viewed that the unified nation-state equates unified 
society.
284
 With such view, Buddhism and traditional Thai culture is viewed as 
dominating the Thai society; thus, any other tradition and cultures are being frown upon 
or excluded.  In discussing Thailand‘s identity, Craig Reynold points out that throughout 
history, Thailand has kept the Arabs and other foreigners at its arm length.
285
  This is 
reflected in the way that Thailand conducts its foreign policy, in which Thailand prefers 
to interact with traditional allies who policy makers are familiar with.  In the case of 
Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States, there had been little accumulated knowledge, 
of the region, nor had there been much enthusiasm from policy makers; thus, the 
comfort zone is neutral and indifferent.   
 
5.2.4 Political Interactions between Thailand  and the GCC States 
In terms of interactions between Thailand and each GCC State, there had been some 
exchanges in visits between Thailand and the GCC States already; however, there were 
not many of the visits.  The recorded significant visits are noted by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  Most of the visits were to explore potential trade and investment 
opportunities as well as political cooperation.  The table below (table 5) shows selected 
high level state visits during the pre-1997 period.  
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Table 5: Selected High Level State Visits between Thailand and the GCC States 
Meeting Purpose Date  Location 
Thailand‘s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs to Bahrain 
Strengthened relations between 
Thailand and Bahrain, sought 
expansion in trade 
1984 Bahrain 
Dr.Rasheed Al-Ameeri of 
Kuwait Ministry of Oil and 
Thai Governmental 
representative 
Asked for Thailand‘s support 
for Kuwait‘s sovereignty and 
confirmed Kuwait‘s interest in 
investment in Thailand 
31 Aug-4 Sep 
1984 
Bangkok 
Representatives from 
Petroleum Authority of 
Thailand and staffs from 
The Omani Ministry of Oil  
Negotiated Thailand‘s oil 
purchase contract 
1986 Oman 
Thailand‘s Minister of 
Interior to Qatar 
Strengthened bilateral relations 
and visited Thai workers 
1987 UAE 
Thailand‘s Minister of the 
Prime Minister‘s Office and 
Kuwait‘s Prime Minister 
and Crown Prince 
Confirmed good relations after 
the end of Kuwait War 
1991 Kuwait 
Dr.Ali Ahmad Al-Gaghli 
from Kuwait‘s Minister of 
oil and Thailand‘s Minister 
of Industry 
Exchanged ideas on cooperation 1993 Bangkok 
Thailand‘s Deputy Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and UAE 
governmental officers and 
businessmen 
Explored possibility to expand 
trade, investment and tourism 
cooperation 
1993 Dubai, 
UAE 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
Compared to other parts of the world, however, the level of political interactions 
between Thailand and the GCC States is relatively low. The content of the interaction 
was mostly concerned with trade, labour and oil contract.  As noted, lacking political 
and cultural compatibilities means that there are few driving forces that impelled the two 
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sides to politically interact.  Before 1997, interaction with Saudi Arabia can only be 
viewed as significant.  There were several channels of interactions with Saudi Arabia, 
including trade and Islam.  During the 1980s the Saudi Development Fund provided 
financial support for the Lignite Electricity Plan in northern Thailand.
286
 
 
5.3   Economic Relations 
Thailand has a long history of economic interactions with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
which can be traced back to 1950s.
287
 With other GCC States, economic interactions 
with Thailand began after their independences. Trade is one of the obvious aspects that 
point out the ascending nature of relations between Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern 
nations, and that Thailand‘s trade with the Middle East has been relatively active and 
progressive. The figure below (figure 5) shows data on trade between the Middle East 
and Southeast Asian nations between 1950 and 1980.  
Figure 6: Southeast Asian Export to the Middle East 1950-1980 (by each Southeast 
Asian country) 
Southeast Asian Exports to the Middle East 1950-1980
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From the graph, export between Southeast Asian countries to the Middle East started to 
rise during the late 1960s and dramatically increased after 1973; an increase in exports is 
obvious in every country shown, but Thailand‘s export has been relatively higher than 
other states.  Such demonstration supports Reich and Silverburg‘s claim that Southeast 
Asian countries became interested in the Middle East around 1973.
288
  The rise in export 
can also be explained through the emergences of newly independent Gulf States, who 
needed more raw products and exports from Southeast Asia; or perhaps it is the 
recognition of the significance of the region under the 1973 oil crisis.  Thailand, due to 
her being independent, had begun trading with the Middle East around mid 1950s.  
Through the observation of 1973 onwards, Singapore ranks the first among Southeast 
Asian nations in her export values with the Middle East, while Thailand and Malaysia 
rank second and third.  This is because Singapore has for a long time been an important 
port of Southeast Asia and it is a convenient gateway to for re-exporting to the Middle 
East though Indian Ocean.  Interestingly, Malaysia has been fast catching up with 
Thailand in terms of exporting despite the fact that it began trading a decade later than 
Thailand, around 1967.
289
 Indonesia and Philippines, despite smaller export values 
compared to other countries, have started trading with the Middle East before the others.  
In the case of Indonesia, the early trade must be driven by Muslim merchants and 
historical contacts with the Middle East; and in the case of Philippines the early trade 
must come from the country‘s early independence and contacts between Middle East 
merchants and local Muslims.  
 
Trade between Thailand and the GCC States had always been concentrated on 
Thailand‘s import of crude oil and GCC States‘ import of industrial products, food and 
agricultural products.
290
  Labour migration is the other crucial factor of economic 
interactions between the two sides. While the GCC States needed to diversify their 
economies and to maintain their petroleum production, they demanded for foreign 
workers.  Labour migration to the GCC States had helped lower Thailand‘s 
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unemployment rate, as well as enhancing the country‘s GDP by their remittances. 
Labour migration has played an important part of in stimulating in inter-governmental 
relations.  
 
The economic relations between Thailand and the GCC States during this period can be 
considered relatively significant, compared to political relations. Economic relations can 
be linked with both political and people-to-people relation. It is an important factor that 
stimulates the relationship between Thailand and the GCC States both during that period 
and in the period to come.  
 
6   SIGNIFICANT TRANSNATIONAL FACTORS THAT AFFECTED THE 
INTERACTIONS  
 
6.1   Kuwait War  
Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait, which escalated into Kuwait War in 1991, disrupted 
Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States, particularly in terms of trade and labour 
relations. In terms of labour export from Thailand, in 1990, the number of Thai labour 
migrants dropped severely from the year earlier.
291
  The severe reduction of labour 
migrants was also due to the ramifications of the Saudi Jewellery theft issue, which 
caused Saudi Arabia to ban Thai workers to enter the country which will be discussed in 
the next section. 
 
6.2   Saudi Jewellery Theft 
The case of Saudi jewellery theft largely demonstrates how unmonitored people-to-
people relations can affect state relations. In the particular case, the relationship between 
Thailand and Saudi Arabia was undermined when a Thai worker stole jewellery worth 
about US 142 millions
292
 from the palace of Prince Faisal in Saudi Arabia.  The theft 
was followed by the murder of two Saudi diplomats and two businessmen.
293
  Thai 
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jewellery dealers were investigated and later one was murdered, along with his family. 
The Thai authorities during that time, after investigation, had claimed to retrieve the 
jewellery, but once they were returned to Prince Faisal, it was found that some of them 
were forged.
294
  Saudi Arabia‘s frustration with the Thai authority‘s inability to 
investigate the murders, along with the inability to return the jewellery to Saudi Arabia 
led the country to call back its ambassador.
295
  The relations between the two countries 
was reduced and until today it was not been fully normalised.  Since early 1990s until 
now, there is only a charge d‘affairs in the Saudi Embassy in Thailand.  Saudi Arabia 
has not been granting visas for Thai workers. 
 
Until today, the Saudi jewellery theft has not been resolved, and the relationship 
between Thailand and Saudi Arabia has not resumed to the same level prior to the 
incident. The ramification of the incident, however, lasts and affects the nature of 
Thailand‘s relations with Saudi Arabia in the further period, which will be discussed 
further.  
 
The graph below (figure 7) shows that both the Kuwait crisis and the Saudi jewellery 
theft affected Thailand‘s relations with the Middle East. The most obvious impact can be 
seen on the drastic reduction of labour migrants to the Middle East. It is obvious that the 
drastic change in number of labour migrant from Thailand during this period is largely 
the result of Saudi Arabia‘s changing attitude toward Thailand. The political 
ramifications of the event have lasted for a long time and it will take much effort on the 
Thai side to improve the relations with Saudi Arabia, as will be discussed in further 
chapters.  
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Figure 7: Thai Labour Migrants to the Middle East 
Thai Labour Migrants to the Middle East 1982-2000
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7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides historical background information on Thailand‘s relations with the 
GCC States prior to 1997.  It is clear that the diplomatic relations between Thailand and 
most of the GCC States, with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, did not begin 
until late 1970s.  Despite the lack of official state relations, the people-to-people 
relations between Thailand and the GCC States were dynamic.  Even before the 
independence of the small Gulf States, relations between Thailand and the Gulf region 
can be explored through the context of people-to-people relations, particularly through 
the Islamic connections.   
 
It can be seen that Islam is a vital part of people-to-people relations between Thailand 
and the GCC States, particularly in the case of Saudi Arabia, in which the hajj and 
Islamic education have long been the core of the people relations between the two 
countries.  In an attempt to understand Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States, it is 
therefore significant to explore Islamic and Muslim relations within the Middle East 
region.  The historical account and characteristics of Muslims in Thailand enable us to 
understand the linkage between Thailand and the GCC region, which have existed prior 
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to official diplomatic relations; in the contemporary period, the understanding of the 
classification of Muslims in Thailand also allows us to understand the groupings and 
socialisation of Muslims in Thailand, particularly in terms of Muslim private sector 
associations in Thailand.  
 
Thailand‘s relationship with the GCC States just before the Chuan administration began 
in 1997 can be considered as neutral.  The survey of state relations reveals that prior to 
1997, Thailand‘s attitude toward the Middle East and the GCC region leans toward 
indifference.  The Middle East and the GCC States received very little attention from the 
Thai government, in which there was the lack of staff and expertise in the areas.  Thus 
the result was low level of exchange in visits to the Middle East compared to exchanges 
in visits in other regions of the world.  The Gulf war and the Saudi jewellery theft have 
brought a negative image of Thailand to the Gulf States; worse was the deteriorated 
relations between Thailand and Saudi Arabia.   
  
As this section has set the foundation for the theoretical and empirical analysis of 
Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States, the next part of the research embarks on 
examining the state-to-state relations; within it are the next chapters that will 
demonstrate how the Thai state moved away from the point of indifference to more 
dynamic interactions with the GCC States. 
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PART 2 
STATE REALM 
 
The previous part provided the setting for the nature of Thai politics at the beginning of 
1997; it can be seen that Thailand‘s relations with the Muslim world were traditionally 
driven by people to people relations and Islam.  From 1997 onwards, however, it will be 
seen that the Thai state became more in charge of Thai-GCC State relations.  As the 
Chuan administration took over the office that year, there was the change in perception 
toward the Middle East and other regions that were once perceived as peripheral.  Asian 
economic crisis, which partially causes the urge to expand economic relations, plus 
increased path-crossing at international stages, had motivated Thai and Arab policy 
makers to interact more with each other.  The period between 1997 and 2001 clearly 
show the trend in the development in relations between Thailand and the GCC States.  
Between 2001 and 2006, under Thaksin administration, Thailand‘s relations with the 
GCC States were dramatically improving, thanks to the foundation laid from the 
previous administration, and the expansion of international trade in the new 
administration.  The incidents in the southern Thailand, which intensified during 
Thaksin administration, however, can be considered as one of the key factors that 
challenged the strength of relations between Thailand and the Muslim world.  
 
Equipped with theoretical concepts discussed in the previous part, the following chapters 
embark on exploring the interactions between the Thai and GCC States as well as to 
explore the context in which the Thai and GCC States interact. This part focuses on how 
states became more involved in the relations and had taken the relations to another level 
by means of foreign policy and agreements, increased state visits, and trade promotions.  
The contexts in which the Thai and GCC States interact also play an important role in 
the nature of relations between the two sides.  Globalisation, economic development, 
and the improvement in telecommunication have made state interactions more efficient.  
At the same time, globalisation and economic development have improved the well 
being and skills of individuals, allowing them to participate more actively in domestic 
and international politics.  The new factors that have emerged to challenge states include 
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pressure from social groups, identity questions, and states declined ability to keep all 
channel of state relations in check.     
 
The focus of this part is therefore a state-centric approach, with attention to the 
mechanism modern states use to develop relations with other states, including diplomacy, 
national security and interests, trade and international institutions.   The discussions 
focus on the characteristics of the modern states and their functions, as well as the way 
these states respond to the challenge that potentially undermined their sovereignty.   
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CHAPTER 3 
THAILAND-GULF STATES RELATIONS 1997-2001 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Although it may be perceived as ―smooth and non-problematic,‖296  the relationship 
between Thailand and the Gulf states prior 1997 had traditionally been viewed as 
peripheral by the Thai administrations.  At the non-government level, however, the 
relationship between Thailand and the Gulf states was significant, particularly at people-
to-people relations and at the links between Muslims in Thailand and in the GCC States; 
such relations had drawn the state to be involved, and thus the traditional state-centric 
relations became more relevant.
297
  State-centric relations became gradually significant 
when Thailand started to import more oil with the GCC States as well as when there was 
the need to draw cooperation with these states in terms of security issues.  Before 1997, 
therefore, the relations between Thailand and the GCC States can be viewed in two ways. 
At the non-state relation level, the relationship continued to be significant; though at the 
state-centric relations level, diplomatic relations and other conventional state relations 
mechanisms only began to receive attention from the administration, whose view on this 
region had been limited.  
 
Since the level of interaction with the GCC States prior to 1997 was limited, the 
department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bangkok that was responsible for the 
GCC regions was small, inactive and understaffed.
298
  High-ranking state visits were 
rare and mostly concerned oil trade.  The prospect to expand trade was small.  The 
number of experts in the field of the Middle East was few.  The region of the Middle 
East was little known to the Thais; and the motivation to expand diplomatic relations 
through functional state-centric mechanisms, asides from non-state agenda was limited.   
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The Asian Economic crisis in 1997 urged the newly elected administration of Chuan 
Leekpai to issue a national policy that geared toward resolving the economic problems 
and the affected areas.  Foreign-policy making was also influenced by economic crisis, 
resulting in the expansion of diplomatic horizon with oversea states.  The need to seek 
support from the international community and to expand trade to bolster the economy 
had been the key agenda of this administration.   
 
This chapter seeks to analyse the nature of Thailand‘s relationship with the GCC States 
during the Chuan administration between 1997 and 2001.  Changes from the pre-1997 
period will be highlighted.  The first section will provide an overview of Thailand‘s 
foreign policy under the Chuan administration and then the attention will shift to the key 
driving forces for Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States.  With key driving forces 
identified, the next section seeks to explore the overall picture of Thai-GCC States 
relations, and then move to explore the bilateral relations.  As one of the key changes in 
Thai foreign policy is to be more proactive at the international level, the last chapter 
explores how Thailand‘s relationship with selected international organisations facilitated 
Thailand‘s position in global politics as well as greater access to the relationship with 
the GCC States and the Muslim world.   
 
2. THAILAND’S FOREIGN RELATIONS UNDER CHUAN  
In November 1997, Chuan Leekpai delivered his policy statement to the Thai Parliament.  
Among several proposals, the policy statement on foreign policy suggests that the 
government aims to: 
 
 Encourage greater relations, and economic cooperation, with important trade 
partners. Support fair trade competition. Take part in reducing international 
conflicts resulted from trade and investment, as well as take part in the protection of 
property rights. 
 Encourage economic, academic, cultural and tourism cooperation as well as human 
development with other countries, with particular emphasis on sub-regional 
cooperation. 
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 Take part in international stage in protecting and promoting democracy and human 
rights. 
 Facilitate, protect, and promote rights and benefits of Thai citizens, workers and 
private businessmen abroad. 
299
 
 
In the foreign policy proposals of the Chuan administration, two agendas are relevant to 
the design of foreign policy: the need to recover from the economic crisis, and the urge 
to become increasingly globally active. Chuan Leekpai took the office immediately after 
the Asian economic crisis broke out; it was crucial for the government to bring back 
domestic and international confidence back to the economic status of the country, as 
well as to increase national revenues. International trade is a significant source of 
income and the government aimed to bolster trade expansion to new and existing 
markets.  
 
Taking an active role globally has been a strategy to deal with the consequences of the 
economic crisis, as well as to enhance the political stand of Thailand in global politics. 
With lingering consequences of the economic crisis, the international supports are 
important to Thailand.  The IMF, in particular, stepped in to help resolve the crisis.  By 
taking part in international stages, Thailand demonstrates to the global community its 
eagerness to enhanced diplomatic relations and uphold of international principles, as 
well as its willingness to improve its economic conditions; this facilitates bilateral 
relations with other countries, particularly with those whose relations had been 
constrained like Saudi Arabia. It also allows Thailand to present its stand, thus revealing 
Thailand‘s gesture of friendliness and supports for the call of some countries, for 
example the Palestinian issues.  This discussion can be summarised through the then 
foreign minister‘s recount of Thailand‘s role in international stage during his office: 
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Before my administration, Thailand faced a problem; we lacked the stage 
and stand that we belonged. We did not have any idea of what we should 
hold on to or to promote. When I came to office, I questioned why could 
not we create our own stage to discuss the issue we cared about… we 
became membership and joined most of the organizations like OAS, 
OSCE. We became observers of OIC. With the GCC States, under my 
administration; we invited them to the UNCTAD conference. There were 
more high-level visits during this time.  Then we had more friends and 
became more accepted internationally.
300
 
 
Having an active role in the international stage has been new to Thailand; however, it 
had been welcome by the international community as much as high-level officers within 
the foreign ministry.  In an interview with a journalist over the priority of Thailand‘s 
mission in New York, the Thai ambassador to the UN then pointed out that:  
 
Sometimes they [the government] don‘t have priorities. But this 
government does. For the first time it is stated in the foreign policy 
statement to parliament. We say something about human rights, we say 
something about environmental policies…we have three important issues 
in the UN which the Thai government adheres to, which has never 
happened before. The work at the UN is basically to make your views, 
positions or stands known on various issues. Either you promote your 
stand or you defend your stand.
301
 
 
Thailand under this administration had therefore demonstrated increased participation at 
the international stage; and the government became much clearer about Thailand‘s 
priorities in global politics. The nature of Thailand‘s status became more active in 
international agendas.  The next section will examine how the foreign policy statement 
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delivered by the Chuan administration had been made relevant to Thailand‘s relationship 
with the GCC States.  
 
2.2   The Palestinian Issue 
Thailand‘s stand on the Palestinian issue was in favour of peaceful settlement, as it 
always voted in favour of the UN resolutions on the Middle East peace settlement.
302
  In 
addition, under the Chuan administration, the country took a further step by becoming 
more visible in the support for the settlement.  This can be seen through more frequent 
statements delivered in support of the process. In 1998, a Thai representative, Asda 
Jayanama, made a statement during the United Nations Assembly on the situation in the 
Middle East. Representing Thailand, Asda suggested that, ―…all sides must make efforts 
to remove obstacles and implement all the agreements reached, as soon and as 
thoroughly as possible. Terrorism and acts of violence in any form or manifestation must 
cease.‖303  Asda also reaffirmed Thailand‘s support for ―the inalienable rights of the 
Palestinian people and for the Middle East peace process,‖ which are based on the UN 
Security Council resolutions 242, 338, and 425.
304
  
 
It is clear that Surin Pitsuwan, then foreign minister, played an important role in 
channeling the country‘s more outgoing role on the Palestinian issue. As noted before, in 
1979 Surin wrote an article suggesting that Thailand adjust its attitude on the Palestinian 
issue, from traditionally following the view of the United States, which leaned toward 
Israel, to finding its own stand by considering the historical account and the human 
rights agenda.
305
  In addition, Muslim associations in Thailand also pressured the 
government to take a more active stand in the issue. 
 
The commitment to promote the principle of human rights also encouraged Thailand‘s 
support for the peace process in the Middle East.  Several of the foreign minister 
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speeches reflected the importance this administration focused on human rights, which 
extended to imply Thailand‘s support for the peace process. Thailand even stepped up to 
call for international support for human rights; this can be seen through Surin‘s 
statement, delivered during the 2000 United Nations General Assembly: 
 
Thailand therefore calls upon the international community to renew its 
commitment to promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, in order to ensure that people's interests and welfare are indeed 
at the centre of our policies and programs. It is with this conviction that 
Thailand commits itself to playing an active and responsible role within 
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights….we will continue to 
give our full support to the efforts of the United Nations to the protection 
and promotion of basic human rights, freedoms and dignity.
306
 
 
Fitting human rights promotion to the promotion of the peace process in the speech at 
the international stage was not the only thing the government did, it went further by 
pointing out that the support for the process was natural for the Thais, for the human 
rights concept had long been internalised within the Thai society.  Therefore, the 
government‘s support naturally reflected the opinion of the Thais, as shown in this 
speech: 
 
This [human right] is a subject that has always been close to the hearts of 
the Thai people and the present Thai Government. While human rights 
may be viewed by some as a luxury of rich countries or as a ―Western‖ 
value alien to Eastern Societies, I would say that human rights have been 
instilled in the Thai tradition and Thai society for a very long time. Thai 
people have always been known for their love of liberty and freedom as 
well as their respect for other people‘s rights.307  
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Therefore, the promotion of human rights, the support for the peace process had been 
put together and delivered through international audience, pointing out how Thailand 
and its people had accommodated such ideas.  
 
To evaluate the success of Thailand‘s support for the peace process is to see how it 
helped facilitate Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States. It can be seen that, as noted, 
such move reveals Thailand‘s gesture of goodwill for peace and well being of people in 
the Middle East who were affected by the issue.  The Middle East peace process had 
been the significant agenda in almost all high-level state visits to the GCC States, where 
both Thai and GCC leaders found a common ground, thus led to cordial relations.  For 
example, during the foreign minister‘s tour of GCC regions in June and November 1998, 
the Palestinian agendas had been the topic for conversation with leaders from Qatar, 
UAE and Kuwait.
308
  The promotion of the peace process also helped the government 
domestically by creating positive attitude with the domestic Muslim groups who had 
been pressing the government on the topic.  
 
2.3   Look West Policy 
The ―Look West policy‖ was launched in 1997. The two main objectives of the policy 
are ―to strengthen the existing bilateral relations with South Asia, the Middle East and 
Africa,‖ and to ―seek potential markets and investment opportunities in these areas of 
the world.‖309  The policy is aimed for Thailand to ―cope effectively and efficiently with 
the rapid changes in the international political and economic environment in accordance 
with the reality of the post-Cold War‖310 and to reflect upon Thailand‘s recognition of 
―promising economic potential of other regions beyond the region of Southeast Asia.‖311  
 
Misunderstandings about the Look West policy is that it was launched during the Chuan 
administration, thus giving the administration faulty credit as the mover to expand 
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diplomatic horizon through this policy.  Indeed, the policy had been planned and 
launched since the previous administration, but in the same year the Chuan 
administration came to the office in 2001.  The underlying aim was to expand markets 
for Thai goods; therefore, the expansion of foreign relations is a necessary gateway.  The 
rationale for the Chuan administration to taking on the policy is because the policy 
corresponds to the government‘s aim in becoming active in the international community, 
as claimed by Surin in the interview that:  
 
We can say that Look West policy is our effort to bring back our 
confidence as a nation. The more friends and support we get at the 
international stage, the more confidence we will have. And friendship 
with the Middle East states can do that.  Also part of the Look West 
policy is to create friends, friendly blocks in the global stage. That will 
help enhance our confidence in the global stage.
312
 
 
Through the interview, Surin, however was not specific of the region Look West policy 
focuses. Despite the Ministry suggests that the policy covered the Middle East, South 
Asia and Africa, the survey of international interactions between 1997 to 2001 reveals 
that there was comparatively low dynamism between Thailand and the GCC States 
within the Look West policy framework.  Much of the attention within the Look West 
policy had been given to South Asia, particularly India.  This is reflected through several 
projects Thailand had initiated with India, including the BISEC project, which linked 
Thailand with countries in South Asia, including India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka.  Within the Foreign Ministry itself, staff are more familiar with the Look West 
Policy as oriented toward India more than the Gulf States
313
.  On the other hand, there 
was neither a significant initiated plan nor an investment with the GCC States, despite an 
economic boom within that region.  
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In assessing the impact of the Look West policy on the Gulf States during Surin‘s 
foreign administration, many academics are sceptical about the practicality of the policy. 
A scholar commented that, ―The Look West Policy is really a show case. It is not 
practical at all. It looks nice, but it is difficult to implement.‖314 Other academic points 
out that the Look West policy did not get implemented with the Middle East because of 
the lack of knowledge about the Middle East and because ―we [the Thais] found it is 
easier to interact with India, but we do not know much about Arab culture.‖315 Thus 
limited knowledge is one of the factors that impeded and discouraged the motivation to 
initiate any project in the GCC States.  
 
On the surface, the Look West policy may appear as the government‘s tool to expand 
diplomatic relations with the GCC States and the Middle East; however, the newspaper 
sources and the discussion with anonymous informants reveal that under the Chuan 
administration, the role of the Look West policy toward the GCC States, or even the 
Middle East as a whole, was comparatively marginal, when compared with its role in the 
South Asia region.  Two prevalent criticisms can be given to this policy during this time 
period: first, that the policy lacks practicality in the Middle East, this is because there are 
no sufficient staff or knowledge to implement the policy in the region, second that the 
policy had given much more weight to South Asia.  
 
Therefore, in looking at the relevance of the Look West policy to Thailand‘s relationship 
with the GCC States under this administration, it is fair to say that under the Chuan 
administration, the policy has very little impact to the GCC States.  The bilateral 
relations that occurred were not based on the policy, but rather on other factors, which 
have long been the important factors for the relations.  These factors will be discussed in 
the next section.  
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3. KEY DRIVING FORCES—AN ASSESSMENT 
3.1   Oil Consumption 
Thailand‘s consumptions of crude oil had increased constantly. In 1991, crude oil was 
the 7
th
 most important imported good in Thailand; however, in 1997 it moved to the 3
rd
 
place, and in 2000 it was the 2
nd
 most important imported goods.
316
  This demonstrates 
that the consumption has constantly increased. Figure 7 below shows that starting from 
late 1990s; the dispersion between Thailand‘s oil consumption, and production capacity 
started getting wider. Thus the demand for imported crude oil, which has always been 
high, became even higher.   
 
Figure 8: Thailand’s Crude Oil Production, Consumption and Net Import (1980-2005) 
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Source:.Author-created diagram based on information from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=54&aid=2 (Last accessed 7 July 
2009).  
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Figure 9: Thailand’s Top Ten Sources of Imported Crude Oil 1991 (in percentage) 
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Source: Author-created diagram based on data from the Ministry of Commerce, Royal Thai Government. 
http://www.moc.go.th/. (Last accessed 10 June, 2009). 
 
Figure 10: Thailand’s Top Ten Sources of Imported Crude Oil 1997 (in 
percentages) 
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Source: Author-created diagram based on data from the Ministry of Commerce, Royal Thai Government. 
http://www.moc.go.th/. (Last accessed 10 June, 2009). 
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Figure 11: Thailand’s Top Ten Sources of Imported Crude Oil 2000 
Thailand's Top Ten Sources of Imported Crude Oil 
2000 (In percentage)
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Source: Author-created diagram based on data from the Ministry of Commerce, Royal Thai Government. 
http://www.moc.go.th/. (Last accessed 10 June, 2009). 
 
From 1997 to 2000, there was the inclination that Thailand depends more on crude oil 
from the GCC States.  This can be seen through the GCC States being the biggest 
suppliers, and that five out of the six GCC States are among top ten exporters.  Between 
1991 and 2000, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have maintained their ranks as key suppliers 
over time.  In 1997, Oman was the biggest oil supplier to Thailand and in 2000, the UAE 
became the biggest oil supplier to Thailand, with Oman and Saudi Arabia ranked 2
nd
 and 
3
rd
.  Other two GCC States, Qatar and Kuwait, were within top ten suppliers as well.   
 
As noted, the three above figures suggest that there has been a striking change in sources 
of Thailand‘s imported crude oil. The striking change in the value of crude oil Thailand 
imported from the GCC States, a big jump from 1991 to 1997 and to 2000, suggests the 
level of development between Thailand and the GCC States within these years; such 
increase in the value of oil import implies positive development in international relations 
between Thailand and the GCC States.  The oil deals, political relations, and 
international interactions between Thailand and the GCC States are therefore interlinked 
with one another; and the development of one supports the growth of the others. 
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As the key providers for crude oil, the GCC States are strategically vital to Thailand.  
Not only was there a need to guarantee the flow of oil from the region to Thailand, there 
was also the need to prevent the oil price from these countries to step up, which will 
affect the Thai economy. The experience of the 1970s oil crisis had always been 
remembered; and for the government to maintain cordial relations with these key oil 
producers, who are members of the OPEC, it is expected that the GCC States can agree 
to negotiate for an acceptable oil price.  
 
3.2   Trade with the GCC States  
Thailand‘s trade with the GCC States is closely related to the country‘s dependence on 
oil from the region. With the country imported more oil from the GCC States, 
Thailand‘s trade deficit with these states constantly increased. 
 
Table 7 below shows information on import, export and trade balance between Thailand 
and the GCC States on selected years. The trade deficit between Thailand and the GCC 
States has been a regular affair; and there is no doubt that the major part of Thailand‘s 
import from the GCC States is oil.  Comparing between the mid-1990s and late-1990s, it 
appears that there was a big increase in the trade deficit with some GCC countries.  This 
is apparently the case of the UAE, whose balance went from $336 million positive in 
1995 to $85 million negative in 1996, and ultimately negative $1187 million in 2000; 
almost 13 times in four years.  The same can be said about Oman, whose deficit in 1995 
was $660 million, 1024 in 1999 and ultimately $1198 million in 2001. The table also 
shows that there has been some fluctuation between Thailand‘s imports and exports with 
GCC countries every year. This can easily be seen in some small GCC States, for 
example Kuwait and Bahrain, where the amount of import and export changes in 
different year.  
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Table 6: Trade between Thailand and Individual GCC State 1995-2001 ($ million) 
1995  1999 
Country Import Export Trade Balance Total Trade Country Import Export 
Trade 
Balance 
Total 
Trade 
Saudi 572 570 -2 1142  Saudi 659 333 -326 992 
Bahrain 28 32 4 60  Bahrain 52 30 -22 82 
Kuwait 33 112 79 145  Kuwait 238 70 -168 308 
Qatar 90 61 -29 151  Qatar 306 17 -289 323 
UAE 678 1013 335 1691  UAE 864 568 -296 1432 
Oman 682 21 -661 703  Oman 1051 27 -1024 1078 
           
Total 2083 1809 -274 3892  Total 3170 1045 -2125 4215 
           
1996  2000 
Country Import Export Trade Balance Total Trade Country Import Export 
Trade 
Balance 
Total 
Trade 
Saudi 619 461 -158 1080  Saudi 1165 300 -865 1465 
Bahrain 26 21 -5 47  Bahrain 57 29 -28 86 
Kuwait 171 85 -86 256  Kuwait 378 66 -312 444 
Qatar 221 15 -206 236  Qatar 285 21 -264 306 
UAE 778 693 -85 1471  UAE 1776 589 -1187 2365 
Oman 1051 19 -1032 1070  Oman 963 32 -931 995 
           
Total 2866 1294 -1572 4160  Total 4624 1037 -3587 5661 
           
1997  2001 
Country Import Export Trade Balance Total Trade Country Import Export 
Trade 
Balance 
Total 
Trade 
Saudi 861 400 -461 1261  Saudi 1337 350 -987 1687 
Bahrain 31 26 -5 57  Bahrain 57 33 -24 90 
Kuwait 93 76 -17 169  Kuwait 336 65 -271 401 
Qatar 249 13 -236 262  Qatar 285 21 -264 306 
UAE 851 578 -273 1429  UAE 1496 639 -857 2135 
Oman 1345 25 -1320 1370  Oman 1239 40 -1199 1279 
           
Total 3430 1118 -2312 4548  Total 4750 1148 -3602 5898 
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1998       
Country Import Export Trade Balance Total Trade      
Saudi 534 352 -182 886       
Bahrain 32 27 -5 59       
Kuwait 24 66 42 90       
Qatar 218 17 -201 235       
UAE 713 550 -163 1263       
Oman 1093 28 -1065 1121       
           
 
Total 2614 1040 -1574 3654       
 
Source: Ministry of Commerce. www.moc.go.th. (Last accessed 10 June 2009). 
What we can analyse from looking at the amount of the trade deficit, most obviously in 
the case of Oman and the UAE is that the trade deficit depends largely on the value and 
amount of oil imported; thus trade deficit with a country closely corresponds with oil 
imports from that country.  For example, in 2000 Thailand‘s deficit with the UAE was 
the highest in its trade with the GCC States, $1187 million; by taking a look at the 
import of oil in the previous section, UAE was the biggest crude oil provider for 
Thailand in that year. The same case applies to Oman, whose deficit with Thailand was 
the biggest in 1997 at $1320 million. Looking back at the previous section, Oman was 
the biggest provider of crude oil for Thailand in that year.  
 
The table and figure on the following page (table 7 and figure 11) demonstrate that 
export of key goods including automobile parts, air condition and clothes between 
Thailand and the GCC States had been in the same range and pattern throughout the 
period of 1997-2001.
 317
  On contrary, import, as noted, had constantly increased. Figure 
11 answers the question over the proportion of import/export value; it shows that import 
is a dominant amount within the total trade value. From the figure, it is clear that the 
import value defines the total value curve.  There is no doubt that the major part of 
import is crude oil.  
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Table 7: Thailand’s Trade with the Aggregate GCC States 1995-2001 ($ million) 
Year Export  Import Total Value Deficit 
1995 1809 2083 3892 -274 
1996 1924 2866 4160 -942 
1997 1118 3430 4548 -2312 
1998 1040 2614 3654 -1574 
1999 1045 3170 4215 -2125 
2000 1037 4624 5661 -3587 
2001 1148 4716 5864 -3568 
 
Source: Ministry of Commerce, www.moc.go.th. (Last accessed 10 June, 2009). 
 
Figure 12: Thailand’s Trade with the GCC States 1995-2001 
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Source: Ministry of Commerce, www.moc.go.th. (Last accessed 10 June, 2009). 
 
To narrow down the deficit, it is important for the Thai government to encourage trade, 
specifically export, to the GCC States.  The fact that export values have not changed 
much within the four years of the Chuan administration demonstrates that the Look West 
policy which aimed to promote trade and investment in South Asia, the Middle East and 
Africa, was not significantly efficient in the GCC regions within this period. One of the 
problems, pointed out by officers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is that people in the 
Middle East did not know much about Thailand and its products, and that the 
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governments failed to sufficiently promote knowledge about each other.  For those who 
know more, there was a lack of confidence in the quality of halal food in Thailand. The 
government tried, however, to promote halal food from Thailand and to improve its 
standard.  
 
In 1999, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinated with other governmental and 
private agencies, namely Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of 
Industry, the Board of Investment and the Shaikh al-Islam to explore the potential of 
Halal food business in Thailand to be exported to the Muslim world.
318
  As a result of 
the coordination, a Thai delegation had been sent to the UAE and Qatar in May 1999 to 
explore the opportunities to export halal food, and to the halal food exhibition in Dubai.  
In addition, in the same year, Thailand was holding the International Muslim Food 
Exhibition in Bangkok, which was aimed to promote halal food from Thailand.  To 
support for the expansion of halal food production in Thailand, the government 
considered establishing a halal food production zone in southern Thailand.
319
 In addition 
to encourage trade, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also produced information materials 
about the role of Thai Muslims in economic development in Thailand to be 
distributed.
320
 For the Thai halal food to be accepted in the Muslim world, the Thai 
government, perceived as a Buddhist state, needed to coordinate closely with the private 
sector, particularly the Muslim agencies, including the Muslim entrepreneur groups, the 
Shaikh al-Islam and the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand (CICOT) to obtain 
support and bolster confidence on the compliance of halal standard of Thai products 
going to be sold in the Muslim world.  
 
3.3   Security  
There are two key factors that the GCC States are relevant to Thailand‘s internal security. 
The first factor is the need to prevent further supports for the Malay-Muslim separatist 
activities in Thailand, which had been suspected to receive support from some Middle 
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Eastern countries, including some GCC States.  The second factor is the need for the 
support from the GCC States in mitigating the image and projecting the better 
understanding of Thailand‘s treatment of Muslim minority and counter separatist 
movements.  
 
According to Von der Mehden, the Malay-Muslim separatist movements in Southern 
Thailand received financial support and training from some Middle Eastern countries, 
with Libya being viewed as most directly involved.
321
  In addition, some organisations 
and individuals in Saudi Arabia had been reportedly providing financial support and 
shelters for the members of the movements.
322
 Supports from different Muslim 
organisations, including from Saudi Arabia‘s Department of Scholarly Research and 
Religious Ruling, the Islamic Development Bank, and the Islamic Call of Kuwait have 
been provided for Muslims in southern Thailand.
323
  While all these organisations have 
been transparent about the destination of the support, there are other sources of funding 
which had gone to militants. Therefore, there is a need for Thailand to cooperate with 
countries where these funding come from to help monitor the movement of support to 
the separatist movements.  Most of the GCC embassies in Thailand have particularly 
clear and articulate about their transparency and in monitoring the movement of funding 
to support separatist movements in the South. In the interviews with the Saudi charge 
d‘affaires, conducted by Maluleem et al. in 1991, the charge d‘affaires pointed out that 
Saudi Arabia regularly provides financial support for Muslims in Thailand and that most 
of the provisions have been done transparently, he said: 
 
We [Saudi Arabian government] didn‘t work in the dark. We have our 
way, our style. We don‘t enter the house by the back door, we enter 
through the front door…And if we want to support Muslim organizations 
or to build hospitals or schools or to support other countries to build 
bridges or this kind of facilities, we go through it officially. We don‘t 
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donate money to person, and we don‘t use them. If we give or grant the 
scholarship, we give it to the people through their government. And when 
they go to Saudi Arabia, they go to the university or schools and they 
come back to their country. We don‘t teach them some other kinds or 
some behaviours and we do not wash their brains or anything.
324
 
 
The interview reflects several points: one is the need to confirm that Saudi Arabia has 
been a transparent supporter of Muslims in Thailand, and that the transactions of support 
had been recognised by the government. The other point is the need to counter prevalent 
misperceptions in Thailand that Saudi Arabia has been secretly sponsoring separatism 
and brainwashing Muslim students from Thailand who had gone to study in Saudi 
Arabia.  
 
In the author‘s interview with the UAE ambassador in 2007, in response to the question 
about support to Muslims in Thailand, the ambassador emphasised the transparency of 
the Emirate‘s support to Thai Muslims that, ―We give aid and support to Muslims in the 
south, though that goes through the government and sometimes the Crescent society, 
which is the Islamic charity. It is clear and transparent.‖325  In addition, in an interview 
with a political analyst at the Qatar embassy on Qatar‘s support to Muslims in Thailand, 
the officer pointed out that: 
 
Qatar tries to initiate good relations with Thailand in the direction of non-
political dimension. One areas of Qatar‘s support is through private 
organizations, foundations for Muslims. Though sometimes the contacts 
have been through these organizations, the Qatari government is trying to 
make it as transparent and through the government as much as it can.
326
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When consider together, the interview conducted by other in 1991 and the author-
conduct interviews confirm similar fact that the GCC governments have continued to be 
cautious about transparency question over their financial support to Thai Muslims.  
While the GCC governments work hard to demonstrate their transparency in the support 
for the Muslims in the south, these government, as well as the Thai government are not 
entirely able to monitor and capture all transactions. While the GCC governments are 
clear about directions of their support to Thai Muslims, there is no guarantee that they 
are aware of most supports from the private sectors and individuals that bypass the 
governments and go straight to their recipients in Thailand. The cooperation between the 
Thai and GCC governments in terms of intelligence and investigation are therefore 
necessary.   
 
Other significance of the GCC States to Thailand‘s security agenda is their lobby for 
Thailand in the community of Muslim states, particularly in the case that Thailand needs 
to clarify itself regarding its treatment toward Muslim minority, as well as its effort to 
counter the separatist movement. Prior to becoming the observer of the Organisation of 
Islamic Conference (OIC), Thailand lacked the opportunity to stand for itself under the 
issue of Muslim minority; much of the responses had to go through Muslim ASEAN 
countries, namely Malaysia and Indonesia.  There had been several attempts by the 
movements of southern separatists to represent Thailand in the OIC meeting.
327
  The 
example is that in 1988, the Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), whose call 
had been for the secession of the three southern Muslim-prominent provinces of 
Thailand, had asked to attend the OIC Foreign Minister Meeting in Amman, Jordan.
328
 
The attempt had been objected by some OIC member countries, including Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Egypt, and Pakistan.
329
 Support from the GCC States will therefore help 
prevent any non-state actor attempting to represent Thailand in the Muslim world. The 
GCC States are viewed by Thailand as moderate Muslim states; in addition, they have 
been recognised as ―friendly Muslim states‖ by the Thai government.330   The GCC 
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States are crucial to Thailand in terms of providing support and back-up for the 
government in the international stage of Muslim communities, and preventing other non-
state actors, particularly separatist movement to claim their rights to represent Thailand 
in the OIC stage.  
 
There are linkages in all the three key factors that motivated the relations between 
Thailand and the GCC States.  The relationship between the need of Gulf oil and trade is 
particularly obvious.  At the same time the significance of security issues may not be as 
obvious, but is proved to be vital to Thailand. The next section will further discuss how 
these factors define the nature of Thailand‘s relation with the GCC States under the 
Chuan administration.    
 
4. NATURE OF RELATIONS WITH THE GCC STATES 
As noted, the GCC States are vital to Thailand in many ways.  To evaluate the 
recognition of such significance, it is best to examine Thailand‘s policy toward the GCC 
region between 1997 and 2001. An interview with a Thai officer in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs elucidates the nature of Thailand‘s relationship with the GCC States:331  
 
1. Thailand had no specific foreign policy made for the GCC States.  The foreign 
policy used toward the GCC States is the same policy used for the rest of the 
Middle East, but some details are being tailored to suit with specific bilateral 
relations, depending on the characteristics of the relations with target countries.   
2. When the ministry initiates a program or cooperation project, the targeted 
countries do not rest only within the GCC States; the ministry broadens the 
policy to cover others that are relevant to Thailand, including countries in North 
Africa, or the rest of the Middle East. 
3. Most of the relationship between Thailand and the GCC States are done through 
bilateral relations.  
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4. The dominant feature of Thailand‘s bilateral relations with individual GCC 
States is, according to this officer, that the policy is tailored based on a win-win 
situation for both parties.  
 
The other Persian Gulf desk officer pointed out that the relationship between Thailand 
and the GCC States under the Chuan administration had been strengthened; this is 
because of strengthened personal contacts between high ranking Thai officers and their 
counterparts in GCC States.
332
  In addition, Surin Pitsuwan, then the foreign minister, is 
a Muslim and an expert in Middle Eastern politics.  Surin has brought to the Thai-GCC 
States relations his expertise, modern Islamic ideology, and support on human rights.  In 
1998, Surin embarked on a tour of all GCC States, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, 
to strengthen the existing relations.
333
  When asked why the relationship between the 
two regions had not been active earlier, Surin commented that: 
 
In my opinion, the reason that we did not actively engage with this region 
[the Gulf] earlier is, first, we lacked of knowledge during that time. 
Second reason might be the specialty of each key figure within the 
government. For me, Middle East and the Muslim world is my specialty. 
I have strong background within the region. I have connection. It is easier 
for me to initiate the relationship, and I feel comfortable. Another thing is 
that I am a Muslim, so it is easier for me to make contacts and understand 
their culture. So you can see that personality, a person‘s specialty helps a 
lot.
334
 
 
Under Surin, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had undergone changes, particularly at the 
Department of Middle East, South Asia and Africa.  There had been an increase in the 
recruitment of officers with knowledge of Arabic and the Middle East; more staffs have 
been selected to suit the tasks relevant to this region. An officer recounts that, ―[in] early 
1997-1998, Dr. Surin had brought to the department a lot of people with good 
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knowledge and language skills in the Middle East.‖335  The foreign minister himself 
embarked on the tour of the Middle East as early as 1998, visiting almost all the 
countries in the GCC, as will be discussed more in the further section.  
 
The diplomatic relations between Thailand and the GCC States under the Chuan 
administration generally consisted of two aspects: economic and political.  In terms of 
economic, Thailand sought the opportunity to expand markets for Thai goods in the 
Gulf; the Thai delegations to the Gulf States under this administration always consisted 
of entrepreneurs, which received governmental supported in pairing with trade 
counterparts.  Politically, Thailand attempted to restore the relationship with Saudi 
Arabia and to take advantage of good relations with other small Gulf States to help 
mitigate the relations, though nothing had been improved much.  
 
Reviewing the relationship between Thailand and the GCC States under the Chuan 
administration, while Thai officials have been optimistic about the nature of relations 
during the era, scholars have been more sceptical about the level of improvement; 
several criticisms have been proposed for the analysis of the relationship between two 
sides.  One scholars point out that while the relationship between Thailand and the GCC 
States looked promising, the relationship with the Muslim world had not developed as 
much as it could have been.  One scholar points out that in order to consider the relations 
between Thailand and the GCC States, it is important to consider Thailand‘s 
accommodation for Islamic Affairs and relations with the Muslim world.  The scholar 
criticised that the government had not done enough to accommodate Muslim affairs.  
The example is that it rejected the proposal for the establishment of the Islamic Bank in 
Thailand.
336
  This, according to the scholar, resulted from the lack of knowledge about 
Islam, particularly Islamic finance and banking, in which there were very few experts in 
Thailand.  Several Thai Muslims therefore banked with Malaysia‘s Islamic banks.  At 
the same time, not having Islamic bank in Thailand was one of the factors that drew 
wealthy GCC individuals to invest in Malaysia instead.
337
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The other researcher also noted the small attention the government gives to the GCC 
regions compared to other region of the world. She noted the lack of staff with sufficient 
knowledge about the Middle East while pointing out the traditional view of the Middle 
East and Islam in the Ministry that, ―because the staffs do not understand about the 
Middle East, and people in general are not interested, then nobody is bothered. 
Compared to attention given to Europe where everybody is excited about.‖338 
 
The overall picture of Thailand‘s relations with the aggregated GCC States shows that 
the government had been trying to improve the existing relations with these states in 
many ways.  The government had shown to recognise that oil, trade and security are 
vital driving forces for Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States.  Efforts had been made 
through foreign policies relevant to the GCC States; however, in some aspects the 
outcomes had not resulted in a satisfactory level, particularly in terms of trade, in which 
export had not improved much.  In addition, traditional perception that the Middle East 
is peripheral still exists, as well as the underestimation of the measures to accommodate 
Islamic affairs.  By looking at the overall picture of Thailand‘s relations with the 
aggregate GCC States only provide a quick, broad glance; the next section explores 
Thailand‘s relationship with individual GCC States. 
 
5. BILATERAL STATE RELATIONS 
5.1   Thailand-Saudi Arabia 
Thailand‘s political relations with the Saudi Arabia had been problematic since the 
jewellery theft and the murder of Saudi diplomats and businessmen in 1991.  The 
strained relations made it difficult for Thailand to conduct and initiate all aspect of 
relations, when Saudi Arabia maintained requesting that Thailand investigate the murder.  
The investigation had been conducted, though the result was not satisfactory to Saudi 
Arabia; the Thai government then pointed out the difficulty to arrest anybody, as the 
case had been closed for almost a decade.
339
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Diplomatic relations had been severely affected. Saudi Arabia refused to negotiate with 
Thailand unless the investigation reached satisfactory level. The high-level state visits 
from Thailand to Saudi Arabia were very rare. At the popular level, the Thai citizens, 
particularly workers, were not granted visa to work in Saudi Arabia. At the same time, 
the existing Thai workers in Saudi Arabia did not get their visa renewal.
340
 
 
There was long a fear that Saudi Arabia, as the influential player in the GCC, would 
draw other GCC countries against Thailand.  The relationship with other GCC States 
demonstrates, however, that the relationship between the other GCC countries and 
Thailand had been affected very little; this can be seen through the normal trade level, as 
well as the exchanges of high-level state visits between Thailand and other GCC States.  
 
In order to mitigate the difficult relations with Saudi Arabia and to prevent the situation 
from deteriorating, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs implemented the Dual Track policy 
with Saudi Arabia.  The key content of the policy is to ―investigate the murder and the 
theft cases, along with encourage other constructive aspects of the relations, including 
trade, culture, religion, sports.‖ 341   In addition, Thailand also used the institutional 
framework to improve the relations, for example, through ASEAN and GCC 
frameworks.
342
  There were efforts at popular level, though inviting Saudi scholars to 
conferences in Thailand, as well as the use of personal connection.
343
  
 
The outcomes of such effort resulted that since 1997, Saudi Arabia resumed to give visa 
to Thai businessmen that would go to trade exhibition in Riyadh and Jeddah; in 2000, 
existing Thai workers can get the exit re-entry visa just like workers in other 
countries.
344
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In improving the diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, the non-political agendas had 
significant contribution. The Thai state had to incorporate these agendas into improving 
the relations.  The significance of individuals and personal contacts also shows the role 
of culture in Asian and Arab foreign affairs; that it is significant as much as traditional 
diplomatic mechanisms.  
 
5.1.1 Trade Relations  
Thailand‘s trade relations with Saudi Arabia had been badly affected. The graph below 
(figure 13) illustrates the difficulty in promoting export of Thai goods to Saudi Market.  
As shown, export had not increased within the decade between 1991 and 2001.  Indeed, 
from 1996 onward, the export was going downward.   
Figure 13: Import-Export to Saudi Arabia 1995-2001 
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Source: Ministry of Commerce, Thailand‘s trade information. www.moc.go.th. (Last accessed 20 May, 
2009).  
 
The major problem is that several Thai goods had been rejected. For example, in 2000, 
Saudi Arabia banned canned tuna from Thailand, claiming that such product had been 
contaminated with GMOs (Genetically Modified Organisms).
345
  In addition to banning 
the canned tuna, Saudi Arabia asked Thailand to guarantee the safety of Thai goods 
entering the country. A Thai newspaper reports that Thai exporters feel that Saudi 
banning Thai goods was not really the problem of the products, it was indeed rooted in 
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political constrain, due to the Saudi Theft issue.
346
  The Thai government tried to 
negotiate by sending delegation to explain and negotiate with Saudi authorities, Saudi 
Arabia accepted to reconsider the ban, though it did not provide any promise of when 
the ban would be lifted.
347
  
 
5.1.2 Social Relations 
Socio-political aspect also shows the constraint between Saudi Arabia and Thailand. In 
1998, Saudi Arabia withdrew from participating in Asian Games in 1998 in which 
Thailand was a host.
348
  The Thai government pointed out that the reasons Saudi Arabia 
pulled out of the games were due to Ramadan and Saudi Arabia‘s centenary celebration; 
however, the Thai media claimed that the unresolved murder of the Saudi diplomats 
might be one of the factors that made Saudi Arabia withdrew.
349
  
 
One of the worst repercussions from the strained relations is sustained banning of 
migrant workers from Thailand to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has been a big hub for 
Thai labour migrants, therefore banning the workers means a great loss of income and 
employment opportunities on the Thai part. Under the Asian Financial Crisis, Thai 
companies lay off their employees and the unemployment rates increased. Not having 
Saudi Arabia as hub for Thai workers was a great loss to Thai economy. There was still 
the interest among the Thai workers to go to work in Saudi Arabia. The graph on the 
following page (figure 13) shows that despite unresolved visa issues and diplomatic 
relations, there were a large number of Thai workers applying to work in Saudi Arabia.  
According to the graph, the numbers represent only workers who applied, not those who 
had been granted to work. The news that Saudi Arabia had relaxed to grant exit-re-entry 
visas gave people hope that the country would allow Thai workers to work in Saudi 
Arabia again, thus resulting in the larger number of applicants, from 47 persons in 1998 
to 858 persons in 1999 and it has continued to grow in numbers in the following years.  
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Figure 14: The Number of Thai workers that attempted to work in selected GCC 
States 1997-2001 
The Number of Thai workers that applied to work 
in selected GCC states  1997-2001
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Source: Ministry of Labour, Thailand. 
 
Even though affecting political and economic relations, the theft and murder cases 
barely affected Islamic affairs between Thailand and Saudi Arabia, including hajj 
supports for Muslims in the south. Indeed, it was the hajj and Islamic affairs that helped 
relax, if not neutralised, the relations between Thailand and Saudi Arabia.  On leading 
200-250 pilgrims to Mecca in 2000, Thailand‘s Foreign Minister, Surin Pitsuwan, took 
the opportunity to give a talk about Thai-Saudi Relations.
350
 
 
5.1.3 Notes on Thailand-Saudi Relations 
Between 1997 and 2001, much effort had been put into normalising relations with Saudi 
Arabia. The foreign ministry used both contacts through governmental and personal 
connections, though the result was only a slight improvement. One journalist points out 
that the unsolved problematic relations came from the fact that Thailand refused to give 
what had been asked for by Saudi Arabia; no matter how much effort was put into 
improving relations with Saudi Arabia, as long as the theft and the murder cases 
remained unresolved, then those efforts will mean little.
351
  Thailand‘s difficult relations 
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with Saudi Arabia is the example of the case where government-to-government relations 
was not so effective in solving bilateral problem and where certain aspect, here Islamic 
relations, were not affected by sour bilateral relations. Indeed, during this period, Islam 
has proved to be among only a few channels that allow Thailand to have access to 
negotiation with Saudi Arabia.  The case of Thailand‘s relations with Saudi Arabia, 
therefore, shows that in some circumstances, norms, values and identity can be as 
efficient as economic and political diplomatic tools. 
 
5.2   Thailand-Bahrain 
In November 1998, Thailand‘s foreign minister paid an official state visit to Bahrain. 
The visit resulted in the signing of an Agreement on Economic and Trade Cooperation 
with Bahrain in 1999 and the signing of an Agreement on the Exemption of Double 
Taxation in 2001. 
352
  
 
Diplomatic relations with Bahrain, however, have not been comparatively dynamic 
during the Chuan administration.  There is no Bahrain embassy in Bangkok, neither was 
there the Royal Thai embassy in Bahrain.
353
  Thai officials and businessmen had to 
contact the Embassy of Bahrain in Beijing should they need to interact.   
 
5.2.1 Trade Relations  
Compared to the rest of the GCC States, the value of Thailand‘s trade with Bahrain is 
the lowest.  Between 1997 and 2001, the total trade value had not changed much. This 
can be seen through table 6 on page 141.  Not having the Embassy of Bahrain in 
Thailand is partly made trade between the two sides difficult.  Thailand has always run a 
trade deficit with Bahrain.  Important Thai goods that are exported to Bahrain include 
cars and parts, air conditioning and parts, machinery, clothes, refrigerators and jewellery.  
The important goods that Thailand imports from Bahrain include material minerals, oil, 
cloth, iron, paper and paper goods.   
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5.2.2 Social Relations 
The social relations between Thailand and Bahrain have been quite limited.
354
 However, 
in November 2001 Thailand signed an agreement on economic, trade and academic 
cooperation with Bahrain.  Still, nothing much has been done to promote social and 
academic cooperation with Bahrain. However, many Bahrainis are familiar with 
Thailand as many have been to Thailand for tourism or for medical purpose. The 
interactions between the two regions were not new phenomenon; the contacts between 
the two sides have existed long before 1997, this can be seen from the availability and 
the frequency of flights from Bahrain to Thailand.  Gulf Air, which is the national carrier 
of the four Gulf States--Abu Dhabi, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain--has flights to Thailand 
regularly since 1976.
355
  Thai Airways also began to fly to Bahrain in November 1978 
but the operation was suspended and was not resumed until 2002.
356
  The launch of the 
flight between the two countries was largely motivated by the growing number of labour 
migration from Thailand to Bahrain, which had begun in late 1970s, as well as Muslims 
from Thailand travelling to the Middle East, and from Bahrain tourists and businessmen 
to Thailand.  Compared to other small GCC States like Oman and Qatar, there have been 
more official visits from Thailand to Bahrain.
357
   
 
5.2.3 Notes on Thailand-Bahrain Relations 
Thailand‘s relationship with Bahrain can be used to argue that oil defines the nature of 
relationship in all aspects between Thailand and the GCC States.  For Thailand‘s 
relations with the GCC States, dynamic diplomatic, trade and social relations starts off 
with oil trading.  Bahrain is the only country in the GCC States that does not trade oil 
with Thailand, thus it is less known among Thai officials.  The incentive to interact 
therefore had gone to other states.  However, there has always been an effort to bolster 
the interactions.  
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5.3   Thailand-Qatar 
Under the Chuan administration, the diplomatic relations with Qatar was relatively 
dynamic.  It started off with the 1998 visit of the Thai foreign minister to Qatar.  In the 
same year, Thailand signed the MOU with Qatar in terms of inter-foreign ministry 
cooperation, and in 1999 the two countries signed an Agreement on Economic and 
Trade Cooperation.
358
 
 
In 1999 the emir of Qatar visited Thailand; it was considered to be the first visit ever 
made by a head of the Gulf States. The outcome of the visit was the proposal projects on 
a urea fertiliser plant in Qatar.
359
  In addition, the agreement over the exemption of 
double taxation had been signed.
360
  Prior to the leader‘s visit, Thailand had proposed 
the concept of strategic partnership to Qatar, where Thailand could become the centre 
for distribution of Qatar‘s liquefied national gas (LNG) to Asia and the Pacific.361 
 
5.3.1 Trade Relations  
Thailand has always run trade deficits with Qatar. While Thailand imports crude oil and 
petroleum products, e.g. fertiliser, Qatar imports cars, car parts, air conditions, 
machinery, aluminium and jewellery from Thailand.  Export of Thai goods to Qatar had 
been difficult as Thai products were not well known among Qataris and because 
Thailand has had to compete with other exporters from India, China and Singapore as 
well as North America and Europe in Qatar market, which is comparatively small.  The 
volume of trade was comparatively not as significant as Oman, the UAE and Saudi 
Arabia.  The Thai Ministry of Commerce has been trying to introduce more products to 
the Qatar market; the products that the government viewed having potential included 
machinery, construction material, halal food and jewellery.   
 
That trade relations between Thailand and Qatar has not been active can be accounted by 
the lack of motivations in conducting trade with Qataris from Thai businessmen‘s part.  
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With difficulty in communication and transportation, it was difficult for Thai and Qatar 
entrepreneurs to meet and match. Despite the government‘s attempt to lead businessmen 
to Qatar, not all businessmen were able to be part of the delegations; this is because the 
opportunity was limit and most of the time larger enterprises are selected. Businessmen 
who could not find access to information and connection with Qatari trade partners 
therefore switched to other countries or did not consider Qatar at all.  Exporting food is 
one obvious example, during this period Thailand has not developed the halal standard 
to the acceptable level to be exported to Qatar; even though some products had been 
approved, the products still had to compete with exporters from Muslim countries.   
 
5.3.2 Social Relations 
Comparing to other GCC countries, there was not much dynamism between social 
relations between Qatar and Thailand.  Most of the social relations are based on Islamic 
Affairs, where the Qatari government and royal family donated money to Muslims in 
Thailand.  The social relations, however, were the key factors that encouraged the 
interactions between Thailand and Qatar.  It greatly defined the whole picture of 
diplomatic relations; as a political analyst at the Qatar embassy points out that, ―Qatar 
tries to initiate good relations with Thailand in the direction of non-political 
dimension.‖362 
 
The relationship between the Thai royal family and the Qatari monarch plays an 
important role in strengthening social relations between Thailand and Qatar.  When 
asked over the influential factors that define the relationship between the two states, a 
Qatari political analyst pointed out that, ―one [of the influential] factor had to do with 
monarchical institute; and there is more chance that the relationship will be 
prolonged.‖363 
 
5.3.3 Notes on Thailand-Qatar Relations  
Lacking knowledge about each other is the significant issue that hinders the relationship 
between Qatar and Thailand.  This is particularly in terms of trade, where between 1997 
                                                          
362
 Interview with political analysts, Qatar embassy, 13 August 2007. 
363
 Ibid.  
Chapter 3                                                           Thailand-Gulf States Relations 1997-2001 
 
 185 
and 2001, each side knew very little about each other.  This resulted in comparatively 
inactive relations.  
 
The visit of the emir of Qatar in 1999 had brought about greater knowledge about 
Thailand among Qataris.  While trade had not expanded much right after, but the 
foundation and agreements the emir and other high-level staff had done with Thailand 
had proved to be useful for further relations between Thailand and Qatar in the next 
administration.  
 
5.4   Thailand-Kuwait 
Prior to 1997, the relations between Thailand and Kuwait was under supervision of the 
Kuwaiti ambassador in Malaysia; however, in 1997, the Kuwaiti government assigned 
the first Kuwaiti ambassador for Thailand; thus making the interactions between the two 
countries more efficient and faster.
364
  Generally, Thailand has cordial relations with 
Kuwait.  During the Gulf War, the Thai government voted in favour of all UN 
resolutions on the Iraq-Kuwait agenda.  In addition, Thailand had contributed troops in 
the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), as well as sending medical teams to 
help Kuwait.  Kuwait has been aware of the goodwill Thailand had demonstrated in the 
past.
365
  Thus the relationship between the two sides has been strengthened.  In 1998, the 
Thai foreign minister also paid an official visit to the country.  
 
Diplomatic relations between Thailand and Kuwait had been put to the test, however, in 
1999.  The secretary of the Foreign Minister, Ong-Art Klampaiboon, accused Bangkok-
based Kuwaiti diplomats of sexually assaulting a Thai female domestic worker.
366
  A 
press conference had been organised at the Thai Parliament for the worker. The Foreign 
Minister‘s secretary, however, had been attacked and criticised as improperly handling 
of the incident, which should have been handled with care and through diplomatic 
protocol by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
367
  One newspaper reported Ong-Art‘s 
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failure in ―differentiating domestic politics and diplomacy‖ 368   and ―put national 
interests at risk.‖369  The same newspaper reported the sentiments of staff in the foreign 
ministry that: 
 
Several officials said Ong-Art‘s action could have put Thai-Middle East 
ties at risk. The ministry said officials there have worked hard to elevated 
diplomatic ties to the current level, citing the number of Thai nationals 
working in the region and the discussion over fishery projects with a 
number of countries…Thai officials said the connection could bear fruit 
as the nation expands its economic and political ties.
370
 
 
The Kuwaiti embassy in Bangkok rejected the sex allegation against its diplomat and 
pointed out that Thailand had mishandled the incident by neglecting diplomatic 
protocol.
371
  The embassy also stated that the incident could potentially have a great 
impact on diplomatic relations.
372
  Mr. Ong-Art‘s action stirred up protests from Gulf 
States‘ envoys and other diplomats in Bangkok. 373   The department of protocol of 
ministry of foreign affairs therefore tried to resolve the situation, which finally was 
settled.  
 
From the incident, two observations can be made. First, the incident reflects that the 
Thai public, media and government officials alike, had been aware and appreciate the 
interests and benefits returned from the government‘s effort in interacting with the GCC 
States.  Thailand‘s diplomatic relations with Kuwait had long been established, second 
to Saudi Arabia, in 1963.  The second observation is that there is a close tie among the 
GCC States‘ embassies which were rooted in shared identity, culture and geographical 
proximity.   An incident that affects a GCC States can have implication and stir up the 
relations with other GCC States as well.  There was the reason to be threatened as the 
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relations with Saudi Arabia had not been resolved and could deteriorate.  Thus it could 
affect the overall relations between Thailand and the whole GCC.  
 
5.4.1 Trade Relations  
There was no significant volume in trade between Thailand and Kuwait. The pattern of 
Thailand‘s imports-export to Kuwait is similar to that of Bahrain and Qatar: Thailand 
exported less, both in terms of value and volume, than it imported from Kuwait. The key 
import has been crude oil and Thailand has always run trade deficit with Kuwait. One of 
the difficulties in promoting Thai products in Kuwait is the insufficient knowledge the 
Kuwaitis have about Thailand and products available. At the same time, like in small 
GCC States, it was difficult for entrepreneurs and companies in both Kuwait and 
Thailand to meet. Lack of knowledge about each other is the key problem. Both the Thai 
and Kuwait governments have encouraged the knowledge of each other through trade 
shows in Kuwait as well as greater exchanges in visits among Thai and Kuwaiti private 
sectors.   
 
The Kuwaiti market has been viewed as having good potential for Thai products because 
of high purchasing power and high economic growth.  In 1999 there was a meeting of 
the Kuwait-Thailand Joint Committee, which had been established since 1987.  The 
committee discussed over the potential to strengthen cooperation in trade, investment, 
finance and banking, oil industry, tourism and private sector relations.  In 2000, the Thai 
Chamber of Commerce has led the delegation of Thai entrepreneurs to visit Kuwait to 
strengthen trade relations and explore trade and investment opportunities.   
 
5.4.2 Social Relations 
In terms of social relations, Thailand and Kuwait has been interacting through the fields 
of education, tourism and labour migration.  Kuwait has been providing annual 
scholarship to Thai students to study in Kuwait; the fields of study provided include 
Islamic Law, Islamic Studies, and Arabic language.
374
  As for labour migration, Kuwait 
has been one of the biggest hubs for Thai workers; the large amount of Thai workers in 
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Kuwait urged the government to open the office of labour affairs in Kuwait to provide 
support for the workers in Kuwait and neighbouring countries. Starting in 2001, the 
Kuwaiti government attempted to encourage Kuwaitis to enter the workforce and to 
replace foreign labour; however, the attempt has not been successful as Kuwaitis prefer 
civil servant careers and are less keen to do labour jobs.   
 
In terms of tourism, despite its small size, Kuwait has been Thailand‘s highest potential 
for the tourist market.  It has long been incorporated in the Tourism Authority of 
Thailand‘s Tourism Strategic plan.  This is because Kuwait tourists come in large 
batches and stay for long periods, thus bringing good revenue to Thailand.   
 
5.4.3 Notes on Thailand-Kuwait Relations 
The relations between Kuwait and Thailand had not been dynamic; although one cannot 
deny the good attitude the two sides have had toward each other. For Kuwait, Thailand 
has shown good will in supporting Kuwaiti national security by assisting Kuwait during 
the Kuwait war as noted; for Thailand, Kuwait is considered a moderate Arab state, and 
can be counted as a political ally in the international stages. At the popular level, in 
addition to labour migration and tourism, the Thais in general have a better knowledge 
of Kuwait more than other small Gulf states, i.e. Oman and Bahrain.  This is because the 
news and media coverage about Kuwait during the Kuwait war, in which the Thais had 
sympathy over the Kuwaitis.   
 
Despite the visit of the foreign minister and the establishment of Thailand‘s agreement 
with Kuwait, there was no visible improvement in the relations. The motivation is 
needed from the government officers as well as members of the private sector to initiate 
and interact with their counterparts in Kuwait to establish more relations. Additional 
channels of relations should be added to the relations with Kuwait from the Thai side, 
aside from labour migration which is a small niche and volatile.  More trade, tourism 
and educational cooperation should be encouraged  as they are more stable and broader 
niche; thus they can do better in assuring greater development and more durable 
relations.   
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5.5   Thailand-Oman 
Compared to other small GCC States, Thailand‘s relations with Oman was more 
established in one aspect, it can be seen that both Thailand and Oman decided to 
establish embassies in each other‘s countries quite early. Thailand opened an embassy in 
Muscat in 1987, while Oman opened its embassy in Bangkok in 1994.  Thailand has 
always had cordial diplomatic relations with Oman. Like other small GCC States, Oman 
is considered a moderate Arab state.  Oman, also like other GCC States, has always been 
supportive of Thailand‘s position within Asian and other international stages.   
 
The other channel of Thailand‘s relations with Oman was that both countries were 
member of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), 
which no other GCC States were a member; the commitment and joint activities of the 
member countries have also spilled over to other aspect of cooperation between 
Thailand and Oman.   
 
5.5.1 Trade Relations  
During this period, one of the significant moves in trade relations between Thailand and 
Oman was the contract made between Thai and Oman authority in terms of trade. Since 
1998 Thailand has imported crude oil from Oman through international oil 
companies.
375
 In 1999, the oil purchasing contract has been agreed between government 
institutions; since then the oil purchase is done through the PTT Public Company Ltd. of 
Thailand and the Oman‘s Ministry of Oil and Gas.  According to the contract, Oman was 
to sell 17,000 barrels of oil to Thailand daily.  
 
The oil purchase has thus made Oman one of the most significant trade partners to 
Thailand among the GCC States. Thailand‘s trade with Oman has been defined, as 
mentioned, by oil trade.  Not only that Oman has been a reliable supplier of oil, Thailand 
benefited from Oman‘s assistance in oil purchase.  In 2000, Thailand conveyed its 
concern over the rise of oil price to Oman to discuss during the OPEC meeting, which 
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Oman agreed to help.
376
  The result of oil trade leaves Thailand with a sizeable trade 
deficit.  To reduce the deficit, Thailand tried to promote Thai products to Oman, but had 
not improved export that much. The problem remarked by diplomats is that between 
1997 and 2001, there is very little knowledge between Thailand and Oman.
377
 To 
facilitate potentially greater trade between the two sides, two significant agreements 
were signed: one was Thailand-Oman Agreement on Trade, signed in 1998, and the 
other was the Agreement on Double Tax Exemption was signed in 1999.  
 
5.5.2 Social Relations 
Thailand‘s social relations with Oman have been active in terms of academic 
cooperation.  Since 1987, Thailand has been providing academic support to Omanis by 
funding training workshops in different fields, including public health, agriculture, 
communication and so on.
378
  Under this administration, Omanis expressed greater 
interest to visit Thailand for a medical check-up.  Thailand has been trying to promote 
medical tourism to encourage more tourists from Oman.  Thai Airways has been 
operating flights from Bangkok to Oman since 1984 to facilitate tourism and relations at 
a popular level.  
 
While Omanis have some knowledge about Thailand, the Thais do not know much about 
Oman.  Even there was the urge to know about the country, it was difficult to seek 
information.  The lack of information about Oman among the Thais has resulted in a 
lack of motivation to interact, both at the popular and government level.   
 
5.5.3 Notes on Thailand-Oman Relations 
Thailand‘s relationship with Oman is therefore defined largely by oil trade.  New 
projects and cooperation emerged within this administration to facilitate trade.  At the 
same time, the government has taken into consideration the trade deficit; in order to 
reduce the deficits, more exports were encouraged.  Politically, Oman is at more of an 
advantage than other small GCC States in that it has additional channels for interaction, 
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through the organisational framework of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional 
Cooperation (IOR-ARC), which provide chances for government officials from the two 
states to interact and develop new initiatives.   
 
Therefore, within Thailand‘s relations with Oman, the economic aspect has already 
taken off, while much can be done to improve the political and social aspects of the 
relations.  In order to do so, it is important that the government provide and promote 
more information about Oman; such will create more incentive to government officials, 
entrepreneurs and the public to interact with Omanis.  As well, in terms of social 
relations it is important to encourage greater cooperation in terms of social and cultural 
exchanges.  
 
5.6   Thailand-UAE 
Since the establishment of the UAE embassy in Thailand in 1998, the relationship 
between Thailand and the UAE has been more dynamic.
379
  Thailand‘s diplomatic 
relations with the UAE is highlighted with exchange of visits between Thai and UAE 
officials, including Thai foreign minister visit in 1998 and the visit of the UAE Minister 
on Trade and Economic H.H. Sheikh Fahim Bin Sultan Al-Qasimi who led the UAE 
delegation to the 10
th
 UNCTAD Conference in Bangkok and sought opportunity to meet 
with the Thai foreign minister.
380
  In 2000, Thailand signed a bilateral accord with the 
United Arab Emirates to exempt Thai companies and workers from double taxation.
381
 
 
5.6.1 Trade Relations  
The UAE ranked the biggest supplier for crude oil for Thailand in 2001; as a result, 
Thailand‘s trade deficit with the UAE tremendously increased. Unlike Oman, however, 
Thailand‘s trade with the UAE had been better promoted. Compared to Oman, the 
differential value of the UAE-Thailand import-export was closer, when in the case of 
Oman, there is a large gap between the import-export value (see figure 14).  
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Figure 15: Comparison between UAE and Oman’s Import-Export to Thailand 
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Source: Ministry of Commerce, Thailand. 
 
In terms of investment, in 1998, a well-known Thai hotel chain, the Dusit Thani, signed 
a 15-year contract to manage a five-star hotel in Dubai, the Dusit Dubai.  The hotel is to 
be the first five-star hotel in the Middle East ever managed by an Asian hotel chain.
382
  
In 2000 the Thailand-Middle East Distribution Center (TMDC) had been inaugurated at 
Jebel Ali Free Zone (Jafz), with twenty Thai firms using the Jafz warehouse. Thailand 
hoped that the TMDC will stimulate a two-way flow of business between Thailand and 
the UAE.
383
 The establishment of the TMDC is one of Thailand‘s incentives to create an 
increase in the flow of trade between Thailand and the Gulf region. 
 
5.6.2 Social Relations 
While diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia had not been improved, the UAE has 
absorbed the large amount of Thai workers in the GCC States.  Between 1997 and 2001, 
the number of workers who applied to work in the UAE had doubled, from 542 in 1998 
to 1310 in 1999, and the number continued to rise over the period of four years.
384
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Tourism is an important factor that stimulates Thailand‘s social relations with the UAE. 
The United Arab Emirates ranked the first in number of tourists from the GCC States to 
Thailand, and second from all the tourists from the Middle East, with Israelis ranks the 
first. The graph below (figure 15) shows that between 1997 and 2001, the number of 
UAE tourists coming to Thailand continued to rank 2
nd
 in the Middle East.  Therefore, in 
terms of tourist promotion, the UAE has been considered as one of the key target for the 
Tourism authority of Thailand in promoting tourism.
385
  In terms of Muslim relations, 
there was no remarkable contact between Muslims from the two sides.  
 
Figure 16: Percentage of Tourists from Selected Middle Eastern Countries Coming 
to Thailand 1997-2001 
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5.6.3 Notes on Thailand-UAE Relations 
Thailand‘s relations with the UAE were important in all aspects.  The relationship is 
considerably successful political, economic and social relations seem to link together 
more than in the case of other GCC States.  Economic wise, Thailand has done well in 
promoting trade, thus leading to sizeable export which helps narrow deficits.  The UAE 
had come to replace the role of Saudi Arabia as Thailand‘s close diplomatic partner in 
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the GCC States.  Remarkably, however, in the case of people relations, the interactions 
among people are through tourism and labour, not so much through Islamic Affairs like 
in the case of Saudi Arabia and Qatar.  
 
5.7   Summary Assessment 
The bilateral relations between Thailand and the individual GCC State differ from one 
country to another. Most of the time, the closeness in diplomatic relations are subjected 
to oil trade and trade between Thailand and individual states. Stripping out trade and oil 
flow, the relationship between Thailand and the GCC States are left only a few driving 
factors. The government dwells so much on these non-state factors to maintain the 
relations. The interview with diplomats from the embassies of the GCC States in 
Thailand reveals that most diplomats characterised their countries‘ relation with 
Thailand through trade and Islam.
386
  The perception that diplomatic relations between 
Thailand and the GCC States started off with Islam and people-to-people relations 
prevails, as well as the recognition of the fact that personal contacts is significant to the 
relations; and the state sought to use these agendas, as much as conventional diplomatic 
tools to resolve and further enhance the relations.  
 
The role of the state in improving the relations between Thailand and the GCC States in 
the future is subjected to the ability of the state to develop its own agenda and to 
integrate traditional diplomatic mechanisms with the non-state agenda like Islam as the 
key driving factor.  The next section demonstrates that the Thai state developed a greater 
state-centric approach to the international community and the GCC States through inter-
governmental organisations.  
 
6. THAILAND-INTERGOVERNMENT RELATIONS 
6.1   Thailand’s Role in the UN and in Other International Platforms 
In addition to becoming the member of the OIC, which will be discussed further, under 
the Chuan administration, Thailand became an active member of the UN.  The 
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administration stated its support for democracy and human rights in its policy statement; 
and it demonstrated its commitment at the international level through frequently 
participating and providing statement on different topics at the UN conferences. To 
demonstrate Thailand‘s commitment to global peace and regional security, in 1999 
Thailand sent 1500 troops to help stabilise East Timor.
387
  
 
In the international platform, the Chuan administration had engaged itself with as 
members of several inter-government organisations, including the Organisation of 
American States, the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-
ARC) and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), which will be elaborated in the 
next section. 
 
6.2   Thailand-OIC Relations 
6.2.1 Background of the OIC 
The Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) was established in 1969 at the meeting of 
the Muslim states in Rabat, Morocco, in response to the arson incident in Al-Quds in 
Jerusalem.
388
  In 1972, the organisation was formally established after the Muslim 
Foreign Ministerial meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.  The content of the meeting was 
not only to launch the organisation officially, but also to establish other sub-
organisations, including the Islamic Development Bank, the Islamic Cultural Center and 
the Islamic News Agency.
389
 It is the biggest Muslim organisation in the world, 
consisting of 57 members, which are Muslim states.  All the GCC States are members of 
the organisation; and in Southeast Asia, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei are members. In 
additional to Muslim states, there are more than 20 states and organisations holding a 
position as observing members.
390
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6.2.2 Criteria for Being Accepted in Observer Status—Case of Non-
Muslim States 
The Charter of the OIC clearly indicates the condition in which non-Muslim states can 
apply for the observer status. Article 4 point 1 of the OIC charter states that, ―Decision 
on granting Observer Status to a States, member of the United Nations, will be taken by 
the Council of Foreign Ministers by consensus only and on the basis of the agreed 
criteria by the Council of Foreign Ministers.‖391  According to the article, this means 
that any non-Muslim states can apply for an observer status, whether they are granted 
the membership or not is subjected to the applicant states and its relation with permanent 
OIC members, who will vote for it.  
 
Asides from the condition set by the charter, there are no solid criteria set for the 
acceptance by a country as an observer in the OIC.  The decision of the member states in 
accepting a state in observer status that may largely be subjected to Article 1, point 16 of 
the OIC charter, which states that the objectives of the OIC shall be ―To safeguard the 
rights, dignity and religious and culture identity of Muslim communities and minorities 
in non-Member states.‖392  The member states usually evaluate the suitability of the 
applicant states by considering whether the state had provided appropriate treatment for 
their Muslim minorities.
393
  
 
As of 1997, only two non-Muslim states had been granted observer status, one is Bosnia 
Herzegovina (1994); the other is the Central African Republic (1996).
394
  In addition, 
some non-state Muslim communities had been granted the status, including the Turkish 
Cypriot State (1979), and the Moro National Liberation Front (1977).
395
  Thailand was 
the third country, after Bosnia Herzegovina and Central African Republic to have been 
granted the status. For non-Muslim states, it is not easy to become an observer member 
of the OIC. Some non-Muslim states have tried but failed; for example, Philippines had 
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been applying for such position, but so far had not been granted the status.
396
  The case 
of the Philippines may have created fear among Thai policy makers.  Instead of the state 
being granted membership, the membership of the OIC in part of Philippines went to the 
Moro National Liberation Front, which had created threat for the Philippines state.  In 
the case of Thailand, it was feared that the non-state organisation, i.e. the Pattani United 
Liberation Organisation (PULO), may try to win the status over the government.  It was 
a relief to governmental officials and scholars alike that the Thai state was granted the 
position.  
 
6.2.3 Obtaining the Observer Status—the Case of Thailand 
The initiative in applying as an observer in the OIC took shape in 1997.  Much credit 
should be given to then foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan as well as the staff at the foreign 
ministry.  In order to receive sufficient amount of votes for the OIC membership, 
Thailand had asked for support by sending letter to ambassadors of OIC countries in 
Thailand and by asking Royal Thai Embassies in the OIC countries to seek support from 
their host states.
397
  According to an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Malaysia and Indonesia, as well as the GCC States, have helped lobby other OIC states 
to vote in favour of Thailand.  
 
According to Maluleem, there are at least five reasons why Thailand obtained the 
observer status; each of the reason demonstrates Thailand‘s respect and reasonable 
treatment of Muslims, including:
398
 
 
1. The government supports Thai Muslims to preach and perpetuate Islamic beliefs. 
2. The Thai king honours the Sheikul Islam, and trusted him to manage Islamic 
affairs.  
3. The king also provides financial support for Islamic Affairs, for example, support 
for the translation of the Quran into Thai.  
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4. Each year, the king appoints representatives or he himself attends the celebration 
to commemorate the birth of Prophet Mohammad.  
5. The government provides financial support for mosque constructions and 
renovations.  
 
In 1998, Thailand had been accepted into the OIC in an observer status; and in 1999, Dr. 
Surin led the Thai delegation to attend the 26
th
 session of the OIC Foreign Ministers 
conference in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, this was the first time Thailand attended the 
OIC meeting.
399
 
 
6.2.4 Pros and Cons of Thailand’s Observer Status with the OIC 
The only criticism and fear some Thai scholars and officials have about Thailand 
becoming a member of the OIC is in terms of the involvement of the OIC in Thailand‘s 
domestic politics, particularly with regard to the Southern issue.
400
 Jaran Maluleem 
responds to this criticism by acknowledging that such scenario can take place, though it 
is very unlikely.  The OIC will naturally intervene in the case that Muslim minorities 
had been mistreated by the host countries; as long as Thailand maintained to solve the 
southern problem peacefully, as long as the government demonstrates a good 
understanding of Muslim citizens, the intervention should not happen.
401
  
 
On the positive side, the membership with the OIC benefited Thailand in political, 
economic and social aspects.  Politically, observer status allows Thailand to have its own 
stage in the OIC meeting.  Prior to becoming the member of the OIC, in order to propose 
its idea or bring some relevant agenda to the OIC meeting, Thailand had to pass the 
matter through OIC members in ASEAN, which are, Malaysia and Indonesia.
402
  That 
the agenda will be brought to the meeting was therefore subjected to national interest 
and potential impacts to those states on the agenda.  It was also subjected to Thailand‘s 
relationship with Indonesia and Malaysia. Another political benefit is that Thailand can 
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prevent other non-state, illegitimate groups, such as the Pattani United Liberation 
Organisation (PULO) which had been appealing for OIC membership to represent 
Thailand in the OIC meeting without the government‘s consent.403  In addition, through 
the OIC, Thailand will be able to strengthen diplomatic relations with the OIC member 
countries, particularly with the perceived friendly Islamic Block, which include most of 
the GCC States 
404
 
 
At the international level, an officer from the minister of foreign affairs points out that 
the winning of Thai candidate in the WTO director general election to be director 
general in 1999, Dr. Supachai Panichpakdi, was partially resulted from strengthening 
relationship with the OIC states.
405
 As OIC member countries are also a large part within 
the WTO, lobbying for the Thai candidate through the OIC framework was helpful. This 
can be explained through the result of the election which shows that Supachai gained 
strong support in Asia and the Middle East.
406
 
 
Economically, membership with the OIC supports export of Thai goods to the Muslim 
world.  Through the OIC, Thailand gained greater access to the markets in the Muslim 
world.  In addition, it was easier for Thailand to seek acceptance of halal food from 
Thailand with the Muslim countries.   
 
Socially, the relationship with the OIC states allows greater interactions between 
Muslims in Thailand and Muslims abroad.  As of 2001, the OIC had been supporting 
Muslims in Thailand through its specialised organ, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB).  
The IDB had been providing scholarship for Thai-Muslim students as well as financial 
support for the construction of the Islamic schools in Thailand.
407
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6.3   Summary Assessment--Inter-Government Relations and Thailand 
Survival is the key purpose for Thailand to strengthen its link with the inter-government 
organisations. Between 1997 and 2001, the need for survival was based largely on 
consequence of the economic crisis in 1997. Seeking new economic allies and becoming 
active members of international organisations provided Thailand with support for its 
economic solution; it was not pure luck that regional powers like Japan and China 
offered some financial support to the country for crisis relief. This helps Thailand be 
able to respond to economic crises, as well as bring back confidence to the Thais. 
Upholding the universal values is a mechanism that goes along with the international 
institution. The challenge is how to combine the perceived Western concept with 
traditional Thai value, which the government had done quite properly through claiming 
that human rights has existed in Buddhism long before. The need to expand the market 
of Thai goods urged Thailand to develop relations with the OIC, which is the biggest 
international organisation of Muslim countries; close relations with the OIC can help 
Thailand in the expansion of trade to the Muslim world.  
 
 For most of the countries, changes in the late 1990s also urged them to band together to 
face the challenges of the post-Cold War era.  Each of the groupings has its own 
dynamism.  By grouping together and seeking support or voting in favour of other states, 
there is more chance for states to survive together than doing all for their own purposes.  
This explains why states like Thailand or the GCC States seek friends or allies outside of 
their grouping, particularly with countries that share some common agendas. 
 
Secondary from survival, inter-government relations allow Thailand to have access to 
greater bilateral relations.  For example, membership with the OIC facilitates the 
relations between Thailand and the GCC States and the rest of the Muslim world.  It 
reflects the effort of the Thai state to establish the state-centric channel in its relations 
with the GCC States in spite of relying on non-state agendas like Islam and people-to-
people relations.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
The Chuan administration‘s policy was characterised by gearing to promote the 
country‘s greater contribution to the international community.  Upholding the universal 
principle as well as greater participation in international stage, and membership of 
international organisations are the means the states used to expand trade, as well as 
relationship with other countries.  While the traditional sphere of Thailand‘s relations 
with the GCC States are defined by the non-state agenda i.e. Islam and people-to-people 
relations, under the Chuan administration, the increased significance of oil, security and 
trade had influenced the urge to strengthen the governmental relations.  At the same time, 
since individual GCC States differ in their ability to supply oil and in issues related to 
security significance to Thailand, the intimacy differs.   
 
While oil, trade, and security had increased its significance as forces for the state to 
conduct its diplomacy, the significance of traditional driving forces, Islam and people-
to-people relations--had not vanished.  The foreign ministry continued to place people 
relations and Islam as significant factors. Cultural influences, i.e. personal connections 
and shared values, also define the nature of relations. States still rely on these traditional 
mechanisms in strengthening and resolving conflicts and improve relations, which 
contemporary state-centric mechanism alone are sometimes unable to establish or link 
with the conflicting country, like in the case of Saudi Arabia.  
 
Since Islam and people-to-people relations are considered significant to the relationship 
between Thailand and the GCC States, the Thai state therefore had had no control over 
such agenda.  Seeking other means to approach the GCC States in the areas that are 
state-centric in nature, and that the state has control over was crucial.  Working through 
state mechanisms as active member of the global community and international 
organisations helps the state to have greater access to the GCC States through the 
organisational framework.  The Thai state benefited from such doing and also gained 
control and legitimacy over the channel that it had developed in the interaction with the 
GCC States and the Muslim world.   
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Therefore, between 1997 and 2001, it can be said that the Thai state was at another 
phase in terms of relationship with the GCC States from the previous era.  There are 
greater interests in the region than before.  This is because of the key factors identified in 
the earlier section. There are, however, some limits.  The state finds it difficult to apply 
conventional diplomatic tools into relations.  This is because state relations were based 
on Islam and people-to-people relations.  As of 1997, aside from trade, Islam and 
people-to-people relations had still been the key agenda for diplomatic relations and at 
the same time they had been used as a diplomatic tool to resolve conflicts and difficult 
relations that Thailand had with states like Saudi Arabia..   
 
For Thailand to develop greater relations with the international community and also with 
the GCC States, membership and more active roles at the international stage are helpful.  
This supports the claim that states seek inter-governmental organisations to strengthen 
its position.  At the same time, states gain more access to bilateral relations from being 
part of the inter-governmental relations.  In the case of Thailand, when the state finds 
itself depending too much on the non-state agenda, i.e. people-to-people relations and 
Islam, the state finds ways to exert more legitimate means to access greater levels of 
relations through a more legitimate and state-centric agenda, i.e. through inter-
governmental relations and trade. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THAILAND-GULF STATES RELATIONS—2001-2006 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter suggests that the Asian Economic crisis in 1997 had urged changes 
to Thai foreign affairs, including the changes in nature of state relations with the GCC 
States which became a little more dynamic and positive.  Several key driving forces lead 
to the urge for the development of greater relations with these states; this includes the 
GCC‘s role as the biggest oil suppliers to Thailand, and their role as potential important 
trade partners with Thailand.   
 
In addition to increased state-to-state interactions with the GCC States, a lot of 
foundations had been laid in the Middle East section of the Thai Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs during the Chuan administration. More staff had been recruited, while traditional 
views that the Middle East was a peripheral area had been altered.  However, not all the 
aspects of the relations had been successful; for one, the strained relationship with Saudi 
Arabia had not been resolved.  In addition, the Look West policy, which aimed to 
incorporate the Middle East as one of the core areas to focus, had not been successful in 
sufficiently emphasising the region, while more attention had been given to South Asia, 
as noted in the previous chapter.  With regards to the people-to-people relations, it is 
clear that traditional sphere of relations between the two sides, Islamic and labour 
relations, played an important role in defining the nature of the entire relationship.  And 
the Thai state had benefited from the people relations in helping to solve difficult state-
centric agendas with the GCC States.  
 
The national election in 2001 had brought changes to Thailand.  The Thai Rak Thai 
party of Thaksin Chinawatra won a landslide victory in the national election.  The 
administration brought with them changed outlook on state policy.  Much of the policy 
reflected Thaksin‘s expertise and previous experience.  One obvious change was the 
administration‘s emphasis on trade.  In addition, having been foreign minister before, 
Thaksin was keen on adopting a foreign policy that suited both his previous experience 
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and his expertise in trade.  Thus came out a foreign policy that placed trade promotion 
on the top of the list. 
 
The following chapter seeks to analyse the nature of Thailand‘s relationship with the 
GCC States during the Thaksin administration between 2001 and 2006.  While the 
second term of Thaksin‘s administration ended in mid-2006 by a coup d‘etat, this 
research continues to take into account the entire of 2006.  This is because the legacy of 
Thaksin‘s administration lingered, including the administration‘s handling of the 
southern issue; and the interim government continued to pursue  and handle some 
foreign policy agendas that had been left undone, including Thailand‘s relations with the 
GCC States.  Changes from the Chuan administration will be highlighted, as well as 
several international and domestic incidents that had implications for Thailand‘s 
relations with the GCC States, the Muslim world and the global community.  The first 
section provides an overview of Thai foreign policy under the Thaksin administration.  
Then the key driving forces for Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States will be 
highlighted.  The next section provides the overview of the nature of relationship 
between the two sides which leads to a more specific analysis of relations between 
Thailand and individual GCC state.  The last section explores the relationship between 
Thailand and the inter-governmental organisations; much emphasis will be given to the 
organisation relevant to Thailand and the Muslim world, particularly the OIC.  
 
2. THAILAND’S FOREIGN RELATIONS UNDER THAKSIN 
2.1   Thaksin Administration’s Policy Statement on Foreign policy 
On 26 February 2001, Thaksin Chinawatra delivered the policy statement of his 
administration to the parliament.  On foreign policy, the Thaksin administration aimed to: 
 
 Implement foreign policy that promotes economic strategy alongside with other 
aspects of diplomatic practices in order to restore and establish international 
relations as well as to seek all kinds of cooperation 
 Maintain security, development and peace-building within the framework of the UN 
and other relevant international organisations.  
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 Increase Thailand’s role in international community by expanding the relations and 
cooperation from ASEAN region to East Asia, South Asia and other regions. In 
addition, act as a middleman to mediate cooperation for peace building and conflict 
resolution in the region. 
 Promote, maintain, and protect the rights and interests of the country, including that 
of the Thai private sectors, workers and people abroad.  
 Restore, strengthen, and cooperate in the development between Thailand and 
neighbouring countries and in Asia by maintaining or establishing the cooperation 
and development in all aspects, both in bilateral and multilateral.
 408
  
 
Glancing at the policy statement, there are several changes in foreign policy agendas 
from the previous administration.  The most obvious change is that the economic agenda 
has been placed at the forefront of foreign policy.  Incorporating economic realms into 
foreign policy and diplomatic practice was not new, it had been done before during the 
administration of Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan, where he intended to reduce 
conflict with Thailand‘s neighbouring countries and to promote trade with them; the 
policy had been known as ―transforming the conflicting zone into trading zone.‖ The 
circumstance in which Thaksin came into power differed from Chatchai‘s era.  Under 
Thaksin, Thailand still suffered from the 1997 economic crisis and the previous 
government was partly able to solve the problem and improve economic conditions.  
Placing the economic agenda at the top of foreign policy was aimed to enable Thailand 
to pay off the debt and bolster economic growth.  Such incorporation corresponds with 
Thaksin‘s expertise in business and trade; and there is no doubt that much of this policy 
statement has been influenced by Thaksin‘s view.  
 
Closely relevant to incorporating the economic agenda into foreign policy is the urge to 
restore and strengthen the relationship abroad.  This is linked to Thailand‘s economic 
strategy, which considers the opportunity cost incurred to Thailand from unresolved 
conflict and indifferent relations.   
                                                          
408
 Statement Policy of the Thaksin Chinnawatra Administration, Delivered to the Thai Parliament on 26 
February 2001. http://library2.parliament.go.th/giventake/content_sp/sp54.pdf. (Last accessed 6 May, 
2009).  
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The agenda that was not continued from the previous government was the promotion of 
human rights and democracy, which the previous administration strongly highlighted.  
One of the media and opposition parties‘ criticisms of the government was that the new 
administration totally ignored traditional foreign policy and diplomatic practices, as well, 
the new administration discontinued some valuable initiatives and projects the previous 
governments had set up.
409
  When the new administration took the office, there was a 
moment of confusion when some of the old policies had been rejected and the 
implementation of the new policy was on its way, and the outcome of the new policy 
took t some time to achieve.   
 
In 2003, the government embarked on a newly designed ―Forward Engagement Policy.‖  
The policy concept and motivation had been explained by Thaksin in his speech at the 
Institute of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs:  
 
We need to formulate a foreign policy that looks ahead and forward to the 
future while mindful of the past. We need a foreign policy that responds 
effectively to the rapid changes while strengthening the basic foundations. 
We need a foreign policy that is pro-active and forward-looking. We need 
a foreign policy that seeks innovative opportunities while safeguarding 
national interests. We need a foreign policy that strengthens our existing 
international cooperation while further expanding to encompass new 
dimensions of cooperation with new partners.  We need a foreign policy 
that accommodates differences while turning diversity into the new 
partnership for peace, stability, and prosperity for the nation, the region 
and the world at large. This is what we call ―Forward Engagement‖ 
policy.
410
 
 
                                                          
409
 Kavi Chongkittavorn, ―Regional Perspective: New Foreign Policy: ‗Backward Engagement‘?,‖ The 
Nation, 19 February 2001. 
410
 Thaksin Chinnawatra, ―Forward Engagement: The New Era of Thailand‘s Foreign Policy,‖ an 
Inaugural Lecture delivered at the Saranrom Institute of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
December 2003.  
Chapter 4                                                        Thailand-Gulf States Relations—2001-2006 
 
 - 207 - 
According to Surakiat Satianrathai, then foreign minister, there are four focal points 
within the Forward Engagement Policy, that the policy must ―accommodate changes and 
new challenges, hold on firmly to principles, though must be flexible enough to apply; 
place people at the core of the foreign policy and; be self-sufficient and be able to 
engage in strategic partnership to share mutual interest.‖411 
 
The Forward Engagement Policy was intended to accommodate global politics, 
particularly to the post-9/11 incident as well as Thailand‘s relations with neighbouring 
countries. The policy provided a foreshadow of several significant foreign interaction, 
and behaviours of the Thai state, including sending troop to Iraq, rejecting foreign aid, 
and taking initiative in organising the Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD). Thaksin‘s 
role in tailoring foreign policy and implementing it was apparent.   
 
The administration‘s decision to promote greater involvement in international affairs can 
be seen through the government‘s announcement to send its foreign minister, Dr. 
Surakiat Sathirathai, to run for the seat of UN secretary general.  The announcement was 
made in 2004, three years ahead of the seat vacancy in 2007.
412
  The aim to win the seat 
affected the nature of Thailand‘s relations with diplomatic partners around the world.  
There was a need to seek the vote for Surakiat, thus the Thai embassies had been 
instructed to call for support from their host countries; the policy decision also had to be 
more cautious and take into consideration the effect it would have on the UN secretary 
general votes.  
 
In sum, there were several differences between the foreign policy under Thaksin‘s 
administration and that of the preceding administrations.  Forces that define the nature of 
foreign policy under Thaksin come both from domestic and international factors.  
Domestically, the urge to improve the Thai economy remained; the additional factor is 
the southern unrest.  These factors are coupled with domestic politics among different 
                                                          
411
 Surakiat Sathianrathai, ―Thailand‘s Foreign Policy Agenda,‖ statement delivered at Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Thailand in 2003.  
412
 Khien Theeravit, Thailand’s Foreign Policy and Proactive Diplomacy : A Critique (Thai World Affairs 
Center, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 2004 
http://www.thaiworld.org/en/thailand_monitor/answer.php?question_id=54. (Last accessed 25 May, 2009).  
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political parties in Thailand, as well as Thaksin‘s attempt to rally for popular support for 
the next election.  Internationally, September 11 and the War on Terror greatly influence 
the government‘s relations, not only with the US, but also with other regions, including 
Thailand‘s relationship with the Muslim world.  The next section seeks to explore the 
economic agenda that was incorporated into Thailand‘s foreign policy.  
 
2.2   Trade Expansion 
One of the significant challenges to the government after the economic crisis is 
stimulating economic growth.  Through highly concentrated economic policy after 2002, 
Thailand‘s GDP growth had constantly increased as shown in figure 17.  
 
Figure 17: Thailand’s GDP Growth in Selected Years between 1995 and 2005 
 
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) December 2008, ESDS International, 
(Mimas) University of Manchester. 
 
In order to achieve economic growth, the promotion of Thai goods abroad was crucial.  
The government placed an emphasis on creating commercial bases for Thailand abroad, 
as well as laying the foundation for development of the strategic partnership, particularly 
in terms of trade between Thailand and the world.  Such a move is reflected in Thaksin‘s 
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speech at Thailand‘s annual ambassador and consul general meeting in Bangkok in 2003 
that: 
 
Thai foreign policy under my administration has no room for ―begging,‖ 
We only have room for strategic partner; we don‘t beg anybody. We are 
not rich, but we don‘t beg. We will stand on our own. That is absolute. 
Take our Thai dignity to focus on strategy, think together, work 
together…I want to leave it as homework for you. You have to sell 
Thailand, both products and image. You have to believe in Thailand and 
have to supports its product and images.
413
 
 
As discussed, economic agenda had been incorporated into foreign policy, and vice 
versa.  Ambassadors and diplomats had been encouraged to promote Thai products.  The 
government supported road shows and trade exhibitions overseas.  There was a 
restructure of embassies and some changes in responsibilities of diplomatic staffs to 
accommodate the economic agenda.  The establishment of the Free Trade Area (FTA) 
had been promoted by this administration.  It is aimed to expand trade and investment, 
particularly export from Thailand to an overseas market.  The FTA project was under the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce. In 2005, 
the joint committee and plan for the FTA agreements took shape between Thailand and 
China, India, Japan, the US, Australia and Bahrain.  Although in some of the countries, 
the projects had been abandoned; this detail will be discussed in the further section.  
 
Figure 18 reflects the outcome of the economic promotion.  From 2001, total trade 
increased constantly; with both import and export increased and closely matched each 
other.  The data then shows that the government had been doing well in promoting trade.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
413
 Ibid. 
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Figure 18: Thailand’s Trade between 1994 and 2005 
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Source: Ministry of Commerce, Thailand. 
 
In sum, as the economic agenda has been incorporated into the realm of foreign policy 
making and diplomacy, there is the evidence of economic growth and increase in trade 
value.  On the other hand, the traditional practice of Thai diplomacy had been changed 
to a more global-conscious, CEO style, and economic-oriented nature.  Traditional 
diplomatic mechanisms, which Thailand used to understand and to interact with other 
states, was only one of the tools under Thaksin‘s administration where trade was 
apparently one of the most influential factors within the foreign policy decisions and 
initiatives.  
 
2.3   2003 Iraq War  
When the US declared the ultimatum with Iraq, Thailand claimed a neutral stand over 
the conflict.
414
  In August 2003, however, Thailand sent troops to Karbala to provide 
humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people.
415
  When asked to explain the motivation of 
such an act, and despite the deaths of two soldiers, Thaksin tried to justify the 
government‘s contribution of troops.416  In November 2003, he pointed out that the Thai 
                                                          
414
 Kavi Chongkittavorn, ―Thai Troops for Iraq: Muslims Warn of Dangers,‖ The Nation, 24 August 2003. 
415
 Ibid.  
416
 ―Thailand‘s Thaksin under Pressure over Iraq Troop Commitment,‖ AFX European Focus, 22 April 
2004. 
Chapter 4                                                        Thailand-Gulf States Relations—2001-2006 
 
 - 211 - 
troops were to provide humanitarian only, not to combat.  In April 2004, the senate 
voted for Thailand to continue keeping 451 troops in Iraq.
417
  Perhaps one of the key 
motivations for Thailand to send troops to Iraq was to strengthen Thailand‘s relationship 
with the U.S.   
 
Despite the attempt to demonstrate friendship with the U.S. at the international level, 
dispatching Thai troops to Iraq created discontent among Thai Muslims, who started 
protesting the U.S. invasion of Iraq since the beginning of the war. Mass gatherings and 
the boycotting of U.S. goods were being organised in the Muslim-majority provinces.
418
  
In Bangkok, Thai-Muslims gathered in front of the U.S. embassy to denounce the U.S. 
military campaign.
419
  In the south, the protestors went as far as the plan to recruit 
fighters to help the campaign on the Iraqi side.
420
 
 
The protest of Thai-Muslims against the U.S. war in Iraq showed their connection and 
the link they have with Muslims in the Middle East and the rest of the Muslim world, as 
well as the awareness of Muslim identity. It also showed that Thai-Muslims are 
conscious of the international Muslim community. Media and telecommunication 
technology had a role in strengthening Muslim solidarity across national boundaries.  
While the Thai government dispatched troops to Iraq, the Thai-Muslims continued to 
denounce the US campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as Thailand‘s support to the 
US.  There is a clear conflict between the state and domestic factions.  In this case, the 
international system is dominating state‘s behaviour; and the relationship with the US, 
Thailand‘s traditional ally was deemed important.  At the same time, some of the state‘s 
move contradicted with the feeling of the Muslims.  
 
In sum, the development of Thailand‘s position on the U.S. campaign in Iraq shows the 
administration‘s priority; the state made decision based on their perceived best interest.  
Strengthening relationship with the U.S. is proved to secure Thailand‘s national interest; 
                                                          
417
 Ibid.  
418
 ―Southern Muslims Begin Boycott of Us Goods,‖ Thai Press Reports, 28 January 2003. 
419
 ―Iraq Crisis: Thousands Join Peace March,‖ The Nation, 16 February 2003. 
420
 ―Southern Muslim Groups to Recruit Fighters to Help Iraq,‖ The Nation, 28 March 2003. 
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while the government recognised a negative response from Muslim protesters in 
Thailand and also the majority of the rest of the Muslim world.  The government risked 
putting itself in the position against the members of the OIC, in which Thailand was an 
observing member. The Iraq war in 2003 also shows that Thai-Muslims are aware of the 
international Muslim community, and that loyalty to the state had been undermined by 
their loyalty to the other identity, to Muslim identity.  When combined with the observed 
lack of attention to the human rights principle, which will be discussed in the next 
section, the government‘s relations with the Muslim minority in Thailand had been even 
more distant; such led to the breakdown of the relations in the later period of the 
administration.   
 
2.4   The Human Rights Issue  
Even though under Thaksin administration, Thailand established the Ministry of Human 
Security, and participated in the UN Human Rights Commission,
 421
 the government 
suffered criticisms over its deteriorating human rights record after the government‘s war 
on drugs, the tightened media control, and ultimately the way it handled unrest in the 
southern provinces. 
 
 In 2005,  the Human Rights Watch published the report on Thailand‘s War on Drugs, 
which pointed out that the campaign had claimed about 2275 lives,
422
 several of which 
the government claimed were drug dealers.
423
  According to Human Rights Watch, the 
campaign was not as successful in eradicating the narcotic drugs; indeed, it inflicted 
fears among people who were suspected of drug involvement. 
 
Equally bad was Thailand‘s freedom of the press record.  According to the survey of the 
Freedom House, the independent human rights think-tank, the freedom of the press of 
Thailand between 2002 and 2006 had gone from free to partly free.
424
  Freedom House‘s 
explanation over Thailand‘s change in status was that Thaksin‘s administration had put a 
                                                          
421
 Thaksin Chinnawatra, ―Forward Engagement: The New Era of Thailand‘s Foreign Policy‖ 
422
 Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/en/asia. (Last accessed 2 July, 2009).  
423
 Ibid. 
424
 Freedom House http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=350&ana_page=102&year=2006. 
(Last accessed 2 July, 2009).  
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great deal of political pressure against the press.  News that was perceived as 
destabilising or endangering the government would be banned; some journalists had 
been charged for criticising the government‘s policies or reporting corruption and human 
rights abuse.
425
 This, however, should not be considered jointly with the traditional 
preservation of the government‘s right to restrict the media to present news that could 
jeopardise national security, the royal family or Buddhism.   
 
Thailand‘s human rights record appeared to be deteriorating even more with the way that 
the government handled violence in the southernmost provinces.  Thailand had been 
asked to clarify the nature of the incident as well as the manners in which they had been 
dealt.  There are two key incidents: the crash between the Muslim youths and the Thai 
officials at the Krue Se mosque in Pattani province and the tragedy of the Muslim 
demonstrators at the local police station in Tak Bai district of Narathiwat Province, 
which will be discussed further.
426
    
 
The two cases had consequences for Thailand, both domestically and internationally.  
Domestically, they created confusion and frustration on domestic sectors; this includes 
the media, Thai Muslims and local NGOs.  Internationally, human rights had been the 
principles that the preceding government strongly promoted; the abrupt change in policy 
and level of human rights indicator created confusion over the government‘s intentions, 
especially when the government claimed to support human rights by the existence of the 
Ministry of Human Security and participated in the UN Human Rights Commission. 
  
2.5 Summing Up 
In sum, the foreign policy under Thaksin administration can be viewed as heavily state-
centric, with the state monopolising decisions, and making decisions based on perceived 
maximum state interest.  Economic emphasis had been placed as a priority; on the 
contrary, however, the government failed to follow up, if not worsened the universal 
                                                          
425
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principles like human rights.  The government‘s handling of several issues had 
jeopardised the country‘s human rights records.  At the same time, the country‘s 
decision to send troops to Iraq had demonstrated the superpower‘s influence and 
perceived national interest.  Thailand‘s foreign policy toward the Middle East under 
Thaksin could be seen as taking two directions: one was to support the war in Iraq, 
which goes against the majority of states in the Muslim world, the other way was to 
promote and restore the relationship with several countries in the region.  As noted, the 
motivation in sending troops was clear; the motivation in promoting and restore the 
relationships with the Muslim states, particularly in the GCC States, will be discussed in 
the following section.  
  
3. KEY DRIVING FORCES 
3.1   Oil 
Guaranteeing the flow of oil continued to be the key driving force for Thailand‘s 
relationship with the GCC States. From the previous administration, Thailand‘s key oil 
suppliers had not changed.  Table 8 shows the ratio of crude supplied to Thailand from 
key suppliers.  Oman and the UAE continued to be the top two suppliers to Thailand, 
while Saudi Arabia always ranked in the top five.  Other GCC States like Kuwait and 
Qatar were also significant suppliers.  Over five years‘ time, the role of the GCC States 
as crucial oil suppliers to Thailand continued to be significant to Thailand. 
 
Table 8: Thailand’s Top Ten Crude Oil Import Sources between 1997 and 2005 
No
.  
1997 %   2000            %   2003 %   2005 % 
                        
1 Oman 28.66   UAE 25.83   UAE 26.66   UAE 32.02 
2 UAE 16.28   Oman 15.6   Oman 19.28   Saudi 19.23 
3 Saudi 11.14   Yemen 12.48   Saudi 18.60   Oman 14.15 
4 Malaysia 10.04   Saudi 11.04   Yemen 13.43   Malaysia 11.72 
5 Yemen 9.49   Brunei 8.04   Qatar 5.31   Yemen 5.41 
6 Iran 7.70   Malaysia 5.05   Malaysia 5.12   Qatar 3.72 
7 Qatar 4.72   Kuwait 4.82   Brunei 4.48   Australia 3.04 
8 Australia 2.30   Qatar 4.1   Indonesia 2.72   Indonesia 2.13 
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9 Indonesia 2.08   Iraq 3.95   Australia 1.07   Vietnam 1.64 
10 Brunei 1.86   Iran 3.85   Algeria 0.93   Iraq 1.36 
  Other  5.73   Other 5.24   Other  2.40   Other 5.58 
Source: Ministry of Commerce, Thailand, www.moc.go.th. (Last accessed ..9 June, 2009). 
 
It seems fair to claim that while the different administrations have different foreign 
policy outlooks, a special place within foreign policy is reserved to maintain positive 
relationship with the crude oil suppliers.  Industrial growth in Thailand requires crude oil 
and domestic consumption continues to grow; thus, oil is vital to the Thai economy.
427
  
In a way, the oil trade has been an important stimulant to Thailand‘s trade with the GCC 
States; this is due to the need to offset the deficits incurred by Thailand due to 
purchasing oil from these countries.  For Thailand, oil is a type of good that has very low 
elasticity; for instance, oil from Oman is much preferred from anywhere else because the 
quality fits with the refineries in Thailand.
428
  
 
In sum, the oil import continues to define Thailand‘s total import from the GCC States.  
There is the need on the Thai part to maintain relationships with the GCC States to 
guarantee the flow of oil.  And in order to reduce the large deficit incurred from oil 
purchases, there is the need for Thailand to promote trade with the GCC region, which 
will be discussed in the next section.  
 
3.2   Trade with the GCC States 
Thailand‘s trade with the GCC States between 2001 and 2005 maintained the same 
pattern as the preceding administration;  import still defines the nature of total trade, as 
more than half of Thailand‘s total trade value is import (80% in 2001 and 82 % in 2004), 
of which was mostly oil.
429
  Figure 19 shows the pattern as discussed.  The only 
difference is the gradual improvement of export, which had increased slightly since 2001 
onward; however this increase in export did not catch up with tremendous increase in 
import (see figure 19).  Figure 20, however, points out that while export did not catch up 
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with constant increase in import, export has begun to increase with almost all the GCC 
States, obviously with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Oman.  
The Look West policy, which had been criticised as leaning so much toward South Asia 
in the previous administration, had been used to promote the relationship with the 
Middle East and the GCC regions.  More frequently the Look West policy had been 
applied to fit into the agenda of the relationship between Thailand and the Middle East; 
it had been incorporated into the agenda of the meetings between the government and 
private sectors.
430
  
 
Figure 19: Trade between Thailand and the GCC States 2000-2005 
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Source: Ministry of Commerce www.moc.go.th. (Last accessed 10 June, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
430
 The key agenda of the Look West policy had been discussed and incorporated into different meetings 
between the Thai government and the private sectors, including the meeting between the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Muslim entrepreneurs, the plan for establish closer relations with African 
countries in 2002, which the author attended while interning at the Ministry in 2002.   
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Figure 20: Thailand’s Export to each GCC State 1997-2005 
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Source: Ministry of Commerce, Thailand. www.moc.go.th. (Last accessed 10 June, 2009). 
 
As of 2005, Thailand ran trade deficits with all the GCC States, even with Bahrain, in 
which the value of the oil trade was very small (see table 9).  The large deficits are with 
the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Oman.  It is not surprising, therefore, that there was the 
continued urge to bolster trade with this region to make up for the deficits.  
 
Table 9: Thailand’s Trade with the GCC States between 2005 and 2007 
    2005       2007     
Countries Import Export Balance 
Total 
trade Import Export Balance 
Total 
trade 
Saudi  4047 1008 -3039 5055 4575 1381 -3194 5956 
Bahrain 118 66 -52 184 4473 3354 -1119 7827 
Kuwait 310 153 -157 463 160 231 71 391 
Qatar 837 113 -724 950 2027 217 -1810 2244 
UAE 5700 1175 -4525 6875 6836 2110 -4726 8946 
Oman 2420 158 -2262 2578 2594 289 -2305 2883 
Total 13432 2673 -10759 16105 20665 7582 -13083 28247 
Source: Ministry of Commerce, Thailand. 
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In sum, the pattern of Thailand‘s trade with the GCC States had not changed from the 
previous administration.  The difference is that under Thaksin, trade had been placed as 
significant core of foreign policy; the outcome is that GDP growth increased as well as 
trade value with the GCC States.  Since Thailand runs trade deficits with all the GCC 
States, the challenge for the government was promoting Thai products in the GCC 
market, as well as support Thai businessmen to do business in the GCC States.   
 
3.3   International and Regional Grouping  
With Thaksin‘s administration making a commitment to be internationally active, the 
government attempted to strengthen relations at international and regional levels.  The 
most visible is at the regional level when the administration aimed to push Thailand to 
be one of the regional leaders through the establishment of the Asian Cooperation 
Dialogue.  Support for the establishment and the participation of the ACD reflected 
strength in the relations Thailand had with countries within the region, notably countries 
in the GCC States most of which became the ACD active members, as will be discussed 
in the next section.  
 
3.3.1 The Thai FM’s Candidacy for UN Secretary General 
While the GCC States had been good political allies with Thailand on the international 
stage, Thailand‘s decision to send its foreign minister as a candidate for UN secretary 
general was another test for Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States.  The Thai 
embassies in the GCC States were instructed to lobby for the votes, which most of the 
GCC States are keen to support.  Regional grouping and linkages play an important role 
in the GCC States‘ decision.  Most of the Arab countries supported candidates from 
Asia; however, there were candidates from other Asian countries, therefore since 2004, 
lobbying for the Thai candidate was one of the agendas Thailand put forward in the 
discussion and negotiation tables when interacting with the GCC States.  Therefore, 
starting from 2005, the Thai foreign minister visited the GCC States several times to 
lobby for the votes.  
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3.3.2 The Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) 
The GCC States were responsive to Thailand‘s initiated international platform, the Asian 
Cooperation Dialogue.  All GCC States are member of the ACD (see table 10). In 
addition, several of the GCC States volunteered to take a lead on the cooperation 
projects (see table 11). 
Table 10: ACD Membership of the GCC States and Year of Membership 
ACD member Year of membership 
Qatar 2002 
Bahrain 2002 
Oman 2003 
Kuwait 2003 
UAE 2004 
Saudi Arabia 2005 
Source: Asian Cooperation Dialogue  www.acddialogue.com.  (Last accessed 12 June, 2009). 
 
Table 11: Selected Examples of the ACD's Areas of Cooperation in which Some 
GCC States are Involved 
Areas of cooperation  Prime and Co-prime movers 
Energy Bahrain, China, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Qatar, 
the Philippines 
Road Safety Oman 
Environmental Education Japan, Qatar 
Source: www.acddialogue.com. (Last accessed 12 June, 2009). 
 
It is clear that several GCC States were supportive of Thailand‘s initiatives.  Two small 
GCC States, Qatar and Bahrain, are the founding members of the ACD and both had 
been active in taking up projects.  Qatar also volunteered to host the 5
th
 ACD meeting in 
2006.  
 
On other international stages, the GCC States were also supportive of Thailand.  In the 
case of the OIC, several GCC States, namely Qatar and Bahrain, offered to mitigate the 
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tone of the rest of the Muslim world had over the Thai government‘s handling of 
southern violence.
431
  The GCC States have always been the significant key voters for 
Thailand in the UN.  In addition, some GCC States have been active in mitigating the 
constrained relations between Thailand and Saudi Arabia.  
 
Over all, Thailand‘s relationship with the GCC States is sometimes driven by the 
institutional framework.  Thailand benefits from the participation of the GCC States in 
its international initiatives.  As well, the vote received from these GCC States and the 
potential votes Thailand may receive from the Muslim states, with help from the GCC 
States, would support Thailand‘s potential candidacy in international organisations, 
including the vote for UN secretary general, a post that Thailand‘s former foreign 
minister, Dr. Surakiati Satianrathai, ran for.  
 
3.4  THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MEDIA 
The Role of Media and Technology—Thailand’s Launching of the Thai2Arab Web 
site 
Globalisation plays an important role in defining the nature of international relations and 
also the means states use to interact.  The advancement in media and telecommunication 
has been recognised by governments, as well as local and international organisations.  
With the government being criticised of its tight control of the press, as it was put into 
the ―partly free‖ zone; as well as with the problem in the southernmost, taking absolute 
control over the media and stopping misleading critics was difficult for the Thai 
government.  There has been the transformation in the government‘s approach to 
countering the media: from harsh and strict control to a more diplomatic-oriented 
approach.  
 
In 2005 the government invited journalists from the Middle East to visit the country; the 
journalists met with high level diplomats, visited different parts of Thailand.  It was the 
government‘s hope that the journalists would present positive images about Thailand 
back home. Other attempt was when the government considered having the Qatar-based 
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al-Jazeera to present the news about Thailand, particularly the news about the Muslim-
majority south, with the hope that al-Jazeera will reflect a more positive outlook about 
the situation and the way that the government handled it.
432
 
 
In September 2006, the Thai government, led by the ministry of foreign affairs, launched 
a Web site that specially devotes to Thailand‘s relationship with the Muslim world, the 
Thai2Arab (www.thai2arab.com).  According to the ministry of foreign affairs, the aim 
of the Web site was to ―strengthen the relations and mutual understanding between 
Thailand and the Muslim world.
433‖ It is also the hope that the Web site would be ―the 
windows of information for a wider Arab and Muslim public.‖434  During the launching 
ceremony, then-foreign minister Dr. Kantathi Suphamongkhon remarked that the Web 
site represents a significant milestone in Thai-Middle Eastern relations.  Kantathi 
claimed that it shows ―Thailand‘s commitment to strengthen its ties with the Middle East 
and Muslim countries.
435‖  During the launching ceremony, Arab diplomatic corps in 
Thailand, as well as Arab press from the Middle East had been invited.  
 
Much of the information contained in the Web site largely concerns Thailand‘s 
relationship with Muslims; however, the Web site provides general information on Thai 
political, economic and social situation. One section is allocated specifically to 
information about Muslim in Thailand, touching upon the subjects of the role of 
Muslims in Thailand, history of Islam in Thailand, activities of the monarchy for Islamic 
affairs, the social and political equality, and the role of the executive and legislative 
branches of government in Islamic Affairs.  Observing the Web site where only English 
and Arabic are used, it was quite clear that the target audience of this Web site is not 
Muslims in Thailand but rather the Arabs interested in doing business or tourism in 
Thailand. Trying to understand Thailand from different perspective is useful. Thus the 
media plays an important role in confirming a correct understanding about the country 
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and its Muslim citizens. As well, the Web site allowed the possibility for detail in 
investment and trade between Thailand and the Arab world. 
 
Interestingly, the Thai2arab Web site was launched in 2006, when the relationship 
between Thailand and the Muslim world was tense due to violence in the south. A Thai 
diplomat pointed out that the Web site was one of the government‘s measures to 
improve the country‘s image over its treatment of Muslim minority. Upon conversation 
with staff at the ministry of foreign affairs over whether the motivation to launch the 
Web site was related to the need to improve the image of Thailand with the OIC and the 
Muslim world, the most responses was that the Web site was not directly targeted to 
solve the problem with the OIC or to improve the country‘s image. 436   Creating a 
positive image and good understanding between Thailand and the Muslim world was the 
only benefit from the Web site. The key motivation was indeed to promote Thailand in 
the Middle East to enhance trade, tourism and cooperation.  
 
What can be demonstrated here is that modern technology and advanced 
telecommunication has been applied by states as a tool to strengthen its legitimacy, as 
well as maintaining a positive image and bilateral relations with other states.  The power 
of the media and telecommunication under the globalised world is viewed as threatening 
the legitimacy and state power and public opinion can create strong impact on states, 
leading to the loss of confidence domestically and negative perception at the 
international level.  States will try to reduce the chance of having their legitimacy being 
undermined by public and media opinion.  In the case of Thailand, the media and 
telecommunication technologies had been used by the state to provide information on 
Muslims in Thailand and the relations with the Middle East.  While states can barely 
control the spread of information and the media, one of the means to counter, when 
controlling it is not effective, is to create its own communication channel to spread its 
own information.  This is to solve the image problem and clarify its treatment of 
Muslims.  The Thai2arab Web site is pro-governmental in nature.  It brings out a 
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positive image of Thailand, thus boosting confidence and positive environment for 
tourism, trade and investment. 
 
4. THE NATURE OF RELATIONS 
As noted, it was the Chuan administration that laid the foundation for the interactions 
between Thailand and the GCC States and the rest of the Muslim world.  By the time 
Thaksin took over the office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had recruited sufficient 
staff with good knowledge of the Middle East.  Thus it was less difficult for the Ministry 
to implement economically oriented foreign policy to the GCC and the Middle East 
region.
 437
  In terms of trade expansion, the department of South Asia, the Middle East 
and Africa had been more active in exploring the region of the Middle East and Islamic 
world.  Several countries had been placed under the government‘s pilot survey, 
including Iran, Maldives, and the Gulf region.
438
  Private sector had been included into 
the planning and state visits. Targeting Middle East tourists and medical tourism projects 
with the GCC region had been emphasised more under Thaksin administration.  
 
On the GCC side, all the states follow the GCC policy framework toward Thailand; thus 
the GCC States adhere to the collective action.
439
  Meetings with the Thai government 
were usually done with all the GCC States collectively attended.
440
  There are some 
differences in small details in terms of relations, but the core policy is the same.
441
  This 
explains the failure of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Bahrain.  While both 
Thailand and Bahrain wanted the agreement to be successful, the deal had been objected 
by other GCC members, who claimed that the Free Trade agreement should be done 
between Thailand and the GCC States collectively.  Therefore, the FTA with Bahrain 
had been halted, but with the plan for potential development of new FTA with the GCC 
                                                          
437
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States as a whole.  It is significant, therefore, to note the nature of GCC policy tradition, 
which prefers collective action in making major international agreements.  
 
In terms of security, unlike the previous administration, security concerns did not limit 
only to the threat from militants in the south, but also cover international terrorist 
network like Jemaah Islamiah (JI), and al-Qaeda. With the US war on terror, and the 
commitment most countries made on supporting it, Thailand worked closely with the 
GCC States in order to monitor the movement of terrorist groups, which had been 
reported as operating in some GCC States and using Thailand as transit and operation 
site.
442
   
 
Relations between the GCC monarchies and Thai monarchy is well highlighted through 
the participation of GCC heads of states to the 60
th
 year celebration of the King 
Bhumiphol‘s ascending to the throne in 2006.  All the GCC monarchs, with the 
exception of Saudi Arabia, attended the event.  Information about each of the GCC 
monarchs who visited Thailand during the occasion, as well as GCC country information 
was included in Thai daily newspaper.  Thai people came to learn more about the GCC 
States through this occasion.  
 
 To compare with the previous administration, an official from the Ministry of foreign 
affairs observed that the nature of Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States can be 
characterised as followed: 
 
1. Like the previous administration, there was no specific foreign policy 
made for the GCC States.  The foreign policy used for the GCC States 
was Thailand‘s foreign policy toward the Middle East.  However, there 
are some bilateral agreements Thailand had made with several GCC 
States under this administration.  (For details on the agreements, see 
individual country‘s discussion)  
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2. Most of the relationship and agreements, i.e. on taxation, aviation, with 
the GCC States are still done through bilateral relations.   
3. Some GCC States have been supporting Thailand in restoring and 
enhancing relations with other GCC States.  While the GCC as an 
organisation had no legitimacy in influencing bilateral relations, 
informally, states that have close relationship with Thailand had been 
acting as a proxy for Thailand in strengthening the relations, i.e. Bahrain 
helped Thailand in improving relations with Saudi Arabia.  
 
While personal connection and expertise in the Middle East of the former foreign 
minister had been advantageous to Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States, under 
Thaksin, lack of expertise and connection in the GCC States had been compensated with 
management and business skills.  The relationship with the GCC States, as well as other 
states in the Muslim world had been supported by the government through trade 
promotions.  This can be seen through the establishment of the Islamic Bank in Thailand, 
the project that had been turned down before in the previous administration.  The 
government encouraged investment from the Gulf regions.  According to Professor Jaran 
Maluleem from Thammasat University in Thailand, Thaksin was able to make rapid 
decision and run the risk; such helped hasten bureaucratic nature of Thai policy making 
and decision. 
443
  
 
The southern unrest, which urged Thailand to clarify its approach to handling the issue, 
had stimulated the need to strengthen relationship with the GCC States.  Within the OIC, 
some GCC States were supportive and helpful in mediating the constraints and 
misunderstanding incurred from the southern unrests.   
 
In terms of people-to-people relations, there was an increase in the number of Middle 
East visitors to Thailand.  The incident on September 11 and the U.S. War on terror had 
shifted the interest of the Arab tourists from America and Europe to Asia, because of 
lower cost and friendlier atmosphere.  Within the Middle East tourists, the percentage of 
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the GCC tourists is very high; this factor will be discussed in the following section.  
Figure 20 shows the number of Middle East visitors coming to Thailand between 1997 
and 2004.  There had been constant increase in the tourists, with the exception of 2003, 
with the outbreak of SARS in Asia.  
 
Figure 21: Number of Tourists from Middle East coming to Thailand 1997-2005 
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Source: Tourism Authority of Thailand. 
 
The relationship between Thailand and the GCC States can also be seen as consisting of 
good will.  This can be seen through the pledge received during the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami incident in 2004, which will be elaborated in the next section. 
 
4.1   GCC States’ Support During the Tsunami 
The disastrous outcome of the Tsunami that hit several Indian-Ocean-Rim states in 
December 2004 demonstrated the relations between Thailand and the GCC States.  Even 
though having been criticised by the media that the sum they provided to the affected 
areas was meagre,
444
 the GCC States had pledged a good amount of money to Thailand.  
Some of the GCC States were among the first wave of countries that pledge aid (see 
table 12 below).   
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Table 12: The Pledge that some Affected Countries Received from the GCC States 
in 2004-2005 ($)* 
Countries/amount Thailand  Indonesia Somalia Sri Lanka 
Kuwait n/a** n/a n/a n/a 
UAE 120,000 16,540,315 6,100 5,908,146 
Qatar 293,731 699,585 n/a 239,873 
Bahrain n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Oman n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Saudi Arabia 983,200 9,625,467 600,000 2,607,353 
Total 1,396,931 26,865,367 606,100 8,755,372 
 
*This only includes the pledge given through government-to government direction.  It does not include the 
amount of pledge given through international organisations like the International Crescent Cross and UN 
affiliated organisations. 
**Kuwait did send some assistance and financial support to Thailand through the Kuwait Red crescent 
society.  
Source:  The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, through Reliefweb. 
 www.reliefweb.int/fts . (Last accessed 14 December, 2008). 
 
Table 12 shows the pledges of the GCC States to selected affected states.  That 
Indonesia received the highest pledge is understandably due to Islamic relations; in the 
case of Sri Lanka, the substantial pledge is understandably due to the scale of damages 
in the country.  In the case of Thailand, the pledge came from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and 
UAE, all of which show cordial relations these GCC States have toward Thailand.  With 
Saudi Arabia ranks the first in the amount given.  This shows that despite constrained 
political relations, Saudi Arabia had been generous to Thailand and the constraint had 
very little effect on relief support and people-to-people relations.  This was appreciated 
in Thailand, as can be seen through the discussion in the Thai media.  The President of 
the Thai Islamic Trade and Industrial Association pointed out that despite significant 
pledge help and support from the GCC States during the tsunami, Thai policy makers 
still consider relationship with those states peripheral.  The government still had not 
designed foreign policy that accommodates the development in relationship with this 
region: 
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Thai people like to forget.  We design our foreign policy without 
recognising priority and not identifying good friends.  Think back to the 
Tsunami period, the Arabs gave substantial amount of money.  We 
always give credit to Americans and Europeans, but we forget to realise 
that the Arabs had been helping us a lot too.
445
 
 
In sum, while more attention was given to the Middle East and GCC regions in the 
previous administration, the Thaksin administration continued the established relations 
with the region, although the nature of attention leaned toward trade.  That the 
interaction with the GCC States is based on an imbalanced combination, with the most 
governmental attention given to trade but less to political and social relations, reflects 
traditional perception that the GCC and the Middle East is peripheral politically and 
socially to the majority of the Thais, and that indifference can well be assigned to the 
overall nature of the relations.  In terms of bilateral relations, however, the relationship 
between Thailand and individual GCC States differed in degree of intimacy; this will be 
discussed in the next section.  
 
5. BILATERAL STATE RELATIONS 
5.1   Thailand-Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia is one of the countries which Thaksin aimed to restore relations.  In the 
previous administration, the relationship had not improved because of the unprogressive 
investigation of the murder of the Saudi Diplomats and Jewelry theft.  In 2001, the 
government set up a committee, chaired by the Justice Minister to re-investigate the 
crimes.  The investigation in 2002 progressed slowly, with little improvement in 
political and diplomatic relations.
446
  A little improvement is shown through the 
permission granted to  the Thai foreign minister Surakiat to meet with H.R.H Prince 
Abdullah Ibn Abdul Aziz Al Saud, the first Deputy Minister and Commander of 
National Armed Forces of Saudi Arabia in 2004.
447
  The visit marked the first time in 14 
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years that Saudi Arabia received a ministerial-level delegation from Thailand.
448
  In 
addition, as noted, Saudi Arabia has shown good will in pledging to tsunami victims in 
2004, which Saudi Arabia pledge the highest amount. (See table 12).  Not until 2005 that 
Saudi Arabia expressed satisfaction over the outcome of the investigation, and 
considered restore the relations. In the same year, Saudi Arabia agreed to join the Asian 
Cooperation Dialogue, which makes all the GCC States member of the ACD.   
 
While there was some improvement in diplomatic relations between the two sides, there 
was no formal change in the level of diplomatic relations. It is worth noting that there 
was no representative from Saudi Arabia attended the 60
th
 celebration on the throne of 
King Bhumiphol Adulyadej in 2006.  With the exception of Saudi Arabia, all the Gulf 
heads of state, along with heads of state from Middle East around the world attended.   
 
While the diplomatic relations between the two states had not markedly improved, trade 
relations had, and Islamic relations remained intact. A diplomat from the Thai embassy 
in Riyadh pointed out that, ―We wish that one day progress will be made in bettering the 
political relations between the two countries. I have to admit that despite stable 
relationship at the political level, our ties at religious, trade and economic spheres are 
growing steadily‖449 
 
5.1.1 Trade Relations 
Starting from 2001, commercial tie with Saudi Arabia began to improve even though 
diplomatic relations had not settled back to normal level. 
450
  Such reflects the ability of 
the government to pursue efficient international trade policy with Saudi Arabia, in that it 
could de-link trade from political affairs.  Figure 21 shows that exports from Thailand to 
Saudi Arabia had been gradually improved, starting in 2001 and continue to move 
upward in 2005; at the same time, import increased rapidly.   
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Figure 22: Thailand’s Trade with Saudi Arabia 1997-2005 
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Source: Ministry of Commerce, Thailand. 
 
Trade relations had not been improved only in the government sector, but also in the 
private sector.  In 2005, the Saudi chamber of commerce signed a memorandum of 
understanding with the Federation of Thai Industry for the cooperation between the 
chambers of commerce and industry.  The MOU is to strengthen relations between 
private sectors of the two states. 
451
 
 
5.1.2 Social Relations 
Islamic relations continued to be intact despite the constrained political and diplomatic 
relations.  The dynamism of the religious relations between Thailand and Saudi Arabia 
can be measured through Saudi supports for Muslims in Thailand.  Saudi Arabia still 
provided reasonable quota for pilgrims from Thailand, within which King Fahd 
continued to sponsor some pilgrims each year.  The Saudi government also continued to 
provide scholarship for Thai Muslims going to study in Saudi Arabia.
452
  Religious tie 
continue to prove its strength and its separation from political realm.   
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5.1.3 Notes on Thailand’s Relationship with Saudi Arabia 
The development of an effort in investigation of the theft and murder of Saudi diplomats 
under Thaksin‘s administration had begun with enthusiasm, though at the end of 2006, 
there was no absolute conclusion of the investigation.  Thailand‘s diplomatic relations 
with Saudi Arabia continued to improve very little.  On the other hand, the improvement 
in trade relations and the unaffected Islamic relations had proved the separation among 
political, trade and religious realms.   
 
5.2   Thailand and Bahrain 
Despite not having embassy in Thailand, Bahrain‘s relations with Thailand had seen 
constant growth.  Bahrain had been considered as one of Thailand‘s closest partners in 
the Middle East region.
453
 Under Thaksin‘s administration, Bahrain was considered as 
an important gateway to the rest of the GCC States.
454
  Since the opening of Royal Thai 
embassy in Manama in February 2004, the relationship between Thailand and Bahrain 
has become more dynamic.  There have been several exchanges in visits among 
government officials and private sectors.  Although Bahrain still has no embassy in 
Thailand, there has been plan to establish the embassy in Bangkok, which had been 
approved in 2006.  As of 2005, the Bahrain embassy in Beijing still provides support for 
the interactions between Thailand and Bahrain.   
 
Bahrain is considered as part of the ―friendly Islamic block‖ by ministry of foreign 
affairs staffs.
455
  Not only that Bahrain supported Thailand‘s application for observer 
status in the OIC, Bahrain also supported and helped mitigate Thailand‘s image in the 
Muslim World over its handling of the Southern violence in 2004 in the OIC and among 
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international Muslim community.
456
  Thailand also sought Bahrain‘s support in 
improving relations with Saudi Arabia.
457
  
 
Diplomatic relations between Thailand and Bahrain were enhanced by support from the 
emir of Bahrain, who frequently visited Thailand and used Thai medical facilities.  The 
emir and the Bahrain government had played an active role in supporting Thailand‘s 
celebration of King‘s Bhumiphol‘s 60th year ascending to the throne, in 2006.  Prior to 
the celebration, Bahrain volunteered to coordinate and offered a private plane for 
Minister of Foreign Affairs to fly to invite Gulf royal families.
458
  Such relations support 
demonstrate the characteristics of Asian and Middle East politics, where personal 
connections and distinguish individuals can influence the nature of international 
relations.  
 
5.2.1 Trade and Economic Relations 
Under Thaksin‘s administration, there had been much development in terms of relations 
with Bahrain.  Much more interactions had been done between the two sides, 
particularly in terms of trade.  In 2001, the visit of Bahrain‘s prime minister 
strengthened Thailand‘s relationship with Bahrain, particularly in terms of trade.  The 
visit concluded with agreements on trade promotion, avoiding double taxation and anti-
income tax evasion agreement. 
459
  One year after, in 2002, Thailand proposed the 
signing of agreement on economic cooperation with Bahrain, making the two countries 
become close economic partners.
460
  In September 2004, Thailand and Bahrain signed 
the Memorandum of Understanding to establish Thai Business Center in Bahrain to 
promote and strengthen trade and investment relations.
461
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In 2004, the foreign minister had paid an official visit to Bahrain and the UAE.  
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bahrain aimed to use the expertise of the 
Thai Petroleum company, PTT, to conduct a petroleum survey in Bahrain.
462
  The 
meeting with Bahrain was also aimed to discuss about prospect to promote Thailand‘s 
construction and Thai goods.   
 
5.2.2 Social Relations 
One way to measure the level of people-to-people relations is to measure the amount of 
interactions being made.  Observing the frequency of direct flight between the two states 
can indirectly measure the level of interactions among people.  In 2002, it is apparent 
that there was an increase in people relations.  This is because the Thai national carrier, 
Thai Airways International, began flying from Bangkok to Manama in November, 
making it easier for people from two sides. Manama was the 4
th
 city in the Gulf where 
Thai airways flies, in addition to Dubai, Kuwait City and Muscat.
463
  It can be seen that 
such cities were where Thailand had developed greater relations during that period.  
With direct flight, Thailand aimed to attract more tourists from Bahrain. 
 
Despite improvement in people relation, as of 2005, the social relations between Bahrain 
and Thailand were not active compared to social relations between Thailand and other 
GCC States.  The lack of knowledge among Bahrainis about Thailand and vice versa is 
the underlying explanation.  It was difficult for people of both sides to interact with one 
another.  Lacking embassy in Bahrain and Bangkok had made it difficult to seek 
information and access.  The establishment of embassy and the Thai business center 
would help promote tourism and stimulate people-to-people relations in Bahrain.   
 
5.2.3 Notes on Thailand’s Relationship with Bahrain 
While political relations through monarchical and high ranks officials were dynamic, 
trade and people-to-people relations with Bahrain were comparatively less so.  However, 
there were visually efforts from both states to develop facilities that will bolster relations, 
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both in terms of trade and people-to-people relations.  This includes the establishment of 
embassy in Bahrain, the launching of direct flight between Bangkok and Bahrain.  Such 
move will in the future allow greater interactions, which create greater knowledge about 
one another.  
 
5.3   Thailand and Qatar 
In 2002, Thailand agreed to cooperate with Qatar in preparing for the Asian Games in 
Doha in 2006.  Thailand‘s contribution to such event includes allowing Qatari Asian 
Games Committee to hold meeting in Thailand as well as becoming partnerships with 
many projects in preparation of the Games.
464
  Later in the same year, Thailand won the 
contract to be the designer of the sport village and other facilities for athlete in Doha 
Asian Games 2006.  Qatar also demonstrated good will for bilateral relations with 
Thailand by pledging financial assistance for the victims of tsunami in 2004 (see table 
12). 
 
5.3.1 Trade Relations 
Thailand‘s trade with Qatar maintains the same pattern with the previous administration.  
Thailand imported from Qatar more.  As noted, between 2000 and 2005 Qatar had been 
in the top ten sources for Thailand‘s crude oil import.  Figure 22 shows the import and 
export value between Thailand and Qatar.  While import constantly increases every year, 
export from Thailand to Qatar only began to increase in 2001.  The export value in 2005 
had doubled that of 2004.  As small GCC States, Qatar and Bahrain‘s trade with 
Thailand had always been low compared to other states; and Thailand‘s export to Qatar 
had always been in the same range as that of Bahrain. However, in 2005, export to Qatar 
doubled that of Bahrain (see figure 23).   
 
In sum, there has been an improvement in trade relations with Qatar.  According to 
political and economic analysts at the Qatar embassy, there has been an increase in 
interactions between Qatar and Thai businessmen. At the same time, Qataris have 
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obtained more knowledge about Thailand through tourism and news.  Therefore, Thai 
products have been more welcome in the Qatari market.
465
 
 
Figure 23 : Thailand’s Trade with Qatar 1997-2005 
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Source: Ministry of Commerce, Thailand. 
Figure 24: Thailand’s Trade with Qatar and Bahrain, a Comparison 1997-2005 
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Source: Ministry of Commerce, Thailand. 
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5.3.2 Social Relations 
Social relations between Thailand and Qatar continued to be comparatively inactive.  
However, the relationship between Muslims had been dynamic. In 2006, the Sultan of 
Qatar provided financial support for the construction of school buildings and student 
dormitory in Islamic college in Southern Thailand, where, Qatar‘s minister of 
Endowment and Islamic Affairs attended the inaugural ceremony in Thailand.
466
  In 
addition, the Qatar-based Al-jazeera had been the most known Arab media in Thailand.  
 
5.3.3 Notes on Thailand’s Relationship with Qatar 
Political relationship with Qatar was shown to improve, as well as trade relations.  
However, compared to other GCC States, the amount of trade is still comparatively low.  
In terms of social relations, Islamic relations were dominant.  However, as a whole, 
there is a potential improvement in the people-to-people relations as a whole.  
 
5.4   Thailand-Kuwait 
5.4.1 Diplomatic Relations 
The Thai government continued to maintain the existing relationship with Kuwait, 
although there was no remarkable improvement in relationship between the two sides.  
There had been exchanges in state visits of key officers from both sides, including the 
visits of the deputy minister for Ministry of Labour in 2003, a visit from political advisor 
and Thai private sector groups in 2004, and lastly in 2005, through his GCC States tour, 
the deputy prime minister, Dr. Surakiat Sathianthai visited Kuwait to ask support for his 
running for UN Secretary post.
467
  From the Kuwait side, there has been informal visit of 
Kuwaiti policy maker; in 2003 Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, the deputy 
prime minister and minister of Foreign affairs of Kuwait paid personal visit to 
Thailand.
468
   
 
When tsunami hit Thailand in December 2004, Kuwait had demonstrated a good will by 
providing financial assistance through the Kuwait Red Crescent society for the Tsunami 
                                                          
466
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467
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468
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victims.  Kuwaiti diplomatic delegation also visited the tsunami sites and to provide 
moral support for the victims.
469
 
 
5.4.2 Trade Relations 
Thailand‘s trade with Kuwait had not been significant compared to other GCC States 
like the UAE, and Oman.  However, Thailand‘s export to Kuwait has been increased in 
steady rate (see figure 25). In order to boost trade between Thailand and Kuwait, an 
Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, which had been signed since 1998 
had been amended in 2003.  In addition, the government had tried to explore the 
opportunity to export halal food to Kuwait.  In 2004, a governmental delegation had led 
groups of Thai entrepreneur to Kuwait to explore the halal food market.    
 
Figure 25: Thailand’s Trade with Kuwait 2001-2007 
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Source: Ministry of Commerce, Thailand. 
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Figure 26: Thailand’s Export to Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain 2001-2007 
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Source: Ministry of Commerce, Thailand. 
 
5.4.3 Social Relations 
Kuwait had been included as a targeted country for the promotion of the Tourism 
Authority of Thailand.
470
  Figure 26 demonstrates that the number of tourists in Kuwait 
has constantly increased from 1997.  While tourists from Saudi Arabia decreased and 
remained low, Kuwait tourists became the second to the UAE as the biggest GCC 
tourists visiting Thailand.  
 
Since 2001, medical care and spas have been used to promote Thai tourism in Kuwait.
471
  
In particular, Thailand encouraged Kuwaitis to seek medical care in Thailand, whose 
medical facilities are close to standards in the West but cheaper.  To support tourism 
even more, Thai Airways began flying to Kuwait in April 2002.
472
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Figure 27: Number of Kuwaiti Tourists Visiting Thailand 1997-2005 
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Source: Tourism Authority of Thailand. 
 
In terms of education, in 2002, Kuwait agreed to fund 100 million baht project to 
promote southern Thailand as Southeast Asian Center for Muslim education and 
culture.
473
  A member of the Kuwaiti royal family attended a seminar on Muslim studies 
in southern Thailand.
474
  In addition, the Kuwaiti government also provides scholarship 
for Muslim students to study in Kuwait.   
 
5.4.4 Notes on Thailand’s Relationship with Kuwait 
In sum, Thailand‘s relationship with Kuwait is highlighted with people-to-people 
relation, where there were activities and constant contacts.  Trade and political relations 
had not been remarkably dynamic, compared to other GCC States where several 
agreements and establishment of agencies stimulate relations.  
 
5.5   Thailand and Oman 
Thailand‘s relationship with Oman improved from the previous administration.  
Compared to the previous administration, there was an increase in the number of 
exchanges in visits of high-ranking officials from both sides, namely from the ministry 
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of energy and the ministry of education, and ministry of agriculture.
475
  Averagely, there 
were at least 2 visits of high rank officials from Thailand to Oman, largely officials from 
Ministry of Energy and Labour.
476
 In 2004, there were three official visits within only 
one year; this reflects higher interest in the country from before, where under the Chuan 
administration between 1997 and 2001, there were only two key visits within four years.  
Prime Minister Thaksin visited Oman in 2005 and paid courtesy call to Sultan Qaboos 
bin Said; in addition, the prime minister discussed Oman‘s deputy prime minister over 
the possibility to expand cooperation in trade, investment, energy as well as exchange in 
know-how and academic cooperation.  
 
5.5.1 Trade Relations  
Thailand had always run large trade deficit with Oman, as noted, because of oil purchase.  
At the same time, Thai products had not been popular in Oman, causing low level of 
export.  However, beginning from 2001, Thailand‘s export to Oman began to grow in an 
impressive rate; doubled in value between 2004 and 2005 (see figure 27).  At the same 
time the oil trade, which has always played a crucial rule in Thailand‘s trade relations 
with Oman, continued to expand in investment; in 2002, Thailand‘s PTT Company 
Limited obtained the concession rights from Ministry of Oil and Gas in Oman to 
petroleum in Block 44 in Oman.
477
  In 2003, the PTT Exploration and Production Public 
Company (PTTEP) was established in Muscat; the company employs both Thai and 
Omani workers. Four years after, in 2006, the PTTEP Company Limited also obtained 
another concession from the Oman government in exploring petroleum in Block 58.  
Block 44, which covers 1165 Sqkm can produce $30 million cubic feet, and has liquid 
gas of 2000 barrels/day.
478
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Figure 28: Thailand’s Export to Oman 1997-2005 
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Source: Ministry of Commerce, Thailand. 
 
There has been an increased interest in Thai products, particularly agricultural products.  
In 2002, the Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Agriculture of Thailand organised 
Thailand‘s Agricultural Product Fair in Oman; the fair attracted a large number of 
Omanis.
479
  From the fair, there was hope on the Thai part that there will be good future 
for Thai products.  Agricultural products, namely flowers and plants from Thailand were 
popular in Thailand; and a large amount of Thai orchids had been ordered to decorate 
palaces and hotels in Oman.
480
  
 
5.5.2 Social Relations 
Personal ties played an important role in defining Thailand‘s relationship with Oman. 
The interview with diplomat from ministry of foreign affairs indicates that the sultan of 
Oman visited Thailand on his personal trip several times.
 481
  In addition, there was 
exchange of agricultural experts and students project between Oman and Thailand.
482
 
Compared to the past, where Omanis had very little knowledge about Thailand and its 
products, there has been greater knowledge among Omanis about Thailand, thanks to the 
                                                          
479
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greater promotion about tourism and medical facilities available in Thailand. The figure 
below (figure 28) shows that the number of tourists from Oman substantially increased 
in late 1990s; particularly from 1997 to 1998, the number of Omani tourists visiting 
Thailand almost 63% increased.   
 
Figure 29: The Number of Omani Tourists to Thailand in Selected Years 
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Source: Tourism Authority of Thailand 
 
Among the Omanis, Thailand has become famous medical hub of Asia; there are three 
Thai hospitals have established referral centers in Muscat, including Bumrungrad 
Hospital, Bangkok Hospital, and Piyavej Hospital.
483
 In 2005, Thailand and Oman 
signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Tourism Cooperation; the MOU 
reflects the urge to promote tourism between the two countries.
484
   
 
5.5.3 Notes on Thailand’s Relationship with Oman 
There has been an increase in dynamism in Thailand‘s relations with Oman.  Trade and 
social relations shows that different governmental agencies have played an important 
role in bolstering inter-agency rapport, and ultimately result in increased in trade and 
social relation.  
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5.6   Thailand-UAE 
Diplomatic relations between Thailand and the UAE were enhanced through trade 
relations, which had been discussed through high-ranking official visits.  This 
corresponded to the nature of foreign policy that aims to promote trade in new markets.  
Political relations had been developed along trade relations; there has been closer links 
between the UAE officials and Thailand.  There had been the exchanges in visits among 
governmental agencies that worked closely, namely minister of labour, minister of 
commerce, minister of energy, minister of public health.  In addition, the UAE had 
shown the good will to support Thailand when tsunami hit. 
 
5.6.1 Trade Relations 
The relationship between Thailand and the United Arab Emirates had constantly been 
developed. The UAE ranks the first in the Middle East as trade partner with Thailand.
485
  
In 2005, 33% of the oil Thailand imports comes from the UAE, making it rank the first 
as the crude oil suppliers.  Compared to 2004, Thailand increased its import of oil from 
the UAE by 54.4 %.
486
  The UAE also allowed Thailand to export halal chicken, which 
was the beginning of the development of halal food export from Thailand to the Middle 
East.  To the UAE customers, Thai products and service are of good quality and are 
usually cheaper when compared to products from Western countries.
487
  
 
The UAE has been one of Thailand‘s targeted trade promotion centres in the Middle 
East. In Dubai, the Thai Trade Promotion Office, under the administration of the 
Ministry of Commerce, oversees and provides support to Thailand‘s trade relations with 
the Middle Eastern countries. In 2003, the Thai Trade Promotion Office suggested that 
the government pay special attention to the GCC market due to its high purchasing 
power. Much of the road show and Thai trade fairs were held in the UAE, particularly in 
Dubai. Thus the UAE is one of the most important countries in terms of trade and 
economic relations with Thailand.  
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5.6.2 Social Relations 
Tourism still highlights people to people relations between Thailand and the UAE.  For 
the UAE ambassador to Thailand, tourism greatly promotes Thailand and creates 
positive attitude among the Emiratis toward the country: 
 
Thailand could offer some shopping centers, family style traveling, 
seaside, serviced apartment and hotel. The important thing is also that 
there is the availability of halal food, and mosques. Other thing is that 
they find Thailand a safe and secure country. In terms of visa, the 
Emiratis got the exemption of visa to enter Thailand, making it easier to 
come to visit than going to the West. Other thing is that you have to 
understand that Arabs travel with family, which means a big group; it is 
cheaper, easier to enter Thailand than going to the West. Now there are a 
lot of airlines that fly to Thailand, for the UAE, there are Emirates and 
Ethihad.
488
   
 
Between 2004 and 2006, many Thai private hospitals established its referral centers in 
the UAE, thus facilitating and promoting more medical tourists from the UAE.  Thai 
hospitals are well known for the treatment of heart disease and cancer.
489
  Since the mid-
2000s the UAE government began to send patients to Bamrungrad Hospitals in Thailand 
instead of sending them to Europe, which is costlier.
490
 
 
5.6.3 Notes on Thailand’s Relationship with the UAE 
The relations between Thailand and the UAE had been moving towards a more dynamic 
nature in all aspects.  Trade and tourism has been the major forces that stimulate 
relations.  Islamic affairs had not been remarkably significant in the relations between 
the two sides.  The cooperation between governmental sub-units also helped define the 
nature of the intergovernmental relations between the two sides.  
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6. THAILAND-INTERGOVERNMENT RELATIONS  
6.1   The Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) and Asian states 
The Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) was initiated by Thailand to draw cooperation 
from Asian countries. There are 30 member countries in the ACD, 3 countries in East 
Asia, 5 in Central Asia, 9 in Southeast Asia, 5 in South Asia, and 7 in the Middle East.
491
  
Within 7 ACD members in the Middle East, 6 were all the GCC member countries. The 
aim of the ACD was to provide an informal stage for Asian stage to discuss plans and 
projects, and to create different clusters for cooperation projects.  Different members 
volunteer to be leaders in 19 different cooperative projects, namely tourism, energy, IT 
development, agriculture, road safety, natural disaster, E-Education and human resource 
development. 
492
 
 
While Thaksin viewed that the ACD would demonstrate Thailand‘s attempt to solidify 
relationship among Asian nations together, the ACD had received some criticisms.  One 
of the critics suggests negative feedbacks from Asian nations.  One criticism is over the 
overlapping function of the ACD, when compared with other existing regional forum, 
namely the Asian Region Forum.
493
  Whether effective or not, the ACD reflects ways in 
which states seek to group together to strengthen their position, through cooperation and 
projects. In the case of Thailand, the ACD also demonstrates the urge to become one of 
the region‘s active members.  To strengthen relations and gain support from regional 
powers, Thailand had to demonstrate its success in drawing regional powers like China 
and Japan to join; as well as the friendly Arab blocks like the GCC States to join the 
forum.  The participation in such international platforms demonstrates two key factors: 
mutual benefit from joint projects and cooperation, and the need to strengthen bilateral 
relations by agreeing to participate in the forum.    
 
 
 
 
                                                          
491
 Information from www.acddialogue.com (Last accessed 12 June, 2009).  
492
 Ibid.  
493
 Patumporn Watcharasatien, ―Who Gets What from ACD,‖ Matichon 13 June 2002. 
Chapter 4                                                        Thailand-Gulf States Relations—2001-2006 
 
 - 246 - 
6.2   Relations with the OIC 
Under Thaksin‘s administration between 2001 and 2005, the violence in the southern 
part of Thailand created difficult relations between Thailand and the OIC, which also 
affected Thailand‘s relationship with the Muslim world, and the GCC States.  
 
6.2.1 Background of the Troubled South: Trigger for Thai-OIC Sour 
Relations 
Violence and unrest in the south was not totally a new phenomenon; Thailand has 
suffered from insurgency since mid 20
th
 century.  However, the sequences of violence, 
which intensified in early 2004, had attracted international attention.  This is due to the 
large scale of violence and the government‘s measure to counter incidents that took 
place.  In addition, international attention had been stimulated by the availability and 
swiftness of the media report on the incident and interconnectness among Muslims in 
different parts of the world.  The unrest in the south arguably came to the government 
attention in 2004, when a group of militant robbed a military base in Narathiwat 
province and seized almost 400 weapons.
494
  Since 2004, there had been a dramatic 
increase of violence in the south, including arsons, bombings, and homicides.  Victims 
were teachers, Buddhist monks as well as lay people, both Buddhists and Muslims.  
Table 13 shows the numbers of incident in southern Thailand between 2004 and 2006, in 
which 2005 has the largest number of incidents.  Arrests had been made and most of the 
suspects were local Muslims. 
 
Table 13: Number of Incidents in the Southern Thai Conflict 2004-2006
495
 
Year Number of incidents 
2004 1850 
2005 2297 
2006 1815 
Source: Duncan McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land. 2008. 
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Two of the incidents in the south particularly caused the Muslim world to question 
Thailand‘s approach to handle the issue.  The first incident took place in April 2004, 
when the Thai security officers shoot 105 young Muslim youths, who, mostly armed 
with knives, attacked several police posts in Thailand‘s southern province of Yala.496  
The shooting also took place on the same day at the Krue Se Mosque in Pattani province, 
where some of the youths who escaped from the police took shelter.
497
  This incident 
had been criticised as not only it resulted in the perceived unnecessary death of youths, 
but also the ruin of the respectable ancient place of worship for Muslims. With Pattani is 
viewed as a historically significant Islamic city of Southeast Asia, the incident called for 
attentions from the Muslim world even more.  
 
The second incident took place later in the same year in Narathiwat province; Muslim 
demonstrators were piled up into army trucks heading for Thai army camp after the mass 
demonstration took place at a police station in Tak Bai District.
498
  Lacking of space in 
the truck, the high density of people piled up, plus the weak physical conditions of those 
in the truck resulted in suffocation caused 78 deaths.   
 
In order to handle the incidents, the investigation committees, as well as the National 
Reconciliation Commission (NRC) had been set up in March 2005.
499
  To provide an 
explanation to the incidents, the Thai ambassadors and consul-general whose missions 
are in Muslim countries were invited to visit the south and were given booklets 
explaining situation in the south. In practice, however, the way the Thai government 
handled the situation in southern Thailand has been questioned by the international 
community. In order to clarify the situation with the Muslim world, ambassadors from 
Muslim nations were invited to visit the sites where incidents took place, as well as to 
talk to local Muslims. In addition, Thailand sent special envoys to the OIC headquarters 
in Riyadh to explain the situations to key OIC officers.
500
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6.2.2  OIC and Thailand’s Interactions through Southern Violence 
Problems 
Thailand‘s relationship with the OIC under Thaksin‘s administration had been viewed as 
abandoned even before the southern violence took place. The government had been 
criticised as not utilised the OIC stage to efficiently clarify the situation in the south.
501
  
Twice, in June and July 2005, the OIC, with Thailand‘s approval, sent delegations to 
gather facts and meet with Muslims in the affected south. In its investigation report on 
the southern Thailand incident in June 2005, the OIC concluded that the situation in 
southern Thailand was ―not religious conflict.‖ 502   The organisation also expressed 
support over Thailand‘s effort to resolve problem in the southern provinces.503 
 
Even though Thailand had demonstrated its willingness to resolve the southern problem, 
the situation in the south did not improve much.  Violence took place almost daily, and 
in October 2005, the OIC Secretary General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu expressed his 
concern over violence in Thailand, the Thai government‘s handling the case, and the 
suppression against Muslims in the south.  Ihsanoglu urged the government to depend 
less on military means but more dialogue to restore peace and security.
504
  Prime 
Minister Thaksin, however, responded negatively with the OIC Secretary General‘s 
comment, pointing out that such comments intensified even more the situation.
505
 
 
In an effort to explain the southern incident to the Muslim world, the second foreign 
minister of the Thaksin administration, Dr. Kanthathi Supamonkol, attended the 32
nd
 
session of the OIC ministerial meeting in Yemen, where he delivered a statement that 
emphasised Thailand‘s ties with OIC members and the OIC. Being the first Thai foreign 
minister who delivered a statement at the OIC meeting, Kanthathi raised the issue 
regarding the situation in the south by pointing out Thailand‘s willingness to work with 
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the OIC to solve the problem and that the support from the OIC reflected positive 
relations between Thailand and the OIC.
506
  In the 33
rd
 session of the OIC meeting in 
Azerbaijan, Kanthathi emphasised the government‘s effort in creating harmony with 
people of different religions, at the same time; Thailand offered to help OIC member 
states to fight over the Avian Influenza.
507
  The 33
rd
 OIC ministerial meeting also 
resulted in two documents related to Thailand; one document stated that the OIC 
secretary-general must cooperate with the Thai government to follow up on the 
condition of Muslims in Southern Thailand, while another document emphasised 
protecting the rights of Muslims communities and minorities in non-OIC member 
states.
508
 
 
Until now, the situation in the south had not resolved to the normal level, despite much 
effort and change in government.  There is a need for the Thai state to pursue greater 
efforts to stop the violence and at the same time to improve its image with Muslims in 
the region.  
 
The relationship between Thailand and the OIC under the Thaksin administration had 
gone through a transformation: from cordial relations with the previous administration to 
perceived distant relations under Thaksin‘s administration.  That the OIC‘s attitude 
toward Thailand had transformed dramatically and rapidly from 1998 when it was 
accepted as observer.  Thai media recounted the rationale for the acceptance that was 
due to a positive account of Thailand‘s treatment to Muslim citizen. 509   The OIC 
changed from admiration to cautious optimism to hostile attitude toward Thailand.
510
  
 
While intergovernmental organisations generally help mediate constrains and enhance a 
better understanding of situation within their member countries, as well as relationship 
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among member countries, in the case of Thailand, state relations came second to the 
welfare of Muslim minorities who reside within Thailand. Identity plays an important 
role, as safeguarding Muslims rights strictly corresponds with the organisational 
objective.  Sometimes, states employ international organisations to help clarify its stand 
and demonstrate its good will to solve problem.  The Thai state under Thaksin had not 
done enough to utilise the OIC stage to strengthen its stand.  Instead of internalising the 
OIC support to reduce potential constrain with the Muslim world, Thailand 
unintentionally fail to prevent constraint with the OIC itself.  
 
6.3   Notes on Intergovernmental Organisations 
Contemporary states employ intergovernmental organisation as mediators in enhancing 
inter-state relations.  In the previous administration, the intergovernmental organisations 
largely acted as supportive mechanisms for states; in particular, they strengthened states‘ 
legitimacy and provide access for one state to develop grater bilateral relations with 
others.  Through intergovernmental framework, state cooperation can be achieved much 
faster and more efficiently.  Under Thaksin‘s administration, the Thai state initiated the 
ACD with the aim to develop the intergovernmental framework that enhanced greater 
cooperation in Asia.  Under the ACD framework, Thailand was able to attract Asian 
powers to participate and take part in areas of cooperation.  In addition, through the 
framework, Thailand was able to strengthen relations with the GCC States, even with 
Saudi Arabia; in 2005, Saudi Arabia joined ACD.   
 
It can be seen under Thaksin‘s administration, however, that intergovernmental 
organisation can act as two-edge sword.  In addition to facilitating state relations, the 
intergovernmental organisation can put into question and condemn a member state that 
disagrees or resists the principles and norm of the organisation.  The organisational 
identity and values can be so significant that state who show destabilise such norms is at 
risked to be intervened and inquired.  The state in question may run into conflict with the 
organisation, as well as the conflict with individual members of that organisation; this is 
the case of Thailand who risked being intervened by the OIC and risked having relations 
with its member undermined.  
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The southern violence had been the core agenda in Thailand‘s relation with the OIC.  
While the observer status allowed Thailand to be able to clarify its stand, which the 
government had tried its best.  Such incident shows that the Thai state had used the OIC 
as stage to clarify its position, though not as efficient as it should have.  The state‘s 
legitimate role in handling the situation had been confirmed as well as the confirmation 
that the conflict was handled without religious discrimination.  
 
7. THE CHUAN AND THAKSIN GOVERNMENTS: A COMPARISON  
The previous chapter and this chapter describe and analyse the nature of Thailand‘s 
relationship with the GCC States as well as the Muslim world. This section seeks to 
summarise the nature of the relations through comparing and contrasting the 
characteristics of the two governments‘ relations with the region through the observation 
of international relations factors, including key foreign policy, the content of the 
interactions, the participation of the private sector association, and the attention given to 
the GCC States and the Middle East.  The outcome of the comparison can be 
summarised in the following table: 
 
Table 14: Comparison of the Chuan and Thaksin Administrations 
Agenda/governments 
 
The Chuan government 
 
The Thaksin government 
 
Key agenda in foreign 
policy 
 
Adopting international principles and 
expanding the role of Thailand in 
international stage 
Expanding trade, 
particularly to new markets 
 
Relationship with the 
Middle East 
 
 
 
Established new relations and improved 
existing relations 
 
 
 
Enhanced the improved 
relations through increased 
state visits and proposed 
jointed projects, and 
stimulated more active 
trade. 
Key agenda in interacting 
with the Middle East 
 
Political and social aspects and the use of 
Muslim identity. This can be seen from 
Thailand's joining the OIC and the 
Trade aspect.  This can be 
seen through the attempt to 
expand the market for Thai 
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launching of the Look West Policy 
 
 
goods to the Middle East 
and the proposed of Free 
Trade Agreement with 
Bahrain 
The participation of 
private sector and interest 
group in the relationship 
with the GCC States 
 
 
 
 
Recognised and allowed the participation 
of the private sector in only limited areas, 
specially trade and social agenda. 
 
 
 
 
 
Similar to that of Chuan. 
Recognised and allowed the 
participation of the private 
sector in only limited areas, 
specially trade and social 
agenda. 
 
Attention to the GCC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes, but in the context of wider Middle 
East relations. Relationship with the Gulf 
states is largely defined through oil trade 
and through relationship with the greater 
Muslim world.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes. As the GCC is 
recognised specially as the 
emerging market. Instead of 
recognising the GCC as 
part of the OIC, individual 
GCC state had been given 
more attention, this can be 
seen through the plan to 
improve bilateral trade 
relations with GCC States 
and the planned Free Trade 
Agreement with Bahrain. 
 
The use of state-centric 
agenda as tool in 
interactions  
 
Islamic identity and human rights had 
been incorporated into the interactions 
 
 
 
Non-state agendas were not 
as dominant as trade.  
Although people-to-people 
relations had been 
promoted through tourism.  
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The use of non-state 
agenda as tool to 
interactions 
 
 
 
The government tried to boost bilateral 
relations through increased state visits, as 
well as trade expansion.  
 
 
 
Government heavily 
promoted trade. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author-created table based on the discussion on the previous and current chapters.  
 
From the above table, one can see that the Chuan and the Thaksin governments differ in 
their focuses. The key foreign policy agenda of the Chuan government can be described 
as heavily pluralism, multilateralism and internationalism, this can be seen in its attempt 
in joining international organisations and adopting several universal principles; on the 
other hand, the key foreign policy of the Thaksin agenda is liberal trade. Different 
objectives in the content of the foreign policy resulted in different nature in the 
interaction with the Middle East while the existence of Muslim minority had been the 
vital part of the Chuan Policy.  The expansion of trade and mutual benefits enhanced the 
relations between Thailand and the Muslim World in the Thaksin era.  
 
Thailand‘s relationship with the GCC States was firmly established under the period of 
Chuan administration, although it had been enhanced and continued by Thaksin 
administration, as noted by the increased in state visits and agreements signed between 
the two sides in the previous chapters. Under the Chuan administration the improvement 
in trade relations between Thailand and the Gulf states has not taken placed until a few 
years after the launching of the Look West policy, as one can see from the trade value, 
export value and growth in the back of the chapter.  Moreover, there is no proof that the 
growth in export and trade value resulted from the Look West policy, it could be well 
resulted from the trade promotion and aggressive foreign trade policy encouraged during 
the Thaksin era.  
 
The differences between the Chuan and Thaksin‘s administrations are demonstrated also 
in the manners the two governments handled domestic issues. Since human rights was 
the vital part of Chuan‘s policy, when combined with the government‘s attempt to 
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become the member of the OIC, its attention to Muslims in the South increased. The fact 
that the foreign minister was a Muslim elevated the welfare of the Muslims and 
improved Thailand‘s image over its treatment of the Muslim population. Under Thaksin, 
human rights faded from the key agenda, replacing it was the policy that stimulated trade 
expansion.  At the same time, there was the escalation of violence in the southernmost 
region. The way Thaksin‘s administration handled the problem was counterproductive; 
not only could it not solved the conflicts, it also could not prevent the violence and 
confusion of the government‘s solution among the Muslims in Thailand  While the 
internationalised-focus foreign policy under the Chuan administration tended to include 
as many socioeconomic and ethnic groups, the trade-oriented foreign policy of Thaksin 
administration tended to include only specialised groups, entrepreneurs, elite groups, 
civil servants and the military that were relevant to government‘s goals.  
 
The role of non-state actors and people-to-people relations under the two administrations 
is different. While under the Chuan administration, people relations is emphasised in a 
broad manner, with much emphasis on domestic and international Islamic connections, 
as well as commercial relations; under the Thaksin era, people relations was clustered 
around tourism as well as business relations where the government encouraged more 
connection between businessmen of the two sides.  
 
From the above observation, one can conclude that there are differences between the 
Chuan and Thaksin administration regarding their approach to the relations with the 
Middle East and the GCC States, the underlying reason is based on the stage of 
relationship Thailand was in with the region during each administration. Under the 
Thaksin administration, the government was at more advantage in taking the relationship 
further, for example increase trade relations.  This is because the relations had been 
established from the previous administration. Considering which government had 
maximised the benefit gained from incorporating non-state actors is a challenging task, 
as the nature of focus each administration had was different.  Under Chuan it was rather 
socioeconomic in nature, while under Thaksin it was mainly commercial. Although, one 
can say that the increase in state visits and the relationship between the government and 
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private sector under the Thaksin era was slightly greater, as there is a greater visibility of 
coordination between the government and the private sector associations.  
 
8. THE WEAKNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT 
Observing the nature of Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States and the OIC as a 
whole, one can observe some of the weakness that hinders Thailand from reaching the 
optimal goal in the development of relations with the GCC States and the Muslim world, 
some key weaknesses are noted as followed: 
 
8.1   Shared Identity and OIC Membership 
Even though Thailand had been successful in becoming the member of the OIC, its 
status is only observer. To become the member, a country must be Muslim country; the 
condition that did not apply to Thailand.  As observing member, Thailand was allowed 
only to be presented at the opening and closing ceremony, it can say very little in the 
OIC meeting. Thus, the Thai government may have a stand in the Muslim world, but one 
cannot claim that its ability and status is much improved on what it had before.  
  
Such fact means that the government does not have much access into the Muslim world.  
Thailand is and has always been recognised as Buddhist state; and it strongly maintains 
such identity.  In addition, in terms of trade, the Thai government will be at disadvantage 
when compared to other Muslim countries in Southeast Asia. Examples can be seen in 
the case of Islamic finance, and halal food.  Shared identity is one problem the state has 
in terms of interaction with the Muslim world; which sometimes state find itself 
struggling over the agenda.   
 
With the Thai state is recognised as un-Muslim, it cannot receive full membership, 
neither it can, in practiced, be viewed as sharing identity with the rest of the organisation.  
Presenting the agenda Thailand has may not make strong case.  The alternative to this 
problem can be done through seeking a back up through inserting opportunity to become 
membership in other Muslim organisations.  Even though the government cannot have 
full rights within the OIC, the Muslim non-state actors from Thailand can try to become 
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members and exercise the right and create the sense of shared identity with other OIC-
affiliated organisations.  
 
The private sector associations and interest groups have vital role in supporting the 
government.  The Muslims and state-sponsored Islamic agencies, these organisations are 
more specialised in professional and identity aspects.  While the Ministry of Commerce 
encouraged the export of Thai goods to the Muslim market, the credibility and 
acceptance of Thai goods depends largely on the halal verification.  In order to promote 
the goods and stimulate acceptance, support from the private sector is significant. The 
Muslim businesspersons and interest group have developed their own connections, many 
of them have spent some time in the Gulf States, and thus they are able to create 
confidence among Gulf buyer and officials. 
 
The Look West policy may look promising for Thailand‘s relationship with the Middle 
East; however, it receives much public criticisms. The policy itself is broadly defined, 
by lumping the Middle East, South Asia and Africa as one whole geographical focus. 
The suggestion has been made for a policy specially tailored for each of the regions. 
Indeed, according to a scholar, one policy for the whole Middle East region is even too 
broad, as there are differences in economic progress and market demands among Middle 
East countries, particularly, with high economic performance, market demands and 
purchasing power of the GCC States.  The government should specially design a trade 
policy for the GCC States.  As noted, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not devoted 
sufficient attention to the GCC States; so far, much of the attention has been given to the 
countries in south Asia, namely Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India.   
  
In addition, the content of the Look West policy has been criticised as impractical. 
While the content looked promising, not much has been tangibly done since the 
launching of the policy.
511
  During the Chuan‘s period, when the policy has just been 
launched, one may say that it took time for the policy to take off. The bilateral relations 
had only been in theory, with project planned, but not much has been done. It is during 
                                                          
511
 Interview with Professor Jaran Maluleem, Thammasat University, Mr. Anirut Smutkojorn Director of 
TITIA.  
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the Thaksin era that the policy became more tangible, particularly in terms of the 
expansion of market in the Middle East. One cannot be certain, however, whether the 
expansion is the outcome of the policy or just part of Thaksin‘s new policy of trade 
expansion to the new market, which haphazardly relevant to the Look West policy, but 
was not directly developed from it.
512
   
 
The government is not flexible to change sides or adjust their opinion; it has to go 
through several bureaucratic processes.  Governments still have to consider their place 
and their stand with security guarantors and international powers.  If changes occur at 
the international level, sometimes the non-government agencies can help fill the gaps.  
Changes in post-Cold War era, for example, 9/11 and the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
urged several states, Thailand and the GCC States alike, to seek international guarantors.  
This is because the ties the GCC States and Thailand have with the U.S. have been 
viewed as unstable, thus multilateralism became more preferable.   
 
Compared to other parts of the world, the Middle East is considered peripheral. While 
the view is changing in the case of the GCC States, both the governments have been 
criticised as failing to recognise the capacity of the Middle East. Scholars have pointed 
out that the governments have been slow when it comes to decision making that is 
relevant to the relationship with the Muslim world, including the GCC States. A scholar 
pointed out that the government lacks of efficient adviser that will overlook and 
maximise benefit from the relationship.  
 
There is the lack of initiatives as there are too many agendas for the government to cover. 
Since the Middle East is viewed as peripheral, initiatives are devoted to other prioritised 
areas, including the Western hemisphere, East Asia and Southeast Asia. In terms of 
relationship with the GCC States, the government is less active in developing new 
projects with the GCC States, which can benefit both. 
 
                                                          
512
 Interview with scholar from Chulalongkorn University. 
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Decision making in the government has to go through layers of processes. Many Thai 
officials have little knowledge of the GCC States, thus some of the proposals regarding 
the GCC States have been delayed or disapproved.  This is demonstrated in the noted 
difficulty in establishing Islamic bank in Thailand.  Not until three years later that the 
first Islamic Bank could be opened in Thailand, enabling Thai-Muslim to become 
customer, instead of having to put money in Islamic Bank in Malaysia or in the Middle 
East.  
 
After observing the role of the government in interacting with the GCC States, one can 
see that some of these weaknesses could conceivably be strengthened by the intervention 
from the private sector associations. Private sector could complement the government in 
the areas in which the government is not completely capable.  The future relations 
between Thailand and the GCC States will depend on the role of the government and the 
private sector, as well as how much the government allows the private sector to manage 
the gap and assist in the areas in which the government has not explored.  Thus the 
future of Thailand‘s relationship with the GCC States will also depend on whether the 
government will maximise the benefit they can earn from allowing private sector 
association and interest groups to manage the interaction.  
 
The reasons that prevent the government working with and allowing the private sector to 
interact with GCC States include distrust and unfamiliarity in working with the private 
sector.  One key reason is that the government does not trust in the capacity of the 
private sector to manage the relations and that the content of the relations will be for the 
self interest of that organisation; the other explanation is the traditional division of 
government-private sectors.  We will explore whether other factors must be sought in 
the perceptions and preferences of non-state actors themselves.  
 
9.  CONCLUSION 
One must agree that trade expansion and economic development is the highlight of 
Thailand‘s foreign policy under Prime Minister Thaksin.  With much focus in trade, 
several aspects within foreign policy, which had been developed during the previous 
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administrations, had been abandoned.  The obvious example is the government‘s 
abandoning human rights promotions, which had been the core project of the Chuan 
administration.  Under the Thaksin government, the state was still the key player with in 
foreign affairs.  The key mechanisms of diplomacy, political and economic factors still 
defined Thailand‘s relations with the rest of the world.   
 
What distinguishes the Thaksin administration from the previous administration is that 
the economic agenda preceded the political one, thus reflecting the reality of the 
globalised world, where the flow of goods and commercial transactions had become key 
national agendas of most countries.  At the same time, political affairs still maintains its 
significance.  Indeed, the state had been able to insert trade and people relations agenda 
into political agenda and diplomacy.  To a certain extent, resolving difficult relations 
with Saudi Arabia had been done through employing the justice system along with 
diplomacy.  However Islamic Affairs is still the vital and efficient tool to enhance and 
improve relations. 
 
Thailand‘s relationship with the GCC States under Thaksin administration continued to 
move toward a positive direction.  Oil and trade continued to be the key driving forces 
for the interactions between the GCC and Thailand.  The additional driving force is the 
support Thailand gained from GCC States in the international platform, for example, the 
GCC States‘ support in the Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD). 
 
Islam and people-to-people relations remain the significant factors in Thailand‘s 
relationship with the GCC States.  The globalised world and improved 
telecommunication had enabled Thai Muslims to be connected with the international 
Muslim community.  On the positive side is the support the Thai Muslim communities 
received from their Muslim brethren abroad; on the negative side is the pressure from 
these Thai Muslims who required that the state reveal its position in Muslim-related 
international phenomena, like the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan.  Tourism had 
increased its significance after September 11, when the Arabs shifted their attention to 
Asia.  In addition, there had been an increase in knowledge among the GCC citizens on 
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Thailand.  Such a non-state phenomenon had indirectly supported the state-centric 
mechanisms; it facilitated greater trade expansion as well as the interactions among 
government officials, where more cooperation could be obtained.    
 
The violence in the southern part of Thailand to some extent affected Thailand‘s 
relationship with the Muslim world, including the GCC States.  In the case of Thailand, 
the situation in the south put Thailand and the OIC in a difficult situation.  The 
constrained relations with the OIC also jeopardised Thailand‘s relationship with the OIC 
members, which are the members of the Muslim world.  It was not improved until the 
end of the administration.   
 
As noted in the previous chapter, relationship with the inter-governmental organisations 
helps facilitate the bilateral relations between member states.  In the case of Thailand 
under the Thaksin administration, Thailand‘s relationship with the OIC, taking into 
consideration the constraints caused by the southern violence, the relationship with the 
organisation did not facilitate the relationship with the OIC members.  Since the 
beginning of the administration, there had been distant relations between Thailand and 
the OIC; and such means losing connections and support from the OIC, its organisation 
body and its members.  One remarkable point, while the relationship with the OIC had 
been distant, the GCC the relationship with the GCC States was not.  From the 
observation of bilateral relations between Thailand and individual GCC States, several 
GCC States supported Thailand‘s stand in the southern unrest despite constraint with the 
OIC; some even offered to help mitigate the constraint in relations.  This incident shows 
that sometimes states face the dilemmas between the bilateral relations they have with 
other states and their attachment to inter-governmental organisations. Therefore, the 
nature of bilateral relations is not always subjected to organisations that states are 
members with.   
 
This part has culminated in summarising weaknesses and strength of the Thai state in 
both administrations, as well as the nature of relations with the GCC States.  It can be 
seen that in the contemporary politics, state alone may not be sufficient in improving or 
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strengthening relations with others.  This is due to additional factors that come to play; 
one of the factors that had been highlighted is the identity, in which state may lack, but 
need, as important factor need to be part of the group.  The support from the private 
sector associations within that state, who may be equipped with such identity, can 
facilitate the state to be able to create the linkage for the state.   
 
The problem over lack of compatible identity is one of the key problems that limits 
states from maximising the interest in their interactions with one another.  The 
recognition of potential that non-state actors can absorb some of the interests states fail 
to gain due to such limitation, and that they can act on behalf of states have become 
more compelling.  Interestingly, while all state relations took place, the interactions 
among non-state actors were occurring all along.  With that in mind, the state-centric 
approach that takes into consideration conventional state mechanisms, i.e. diplomacy, 
security, trade, and social relations, has very little to say about the emergence and 
dynamism of these non-state actors.  Approaches that are pro-pluralism are needed to 
examine the realm of non-state actors, in which dynamism took place at the same time 
as the state realm. 
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PART 3 
NON-STATE REALM 
The previous part suggests the continued dominant role of states in international 
relations; however, it also notes the changing context of international environment 
into a more globalised world, where greater number of non-state actors emerged and 
became more active in international politics.  While states find themselves being 
challenged by new agendas, non-state actors are viewed as alternative player who 
can address those agendas on behalf of states or can support the areas where states 
find limitation.  Being perceived as a Buddhist state, it was difficult for the state to 
maximise its economic and cultural interactions with the GCC States and the rest of 
the Muslim world.  Seeking support from non-state actors whose identity is one 
more level closer to the Muslim world is therefore viewed as an alternative way for 
the state to improve its relations with the GCC States.  
 
The following chapters turn to the pluralist approach to examine non-state actors.  
The non-state realm is to be understood as taken place alongside the state sphere in 
the previous part.  The rationale in separating the state and non-state realms from 
each other is to highlight that dynamism with each sphere occurred at the same time; 
however, within its own sphere.  The interactions of actors between the two sphere is 
the highlight of the research; it provides explanation on the relationship between the 
state and the non-state actors, thus enable us to see the possibility that non-state 
actors can become more involve in Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States.   
 
This part therefore provides a brief background on the development of private sector 
associations in Thailand and their relationship to the Thai government.  In addition, 
two case studies are used to explore their relations with the Thai government and 
Muslim states, as well as their relations with other private sector associations and 
non-state actors in Thailand and abroad.  It is worth noting the factors that induce 
these actors to interact with their counterparts, and the approaches they use to 
interact, which differ from those of the government in many ways.  At the same time, 
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it is worth noting the amount of government‘s involvement in private sector 
associations‘ activity and endeavour to interact with their counterparts.   
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CHAPTER 5 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MUSLIM-RELATED PRIVATE SECTOR 
ASSOCIATIONS IN THAILAND 
The Case of the Thai Islamic Trade and Industrial Association (TITIA) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous two chapters focused largely on the role of state actors in maintaining and 
improving relations between Thailand and GCC States.  The chapters suggest that in the 
two administrations the relations between the GCC States and Thailand has not been 
actively dynamic compared to Thailand‘s relations with other global regions; in 
particular, there has been a lack of knowledge between Thailand and small GCC States.  
Taking away trade of oil and commercial goods, there is very little agenda that can 
motivate state interactions.   
 
This chapter seeks to explore the other sphere of world politics, which also contributes 
to Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States.  It has been noted before that the state is not 
the only actor in the relationship.  There are other non-state actors involved, including 
international organisations, domestic and overseas private sector associations, and 
specialised groups and individuals.  Each has its own goals and interacted with the Gulf 
to fulfil such goals.  The government has benefited largely from these non-state actors as 
sometimes it finds limits in developing relations because the IR mechanisms that the 
state possesses are not sufficient to accommodate contemporary relations.  The non-state 
actors can therefore very well support the government.  In this chapter, the role of 
private sector association will be elaborated.  Private sector associations have several 
strong points; they are goal oriented and are less bureaucratic.  There are, however, 
different size and capacity of private sector associations; and the government has been 
quite selective in coordinating with these associations.  This chapter provides a case 
study of the small private sector association, the Thai Islamic and Industrial Association 
(TITIA), its functions and its relations with the Thai government.   
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The author begins the chapter by discussing the development of private sector 
associations in Thailand.  The discussion then moves on to explore the development of 
TITIA, its objectives and activities.  The next part of the chapter highlights TITIA‘s 
capacity to interact with its domestic and overseas counterparts through exploring how it 
manages to organise the International Islamic Economic, Cultural and Tourism 
Conference in 2007.  The last part of the chapter discusses the future of TITIA, which is 
partly subjected to its relations with the government; this part also explores the 
possibility that TITIA will act as a proxy in Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States.  
 
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE SECTOR IN THAILAND 
2.1   The Development of Private Sector and the Government’s Recognition 
of Private Sector in Thailand 
The development of the private sector in Thailand can be reflected in the National 
Development Plans.
513
  The government‘s recognition of the significance of the private 
sector began in the 2
nd
 National Development Plan (1967-1971), during which the 
government encouraged the development of private sector through promoting industrial 
and commercial private sector.  In the 3
rd
 National Development Plan (1972-1976), the 
government tried to engage private sector into the country‘s economic development by 
promoting the establishment of financial and industrial institutes as well as and 
agribusiness.  The outcome was the establishment of the Thailand Stock Market, where 
the private sector managed and the government only monitored it according to legal 
obligation. 
 
The private sector has played an important role in supporting and providing advice to the 
government in the aspect of international economic cooperation.  Under the 4
th
 National 
Development Plan (1978-1982) the role of private sector institutes increasingly 
expanded, particularly in terms of international economic cooperation, including the 
cooperation among private sectors in ASEAN countries.  Significant private sector 
associations that emerged included the Thai Chamber of Commerce, the Federation of 
                                                          
513
 The First National Development Plan was established in 1963; since then, the plans generally cover 4-
year period.  For greater detail on the National Development Plan, visit the National Economic and Social 
Development Board http://www.nesdb.go.th/. (Last accessed 25 May, 2009). 
Chapter 5                         Foreign Private Sector Association in Thailand—case of TITIA 
 
 - 266 - 
Thai Industry and the Thai Bankers‘ Association.514  There had been the coordination 
between these private sectors with the government and foreign private sector.  The 
private sector had increased its role in proposing to the government in creating the joint 
committee between the government and some private sector associations to help enhance 
economic development and trade.
515
  Today, there are a large number of private sector 
agencies in Thailand; the private sector is divided into companies, non-government 
organisations, and private sector associations.  The government has responded to the 
development and growth of the private sector agencies by assigning government units 
especially responsible for different types of private sectors; in addition, several legal 
bodies have been designed to coordinate with these private sector groups.   
 
It is crucial to note that some leading individuals in the private sector usually have a 
significant connection with politicians and high rank officers.  The connections between 
politicians or high rank officers and individuals in non-state actors or large companies is 
not unusual in Thailand; this is because politicians and officers frequently depend on 
entrepreneurs and elite class to support them in order to obtain political positions or 
higher position within the government.  Prime Minister Thaksin himself has been having 
close connections with entrepreneurs in top companies both within Thailand and outside.   
 
For example, under the Thaksin administration, the influence of Singaporean investors 
became more visible; there were a number of proposals and joint projects between Thai 
and Singaporean investors.  A lot of the investments came under the Government of 
Singapore Investment Corps (GIC).
516
  In addition, within Thailand, many members of 
the private sector are former or acting politicians, or have been providing support for 
political parties.  TIITA committees and members, for example, have good relations 
with some politicians, some members themselves considered running in the general 
                                                          
514
 Summary of the Government and Private Sector in the 5
th
 National Development Plan (1981-1985).  
515
 Ibid. 
516
 ―The End of Thaksin Era, the End of Singapore Funds, Watch the Arab Grasp the Real Estate Market,‖ 
NeawNah, March 10, 2007 
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election.
517
  Several honorary guests from the government attended TITIA‘s event in 
favour of TITIA members who were organisers.
518
 
 
Thus, there is a mutual dependency between some Thai government officials and these 
individuals.  The private sector and the government are sometimes linked through 
personal contacts.  Consequently, many parts of the content in the trade and foreign 
policies are deemed to benefit merchants and entrepreneurs.   
 
2.2   Selected Problems in the Cooperation between the Thai Government 
and the Private Sector 
Since being recognised by the government in the 2
nd
 National Development plan, the 
private sector had grown constantly, for instance the growth in cooperation between the 
private sector and the government.  There are, however, some difficulties in the 
coordination between the government and private sector.  The explanation for 
difficulties in coordination between the government and private sectors can be rooted 
from different goals and objectives.  In addition, difficulties in coordination are rooted in 
difference in managing procedures between government and private sector.  Figure 29 
illustrates the differences in managing procedures, as well as aims and objectives 
between the government and private sector.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
517
 Discussion with an anonymous TITIA member.   
518
 The direct observation at the World of Muslims 2006 Conference showed that the honorary guests from 
the government attended the event to enhance credibility and add value to the event despite the lack of 
relevance between the nature of their work and the content of the event.   
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Figure 30: The Differences in Managing Procedures between the Government and Private Sector 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The 5
th
 National Development Plan, the Office of the National Economic and Social Development 
Board. 
 
The above figure was presented in the 5
th
 National Development Plan (1982-1986) as 
part of the discussion on the problems in the coordination between the government and 
private sector.  Within the discussion, coordination problem between the two sides had 
been listed as follow:
519
 
 
1. There is a lack of linkage in terms of responsibility of national development 
between the private sector and government because decision making authority 
and ability to enact all the legal regulations belonging to the government.  While 
the government is bound more with the legal and regulation it set forth, the 
private sector has more flexibility in performing.  
                                                          
519
 Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB).  
 
Specific plan Government  Private 
Sector 
Objective and policy Profit seeking Public interest 
oriented 
-justice among 
players 
Goal Capacity of the country
  
  
Capacity of private actors 
Managing procedure Investment 
Increased Efficiency 
 
Investment 
Regulation 
Incentive 
 
Enacting Regulation 
  
   
Competition 
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2. Different in goal.  The goal of the government is public-oriented, while private 
sector is profited oriented, thus its target is based less on social justice.  
3. The lack of coordination system between the two sides, which will yield more 
efficient, practical outcomes.  
4. The private sectors have not been developed to have capacity that is less 
dependent to the government.  
5. Lack of study and analysis on the nature of private sector on whether it can be 
developed to be part of the governmental mechanism, and how much it needs 
government inference. 
6. There is the lack of knowledge and understanding among staff on the 
cooperation between the government and the private sector.  
 
Recognising the problems over the development of private sector, the government, 
through the 5
th
 National Development Plan, aims to increase the role of the private 
sector, as well as to encourage the government‘s support of private sector involvement.  
The Plan attempted to encourage greater participation, including the design of jointed 
project between the government and private sector, the plan to develop private business 
association by transfer some of governmental responsibility to private sector, and the 
plan to review laws concerning the establishment and management of private sector 
projects.  
 
After the 5
th
 National Development plan, the attention to increase the role of private 
sector had been replaced with the attempt to strengthen public-private partnerships.
520
  
Due to differences in interests, goals and organisational structure, it is still difficult for 
the government to coordinate with private sector, despite the recognition that it can 
alleviate some of the government‘s responsibilities.  The problems regarding the 
establishment and the relationship with the government of the private sector reflected in 
the 5
th
 National Development did not totally disappear. Since the end of such a national 
development plan, the effort in creating strong linkage between government and private 
sector has not been virtually carried out. However, in terms of the development of the 
                                                          
520
 As set forth in the 6
th 
and 7
th
 National Development plan.  
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private sector itself, there has been an increase in number of private sector associations 
specialised in different areas. In addition, the key private sector associations that had 
been established during the 4
th
 and 5
th
 plan, namely the Board of Investment of Thailand, 
the Federation of Thai Industry, Thailand Stock Market and the Bankers‘ Association 
have become more active.  These key private sector associations also support newly-
emerged, smaller private sector associations, which come under the umbrella of these 
key associations, for example, the Thai Islamic Trade and Industrial Association, which 
is affiliated with the Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of Thai Industry.  
 
2.3   The Relationship between Private Sector and the Government 
The relations between private sector and the government are mostly visible in the case of 
large private organisations in Thailand.  Most of the large private sector associations like 
the Thai Chamber of Commerce, the Federation of Thai Industry and the Board of 
Investment of Thailand have long been providing support to the government according 
to their specialties.  The relations between these organisations with the government can 
be traced back to their establishment, in which all of them were originally set up with the 
support from the government according to the aims within the National Development 
plan.  In many cases, the establishments, the governmental support and the 
organisational links with the government can be reflected in the legal bodies, which are 
directly relevant to these organisations; for instance, the Federation of Thai Industry Act 
(1987), the Thai Chamber of Commerce Act (1966).  In addition to stating the objectives, 
organisational structure, and functions of an organisation, the acts generally states that 
the organisation must provide support to the government.  For example, the Federation 
of Thai Industry Act states that the Federation of Thai Industry has ―To act as the sole 
representative of all industrial enterprises in Thailand in co-ordinating with the State in 
both the policy and operation matters,‖ 521   and ―To offer appropriate advices, 
recommendations to the Government for the overall benefits of the industrial circle.‖ 522   
 
Since the government plays a crucial role in their establishment, these organisations 
regularly work with and provide support for the government.  Thus to engage with 
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 The Federation of Thai Industry Act (1987), www.fti.or.th/nfti/org. (Last accessed 24 February, 2009).    
522
 Ibid. 
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private sector associations, there are a few associations that the government will select. 
The associations are entrusted by the government to run projects and be part of the 
governmental committee. The participation of these associations are legally stated, thus 
the government‘s expectation on their role and the limitation of their interventions is 
clear.   
 
The nature of relations between the government and small private sector associations is 
different. It has been suggested before that there are layers of support among private 
sector associations, in which the smaller private sector associations sometimes receive 
support from larger private sector association; indeed, these small associations can be 
seen as their subordinate, affiliated organisations.  For instance, TITIA, the association 
under study, is a member of the Thai Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of Thai 
Industry.  These small private sector associations are more distant from the government.  
It is very rare that the government will directly interact with these associations.  This is 
because, first, it recognises that these smaller organisations are affiliated with larger 
associations anyway, therefore, by interacting with the key associations the government 
will have access to these smaller organisations.  Second, the larger organisations might 
fare better in providing supports needed.  And third, as noted, there is an established 
relationship between the state and the larger organisations.  The role and participation 
these organisations are expected to contribute to the government are clearly established, 
therefore, such make it easier for the two sides to coordinate.  Even though it may be 
easier to work with larger associations, the downside to the government working with 
them is that they are not directly specialised in the field that is needed for the 
government.  For example, the Thai Chamber of Commerce may be able to provide 
information on trade in the Muslim world, however, the association may not have as 
much connections and resources as TITIA does.  Therefore, sometimes the Chamber of 
Commerce seeks support from TITIA, which is more specialised both in terms of 
geographical and functional.  The next section will discuss in detail a kind of specialised 
association, the trade association.   
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2.4   Trade Association 
The development of the private sector during the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 National Development 
Plans led to the grouping of business and professional associations;
523
 trade associations 
are among those associations being developed.  According to the Trade Association Act 
B.E 2509 (1966 AD), trade association is defined as ―an institution established by 
several persons, who are engaged in enterprises, for the promotion of the enterprises 
other than for sharing profit or income.‖524  The promotion of the establishment of trade 
associations in the National Development Plan corresponds with the development and 
evolution of the Trade Association Act in 1966.  The objective of the Act is to regulate 
the nature of trade associations within Thailand as well as to protect the Thai economy 
from being exploited by the grouping of entrepreneurs, particularly in terms of 
illegitimate profit seeking, and the influence of price.  There are a large number of trade 
associations today, with different characteristics.  The Thai Islamic Trade and Industrial 
Association is one of the existing trade associations.  Trade associations are under the 
care of Ministry of Commerce, Department of the Internal Trade.  
 
3. SPECIALISED PRIVATE SECTOR ASSOCIATION—THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF TITIA AND ITS INITIATIVES DURING THE 
CHUAN ERA 
During the period between 1997 and 2001, not only did the state-to-state relations 
between Thailand and the GCC States become more active, there was also a greater 
development among private sector associations relevant to the Muslim world.  The Thai-
Islamic Trade and Industrial Association (TITIA) is one of the private sector 
associations that specialise in business and trade interactions with the Muslim world.  
The success of the organisation can be seen through positive responses it received from 
both Thai and overseas private and governmental sectors. Since its establishment, TITIA 
has hosted several important events, which drew participation from Muslim countries.  
The establishment of TITIA was three years after the government had launched the Look 
West policy.  Thus TITIA has indirectly benefited from the increased level of 
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 National Development Plans, the Office of the National Economic and Social 
Development Board. 
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interactions and exchanges of knowledge with the Middle East and the Muslim world.
525
  
This section provides background of TITIA, its objectives, supports it received from the 
government, and key activities it has undertaken during this period.   
 
3.1   Background and Objectives 
The Thai Islamic Trade and Industrial Association (TITIA) was established on 24 
February 2000. The organisation was originally created by a group of Muslim 
businessmen who wanted to consolidate their domestic network and to expand their 
connections abroad to the Muslim world.  In Thailand, TITIA is one of the most widely 
known associations that promote trade and networking between Thai and Muslim 
businessmen abroad.  Its identity is both professional and cultural oriented, thus, 
focusing on the business and Islamic connections.  TITIA has been appointed by the 
Board of Trade of Thailand (BOI) to act as the Coordinator for the Middle Eastern and 
North African Countries.
526
  Such shows the cooperation and relationship between larger 
private section associations and TITIA; it also shows that TITIA‘s expertise in trade and 
connection with the Muslim world had been utilised by larger private sector associations 
it interacts with.  At the international level, it has been accepted by the Islamic Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (ICCI) as an observer member. Today TITIA is under 
administration of Mr. Anirut Smuthkochorn.  The aims of TITIA are: 
 
1. To encourage trade, industry, finance and business management between Thai 
Companies and the Muslim world, as well as among Thai and Muslim 
businessmen.  
2. To support the standardisation of factories and manufacturers for the purpose of 
expanding into both domestic and foreign market.  
3. To cooperate with the Thai government in supporting trade and investment for 
the benefit of Thai economy in the long run. 
527
 
                                                          
525
 The interview with the President of TITIA and the staff suggests that there was no direct relationship 
between the Launching of the government‘s Look West policy and the emergence of TITIA.  The timing 
was just co-incident.   
526
Background of the Thai Islamic Trade and Industrial Association, briefed in the during the inauguration 
of the 4
th
 meeting of the OIC Task Force on SMEs. 
527
 Information on TITIA http://www.thaiislamictrade.org/thai/index/home.php. (Last accessed 25 June, 
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Since the establishment coincided with the time when the government tried to expand its 
diplomatic and commercial horizon to the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, the 
association and the government had mutually supported each other.  The governmental 
units and larger private sector associations that interacted with TITIA included the South 
Asia, Middle East, and Africa department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of 
Commerce, and the Board of Trade of Thailand. Businessmen and companies that joined 
the organisation are from diverse business groups, ranging from food-export, 
construction, travel agency, and shipping companies.  Interestingly, from meeting with 
TITIA members during the fieldwork, it appeared that there seemed to be a good balance 
between the Muslim and non-Muslim members within TITIA.  The table below (table 
15) shows number and types of businesses of TITIA members: 
 
Table 15: Number and Types of Business of TITIA Members 
Type of Business Number 
Investment  and Consulting 10 
Travel and Tourism 9 
Import-Export 15 
Textile and Garment 6 
Construction 5 
Food and Agriculture 24 
Auto Parts 3 
Energy and Petroleum 7 
Jewellery and Gem 4 
Others 19 
Source: Compiled from Thai Islamic Trade and Industry Association 
http://www.thaiislamictrade.org/eng/index/business.php.( Last accessed 25 June, 2009). 
 
In addition to having members from diverse backgrounds, TITIA also has some 
connections with government officials.  There have been a few exchanges of information 
between TITIA and the governmental units; at the same time, TITIA depends on the 
government connections for high-level network, potential funding and operational 
                                                                                                                                                                           
2009).  
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supports.
528
   There are three levels of interaction that TITIA has been involving: 
interactions with individual businessmen both domestic and overseas, with governments, 
and with international organisations.
529
  TITIA‘s objectives cover broad areas of 
business, and its network with global business circle and domestic sub-agencies allows it 
to have great potential to expand and to sustain itself despite lack or small support from 
government.  Despite some connection with the government, TITIA does not have much 
visible role within the Thai politics and in international trade policy.   
 
Factors that Motivated the Establishment of TITIA—the Role of Globalisation 
Globalisation encourages more cross-border communication. Travelling and 
communication have become faster and more efficient; when combined with reduced 
cost, it created greater incentives for people to do business.  In addition, the 
advancement of education, technology and transportation have increased skills of traders, 
and have encouraged them to link with other traders, not only domestically but 
internationally.  In the case of TITIA, such changes allow greater and more efficient 
networking of the members.  Muslim traders are able to benefit from efficient improved 
telecommunication and can be matched according to their focuses.  It is this force of 
globalisation, which was recognised in Thailand since late 1990s, particularly during the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis, which made people become aware of the global community 
around them and want to create specialised group to accommodate the global trend. 
Businessmen and trade were among those who aspire to improve their trade. Globalism 
also creates stronger sense of identity, particularly among Diasporas. Islamic Diasporas 
encourages Thai-Muslim businessmen to create a group. Using Muslim identity enabled 
the group to efficiently reach the counterparts. 
 
3.2   The Significance of TITIA as an ICCI Observer 
That TITIA is an observer of the Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ICCI), 
which is the affiliated organisation of the OIC, is significant to Thailand.  This is 
because the Thai government could only obtain observer status from the OIC in 1998; an 
observer status does not allow Thailand to fully obtain all rights and benefits that the 
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 Interview with Mr. Fad, the TITIA secretary. 
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 Interview with Mr. Anirut Smutakojorn, Director of TITIA. 
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OIC members have.  In order to have greater access to the Muslim worlds in all aspects, 
there is the need to expand the network, which can be acquired from increasing linkages 
and channels.  In several non-Muslim states that are observer or are not member of the 
OIC, Muslim private sector associations seek involvement with the Muslim world 
through obtaining observer status with the ICCI. Being non-Muslims, these states are 
unable to exercise the full rights; however, at least these states can be part of the meeting 
and can develop better relations with member states. The private sector associations 
from non-Muslim states that are member of the ICCI include Singapore-Malay Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry in Singapore, New Zealand‘s Federation of Islamic 
Associations, and the Philippines National Committee for Islamic Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry of OIC. 
530
  Even though the observer status does not allow 
TITIA to fully benefit from the ICCI, it allows greater connections and opportunity for 
Thai Muslim entrepreneurs to interact with Muslim entrepreneur overseas.  To the Thai 
government, TITIA‘s membership with the ICCI indirectly helps in creating greater 
connection with the Muslim world.   
 
Through its membership with the ICCI, TITIA has brought additional linkage and 
channel for Thailand to interact with the Muslim world.  Non-Muslim states are limited 
in having an access into Muslim organisations and groups.  Increasing linkage, using 
Muslim organisations, is therefore an alternative for these non-Muslim states to have 
access to the Muslim world.  The Muslim identity attached to TITIA has made it more 
eligible and directly relevant than any other trade organisations in Thailand, even the 
Thai Chamber of Commerce, whose identity is largely viewed as more attached to Thai-
ness or Buddhism.  
 
3.3   Relations with Other Private Sector Associations 
As noted, TITIA is a member of other private sector associations and non-government 
organisations in Thailand, including the Thai Chamber of Commerce, the Federation of 
Thai Industry, the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand, and the Board of Trade.  
TITIA has a close relationship with the foreign trade section of the Thai Chamber of 
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 The Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry, ―ICCI Guide: Brief of the ICCI Activities,‖ 
http://icci-oic.org (Last accessed 25 May, 2009).  
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Commerce, particularly the Middle East Market task group.
531
 The staff of the two 
associations always meet and travel together to the Middle East to meet entrepreneurs 
and companies. The President and committee of TITIA also act as consultants to the 
Chamber of Commerce, and most of TITIA‘s members are members of the Chamber of 
Commerce.  
 
Without individuals‘ connections, the larger private sector associations like the Chamber 
of Commerce cannot provide much support to TITIA in terms of finance, and 
operational support.  Its support, according to one of the TITIA‘s committee is only 
through incorporating TITIA into its projects and through events relevant to trade with 
the Middle East.  As noted before, there is a distant relationship between the Thai 
government and small private sector associations.  In terms of the relationship between 
big associations and small ones, there is a linkage and mutual interests among them.  
Sometimes the bigger associations gain advice and network from smaller associations in 
order to fulfil its tasks and commitments with the government.  The smaller associations, 
on the other hand, gain some access and recognition from the government through their 
contacts with the bigger associations.  Therefore, to some extent, there has been the 
mutual dependency between small and large private sector associations.  
 
Organising conferences and meeting has been the highlighted activities of TITIA to 
strengthen networks and attract more members and partners.  TITIA also encourages and 
supports its members and interested businessmen to visit to Muslim countries to seek 
trade and investment opportunity.  The association also supports the government by 
participating in the events which are relevant to the organisation, namely the signing of 
trade agreement between Thailand and other Muslim countries, i.e. Pakistan. Many 
TITIA members are sometimes part of the Thai delegation, acting on behalf of Thai 
businessmen, in the official visit to Muslim countries.  
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4. THE ROLE OF TITIA UNDER THAKSIN ADMINISTRATION 
Aforementioned was the development of TITIA during the Chuan administration. This 
section moves on to examine the development and the role of TITIA under the next 
administration, between 2001 and 2006.  
 
Under the Thaksin government, TITIA had shown constant growth. The growth should 
be viewed in many aspects, including the organisational growth and the growth of 
connections abroad.  There had been an increase in number of members and in TITIA‘s 
ability to draw attention from businessmen in Thailand who aimed to trade with the 
Muslim world. There had also been constant increase in TITIA‘s connection with 
external partners, namely the Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ICCI).  The 
growths in number of its members and the increase of external partners had led to 
greater confidence.  As well, the growth had allowed TITIA to organise more activities 
and aspire to create greater network between Thailand and the Muslim world.  
 
After the coup d‘etat in 2006 and the subsequent change in government, TITIA 
continued to engage in relationship with its domestic members and increasingly with the 
overseas counterpart.  With the interim government in charge of the country, and with 
the unresolved southern violence, TITIA, and Muslim private sector associations in 
Thailand did not seem to be much affected by the events.  In 2007, TITIA went on to 
host the World of Muslims Conference and Trade show, the details of which will be 
elaborated on in a later section.     
 
4.1   Activities 
4.2.1 Seminar on “Thailand’s Trade with the Muslim world”  
Under Thaksin administration, there were close relations between TITIA staff and 
government officials in Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Thus there has been the exchange 
of knowledge and cooperation. Regularly there were joint seminars between the 
government officials and TITIA staffs on trade in the Muslim World.  In 2002, the 
author participated in TITIA‘s conference Thailand’s Trade with the Muslim world, 
where the chief of the Department of South Asia, the Middle East and Africa gave a talk 
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about Thailand‘s trade with the Muslim world.  During that time, there was a close tie 
between TITIA and governmental officials.  Along with the meeting was the small 
exhibition of business enterprises.  The aim of the meeting was to point out the 
opportunities that existed for Thai businessmen in trading with the Muslim world, as 
long as businessmen can look for contacts and facilitators, which the ministry of foreign 
affairs, the department of export promotion, the Thai chamber of commerce, can support.  
The joint meeting and the cooperation between TITIA and the government took place 
quite often; there were also task-sharing between the government and TITIA, where 
TITIA helped the government in seeking information and created network of contacts.   
 
4.2.2 SMEs Task Force Meeting: January 2005 
TITIA organised the 4
th
 Meeting on OIC Taskforce on Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) in Bangkok in January 2005.  The taskforce was established in 2001 by the 
Secretary General of the OIC,  with the coordination of representative of the General 
Secretariat of the OIC, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), the Islamic Centre for the 
Development of Trade (ICDT), the Statistic Economic and Social Research and Training 
Centre for Islamic Countries (SESRTCIC), the Islamic University of Technology (IUT), 
the Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ICCI), and some selected National 
Chambers of Commerce of OIC member states and the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organisation (UNIDO).
532
  The meeting was organised with marginal 
support from government agencies, particularly in terms of funding.
533
  The marginal 
support from the government allows TITIA to take credit of its ability to draw support 
from different external agencies, and to attract participations from members of the OIC 
states.  Upon choosing Thailand as the venue for the meeting, the Taskforce had 
coordinated with TITIA as well as larger private sector associations, namely the Thai 
Chamber of Commerce and the Board of Trade of Thailand. From Thailand‘s part, the 
event had been supported by relevant governmental organisations including the 
Department of Export Promotion (DEP), Ministry of Commerce, Royal Thai 
Government, and the Board of Trade of Thailand.  However, TITIA played a significant 
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 For more information on the meeting, see Ahmad, "Seeking Schumachers of the Muslim World,‖ and 
http://icci-oic.org/ac/SMEs/3task-e.DOC. (Last accessed 25 May, 2009).  
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role as key organiser and coordinator.  TITIA‘s ability to persuade the OIC Task force 
committee to use Thailand as a venue shows that the association has been well accepted 
among the Muslim states.  Being granted an opportunity to host the event was 
symbolically satisfactory as it was the first time the meeting was held outside Muslim 
countries.  
 
5. THE ‘WORLD OF MUSLIMS’ 2007 CONFERENCE 
‗The World of Muslims‘ was a large conference and trade exhibition held in Thailand in 
2007, and the one that the author had participated directly as observer.  The significance 
of the event is that it highlights TITIA‘s capacity to interact efficiently with the 
international organisation with minimal support from the government. It also shows 
TITIA‘s capacity in persuading OIC member states to choose Thailand as a venue.   
 
5.1   Background of ‘The World of Muslims’ 2007 
The 2nd International Islamic Economic, Cultural and Tourism Conference 2007 was 
held in Bangkok, Thailand, from 7 to 9 September 2007 at the Impact Exhibition and 
Convention Centre in Bangkok, Thailand.  In concurrence with the conference was the 
World of Muslims Trade Exhibition 2007.  The conference was a three-day event, in 
which there were working sessions of different themes, all are largely relevant to 
economic, cultural and tourism cooperation and development in the OIC member 
countries.  The exhibition provided opportunity for Thai manufacturers--many who were 
Muslims--from various industries to promote their products to businessmen who 
attended the conference. 
 
The proposal to host an event in Thailand was done by the President of the Thai Islamic 
Trade and Industrial Association (TITIA), during the first preparatory meeting in Iran.  
After a discussion with ICCI and OIC members in the meeting, Thailand had been 
accepted as the venue for the event.  Once the proposal had been accepted, TITIA asked 
for support from the Thai government and private sector.
534
  The Thailand Convention 
and Exhibition Bureau (TCEB), which was the public company, partly owned by the 
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government, offered to sponsor the entire event; this means that in this event, TITIA did 
not bear financial responsibility.  In organising and choosing the location, TCEB hired a 
professional organising company Expolink Ltd to promote and organise the event.  As 
the prime sponsor, TCEB had a crucial role and almost absolute authority in decision-
making.  Though, TITIA still maintained a key role as a host, handling content, 
invitations, and training staff for the event.  This is because TITIA possesses the 
connections with the participating organisations and individuals.   
 
While the role of the government in this event was comparatively marginal, the 
government exerted supports through TCEB.  In large part, its role can be viewed as 
symbolic supporter.  This is because the governmental participation is only through the 
attendance of high-rank officers during inaugural session, through the participation of 
government staff in workshops, and through booth-displaying their organisations in the 
exhibition.  The outcome of the event, however, helped improve the image of Thailand 
as a whole after the constrain it had with the OIC and the Muslim world over the 
government‘s handling of the southern tension.  It can be seen that the government 
benefited from this event as it helped to develop and enhance linkages between Thai 
government units and their counterparts in the Muslim world, the event also helped to 
create positive attitude towards Thailand among OIC member states, and partially, it 
helps reaffirm the Thai government‘s effort in solving problems in the south.  
 
5.2   The Role of TITIA 
As noted, the role of TITIA in this conference was crucial.  The initiatives and 
responsibility TITIA took on board showed the commitment and the ability that private 
sector associations had in order to run big events and create linkages at the international 
level.  In the remark at the inaugural ceremony of the 2
nd
 International Islamic Economic, 
Cultural and Tourism Conference, the president to TITIA implies that private sector 
associations can take greater role in supporting the government in enhancing existing 
relations.  He pointed out that international relations with the Muslim world should be 
multi-channel; that the state should not be the unitary or primary actor in these relations; 
and that private organisations and groups can encourage relations and cooperation: 
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Quest for Muslim brotherhood and unity has been always burning the 
mind and hearts of every Muslim around the world. Numerous serious 
initiatives and efforts have been taken by OIC and Observer States to 
make this dream come true. Now is the time to realise that political 
government alone cannot achieve the desired results unless the social, 
cultural and business communities of all OIC and Observer States come 
forward and create an environment of cooperation and collaboration.
535
 
 
The speech confirms the readiness on the private sector associations‘ part to support the 
government in international relations with the Muslim world.  Multi-channel relations 
also imply different actors, working to fulfil their own objectives, which mostly 
culminated to help enhance international relations. TITIA therefore provides additional 
channel to the government; it works toward its organisational goals, which at the same 
time also contribute to enhance the overall pictures of the relations.  
 
During the preparation period, the author shadowed the TITIA president and staff to 
preparatory meetings.  The observation confirms that TITIA had been capable of 
connecting with many staff from Islamic organisations overseas, in which there were 
both existing and new contacts.  Taking care of participants from both overseas and in 
Thailand was TITIA‘s task, in which the staff felt comfortable.  A TITIA staff pointed 
out that while the government constantly changes, and while government officers rotate 
from one position to another, TITIA staff, particularly the president, remained the same 
for a long time; this allows the association to maintain contacts, if not to improve and 
strengthen relations with existing counterparts. A staff mentioned that without TITIA‘s 
personal connection with the ICCI staff, it would be rather impossible for Thailand to be 
chosen.
536
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 The welcome message of Mr. Anirut Smutkochorn, President of the Thai Islamic Trade and Industrial 
Association (TITIA) to the conference.  
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 Phone interview with a secretary of TITIA, January 2008. 
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5.3   Analysing Success 
The success of the 2
nd
 International Islamic Economic, Cultural and Tourism Conference 
can be seen through the high participation of guests from both the OIC states and from 
Thailand.  In addition, there have been a lot of business deals and matching among 
entrepreneurs who attended the event.  The event demonstrates that TITIA is able to 
work independently in interacting with the OIC, its affiliated organisations, and key 
individuals involved in the Muslim world.  Thailand‘s relationship with the GCC States 
will benefit and be strengthened if smaller private sector associations are considered as 
having capacity, and that they are given opportunity to work with the government.  
Having multi-channel relationship and actors apart from government that could induce 
concept of shared identity, norms and mutual interest, like the Muslim entrepreneur 
groups or Muslim scholars, can create deeply embedded international relations, which 
would make such relations last longer even though there is a change in material interests.  
The success of the event also shows that the transnational linkages among individuals, 
particularly when there were shared professional interests, identities and faith, have 
become more frequent.  Individuals have become more skilful in using technology to 
developing their networks and business; small successes have led to greater confidence 
in participating in larger scale of international relations. In such phenomena, the role of 
states is just marginal, giving ways to the new type of international relations, whose 
dynamism is driven by non-state actors.  
 
In summary, the case of TITIA provides an example to show that some private sector 
associations are capable of being involved in international relations and enhancing 
international relations.  They are able to rely on minimum governmental support, or 
sometimes totally bypass the government and establish relations with their counterparts 
overseas.  Such a fact helps confirm the ability of the private sector associations to act as 
proxies for the Thai government in strengthening Thai-GCC relations. Other questions, 
however, remain.  This includes the durability of these organisations and, knowing that 
these organisations have capacity to act as proxies, whether these organisations and the 
government are considering the increased interactions and proxies as optimal option.  
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The answers to these questions can be found through the discussion on TITIA‘s relations 
with the government in the next section.  
 
6. TITIA’S POTENTIAL ROLE AND UNDERLYING FACTORS  
Since the objectives of TITIA are clear and specific, the organisation has been able to 
organise activities that are exclusive enough, and correspond to the needs of its members.  
The nature of members reveals that TITIA members can even network among 
themselves to complement each other‘s businesses, which range from food 
manufacturing, import-export services, shipping, and other kinds of services. The 
positive experience each member received from networking and support mediated by 
TITIA created loyalty and encourage more membership.  Having a loyal group also 
means more capability and confidence in making contact with their counterparts 
overseas without much support needed from the government. 
 
As noted, dependency existed between TITIA and the government, even though TITIA‘s 
ability to bypass or acquire marginal support from the government shows that the 
organisation can be independent enough.  The relations with the government, however, 
exist, through the network and individual connection the organisation has with the 
government.  Many times TITIA members have been allowed as part of the Thai 
delegation during state visits.  Other time, the organisation strives to develop its own 
channels for trade on the international network.   
 
The fact that the organisation is non-government means that it is less affected by 
changes in politics, both international and domestic environment. As well, the 
organisation will be less subjected to foreign policy and cabinet decision. Thus TITIA 
will be less likely to change and will be relatively stable.  This helps TITIA to be able to 
attract external and domestic members; thus, it helps TITIA in maintaining its network.  
The non-government status also makes TITIA‘s identity more independent from the 
government, therefore, it has more chance to capture the interaction opportunities that 
the government finds itself having limit.   
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For many members, TITIA represents their identity and motivation as Muslim 
businessmen; in addition, TITIA provides an image as an organisation managed largely 
by Muslims, for its Muslim-majority members, in order to do business with their Muslim 
counterparts overseas.  To members, these identities create group power, as well as 
sense of belongings: as Thai-Muslim businessmen; this makes it easy for the members to 
form a team to propose business plan and to request support from the government.  The 
use of Muslim identity creates confidence among members that cooperation and 
proposals might be responded.  By not being attached to the government, rather attached 
by business goal and religion, TITIA can penetrate business circle in the Muslim world 
better. The perception that there is no strong government influence also makes it easier 
and appears less formal and monitored.  
 
While most Thai government officers at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other 
ministries have a good knowledge about the Muslim world, many lower-rank officers, 
who also have to manage contacts between Thailand and the Muslim world, possess 
very little knowledge about the region. Even though many officers have good knowledge 
about the Middle East and the Muslim world, many of them are Buddhists, and are not 
accustomed in interacting with Muslims from overseas.  Many of the TITIA members 
are Muslims, who have had several contacts within the Muslim world; in addition, they 
are motivated by the urge to interact with Muslims abroad.  Thus, they are more 
accustomed, enthusiastic to the culture.  In the region of the world where infirmity and 
personal ties are significant, TITIA can be more effective in connecting with the Muslim 
countries and with the Gulf States than some government officers.  
 
Other fact that contributes to the durability of TITIA is that there are few or no existing 
organisations similar to it.  Thus, there is little competition. The TITIA, therefore, is a 
dominant organisation that aids businessmen with Thai-Muslim relations. Instead of 
having competing organisations, TITIA has several associations that complement its 
work, including the Halal Food Institute, the Central Mosque of Thailand, the Muslim 
Youth group, and so on.  With little competition from another association, TITIA is 
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quite unique in its field and is able to serve potential members and the government in 
terms of specific knowledge, expertise and connection.  Thus, its existence is still crucial.  
 
7. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TITIA AND THE GOVERNMENT  
The interview with the president and other members of TITIA reveal that the 
relationship between TITIA and the government depends largely on personal contacts.  
TITIA and other private sector associations are usually incorporated into governmental 
projects when the leading government officials have personal contacts and are familiar 
with TITIA‘s work.  Between the early to mid-2000s, there had been a close relationship 
between TITIA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where TITIA had been invited to 
the meetings, the drafting of joint projects and the conference.  At the same time, 
government officials also supported TITIA‘s activities by attending TITIA‘s events 
despite the fact that during the World of Muslims 2007, the support was marginal.  The 
interest, however, faded away after the regular rotation in governmental offices, which 
occurs regularly in Thai government.  On average, however, the relationship between the 
two sides has not been regular; with the government usually failing to recognise the 
significance of TITIA.  The president of TITIA and the members point out the difficulty 
in arranging to meet with government officials.  In addition, government officials hardly 
attended any of TITIA‘s initiated events, despite the fact that there were guests who 
represented foreign governments and international organisations, something that would 
have benefited the government in terms of connections and relationship building.
537
 
 
Form the view of the government, TITIA is a small, profit-oriented organisation, and 
much of the activities are comparatively less relevant to the work of the relevant 
government units. The discussion with a group of anonymous government officials 
reveals their lack of interest and knowledge of the events organised by TITIA, no matter 
how big and internationally significant it could have been in the Muslim world.
538
  The 
officials‘ explanation rested largely on the lack of linkage between the government and 
the private sector, the traditional separation in sphere of work between private sector and 
government, and the view that the goals of private sector and government differ.  
                                                          
537
 Interview with an anonymous TITIA‘s member, 25 September, 2007. 
538
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Attending those events, to them, is not useful.  Such perception does not motivate the 
government to draw TITIA to be involved with a government project.  The interactions 
do occur sometimes, many times through indirect contact, through other larger private 
sector associations. Each side has its own interaction channels, where TITIA has its own 
network, and the government has linkages with government sub-units and with those 
private sector associations that it trusts.  This notion demonstrates that the difficulties for 
the government to coordinate with the private sector, as suggested in the past National 
Development Plan, continue to linger.  
 
The view of the academics supports the notion that the government has not paid 
significant attention to private sector associations.  The case of TITIA is one of the many 
cases where private sector associations have been left almost on their own in managing 
their interaction with their foreign partners, not counting the lack of financial support.  
The relationship between the government and private sector associations has long been 
separate in nature, as the government is sometimes reluctant to let private sector 
associations intervene with their projects. 
 
8. THE FUTURE OF TITIA 
The future of TITIA can be understood through looking at the size, network, and 
relations with the government as commented by the organisation‘s staff, academics and 
government officers.  The findings from the semi-structure interviews have been useful 
in suggesting how the future of the organisation will take shape.  
 
In terms of size, interviewees from both the TITIA and government sides, as well as 
academics, agree that TITIA will be smaller; however, interviewees differ on the 
underlying causes for the reduction in size.  According to the President of TITIA, the 
future organisation has to be smaller is because of budget constraints; in addition, there 
is the need to reduce the size to make the organisational structure more efficient and 
manageable. 539   The reduction in size does not imply the reduction in efficiency and 
dynamism; on the other hand, the efficient management will make the organisation runs 
                                                          
539
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better and can serve its members better.  On the other hand, government officers 
comment that the reduction in size of TITIA is based on the view that the organisation is 
very exclusive and member-oriented, thus its potential expansion is less likely.
540
  For 
academics, the reduction in size may be resulted from the lack of regular source of 
income, which will make it difficult for the organisation to expand and even to run 
larger projects. 541   It can be seen, therefore, that the prospects on the future of TITIA 
with regard to size is largely subjected to budget and the organisational structure of the 
organisation.  
 
Regarding network, connections with external partners and additional members will 
benefit and help expand the organisation.  While TITIA has been optimistic about the 
expanded network it will have in the future, government officers and academics have 
been sceptic. To TITIA staff, the organisation has been developing strong network with 
external organisations, as well as businessmen in the Muslim world; the existing 
connections will lead to additional connections, thus making TITIA‘s connection with 
external partners quite strong.
542
  Strong connections with external partners will support 
TITIA in running its own projects with little financial support needed from the 
government.  At the same time, TITIA claims that their internal connections will 
continue to grow; it expects the number of members to increase.
543
  To several 
academics in Thailand, connections with both external and internal partners will be vital 
to the future of TITIA if it wants to be independent from the government.  One scholar 
points out that the problem with TITIA and other private sector associations in Thailand 
is the lack of strong network and groupings, which will strengthen their existence.
544
  If 
TITIA does not maintain strong network with other associations in the private sector, 
such as Thailand chamber of commerce, Central Mosque of Thailand, or the Halal 
Research Centre, it will be difficult to for TITIA function and sustain itself.
545
  Another 
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scholar points out that the future of TITIA depends on leadership and personal 
connections of its member with other key players in the Thai and overseas governments 
and Muslim organisations.546 So far, TITIA has enjoyed good relations with foreign 
partners, thanks to strong personal connection its president has with key Muslim 
countries, i.e. Iran, Saudi Arabia and African countries.
547
 Also, it is important that 
TITIA maintains loyalty of its member and committee with connection from these 
agencies, as well as recruiting more members with additional connection.  Without 
having a strong connection from domestic and foreign parties, TITIA will not be able to 
maintain or increase its initiatives it has been having now.  
 
In terms of TITIA‘s relations with the government, according to the President of TITIA, 
the organisation has come to realise its own capacity and how it can sustain itself with 
marginal support from the government; in addition, considering the network it has 
developed, it can therefore be more independent and needs to seek little support from the 
government.  TITIA will run its own project and network with agencies in the Muslim 
world while asking for minimum support from the Thai government.548  The government, 
however, will continue to benefit from TITIA‘s initiatives, connections and the 
outcomes of the meetings with the Muslim world.  From the government‘ s view, the 
government does not recognise the significance of TITIA, most of its activities are 
considered private-sector oriented, not that relevant to the government, even though 
much of the content had to do with Muslim world. The boundary between the two sides 
has been barred by traditional attitude that international affairs are sensitive agendas, and 
the government should solely take responsible for it.
549
  That private sector should share 
the task with the government has been much frown upon in some areas.  Scholars, 
however, suggest that TITIA and the government cannot be absolute separated from 
each other, as there are mutual benefits between the two sides; while TITIA needs some 
support from the government despite trying to be independent, the government also 
needs TITIA for its connections and expertise for trading with the Muslim World. The 
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future of TITIA will thus depend on its ability to create strong connection with the Thai 
government.   
 
The observation reveals that even though the motivation and the skills individuals put 
into developing TITIA are countless, the structure of the organisation is weak.  There are 
no clear written guidelines on how projects should be done and the committees are not 
solidified.  Committees are scattered and the participation of members is scarce. The 
president constantly seeks projects, which are usually conference organising and funding, 
most of which comes from personal contact.  Lacking financial support, the association 
does not have a permanent office, but is now located at Assumption University in 
Bangkok.  This is due to the ability of the association to link the university with the 
OIC
550
, in that the OIC member can seek educational and training facilities for their 
students in Thailand. TITIA therefore, will act as coordinator for such linkage.  
 
Therefore, the association is not strongly established. Unlike the larger private sector 
associations whose role and responsibilities had been formally defined by the 
government thus allowing them greater chance to participate with the government 
activities, the smaller private sector associations like TITIA are on their own, having to 
constantly survive through seeking external project and financial support.  The future is 
not guaranteed.  The government, unaware of geographical and operational capacity or 
barred by traditional idea that the small private sector associations are insignificant, does 
not intervene to support these organisations.  The future does not look promising for 
these organisations; without external funding, many of them, including TITIA, could 
collapse.  There is a need for the government to help providing support or for the 
association develop a more defined and better financial strategy and project plans.  
 
8.1   The Future of TITIA based on Observations 
In looking at the future of TITIA, there are several factors that should be drawn into 
consideration. Two key factors are TITIA‘s own capacity factor and external factors.  
The significance of analysing the future of TITIA is to evaluate the possibility that the 
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organisation can act as additional actor between Thailand and the GCC States.  The 
resilience of the organisation is the first question prior moving on to evaluate the 
willingness of both sides to coordinate.  
 
If TITIA wants minimum support from the government, it will need to sustain itself in 
many ways, particularly through financial and political supports; so far it has been able 
to do so.  However, it is inevitable that the government intervenes with TITIA in some 
matters, including the needs of approvals from different ministries in some of its events 
and initiatives.  To be politically and financially sustained, TITIA‘s relationship with its 
members, partners, and other organisations will be crucial; these non-government 
sectors will provide financial support and together as a group they can lobby for political 
support.  In addition, the success of the members will strengthen TITIA‘s status and 
reputation, which will call for additional membership and partners; the more links TITIA 
can create, the higher chance it can sustain itself and grow.  In terms of capacity, identity, 
trust and network, the World of Muslims 2007 and the SME Task Force Meeting of the 
OIC member countries had proved that TITIA does have capacity.  However, TITIA 
alone does not have capacity to fully influence interstate politics; such activity needs the 
intervention from the government.  In sum, TITIA does have substantial capacity to act 
independently from the government in terms of international relations, however, in 
interstate relations; sometimes the nature of the interaction makes government 
interactions inevitable.  There are also smaller factors about internal structure of TITIA 
that will determine the future of TITIA, which will be discussed in the following 
sections. 
 
TITIA depends largely on financial distribution from its members, who are mainly 
businessmen and companies engaging in trade with the Muslim world. One of TITIA‘s 
main goals is to link Thai businessmen with their counterparts in the Muslim world 
through country-visiting, informal meetings, networking and exhibitions during 
conferences. So far, members have been happy with TITIA‘s initiative and efforts.551  In 
order to secure support from the members, TITIA will have to continue to work with 
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existing members, as well as inviting more membership. It will need to support 
businesses of its member.  This is because their successes render greater support and 
attract more members.  So far, TITIA has been quite successful in drawing its members 
to do business in the MENA region, including in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and North 
African countries.  
 
As noted, financial support is crucial to TITIA. Much had been pointed out that the 
weakness of TITIA is its lack of funding.  The president himself mentioned the need to 
seek sponsors to support most of the events; and the sponsors are mostly the members of 
the organisation.  Without a steady source of income, the association cannot grow or 
even sustain itself.  So far, there are two main sources of income for TITIA, one is the 
contribution from its members; as noted, these contributions are subjected largely on the 
success of TITIA‘s effort in providing support for these businessmen with their trade in 
the Muslim world.  The other contribution is from foreign sources, including funding 
from foreign governments and organisations such as the ICCI and the OIC.  This 
financial support is not regular, and depends largely on the personal connections of 
TITIA members and ability to point out the need and benefit that contributors will get. 
So far, the financial support TITIA had received came from Islamic charities outside 
Thailand, which TITIA has used in running its initiatives and member meetings and also 
to provide scholarship to Thai students in needs.552 
 
Domestically, TITIA has several agencies that it usually coordinates with, including the 
Chamber of Commerce and the Halal Sciences Centre at Chulalongkorn University.  
While holding events, linkages with additional agencies are usually developed on 
temporary basis.  For example, in the World of Muslims 2007, TITIA worked with the 
Central Mosque of Thailand, TCEB, as well as with sub-governmental agencies.  In 
order to secure the future, TITIA must try to secure a more permanent linkage with these 
domestic agencies. 
 
                                                          
552
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In terms of linkage with foreign agencies, it can be said that TITIA has been successful 
at certain level.  This can be seen through its ability to attract support from organisations 
like the OIC, ICCI, and South-South cooperation task force of the UNDP.  It is 
remarkable that this small private sector association can link with international 
organisations with minimum support from the government.  Each year, TITIA has 
increased its membership and partners with organisations abroad. While relationship 
with domestic agencies is largely temporary, the relationship with foreign organisations 
appears to be more stable and permanent.  To explain such phenomenon, identity plays 
an important role.  It is clear that several external organisations that coordinate with 
TITIA have identity and functional compatibility with TITIA, i.e. they are Muslim 
associations and they are groups of Islamic chambers of commerce.  The cooperation of 
these associations demonstrates the attempt of these associations to group themselves 
internationally, and to become a transnational functional or identity group.    
 
External factors include any agencies outside TITIA, this includes the Thai government 
and its agencies, governments of the foreign countries and the international 
organisations and groups where TITIA would like to create a network. 
 
The future of TITIA will be subject to the attention received from the Thai government.  
If the government gives more support and recognises its significance, the chance to 
secure more funding and developing joint programs will be greater.  The support from 
relevant government agencies, including the Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs are important because it will enable TITIA to embark on new initiatives, 
as well as creating greater confidence among its member and potential partners. 
However, it is difficult, as noted, that the government will be committed and recognise 
the work of TITIA, as it focuses mainly on its own project, which is governmental-based, 
and free from the intervention of private sector.  
 
8.1.1 Foreign Governments and Organisations TITIA Associates with  
As noted, TITIA is able to link with foreign government with small support from the 
Thai government. Much of TITIA‘s initiative had been supported by the OIC and the 
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ICCI member countries.  The future of TITIA in terms of financial support and 
networking will therefore subject to continued support from these countries. As long as 
there are a good numbers of businessmen from these countries interested in doing 
business with the Thai partners, and as long as TITIA can act as linkage for these 
businessmen, these countries will likely support its activities.  So far TITIA has good 
relations with Muslim countries, for instance Iran, Pakistan and African countries.  
Gradually, the organisation aims to develop the network further to countries in the Gulf 
states; some network already exists, but not as strong as those in Iran and South Asia.   
 
As for organisations, from the observation, there are two kinds of organisations that 
interact with TITIA in organising events.  First is Muslim business organisations, this 
include the ICCI, the OIC, and other business-oriented organisations including the 
chambers of commerce in foreign countries.  The second type of organisation is the 
international, non-profit organisations namely UNDP and UNIDO. With the first type of 
organisations, identity of TITIA as Islamic and business oriented organisation is a key 
factor that crates the linkage, which is likely to endure and will continue to be developed 
as there are more sub-branches of OIC that can be related to TITIA. The relationship 
with the second type of organisations will be subjected mainly on the nature of events 
and initiatives TITIA jointly organises with its partners.  As long as the goals are 
relevant and closely related to the UNDP and UNIDO, these organisations can be drawn 
into the project.  
 
8.1.2 Situation in Global Trade, Politics, and Society 
The future of TITIA will also subject to global trade, politics and society, particularly 
Thailand‘s trade with the Muslim world.  Therefore, it depends on the country‘s foreign 
policy and responses it receives from global community.  In terms of global trade, most 
of TITIA‘s activities are based on trade with the Muslim world; therefore, as long as 
there is the positive trend in economic and trade prospect in the Muslim world, it is most 
likely that countries in the region will continue to interact and coordinate with TITIA.  
As well, if Southeast Asia can demonstrate itself to be suitable for investment and trade, 
Muslim businessmen would be willing to invest and attend trade shows, conferences and 
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exhibitions in Thailand and thus need to seek partner, which TITIA will be potential 
candidate on Thailand‘s part.  The future of TITIA also depends on political and social 
situation in Thailand. If the Thai government consolidates and enhances its foreign 
policy with the Muslim countries, as well as promotes its support, economically, 
politically and socially to Thai Muslims, it will create a pleasant atmosphere in 
investment.   
 
Therefore, the future of TITIA does not depend only on the organisation itself.  It is 
subjected to many factors.  Each factor is well related to one another.  Though, the most 
significant is the ability of TITIA to sustain itself should it receive only minimum 
support from the government. What the association needs to prioritise is securing regular 
funding and strengthening its existing and potential network.  Even though it does not 
want support from government, as long as the government finds itself having difficulty 
with its relationship with the Middle East, it might benefit from support from TITIA.  It 
will be difficult, and very unlikely, however, for TITIA to reject governmental 
intervention at all.  In order to move into the future, support from the government is 
necessary.   
 
9. TITIA’S POTENTIAL ROLE IN THAILAND’S RELATIONS WITH THE 
GCC STATES 
It may seem that TITIA has not developed strong connections and contacts with the 
GCC governments and businessmen.  The relations between TITIA and foreign 
governments are limited to only a few countries, as noted, Iran, Pakistan, and some 
African countries.  It is, however, important to recognise the potential development of 
the relations between TITIA and the GCC States through the association‘s relations with 
the OIC and ICCI, in which the GCC States are members.  The GCC entrepreneurs were 
among the guests and participants in the events held by TITIA.  Considering positive 
responses the association has received from interactions through OIC and ICCI channels, 
TITIA‘s relations with the GCC States will be improved and should not be difficult.  As 
long as TITIA can maintain good relations with the OIC and ICCI, the outcome of the 
relations can spill over to positive interactions with their member states.  
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Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States, therefore, may be enhanced by interactions 
among TITIA, the GCC governments, and their private sector associations.  So far 
TITIA has shown to have strong foundations through the context of multilateral 
cooperation; this will facilitate the bilateral relations between TITIA and each GCC 
States too.  TITIA is can be considered as an appropriate additional actor from the non-
state sphere within Thailand-GCC States relations.  The problem, however, is that 
despite being an appropriate proxy, TITIA is not entirely willing to intervene within 
international relations, which is considered as government‘s sphere.  It will take some 
effort from both the government and TITIA to recognise mutual benefits and adapt their 
organisational goals to suit each other.  It is also crucial for both sides to have a positive 
attitude toward each other and to change traditional perceptions about the division 
between government-private sectors.  
 
Since its establishment in 2000, it can be seen that TITIA has achieved certain level of 
success in its attempt to strengthen relations with the Muslim world.  The end of the 
World of Muslim Conference in 2007 sees potential cooperation between TITIA and 
other organisations as followed: 
 
 ICCI in cooperation with Chulalongkorn University and the Thai Islamic Trade 
& Industrial Association (TITIA) aims to organize Training programmes for the 
entrepreneurs of OIC Member Countries in the area of Halal Food.
553
  
 
 There is also the plan to promote business, economic, tourism and cultural 
partnership between OIC Countries and Thailand, in line with the MOU, that had 
been signed in the World of Muslim Conference between the Halal Science 
Centre in Thailand and International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance 
(INCEIF) in Malaysia, for establishing an International Medical Centre project in 
Thailand.
554
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 At the end of the conference, a committee had been proposed, comprising of OIC, 
IDB, ICCI, ISESCO, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, the UAE and TITIA 
to follow-up on the Recommendations and proposal made during the conferences.    
 
While it may be seen that there were not many participants from the GCC States in the 
World of Muslims 2007 Conference, there was recognition of potential significance of 
the GCC States among organizers, including TITIA committee.  As noted, the UAE had 
been recommended to be part of the committee, which implies the increased recognition 
of the significance of the UAE as a gateway to further relations with the GCC States.
555
  
  
In 2008, the president to TITIA had been appointed as the Director and Board Members 
of Halal Standard Institute of Thailand, which is part of the Central Islamic Committee 
of Thailand (CICOT).
556
  With such position, TITIA became more integrated into 
Thailand‘s Islamic Affairs.  The nature of TITIA‘s work that focuses on strengthening 
trade and economic relations between Thailand and the Muslim world had been 
combined with the attempt to promote Halal food from Thailand to the rest of the world.  
In addition, in the same year, there was an MOU signed between TITIA and the Iran 
Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Mines (ICRIC) to establish the Halal World 
Brand in Thailand.
557
 In February 2009 the officials from the ICRIC visited Thailand 
and met with TITIA president to follow up the plan of inaugurating the ICRIC office in 
Thailand and to discuss the aim to develop the ICRIC projects in Thailand.
558
  The Halal 
project, which TITIA had signed an MOU with the ICRIC had been further developed; 
with the ICRIC officials met with Thai officials and the TITIA president, who, as noted, 
also directs the Halal Standard Institute of Thailand as well.
559
 
 
 As for the relations with the GCC States, as of 2008, TITIA has become the link for 
Saudi businessmen, Saudi government officials, and Thai businessmen.  In 2008, the 
Saudi Arabia embassy in Thailand requested support from TITIA in locating Thai 
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manufacturers for several products demanded in the Saudi market.  Furthermore, 
TITIA‘s president, who acted as the committee for the Middle East wing of the Thai 
Chamber of Commerce, was able to visit Saudi Arabia in 2008 to strengthen trade 
relations between Thailand and Saudi Arabia.  Both phenomena demonstrated the 
acceptance of TITIA‘s efficiency in promoting Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States.   
 
10. CONCLUSION 
This chapter begins by providing an overview of the development of private sector 
associations in Thailand, and how they are relevant to Thai politics and foreign trade 
policy.  The highlight of the chapter is the introduction of the Thai Islamic Trade and 
Industrial Association (TITIA), which is used as one of the cases study to examine the 
role of private sector associations in Thailand‘s relations with the GCC and the Muslim 
world. 
  
Theoretically speaking, this chapter discusses the transformation of international 
relations environment, from state-centric to a more pluralist environment, where the 
non-state actors increased their role, agendas and participation at international levels.  
The contemporary international relations in Thailand see not only that the number of 
non-state actors have increased; but also that their development and network have 
constantly grown to sometimes bypass the government in interacting with their foreign 
counterparts.  The identity both the state and non-state actors have constructed or 
attached to themselves while interacting with each other also play an important role in 
determining the nature and outcome of the relations.  In this research, the Islamic 
identity plays an important role in giving the Muslim private sector associations some 
advantage in interacting with the GCC States, while the government, being perceived 
attached to Buddhist identity, finds limited access to closer relations with the GCC 
States. Constructivism has therefore been useful concept in reflecting the role of identity 
in this international relations process.  The development of non-state actors and later 
transnational non-state actors has also urged the state to develop legal body that manage 
these organisations; such phenomenon reflects the government‘s effort in adjusting itself 
to accommodate, but control, these non-state actors.  The choice that the government 
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made in developing relations with these organisations can be understood through 
functional and liberal institutional concepts.  
 
The findings in this chapter lead to the conclusion that even though the government 
faces some challenges in conducting international relations with the GCC States, it stills 
controls most of the activities; and the functions organised by private sector associations 
are being controlled in some way by the government.  The government‘s relations with 
the private sector associations show that the government is very selective in allowing 
private sector to handle foreign affairs.  However, it is clear from this chapter that in 
some areas, private sector associations, with less bureaucracy and more flexible 
characteristics as well as a more compatible identity and focus, can act as efficiently as 
the state in international interactions.   
 
In the case of the TITIA, the association is smaller and comparatively recent in its 
establishment; therefore, it receives less attention from the government. Its linkage with 
the government comes largely through the larger private sector associations, in which it 
is member, and through its specialisation and through personal connections both 
domestically and in the Muslim world.  Even though having less support and recognition 
from the government, looking through the development and role of TITIA throughout 
the two governments, one can see the potential of this association in working as proxy 
for the government in Thailand‘s relationship with the Middle East, including the GCC 
States.  The problems lie in that TITIA has not received much governmental support, 
and it is less willing to act as the formal governmental proxy.  Its main priority is its 
members; this is because much of TITIA‘s ability to survive depends on domestic 
members and foreign financial support.  The future of TITIA therefore depends on the 
association‘s capacity to maintain the level of financial support it can get, and whether 
the government will recognise its potential in enhancing relationship with the Middle 
East.  It will depend also whether TITIA will be willing to consider public interest along 
with, or sometimes against, private interest as it mainly does now.  
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The case of TITIA is a case study that shows how local private sector associations can 
be affected by the government; and how these small private sector associations struggle 
to develop their own network with the GCC States, according to their focus, which in the 
case of TITIA is trade.  While it can be seen that the local private sector associations 
have been regulated and their relations with the government depends on size, familiarity 
with the government and the nature of establishment, it is interesting to see if foreign 
Muslim-related private sector associations in Thailand are affected by the same 
regulations and how their relations with the government looks like.  The next chapter 
will provide the case study of foreign private sector association that operates in Thailand, 
the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, whose function is largely charity based.  The 
two cases will show a more holistic picture of the non-government sphere of Thailand‘s 
relations with the Muslim world, where different types of private sector associations and 
other non-state actors exist.   
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CHAPTER 6 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOREIGN MUSLIM-RELATED  
PRIVATE SECTOR ASSOCIATIONS IN THAILAND  
The Case of the World Association of Muslim Youth (WAMY) Thailand  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, we discussed the development and roles of private sector 
associations in Thailand‘s international relations with the Muslim world.  The author‘s 
argument shows that the Thai state has set a clear role and expectations for the private 
sector associations, which define the nature of relations between the government and the 
associations.  The level of relationship between the government and these associations 
varies, depending on the government‘s familiarity with and sizes of the associations.  
The highlight of the last chapter is also the observation of the Thai Islamic Trade and 
Industrial Association (TITIA), which is a smaller, local private sector association that 
largely involves in trade with the Muslim world.  The findings of TITIA‘s relations 
demonstrate that, with connections and ability to initiate relations, TITIA has potential 
capacity to act as proxy for Thailand‘s relations with the Muslim world and highly 
possible the GCC States; however, TITIA is less enthusiastic to intervene with the 
international relations sphere, which it perceives to be entirely controlled by the 
government.  
 
The existence of private sector associations in Thailand is not limited to those locally 
originated; there are also foreign private sector associations and regional office of the 
foreign associations.  The role and regulations set for these foreign non-government 
organisations differ from the local associations.  They are bound to much stricter 
scrutiny due to national security concerns.  With their links to foreign partners, these 
foreign associations are viewed by some as potential proxy for the international relations, 
particularly in the relations where states find it difficult to gain access to greater 
development.  The constrained relations between Thailand and Saudi Arabia is one 
example, question arises whether the foreign private organisation, founded and 
supported by Saudi Arabia, can play any role in improving the relations.   
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This chapter seeks to examine the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) in 
Thailand.  WAMY Thailand is a branch office that responds to its headquarters in Saudi 
Arabia.  This chapter begins by discussing the position and regulation imposed on 
foreign non-government organisations in Thailand.  The second part of the chapter 
provides a brief overview of WAMY Thailand, and then moves to examine the 
relationship between the association and the government.  The fourth part of the chapter 
explains the growth of WAMY Thailand while the next part points out the factors that 
contribute to the success of WAMY.  The sixth part seeks to explain the future of 
WAMY.  The next section of the chapter seeks to answer the question over the role of 
WAMY in Thailand‘s relations with Saudi Arabia, as well as the overall relations with 
the GCC States.  The author argues that WAMY contributes very little to international 
relations between Thailand and the GCC States.  There are several reasons that account 
for this: first, there is a clear boundary between the state and foreign private sector 
associations, which set how much these foreign associations can get involved in the 
government sphere and that WAMY Thailand is limited by it not being legally 
recognised in Thailand; second, both the government and the foreign private sector are 
less likely to cross paths, traditional bureaucratic procedures is to limit themselves to 
their own sphere; and third, the nature of WAMY‘s management and existence requires 
very little support from the government, its financial independence and the support it 
receives from Muslim communities in Thailand makes it require less attention from the 
government, thus there is no need for the interaction between the government and 
WAMY. 
 
The argument from the previous chapter and the argument gained from this chapter have 
culminated to provide the reflection over the non-state sphere, particularly in the world 
of private sector associations.  The end of this chapter seeks to compare and contrast 
TITIA and WAMY.  The similarities and differences observed from these associations 
will be remarked, as well as the nature of their relationship to the government and to 
international relations with the GCC States and the Muslim world.   
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2. FOREIGN PRIVATE SECTOR ASSOCIATIONS IN THAILAND 
Foreign private sector associations in Thailand are usually viewed under the umbrella of 
foreign private organisations. This is because the characteristics of the private sector 
associations closely correspond with the definition of the foreign private organisations 
set forth by the government.  According to the Rule of the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Welfare on the Entry of Foreign Private Organisations to Operate in Thailand B.E. 2541 
(1998), foreign private organisation  means ―a foreign institution, organisation, society, 
foundation, other juristic person or group of persons which is a private organisation or 
is supported by a foreign government.‖560  There have been a large numbers of foreign 
private organisations in Thailand; the characteristics of these associations differ.  A lot 
of foreign private organisations are the regional offices of the international organisations 
abroad; and others are organisations that are established with much support and funding 
from foreign sources.  There are several purposes of these organisations, including 
charity, environment, and development.  The nature of the organisations, which are 
heavily linked with foreign agencies, creates concerns for national security.  Therefore, 
the Thai government has been vigilant in the operations of these organisations.   
 
The legal bodies that are used to enforce and regulate foreign private sector 
organisations in Thailand is the Rule of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare on 
the Entry of Foreign Private Organisations to Operate in Thailand B.E. 2541 (1998).
561
  
The rule establishes that the committees have duties and power to monitor the operation 
of the foreign private organisations.  In addition, it sets guidelines over the qualifications 
and nature of operations of these organisations.  Compliance with the Thai law, 
observation of the Thai public order and morals are crucial conducts for these 
organisations.  In addition, the foreign organisations must not be profit-making or have 
political purposes.  Most of the foreign organisations in Thailand are charity-based and 
aim to promote development of specific groups.  In 2000, the Ministry of Labour 
launched the new guidelines for the committee established to consider the entry of 
                                                          
560
 The Rule of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare on the Entry of Foreign Private Organizations 
to Operate in Thailand B.E. 2541 (1998), Ministry of Labour, Thailand. 
561
 For more details on the Rule of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare on the Entry of Foreign 
Private Organizations to Operate in Thailand B.E. 2541 and the Rule of the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Welfare on the Entry of Foreign Private Organizations to Operate in Thailand B.E. 2541 (1998).  
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foreign private organisations in Thailand.
562
  The rule for the entry of the foreign private 
organisations became stricter, with more screening procedures from security agencies.  
 
Compared to local private sector associations, the legal bodies used with foreign private 
organisations are subjected to tighter control.  While the legal bodies relevant to local 
private sector associations require that these organisations comply to law, public order 
and morals of the country, the enforcements and screening procedures are not as strict 
and detailed as the one used with foreign private organisations.  The committee that 
consider the entry of these foreign organisations include officials from Ministry of 
foreign affairs, the Office of the National Security Council, the National Intelligence 
Agency, Armed Force Security Centre Supreme Command Headquarters and the Special 
Branch Bureau Commissioner, show that national security and international relations are 
at stake. 
 
The role of foreign private organisations in Thailand‘s international relations cannot be 
denied; this is because of linkages and the nature of funding and support from abroad.  
However, the nature of these organisations‘ operations sometimes creates concerns over 
national security.  The lack of monitoring can affect national security as well as the 
relations with other countries.  Unlike local private sector associations, it is not 
surprising that the legal bodies and regulations for the foreign private organisations are 
comparatively stricter.  At the same time, with the potential that these organisations can 
affect international relations; the regulations had limited the roles and areas of activities 
of these organisations.  
 
3. WAMY THAILAND—THE ESTABLISHMENT AND ITS INITIATIVES  
WAMY Thailand was established in 1996.  The organisation was primarily run by small 
group of volunteers, who received neither compensation nor benefit.
563
  Later, the 
WAMY headquarters in Saudi Arabia, aiming to motivate and reward the volunteers, 
                                                          
562
 The Rule of Committee on Consideration of the Entry of Foreign Private Organization B.E 2543 
(2000), posted in the Government Gazette, 21 November 2000, p. 131. 
563
 Phone interview with the Director of the Women‘s Activities Section, WAMY Thailand, 23 January 
2009.  
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decided to formally establish an office and provide staff with salary.
564
  Since then, 
WAMY Thai office has direct links with WAMY‘s headquarters.  In additional to 
receive funding for Islamic activities, the volunteers have become full-time staff; and 
now there are 14 full-time staff at WAMY Thailand.  
 
3.1  Objectives 
According to a WAMY staff, there are five key objectives for WAMY including:
565
 
1. To coordinate among youths and social organisations both at the domestic and 
international levels, as well as to coordinate with multi-faith organisations.  In 
addition, to seek ways to establish world peace and improve livelihood.   
2. To promote human rights for people at all level of life. 
3. To battle against crime, social immorality, drugs, and violence. 
4. To support programs and projects on environment and world economy which are 
suitable with human life and nature. 
5. To cooperate with the UN and other organisations that work to create peace, 
prosperity and humanitarian support. 
 
Such objectives reflect WAMY‘s vision to become a leading organisation that build 
distinguish Muslim youths.  In order to achieve the objectives and vision, WAMY 
strategic plans include inserting itself in youth activities, becoming youth‘s refuge and 
consultant, establishing strong relationship with youth, and improving revenues to better 
support youths.  The examples of means WAMY has been doing to follow the strategic 
plans are to provide financial support to youths, to help coordinate projects, workshops, 
and knowledge distribution.  The areas of support WAMY Thailand has been providing 
include the areas of education, Islamic affairs, humanitarian, health and sports, 
socioeconomic development, women studies and development and training.
566
  Further 
details on the nature of WAMY‘s activities on these areas will be discussed in a later 
section.  
                                                          
564
 Phone interview with the Secretary of WAMY Thailand, 14 December 2009. 
565
 The World Assembly of Muslim Youth, Thailand (WAMY)  www.wamythai.org. (Last accessed 19 
June, 2009).  
566
 WAMY briefing document. 
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3.2 Division of Work and Sources of Funding 
WAMY Thailand divides its tasks and responsibilities into different sub-divisions. Each 
of the division has to propose at least 8 projects and activities each year, and the 
proposals have to be submitted to WAMY office in Dumman for approvals and funding.  
The divisions include: 
 
1. Administrative division 
2. Activity division, which is further divided into female and male divisions 
3. Knowledge and information technology division 
4. Educational division 
5. Workshop and development divisions 
 
As for sources of funding, there are two sources of income that WAMY Thailand 
receives.  The main source of income is from WAMY headquarters in Saudi Arabia. The 
other sources are from donations and campaign sought domestically.  Occasionally, 
WAMY receives donation from Arab philanthropists.  The incomes are used for 
emergency issues, i.e. to support victims of natural disasters and fire; for charity, 
including scholarship and for orphans, and for workshops, camps and seminars.    
 
3.3 The Existence of WAMY 
Since its establishment, WAMY‘s existence in Thailand has not been formally 
recognised.  While WAMY had been informally set up since 1996, its formal 
establishment has not been completed.  In 1999, the organisation tried to register at the 
department of foreign labour, Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, as required by the 
Thai law; however, the application lacks crucial documents, including proofs of income, 
registered capital stocks, and administrative capital; thus, the application did not go 
through.
567
  In 2000, the organisation filed application again and was turned down due to 
lack of the proof that demonstrated the legitimacy of the head office in Saudi Arabia.
568
  
The WAMY Thai office could not provide such a document to the ministry, as the Saudi 
                                                          
567
 Briefing on background of WAMY Thailand, document provided by WAMY Thai office, personal 
correspondent between the author and a WAMY staff. 
568
 Ibid. 
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law did not require that charity organisations register; therefore, there was no document 
that shows that WAMY headquarters have been granted permission to function in Saudi 
Arabia.
569
 Therefore, with the lack of such document, the Thai government does not 
allow WAMY to be lawfully established and function in Thailand.  
 
Until now, the existence of WAMY in Thailand is theoretically not legitimate.  However, 
the organisation has been functioning in practice, with very few obstacles.  The 
organisation indeed is open to the public; it has Web site and radio stations.
570
  It 
receives positive feedbacks from Muslim communities in Thailand.  One WAMY staff 
pointed out that even though WAMY does not have the formal permission from the Thai 
government, the legitimacy of the organisation rests on the fact that it had been 
established by the Saudi king, it receives recognitions from Saudi authorities, as well as 
acceptance from several countries in the world, even the UN, since WAMY is UN-
affiliated.
571
  
 
3.4 Factors that Motivated the Establishment and the Existence of 
WAMY Thailand—the Role of Globalisation on Individuals 
3.3.1 Thai Muslim Students and Alumni from the Arab World 
Most of WAMY staffs are alumni from universities in the Arab world; several staffs and 
members attended the al-Azhar University in Cairo, as well as universities in Saudi 
Arabia.  These former students had developed strong network of radical, Arabic 
speaking Muslims.  They have also learned about Islamic ideology and Islamist concepts 
from the Arab world.  Once come back to Thailand, these students therefore seek way to 
maintain, as well as to distribute their knowledge and ideology, with the hope of 
strengthening Muslim communities in Thailand.  That‘s when the former Saudi-
university alumni primarily came together to set up WAMY. 
 
One must say that the availability of scholarships offered to Thai Muslim students, as 
well as lower travel cost, play an important role in facilitating the establishment and 
                                                          
569
 Ibid. 
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 Phone Interview with Mr. Abdul Aziz, a WAMY staff member, 26 January 2009.  
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 Ibid.  
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existence of WAMY Thailand.  As long as Thai Muslim students are provided with the 
opportunity to study in the Muslim world, the chance that they will come back, wanting 
to promote Islam through some of the Muslim organisations in the country remains high.  
 
3.3.2 Improved Telecommunication Technology and Global Muslim 
Network 
Ability to attract coordination and membership through different media tools is one of 
WAMY‘s strengths. Improvements in telecommunication technology, as well as Thai 
Muslims‘ greater accessibility of this technology have facilitated the establishment of 
the organisation.  It also makes the contacts between WAMY Thailand and its 
headquarters, as well as contacts between WAMY Thailand and other local Muslim 
organisations possible.  That WAMY continues to attract more Muslims and Muslim 
organisations is because of its accessibility through internet and other media. 
 
3.3.3 The urge to strengthen Islamic network, domestically and 
internationally  
Prior to the establishment of WAMY Thailand, several local Muslim organisations had 
existed.  However, they were lacking of sufficient funding and public relations.  
Therefore, the first batch of WAMY volunteers were urged to create an organisation that 
helped strengthen Islamic network and Muslim youth development in Thailand.  When 
combined to the networks these former students had in the Arab world, as several of 
them had joined Muslim organisations while they were students, these students were 
able to bring establish WAMY Thailand and attract for funding and support from 
headquarters.   
 
4. RELATIONS WITH OTHER PRIVATE SECTOR ASSOCIATIONS 
4.1 Domestic Level 
Domestically, there are two organisations officially affiliated with WAMY Thailand.  
These are the Association of Thai Muslim students and The Young Muslim Association 
of Thailand.  WAMY Thailand also has connections with other Muslim organisations in 
Thailand including the Santichon Muslim foundation, the Foundation of Islamic Center 
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of Thailand, the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand (CICOT), the Islamic 
Committee of Bangkok, etc.  Most of the organisations are religious based and most of 
them are linked with one another.  This is because Muslim organisations in Thailand 
believe in the concept of ummah, or Islamic community.  Therefore, there is a great deal 
of information sharing among these organisations.  
 
From observation, WAMY Thailand generally provides support, i.e. financial support 
and staff support, to smaller Muslim organisations, including the Muslim Youth groups 
in Thai university campuses and Muslim community groups.  WAMY Thailand also 
coordinates with other larger Muslim associations in the rally to promote the rights of 
Muslims.  Key Muslim organisations in Thailand usually get together to share their 
views, and to demonstrate their stand.  Throughout contemporary Thai politics, these 
key Muslim organisations have actively protested and pressured the governments on 
Thailand‘s foreign policy or to renounce any acts perceived to threaten the well-being of 
Muslims.  During the Thaksin administration, it was these key Muslim organisations, 
WAMY included, which criticised the government‘s contribution of troops to Iraq.  The 
Arab-Israeli agenda has impelled Muslim organisations in Thailand, WAMY included, 
to pressure the government and to rally for support to Palestinians.  
 
In relation to other Muslim-related private sector associations, i.e. TITIA, there was 
small level of connection.  During the World of Muslims Trade Exhibition, WAMY 
participated in setting up booths to promote its publication.  Asides from occasional 
interactions, there is no visible joint project between these two associations.  This can be 
rooted in different objectives and goal, as well as nature of network and target groups; 
TITIA‘s main target groups are Muslim entrepreneurs, while WAMY‘s target groups are 
students and youth.  Therefore it is unlikely for both organisations to cross paths.   
 
4.2 International Level 
4.2.1 Relationship with WAMY Headquarters 
There is a close relationship between WAMY Thailand and the WAMY headquarters in 
Saudi Arabia.  The WAMY headquarters looks after finance, appointments committees, 
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approves proposed projects, links WAMY Thailand with other WAMY offices and 
assigns some projects and tasks to WAMY Thailand.  The WAMY office in Dammam is 
in charge of all WAMY offices in Asia-Pacific, and answers to the WAMY headquarters 
in Riyadh.  Staff from the WAMY headquarters and guests from the Arab world, i.e. 
Gulf States, regularly visit WAMY Thailand.   
 
4.2.2 Relationship with WAMY Worldwide 
There are reportedly several WAMY offices worldwide (this number excludes the 
WAMY offices in the Middle East).  Some of the offices are listed below (table 16) 
according to the regions they are located.  
Table 16: Some Selected WAMY Offices Worldwide 
Regions Countries 
Asia 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Azerbaijan, Philippines 
Africa 
Nigeria, Kenya, Senegal, Sudan, Liberia, Malawi, 
Etiopia, Sierra Leone 
Europe Germany, Belgium, Russia, UK, Bulgaria, France 
Australia Australia, New Zealand  
America USA, Argentina 
Source: WAMY office Thailand. 
 
The WAMY offices worldwide coordinate and meet through workshops.  Different 
offices, in addition to the tasks and projects assigned by the headquarters in Saudi 
Arabia, run their own projects and initiatives.  WAMY offices that share similar interests, 
and are in the same geographical region coordinate with one another more often. 
WAMY Thailand has especially good relations with WAMY Philippines.
572
  Therefore, 
transnational Muslim linkage is visible in this case, as it is reflected through the network 
of WAMY offices worldwide, including in Thailand.  
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 Phone interview with the secretary of WAMY Thailand, 14 December 2008.  
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5. RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL MUSLIM 
ORGANISATIONS  
WAMY is recognised as affiliated with the UN‘s Non-government organisations; the 
UN also accepts WAMY‘s role and allows WAMY to have representatives with in UN 
committee.
573
  The relationship with other international organisations is not well 
recorded.  Interestingly, there is no record of the link between WAMY and the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), which is the world‘s largest Muslim 
organisation.  The staff of WAMY Thailand points out that there is very small 
interaction between WAMY and other international Muslim organisations abroad, 
except other WAMY offices worldwide.  The focus of WAMY Thailand is more to 
develop network domestically with Muslim organisations in Thailand.  
 
5.1 Key activities 
WAMY Thailand provides support for activities initiated by other organisations as well 
as actively organises its own activities. There is the division in the nature of tasks and 
responsibilities of staff.  Tasks are distributed according to suitability of activities and to 
genders of participants.  There is one section of WAMY Thailand that specifically 
manages activities for women.  While on the men side, there are several sections, each 
manages different activities, including Islamic studies, orphanage, charity, etc.  
 
Being a sizeable, independent, and economically sustainable Muslim organisation, 
WAMY can organise activities both directly and indirectly.  This means that some of the 
activities are run by other Muslim organisations, but usually with financial and staff 
support from WAMY.  Other type of activities is those that are truly organised by 
WAMY.  Some of WAMY‘s key activities include: 
 
5.1.1 WAMY Radio 
An interview with a producer of WAMY radio provides information on this activity.  
WAMY Thailand broadcasts its one-hour program, WAMY radio, daily.  The WAMY 
radio provides information on Islam as well as news, music and lifestyle.  Audiences are 
                                                          
573
 As claimed by WAMY Thailand.  
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not limited to Thai Muslims, but from other religions as well.  The producer pointed out 
that from the calls the radio program receives, there are a few Buddhist audience who 
point out they benefit from the programs.  The samples of the programs‘ content include 
the information on Islamic tradition, Islamic concepts, guidelines for good praying, 
etc.
574
  The producers points out high airtime renting (around 1000 pounds/month) for a 
one-hour program daily; he claims that it is worthwhile because people have learned 
more about Islam and there has been positive feedbacks.  The contents of the radio 
program have been saved in several Muslim Web sites in Thailand.  
 
5.1.2 Youth Seminars and Camps 
As noted out, organising workshop and youth seminars is one of the areas that WAMY 
Thailand specialises.  Usually the nature of the seminars and workshops are Muslim 
Youth Leadership camps, Young Muslim Camp, and seminar on relevant topics of Islam.
 
575
 The example is WAMY‘s coordination with The Association of Thai Muslim 
students in organising the program on Leadership Development for Thai Muslim 
students, in which WAMY provided both funding and staff support. WAMY also 
coordinated with the Islamic Study and Muslim Community Development for Peaceful 
Social Integration Project at Walailak University, in Nakorn Si Thammarat province in 
organising Muslim Student Leadership program.
 576
  In addition, WAMY also organises 
smaller scale workshops, generally weekend activities for Muslims, including WAMY 
women social groups and short trips for Muslim Youths.
577
  
 
5.1.3 WAMY Publication 
WAMY also publishes and distributes books and reading concerning Islam and Islamic 
thinking.  One of WAMY Thailand‘s publications is the al-ikwan al Muslimun, the 
translation from Arabic from , which 
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 www.islamhouse.com. (Last accessed 12 June, 2009).  
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 http://www.muslimtsu.com/2008/index.php?module=webboard/view&id=54. (Last accessed 27 
January, 2009).  
576
 For more information about the coordination between WAMY and Walailak University, visit Islamic 
Studies program at Walailak University. The most updated activity has been organised in 2009, see 
http://www.wu.ac.th/2550/news/showNewsV.php?id=11846. (Last accessed 27 January, 2009).  
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 www.wamythai.org. (Last accessed July 17, 2009).  
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emphasises the Muslim Brotherhood, its founders Hassan al-Bannah and its significant 
figures, including Syyid Qutb.  The publication comes in the form of small, thin booklet, 
with all explanation in Thai.  Most of WAMY publications can be purchased at the 
WAMY office Thailand and in bookshops of the Foundation of Islamic Center of 
Thailand.  During the World of Muslims exhibition, WAMY attended the Muslim Trade 
fair through having exhibition booth, selling its publications, as noted before.  
 
5.1.4 Arabic Class 
Since most of WAMY staff graduated from universities in the Arab world, almost all of 
them speak Arabic fluently.  Several of the staff graduated from al-Azharr University in 
Egypt. Indeed, the preferred languages for the interviews were either Thai or Arabic.  
Other key activity provided by WAMY is Arabic class, which is open not only to 
Muslims, but general members of the public.   
 
5.1.5 Charity and Orphanage 
WAMY also provides support for orphans and orphaned families.  WAMY defines 
being ‗orphan‘ according to Islamic tradition, that a child without father is considered to 
be orphan; therefore, the orphans supported by WAMY are both those without parents, 
and some of them are without fathers.  There have been approximately 400 orphans 
under care of WAMY Thailand, and the orphans are from different parts of Thailand, 
not limited to Bangkok areas.  The support includes financial support, as well as 
providing gifts and food during Islamic celebrations, including Eid.  In addition, WAMY 
also provides support for inmates, both men and women.  The support is through career 
development, financial aids, as well as religious teaching.  
 
5.2 The Measures Used to Support the Communities 
As noted, there are different types of activities that WAMY organises and supports.  
According to WAMY, the nature of activities supported by the organisation can be 
classified in different categories as followed:  
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a. Education—WAMY provides academic advice and information on scholarship, 
provides scholarship for Thai students, provides funding for different educational 
programs, and organises workshop for teachers.  
b. Tradition and religion—To promote tradition and religion, WAMY distributes 
pamphlets that promote morality and publish some works about Islam. 
c. Humanitarian support—WAMY seeks to help youths and groups that need urgent 
support due to the impact of war, poverty, natural disaster and provides help through 
rallying for donations.  In addition, WAMY coordinates with other organisations to 
help with humanitarian projects.   
d. Health and sports—WAMY supports the establishment of Muslim physician 
groups to provide medical support for people.  As well, WAMY organises 
workshops and provides financial support for sports camps.  
e. Socioeconomic improvement—WAMY provides financial support for educational 
and social projects, as well as job development.  In addition, it helps organise 
workshop that help improve livelihood of people in the rural areas.    
f. Women activities—To promote women activities, WAMY has a women committee 
that work in educational and social projects to improve women status.  
g. Workshops and seminars—Organising workshops and seminars are WAMY‘s 
focus and areas of specialty.  WAMY usually coordinates with local Youth 
organisations in their workshop, it helps providing both financial and staff supports.  
 
The diversity of the activities provided by WAMY helped attract more members; this is 
because the activities are able to target different groups, ranging from different age 
groups, gender groups and socioeconomic groups.  
 
Unfortunately, the data on funding, factual contract among WAMY Thailand, its 
headquarters and the Saudi embassy in Thailand could not be obtained.  WAMY staff 
preferred not to disclose the information.    
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6. WAMY UNDER THE CHUAN AND THAKSIN ADMINISTRATIONS 
The interviews with WAMY staff and consultants reveal that WAMY has not been 
affected much by changes in government and Thai politics.  The policies and 
administrations of both Chuan and Thaksin had no impact on WAMY Thailand.  Once 
asked whether the foreign ministership of Dr. Surin, who is a Muslim, helped with the 
activities of WAMY and help with the promotion of Muslim private organisations in 
Thailand, a WAMY staff pointed out that the Muslim foreign minister did not have any 
impact on the work of Muslim organisations.  It is misleading to see that Muslim 
politicians and high-ranking government officers will largely contribute to the operation 
of Muslim organisations.  Indeed, the division between the government and the private 
sector is clear, and nobody wants to intervene in each other‘s sphere.   
 
The global situation is the significant factor that affects WAMY.  Under the Chuan 
administration, it was much easier for WAMY to operate.  This is because during the pre 
9/11, there was not much difficulty in terms of financial transaction from Saudi Arabia.  
After 9/11, financial transactions have become more complicate, as it has to go through 
tighter scrutiny.  In addition, WAMY activities have been increasingly monitored by the 
government.   
 
In sum, government administrations barely affect the work, development and the growth 
of WAMY.  This is because WAMY is financially independent and has capacity to 
attract members and cooperation from other Muslim organisations.  Common 
misperception is to overestimate the link between WAMY and the government.  Indeed, 
there is a clear separation between them, and each of the spheres has its own dynamism.   
 
7. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WAMY AND THE GOVERNMENT  
According to its claim, WAMY Thailand has a cordial relationship with the Thai 
government.  Despite not being officially recognised in Thailand, WAMY has been clear 
that its goals and objectives do not contradict with the government‘s regulation on the 
entry of foreign private organisations to operate in Thailand.  It is noted that the 
government has been strictly vigilant on the potential national security and threat to 
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international relations from the operation of foreign private organisations.
578
  Several 
governmental institutions, which may be not aware of WAMY‘s not being recognised 
formally, do interact with WAMY.  The association had been invited by several 
government units to participate and help in events which are not major governmental 
projects.  The examples include WAMY‘s participation and support during the World 
Boy Scout Camp and the Scout Camp of Asia Pacific, where WAMY helped host and 
provided support for Muslim scouts.  WAMY had also been invited to participate in 
workshop on ethics and academic support on Islam from the government.  When there is 
the need for the government to host or welcome guest from Saudi Arabia, several times 
WAMY had been asked by governmental units to provide translator and advices on 
Islamic tradition.  
 
Financially, WAMY Thailand is self-sustained; this is because it receives funding 
regularly from its headquarters in Saudi Arabia.  Therefore, WAMY Thailand does not 
seek domestic funding; on the other hand, it provides funding for other domestic Muslim 
organisations in Thailand.  WAMY can therefore be considered as financially 
independent, thus, it is less compelled to closely interact with the government.   
 
From observation, the relationship between WAMY and the Thai government is 
interestingly remarkable. While WAMY is, according to the Thai government, not a 
legitimate foreign private organisation in Thailand, its existence has practically been 
widely open and accepted.  The government still interacts with WAMY in some of its 
activities, but the interactions are based largely on informal basis.  That the informal 
interactions between WAMY and the government occasionally occur despite it not being 
formally recognised can be explained as:  
 
1. There is the lack of coordination among government offices.  The Office of 
Foreign Workers Administration, who is responsible for granting permission 
and monitoring the operation of foreign private organisations in Thailand, 
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may not share information with other governmental offices.  Therefore, there 
is the lack of knowledge about WAMY‘s status with in other relevant 
governmental offices. 
2. Thai law is loosely implemented.  There is no clear procedure over how to 
treat organisations that are not formally recognised.  At the same time, 
personal contact and informal interactions allows WAMY officers to interact 
with some government officers.   
3. The cost of closing down WAMY is more than letting it operate and keeping 
a vigilant eyes on it.  Closing down WAMY can negatively affect Thailand‘s 
relationship with Saudi Arabia, which had already been constrained.  
 
It has been noted before, however, that most of the foreign private organisations in 
Thailand are under strictly monitoring process by several agencies, including the Office 
of the National Security Council, the National Intelligence Agency, Armed Force 
Security Centre Supreme Command Headquarters and the Special Branch Bureau 
Commissioner the Royal Thai Police Department.  National security is one of the most 
crucial agendas the government takes into consideration in permitting an organisation, 
both Thai and foreign, to establish and operate.  In the case of WAMY Thailand, 
traditional perception that some Middle East states provided support for separatism in 
the south, plus Islamophobia resulted from 9/11, may have stimulated stricter scrutiny 
from the National Security agencies.  In the eyes of the Thai government, WAMY is 
considered to be the organisation that promotes radical Islam.  The consultant of 
WAMY, a devout Muslim himself, admits that WAMY promotes a strict, radical 
Islamism; this, he points out to be the characteristics of most Muslim organisation in 
Thailand, which are funded and supported by the Arabs.
579
 
 
International relations are one significant aspect for the government to consider when 
dealing with WAMY and other foreign private sector associations.  The Thai 
government faces a dilemma of undermining national security and international relations.  
One of the core agendas in allowing the entry of a foreign private organisation is that the 
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organisation does not create tension between Thailand and other states.
580
  In the case of 
WAMY, not recognising the organisation should yield the contrary outcome.  Even 
though WAMY is unable to provide necessary document, lacking support and sensitivity 
to the Saudi legal process in the establishment of WAMY from the Thai part project a 
more negative connotation.  It has not helped improve the constraint the state has had 
with Saudi Arabia.  This is because, first, the organisation is Saudi-founded, and second, 
the organisation is heavily Islamic-oriented.   
 
8. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE STRENGTH OF WAMY  
The factor that highly distinguishes WAMY and TITIA is the ability of WAMY to have 
access to greater range of Muslims within Thailand.  While TITIA‘s membership is 
viewed as exclusive, in that almost all members of TITIA are Muslim businessmen and 
entrepreneurs, WAMY members come from different social groups; even though youth 
is the emphasis of the organisation.  This is because WAMY‘s projects are more diverse, 
unlike TITIA whose projects are trade-oriented.  Thus it is not surprising that WAMY 
attracts more members and participation.  In addition, WAMY projects are viewed as 
constructively engaging Muslims into individual and social development.  Therefore the 
organisations can reach more people through its highly valued objectives and projects.   
 
WAMY‘s ability to attract greater members is also based on its ability to promote the 
organisation and its activities through different modes of communication.  WAMY has 
been using different kinds of media, including internet, radio programs, as well as 
through its publications.  In addition, the Association of Thai Muslim students, one of 
WAMY‘s officially affiliated organisation, has been an important source that link 
WAMY to Muslim youths.   
 
One must admit, however, that perhaps the internet is the most significant factor that 
contributes to the strength of WAMY.  In Thailand, internet domains relevant to 
Muslims, Islamic and Islamic lifestyles are booming.  Muslim youths are active users 
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within these Muslim webpage.  WAMY has constantly updated its webpage on its 
activities and news.  Members of WAMY also actively promote WAMY through other 
Web Pages; thus making WAMY more popular and able to attract more members.    
 
As noted, WAMY has strong networks with other Muslim organisations.  When there is 
an agenda that is relevant to the well-being of Muslims, all Muslim organisations in 
Thailand are urged to collectively work together; good examples are, as mentioned, the 
dispatch of Thai troops to Iraq, and the Arab-Israeli conflicts.   
 
Both of WAMY‘s affiliated organisations, the Young Muslim Association of Thailand 
(YMAT), and the Association of Thai Muslim Students are significant Muslim 
organisations.  The YMAT is based in southern Thailand, and is able to attract Muslims 
in the south, while the Association of Thai Muslim Students has been able to attract 
Muslims in different universities all over Thailand.  WAMY has capacity to develop 
stronger bonds with these Muslim organisations because of its financial influence and 
staff expertise.  The network of Muslims organisations in Thailand is impressively 
strong.  The Muslim communities in Bangkok are not so large; therefore staffs of 
Muslim organisations are usually familiar with one another.  Indeed, several of the staff 
in a Muslim organisation can sometimes be consultants and active staff for other 
organisations.  There is always an exchange in information and joint activities among 
these organisations.  A webpage of one Muslim organisation generally links to other 
Muslim organisations.   
 
One of WAMY‘s strength is its ability to create links with other Muslim organisations 
overseas, as well as with Muslim states.  The nature of the rapport, however, is largely in 
the form of people-to-people relations or inter-organisational relations.  Interestingly, 
however, there is not much record of the relations between WAMY and OIC.  This may 
be due to the fact that the OIC is a large scale, politically-oriented organisations, while 
WAMY is a smaller, local-based organisations.  
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Unlike TITIA, funding is not the constraint for WAMY Thailand.  The organisation has 
a secure source of funding from WAMY headquarters in Saudi Arabia, as well as 
occasional funding the office receives from its campaign in Thailand.  The fund from the 
Saudi headquarters is paid regularly once all the projects and proposals submitted by 
WAMY Thailand have been examined and approved.  Generally, the fund is transferred 
to the bank account in Thailand.  The 9/11 incident, as well as southern violence in 
Thailand have made fund transferring more difficult; this is because account has been 
under greater scrutiny.  The funding gain domestically comes from Muslim 
philanthropists and the zakat from Muslim community during Ramadan and special 
occasions. Unlike TITIA, where donation depends largely on members‘ loyalty, 
donation to WAMY is based on the Islamic faith and the urge to support people in the 
ummah; such motivation to contribute money is less volatile and depends less on profit 
calculation.  In addition to financial support, WAMY Thailand claims other kinds of 
support from the Saudi government.  The organisation receives support from the Saudi 
embassy in Thailand.  Arab philanthropists from outside Saudi Arabia also occasionally 
helps provide financial support.  It can be seen that WAMY has broader and more 
powerful support bases than TITIA, whose support base is very small and unpredictable. 
 
9. THE FUTURE OF WAMY 
In order to assess the future of WAMY Thailand, it is crucial to analyse internal and 
external factors that are relevant to it. In terms of its own capacity, WAMY can sustain 
itself both in terms of financial capacity and member support.  This is because WAMY 
staffs are not only capable and strongly motivated by faith, but they are also securely 
paid by its headquarters.  The activities organised receive good feedbacks from 
participants, and from it, WAMY increasingly attracts more volunteers to assist its 
activities.  With more volunteers, the possibility for the organisation to increase its 
activities to other parts of Thailand and to attract more participation is greater.   
 
As noted, funding and support from its Saudi headquarters is one of the most important 
reasons that contribute to the strength and durability of WAMY.  Financial 
Chapter 6                      Foreign Private Sector Association in Thailand—case of WAMY 
 - 321 - 
independence and strong tie with headquarters leaves WAMY with very little need for 
WAMY to seek external support other than its headquarters. 
 
According to a WAMY consultant, WAMY will continue to operate in Thailand with 
little difficulty.  It is easy to think that by not begin registered, WAMY‘s status and its 
future in Thailand is shaky.  In reality, there are a lot of organisations in Thailand that 
are functioning without permission to register; law enforcement in Thailand in this 
aspect is quite relaxed.
581
  At the same time, the nature of WAMY‘s focus is harmless 
and beneficial to Muslim communities; therefore it has strong popular support.  WAMY 
is also supported by Muslim politicians, many of whom had worked in the government.   
 
While the future of WAMY is secured in terms of funding, member support, and 
feedbacks from the community, its future is still subjected to the government.  This is 
because of its existence, which is still considered illegitimate according to the Thai law. 
So far the organisation has been able to functions because of the government‘s turning 
of blind eyes on it or lacking of knowledge of its operation.  This reflects the nature of 
Thai law enforcement, where sometimes authorities let loose on security control, and 
permit unregistered organisations to operate.  In addition, several of WAMY members 
or consultants are respectable figures within Thailand; therefore, it makes it more 
difficult organisation to be asked to close down.  This does not mean, however, that 
WAMY is not under the government surveillance and scrutiny; and the organisation will 
be under investigation and asked to be closed down any time should there be any 
suspicion on national security.  
 
With the current nature of WAMY Thailand, it is less likely that the organisation will 
become more significant to the government. On the other hand, WAMY can be viewed 
by the government as an obstacle in the government‘s attempt to develop strong links 
with Muslims.  The network WAMY has developed, together with other Muslim 
organisations, is viewed as threat rather than benefit to national security; it very much 
excludes the government, as well as blocking the government‘s role in supporting 
                                                          
581
Phone Interview with a WAMY Staff, November 2008.  
Chapter 6                      Foreign Private Sector Association in Thailand—case of WAMY 
 - 322 - 
Muslim populations.  Muslim communities are more likely to rely on socioeconomic 
support from Muslim organisations than from the government. Therefore, the 
government‘s attempt to secure loyalty from the Muslims is hindered.  
 
One must admit that WAMY Thailand is a well-established organisation, with staff 
having strong incentive and motivations.  Secured funding and strong support, as well as 
faith, play an important role in creating strong incentive within the organisation.  The 
division of tasks and activities have created a strong foundation for WAMY to attract 
Muslim communities.  Considering the future of WAMY in terms of its stand in Muslim 
communities, it is very likely that WAMY will continue to function; this is due to 
continued positive response and good coordination it receives at popular level.  
Assessing the future of WAMY by incorporating its relationship with the government, 
there is no guarantee of the organisation‘s future on this part.  It depends largely on the 
government‘s enforcement on national security, and the global security trend.  At the 
same time, considering WAMY‘s linkage to Saudi Arabia as well as its founder and 
supporter, the Saudi royal family, it is less likely that the organisation will be forced to 
close down, as long as it does not project a threat to Thailand‘s national security.  
 
Even though the Governing Principle to Regulate the Entry of Foreign Private 
Organisations to Operate in Thailand states clearly about the role of foreign private 
sector organisations, the decision to let WAMY operate also depends largely on 
WAMY‘s connection to government officials.  With its staff and consultants having 
connection with politicians and high-rank government officials, it helps WAMY to be 
able to exist.  As well, the cost of closing down the association, which might have 
negative implication to Thailand‘s relations with Saudi Arabia, is not worth; it may be 
better letting it organisation operate while keeping an eye on it.  The further details on 
the role of WAMY to Thailand‘s relations with Saudi Arabia and to the GCC States will 
be described in the next section.   
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10.  THE ROLE OF WAMY IN THAI-SAUDI RELATIONS 
While it can be seen that the Thai government has been struggling to improve its relation 
with Saudi Arabia, the idea of improving the relation through different sources has been 
proposed and implemented.  Civil society is one source that is considered to be able to 
help providing greater access to normalise relations with Saudi Arabia.  WAMY which 
is an organisation originated in Saudi Arabia is viewed as potential candidate to help 
improve Thai-Saudi relations. 
 
According to WAMY staff, improving the relations between Thailand and Saudi Arabia 
is beyond WAMY‘s responsibility; it is outside the framework set out by the WAMY 
headquarters.  At the same time, WAMY recognises that the government has its own 
capacity to improve the relations, it has its own staff and seems to preserve the task 
within the government sphere; it has not asked any Muslim organisations to support its 
campaign.  Therefore, it is also misleading to view that WAMY, as well as other Muslim 
organisations in Thailand, will participate in international relations.  Most of Muslim 
organisations in Thailand will focus on their own projects and are less likely to intervene 
with government and state sphere.  At the same time, the government is less likely to 
seek much support from private sector associations, particularly the foreign ones.
582
   
 
As for WAMY, the constrained relation between Thailand and Saudi Arabia has very 
little impact on the organisation.  This is because WAMY is a private organisation for 
the benefit of Muslims; therefore it has little to do with the Thai government sector and 
interstate relations, where the constraint exists.  With no impact on the operation, there is 
no urge from the WAMY Thailand office to initiate or offer itself to help with the issue.   
 
 As for WAMY‘s potential role as a proxy for Saudi Arabia within Thailand‘s relations, 
WAMY staff pointed out that it is beyond WAMY‘s scope of responsibility.  There is a 
good relationship between WAMY Thailand and Saudi Embassy in Thailand; however 
the relations are limited to cultural and religious activities.  WAMY Thailand does not 
get involved in the political and international relations aspect at all.  While WAMY does 
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not directly get involved in improving relations between the two sides, WAMY has been 
a good link between Saudi Arabia and Thailand through incorporating the Saudi 
Embassy in Thailand into supporting its activities, i.e. Eid, and sponsoring orphanages in 
Thailand.
583
  There has also been an attempt by WAMY to strengthen relationships 
among staff of WAMY, Arab embassies in Thailand, Muslims and Thai organizations in 
Thailand through creative activities i.e. football match.
584
  The Saudi embassy in 
Thailand did not comment on its relations with WAMY, but stated Saudi‘s foreign 
policy as in according with the GCC framework and in accordance with other GCC 
States; as with the relationship to Thailand, the Saudi embassy has highlighted the 
attempt in improving relations from both the Saudi and Thai sides.
585
   
 
In sum, WAMY plays a very small role in Thailand‘s relationship with Saudi Arabia.  
While the government is not likely to have WAMY act on its behalf considering 
WAMY‘s unofficial existence within Thailand, WAMY itself does not want to take part 
in inter-state relations.  The constrained relationship between Thailand and Saudi Arabia 
has had very little impact on WAMY; this is because its focus is at popular level, and the 
funding has not been disrupted.  The existence of WAMY in Thailand, however, can be 
considered to have implication for Thai-Saudi relations.  Government‘s closing down of 
WAMY can affect the constrained relations even more, considering the nature of 
WAMY‘s establishment.  The status of WAMY is therefore considerably awkward for 
the government; it cannot be registered as it cannot provide sufficient documents, at the 
same time, rejecting its operation might informally affect the already constrained 
relations.  
 
11.  THE ROLE OF WAMY IN THAILAND’S RELATIONS WITH THE 
GCC STATES 
While WAMY Thailand has a close relationship with Saudi Arabia, its relations with 
other GCC States were not distinguished.  As noted by WAMY staff, philanthropists 
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from the GCC world may donate some money for the organisations, but it is only 
occasionally.  There has been little contribution from other GCC States, both at 
government and people levels, into the work of WAMY Thailand.  Most of the GCC 
States governments have their own channels of funding and support; as noted, they 
prefer their contribution go through the Thai government or registered organisations, 
where they can demonstrate the transparency.  In addition, charities in the GCC States 
prefer to go directly to the communities, i.e. Islamic school or communities in the South, 
instead of donating or providing money to WAMY Thailand.    
 
In summary, aside from Saudi Arabia, WAMY has a very small role in strengthening the 
relationship between the GCC States and Thailand.  One can see that TITIA‘s focus is 
partly outward-looking.  It has good potential to include GCC state agencies and 
businessmen abroad to participate in its activities.  WAMY‘s focus is on the other hand 
inward-looking; it largely focuses on domestic Muslims; and aims very little to attract 
external support to help with its organisations.  Even though one can point out that the 
staff, who were alumni from universities in Arab world, may attract Arabs to participate, 
the chance that the GCC States will be involved in WAMY activities is very limited.   
 
12.   WAMY AND TITIA COMPARED 
This chapter and the previous chapter dealt with the characteristics of the private sector 
associations that exist in Thailand.  One of the clearest differences among these 
organisations is that one is considered to be local private sector association, while the 
other as foreign based.  This difference contributes to the nature of the 
associations‘relations with the government.  This part seeks to compare and contrast 
selected characteristics of the associations, which are relevant to Thailand‘s relations 
with the GCC States.  
 
12.1   Transnational-Ness 
WAMY and TITIA provide case studies of two different private sector associations that 
are considered to be transnational.  The transnational-ness of WAMY may be clearer 
than TITIA, because of its strong linkage with its headquarters in Saudi Arabia and its 
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relations with WAMY office worldwide.  The transnational-ness of TITIA may not be as 
clear; however, the attempts of the organisation in developing network with 
organisations of like-nature abroad, i.e. chambers of commerce and trade associations in 
the Muslim world, as well as the ICCI, also show the trend to become greatly more 
transnational.   
 
While WAMY and TITIA are both considered as private sector associations, WAMY is 
considered as foreign association and TITIA is a domestic one.  The Thai state treats 
associations of the two natures differently; this can be seen through different legal 
bodies used to regulate them.  (The details of the legal bodies on domestic association 
and foreign private sector associations are in the indices).  As for the associations 
themselves, the nature of their practices are also different.  It is clear that WAMY is a 
charity-based association, while TITIA is a trade association.  With that come different 
objectives, key activities as well as the target groups of members.  WAMY has more 
capacity to attract and accommodate Muslims from wider ranges of the society, with the 
nature of its organisation that offers diverse activities, suitable for both youths and 
people in general.  TITIA‘s target is rather professional focus, exclusively attract 
businessmen and companies.   
 
In terms of the ability to maximise the governmental support limitedly provided to 
private sector associations, it is clear that TITIA has greater potential to absorb the 
available support.  This is because, first, the guidelines and role assigned to domestic 
private associations is more receptive to its relations with the government; plus, local 
private sector associations are subjected to less security scrutiny, thus allowing greater 
potential for cooperation with government units as well as opportunity to be involved in 
different projects.  Second, the objective of TITIA corresponds to the government‘s 
interests, which is international economic policy; it is therefore easier to incorporate 
TITIA into its projects.  Third, the network of TITIA consists of organisations that also 
have strong links with the government i.e. the Thai Chamber of Commerce; therefore, it 
is easy for the whole network to absorb the available support.  In sum, TITIA and local 
private sector associations of the like nature are more likely to be able to maximise the 
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government‘s support for its development, both for its growth and its attempt to 
strengthen its relations with overseas counterparts.   
 
12.2 The Organisations’ Relations with the Thai State 
As observed, there is a clear separation between the governmental and private sector 
spheres.  The Thai state is clear in stating the role and regulations for private sector 
associations, in a way such regulations limit and regulate the role and how much these 
private associations can be involved in state projects, as well as international relations.  
Such limitation is mainly rooted in national security concerns, which can be further 
explained by the threat most states face in contemporary international politics: the threat 
that their sovereignty is being undermined by transnational movements and non-state 
agendas.  That states use legal body and regulations to construct a boundary from the 
private sector participating in international affairs is also aided by traditional state 
practice, where government officials generally interact within government bodies.  They 
are, therefore, reluctant to draw the participation of private sectors into its projects, with 
the exception of large private sector associations that they are familiar with.   
 
From the private sector association aspect, there are only a few reasons for the need to 
interact with the government, one is the need for connections with relevant government 
authorities, and the other is the need for operational supports.  In addition to that, most 
private sector associations are likely to intervene very little with the government sphere.  
There is the dynamism within the private sectors, where most of these associations have 
developed their own network to maximise their independence.  
 
In sum, there is a separation between the government and private sector association 
spheres.  Neither the government nor the private sector associations want to cross path 
with each other, this is because each sphere has its own dynamism and objectives to 
fulfil.  In terms of the relationship between Thailand and the GCC States, there is very 
small chance within the relations where the government can coordinate with the private 
sector associations.  This is because neither side would like to directly cooperate.  Most 
of the outcomes of Thai-GCC relations are from dynamism within each side.  The 
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question on the role of private sector associations as the proxies for the government in 
Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States will be discussed in the next section.  
 
12.3   Relations with the GCC States—Proxy Questions 
While both organisations have already, and potentially, developed linkages with the 
GCC States, the possibility for each organisation to have strong linkages, as well as to 
stimulate greater state interactions with the GCC States differ.  While WAMY is well 
known in the Muslim world, the potential that that it can stimulate greater interactions 
between Thailand and the GCC States is very limited.  The GCC States, as noted, have 
their own channels in interacting with Thailand; transparency is a crucial issue and each 
GCC States have tried to clarify how their funding is being transacted and nature of 
activities they support.  Asides from a chance to develop greater relations with WAMY 
branches in the GCC States, there is very little chance that WAMY Thailand will be able 
to stimulate relationship with the GCC States, both at state and people to people level.   
As for TITIA, the organisation has shown to have greater potential to act as proxy for 
Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States.  Being a trade association, it is easier for 
TITIA to attract associations and businessmen in the GCC States to cooperate.  
Although it can be seen that so far TITIA interacts very little with the GCC States, it is 
very likely that there will be greater development; the chance that its network will 
expand internationally is much greater than WAMY, this is because of TITIA‘s focus, 
and the existing network it already has with the ICCI and the OIC. 
 
In considering about possible role as state proxy, it is also crucial to examine the overall 
political environment, the traditional relations between government and private sector 
associations, as well as the level of constraints and willingness of the private association 
to act as proxies.  While the ability to absorb governmental supports differs, it is not 
definite that associations that have high ability to maximise government support will be 
willing to act as proxies.  
 
 Indeed, the interviews and the observation of the two private sector associations reveal 
that the private sector associations do not want to act as official or direct state proxies.  
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In the case of TITIA, despite its need for government funding and operational supports, 
the organisation does not accept its role as direct state proxy.  It prefers to act on its own, 
particularly in seeking cooperation from foreign associations and trade partner.  It tries 
to depend less from the government.  A great deal of its activities, the World of Muslims 
2007 for example, demonstrates that TITIA depended very little on the government and 
seek its own channel by seeking overseas network.  In the case of WAMY, it is very 
unlikely that the organisation will act as the government‘s proxy.  This is because, first, 
the nature of WAMY as charity-bases, inward-focus, and Muslim oriented; its objectives 
and focus have no room for international relations.  Second, being transnational 
organisation, Thailand‘s national interest means very little compared to the need to 
support Thai Muslims, considering the ummah perspective.  Third, WAMY is fully 
supported, particularly it is financially independent, therefore, and it seeks little support 
from the Thai government and thus, is less willing to help support the state in improving 
Thai-Saudi international relations.   
 
13.  CONCLUSION 
This chapter starts off by providing an overview of the nature of foreign private 
associations in Thailand and their relations with the government, then it moves on to 
introduce WAMY, whose case had been selected to provide additional example of 
private sector associations relevant to Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States.  While 
TITIA is local private sector association, whose objectives, activities and means to seek 
cooperation has made it transnational, WAMY is a foreign private sector association, 
whose existence and relations with headquarters and WAMY offices worldwide has 
made it transnational in nature.   
 
Examining WAMY also provides the insight of transnational Islamic organisation in 
Thailand.  The role of transnational organisation has been viewed theoretically as having 
potential to undermine state‘s sovereignty.  The way state maintains its sovereignty and 
national security is to regulate the foreign private sector associations and to put most of 
them under strict scrutiny.  In the case of WAMY, its identity as transnational Islamic 
organisation has challenged state‘s sovereignty.  The organisation‘s ability to attract 
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Muslims within the country, its ability to rally support for international Islamic causes, 
and its ability to develop its own relations with countries in the Muslim world, using its 
Islamic identity and influence from its headquarters in Saudi Arabia, have threaten 
Thailand‘s national security and potential state‘s international relations.  
 
The transnational agenda has begun to challenge states even more.  Globalisation and 
the improvement of transportation and telecommunication have made it even more 
difficult for states to monitor the dynamism of these transnational organisations.  The 
Thai state, upon countering the challenge of these organisations in taking over its role, 
clarified the limit on the role and regulations for these organisations.  The law has been 
set clear for both Thailand-based organisations trading with the Middle East, and Saudi 
and foreign-based organisations operating in Thailand.  
 
While liberal institutionalists would argue in support of the prospect that institutions and 
organisations, both domestic and international, can potentially help improve the capacity 
of state in enhancing international relations, the result of these two chapters suggests that 
the argument must be examined case by case; and the role of institutions in enhancing 
international relations is largely subjected to how much the government agencies allow 
private sector associations to participate.  In Thailand, the Thai government agencies 
have a tradition of not engaging private sector and non-government associations into 
state agenda, particularly in international affairs.  The chance for the private sector 
intervention is even much lower in the case of foreign private sector associations; this is 
because national security concern is even graver.  
 
The findings in this chapter confirm the conclusion in the previous chapter that state 
controls most of the activities in international relations.  It demonstrates further that 
foreign private sector associations are even more limited in its ability to be involved in 
state‘s sphere of international relations.  While some private sector associations have 
potential to create strong network and linkage in the GCC States, its involvement is very 
limited; and most private sector associations are content in keeping it that way.  This is 
because the dynamism within these organisations has made supporting the government 
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secondary to focusing on its organisational objectives; this can be seen in both the cases 
of TIITA and WAMY, where fulfilling their objectives is their priority.  The following 
table (table 17) includes a comparison between TITIA and WAMY. 
 
Table 17: Comparison of TITIA and WAMY 
Organisations/ 
agendas TITIA WAMY 
Background   
Establishment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Establish 2000, formally recognised 
by the government.  This is because it 
was registered as required by the Thai 
Civil and Commercial Code, cause 78-
109, regarding the establishment of 
association.  
 
 
 
 
Set up in 1996, although the 
establishment has not been 
recognised due to the lack of 
document.  Therefore the 
establishment is not 
completed and approved 
according to the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Welfare's 
regulation on foreign private 
organisations (1998). 
Status  Domestic association Private foreign organisation 
Purpose 
 
 
 
Trade promotion. To support Muslim 
businessmen with foreign trade 
partners, particularly in the Muslim 
world. 
 
Charity and Islamic 
promotion. To support 
Muslim youth groups and 
Muslim communities in 
Thailand. 
Target groups 
 
 
 
 
Thai Muslims and overseas 
businessmen, largely focus in 
Bangkok. 
 
 
 
Muslim youth and Muslim 
communities, the focus 
includes also Muslim youths 
and communities in and 
outside Bangkok. 
Activities and 
dynamism   
Relationship with 
the GCC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Has a trade relation with some 
businessmen in the GCC States, 
although there is no strong established 
connection.  The existing relations had 
been partially supported by the Thai 
Chamber of Commerce, who had been 
supported by the government. 
 
 
Has strong relationship with 
WAMY headquarters in 
Saudi Arabia.  The 
organisation is claimed to be 
founded by King Faisal.  
Therefore, is well relevant to 
Saudi Arabia.  WAMY has 
office worldwide, and has 
been recognised in the GCC 
States.   
Relationship with 
the Muslim 
world 
 
Is part of the OIC's affiliation, the 
ICCI.  Also, has some relationship 
with other OIC states. 
 
WAMY has offices 
worldwide.  Not only in 
Thailand.  There is a strong 
links with other international 
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Muslim networks.  
Relationship with 
the Thai 
government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are some interactions between 
TITIA and the government, and 
TITIA is sometimes included into 
some of the governments‘ projects, as 
well as occasionally become part of 
the delegation during state visit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The government does not 
officially recognised 
WAMY.  Although, some of 
the government divisions 
have coordinated with 
WAMY.  The relationship 
between the government and 
WAMY has been a shaky 
one.  There is some suspicion 
over WAMY's activities, 
which are claimed to threaten 
Thailand's national security.  
Relationship with 
other domestic 
organisations 
Has a cordial relation with Chamber 
of Commerce and trade organisation.  
 
Has cordial and strong 
connections and network 
with Muslim organisations 
Relationship with 
Thai Muslims 
 
Connected largely with Muslim 
businessmen. 
 
Connected with a lot of 
Muslim communities, in a 
broad range. 
 
Nature of 
activities 
 
Conference organising, trade show, 
trade support, business matching. 
 
Charity, Islamic studies and 
training. 
 
Nature of organisation  
Membership 
 
More exclusive, mostly businessmen, 
pay membership fee. 
 
Anybody, mostly free or low 
cost entry through taking part 
in WAMY activities. 
Staff 
 
Committee, elected as part of the 
association as require by the 
Association Act. 
Full-time paid staff, 
appointed by WAMY 
headquarters and local 
volunteers. 
Financial source 
From members and temporary sponsor 
seeking. 
Secured funding from 
headquarters. 
The need for 
domestic/external 
support 
 
 
Need funding and loyalty from 
members, external support is 
necessary to maintain the existence of 
the organisation. 
 
 
With full backup from the 
headquarters, does not need 
much domestic and external 
support. 
 
Future of the 
organisation 
 
 
 
Smaller, but functional, this is due to 
lack of funding. 
 
 
 
Should be the same, although 
can be subjected to the 
change in government's 
control.  Its function can be 
stopped any time.  
Potential role as 
government's 
proxy 
 
Has been indirectly acting as 
government's proxy, although not 
willing to interfere in government's 
sphere. 
Cannot act as formal proxy 
because the organisation 
itself is not legitimate.  Does 
not want to interfere with 
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government's sphere. 
 
 
Source: Author-created table based on the comparison between WAMY and TITIA in the current and 
previous chapters 
 
The relations between the government and the private sector associations vary.  Most of 
the relations are defined by the supported these organisations needed from the 
government.  Organisations that are well financed are more independent from the 
government.  At the same time, informal relations exist, as there are interactions 
between these organisations and the government.   
 
This leads to the last question over the possibility that private sector associations can act 
as proxies for the government.  The two chapters suggest that the dynamism within the 
private sector association sphere makes it difficult for these associations to act as proxies.  
To answer the question over the possibility that private sector associations can act as 
proxies for the states in relations with the GCC States, two key areas should be 
evaluated, one is capacity and the other is willingness of the organisations.  The previous 
chapter and this chapter have highlighted both criteria to evaluate the readiness of these 
associations.  In terms of capacity, it appears that both TITIA and WAMY do have some 
level of capacity, and with only small support, they are able to act as efficient proxies.  
On the other hand, in terms of willingness, none of the associations under studies want 
to be involved in foreign affairs.  Each association prefers to limit itself within the 
private sector sphere and to develop their own network.  The goals and objectives of 
these associations do not equip them to become proxy.  Therefore, the overall evaluation 
suggest that while these private sector associations have capacity, the organisational 
structure and objectives they have, which are not supportive to proxy role, discourage 
them to take the proxy roles.  
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CONCLUSION 
The GCC States have become increasingly significant to Thailand, not only as trade 
partners and crude oil providers, but as political allies on the regional and international 
stage.  The aim of this research was to investigate the nature and future direction of the 
relationship between Thailand and the GCC States through observing the interaction 
processes between the state and non-state spheres, who have been involved with 
Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States.  Particular attention was given to the role of 
transnationalism and non-state actors.  The main question is to what extent the Thai 
private sector associations involved in the Middle East and the Muslim world can 
support the Thai governments when it faces the limit in international relations with GCC 
countries.  The objectives of the research sought to explore the nature of current 
Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States, to identify significant agendas within the 
relations, to select significant non-state actors to conduct case studies and to use the 
understanding from case studies to explain the nature of interaction process between the 
state and non-state actors. 
 
In achieving the research goal, which is to examine the role of some private sectors 
associations in Thailand and evaluate their potential to act as the government‘s proxies 
in Thailand‘s relationship with the GCC States, qualitative methodology based on 
historical analysis and semi-structured interviews have been employed to understand the 
nature of state-to-state relations, the development of private sector associations in 
Thailand and their relationship with the government and their overseas counterparts.  In 
terms of methods, this research examined the state-centric and non-state worlds 
independently, before looking at the nature of the overlapping sphere.  The state-to-state 
relations explored in chapters 3 and 4 have shown the essence of state-centric nature, 
where state-centric agendas like diplomacy, trade and securities were examined.  
Chapter 5 and 6 examined the world of non-state actors, where selected private sector 
associations, TITIA and WAMY, were explored in terms of their development, their 
relations to the Thai government, and the possibility of their involvement in Thailand‘s 
relations with the GCC States.  The main research question and its objectives led to the 
need to design a theoretical framework and model that could facilitate the analysis.  
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Thus the state-centric, pluralist and postinternational views had been selected as key 
theoretical concepts for the research, with the addition of concepts in constructivism, 
globalisation, cultures and individuals in international relations.  While several concepts 
have been included into the discussion, Rosenau‘s postinternationalism ultimately sums 
up the argument over the need to combine state-centric and pluralist view to better 
understand international relations; this is because the nature of postinternational view 
facilitates both state-centrism and pluralism.  The concepts have been simplified into the 
model, which has been heavily influenced by Rosenua‘s bifurcated world politics.  The 
highlight of the model is to show the separation and overlaps of the state-centric and the 
non-state spheres.  In this research, what had been added from Rosenau‘s model is a 
greater emphasis on the environment surrounded the existence of the two spheres.   
 
ASSESSING THE THEORETICAL CONCEPT AND MODELS  
Assessing the efficiency of theoretical concepts and models proposed, the theoretical 
concepts have been useful in helping to understand the dynamism within the state and 
non-state spheres.  State-centric view is valuable in understanding state behaviours, 
particularly the way in which the Thai state reacted to changes in international relations 
during the period under study. Indeed, the findings of the research have shown that state-
centric view is proved to be significant for the understanding of the state‘s behaviour 
and the continued dominance of the state. As it can be seen from the findings in chapter 
5 and 6, the Thai state has been able to manipulate and control the involvement of 
private sector associations.  At the same time, it can be seen that the state has been able 
to develop its own capacity to interact with the GCC States over time.  Thus, the state-
centric view continues to be significant to the understanding of the role of the Thai state.  
Pluralism helps identify and understand the behaviours of non-state actors and agendas, 
which the state-centric view cannot sufficiently explain.  In addition, pluralism helps to 
understand the state‘s behaviours and see that interactions through institutional 
framework can lead, to certain extent, enhanced bilateral relations, i.e. the case of 
Thailand‘s entering the OIC. Constructivist concept has helped to understand the role of 
identity in influencing the nature of relationship between the two sides, particularly in 
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the case of Islamic identity, which affected the state‘s ability to interact with the GCC 
States or supported the non-state actors in their interactions with their overseas partners.    
 
Since Rosenau‘s postinternationalism facilitates the understanding of the dynamism 
within both the state-centric and pluralist environment, and also provides an explanation 
for additional factors that influenced the dynamism within world politics, i.e. the role of 
globalisation and individuals, it deserves further elaboration.  The motivation to use 
postinternationalism in this research is based on the nature of contemporary international 
politics, where the roles of states have been infiltrated by non-state actors.  
Postinternationalism can be seen as a reflection of development in the IR thought 
process, from viewing states as dominant players in state-centricism, to adding non-state 
actors, and then ultimately to combining the two phenomena.  Examining the work of 
Rosenau in the last two decades, it is clear that, in his opinion, this development has 
taken place.  Indeed, Rosenau‘s book trilogy clearly reflects his prediction that world 
politics will take shape in the postinternational manner.  The question he raises in this 
trilogy is simply whether this pattern is permanent or transitional, and if so, for how long.  
In his most recent work, Rosenau delves even further into the essence of his 
postinternational argument, this time highlighting the significance of people.   
 
Postinternationalism is proved to be useful in this research, both in terms of its flexibility 
and its ability to accommodate both state and non-state actors.  Moreover, it addresses 
the significance of individuals, whose skills and political activeness have increased. 
Understanding the development of private sector associations can be explained in many 
ways, but increased skills and education, as well as improvement in technology and 
telecommunication under globalisation, as proposed by postinternaitonalism, is one of 
the best explanatory mechanisms for such development.   
 
The model proposed in this research has proved extremely helpful in terms of gaining an 
understanding the dynamism of the two worlds, and the overlapping world.  By 
separating the actors into government and non-government worlds, appropriate concepts 
can be specifically applied; thus the outcome is more precise.  In addition, giving 
significant weight to non-state actors, including here collective individuals and groups, 
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through assigning another sphere has been suitable to world politics, where non-state 
actors have become as significant and require as many explanation mechanisms as state 
actors.  Adding environmental factors, i.e. culture, individual and globalisation, into the 
model is crucial; failing to do so means omitting a significant link that can be used to 
explain the insufficiency and efficiency of state and non-state actors.  In addition, what 
make Rosenau‘s bifurcated model useful is the ability to find suitable space for the 
micro level unit, individuals and groups in particular.  As noted, the increased 
significance of individuals in international relations is widely acknowledged; however, 
finding a suitable place to locate them in the theoretical framework and model is a 
challenging task.  Through Rosenau‘s model, and the newly constructed model used in 
this research, one is able to place individuals in the non-state actor sphere.  In addition, 
the influence of individuals also appears in the overlapping areas within the model, 
where individuals are considered the driving mechanism for the interactions of state and 
non-state worlds.  It can be seen that much of the discussion on private sector 
associations has been based on activities run by individuals involved; incorporating it 
into the model, such activities and individuals‘ participation shows dynamism within the 
non-state sphere and potential linkages with the government in the overlapping sphere.   
 
Putting the theoretical concepts together to test the hypothesis has been a challenging 
task.  This is because little research has previously been done in this area; this is 
particularly true in terms of the application of similar theoretical concepts to the 
empirical realities of Thailand‘s international relations with the GCC States.  Rosenau 
has done very little himself in testing his proposal and model with empirical data.  Thus, 
with few accounts of previous experiments that relate the theoretical concepts to reality, 
it is difficult to reflect the degree of dynamism or ‗cascading‘ nature between the 
interactions of state and non-state actors, which may result in potential task-sharing in 
international relations.  Many of Rosenau‘s case studies and examples relate to the 
Western Hemisphere, and little, if anything at all, has been done in the developing world.  
The significance of this remark is to point out the difference in the degree of acceptance 
in the participation of civil society and public between the West and the developing 
world.  While the dynamism between the government and non-state actors in domestic 
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and international politics can be conveniently observed and discussed in the West, it 
might not be so clear in the developing world.  That, however, does not mean that 
interactions do not take place, it may only mean that the pattern has still been controlled 
or influenced by states, who, unlike in the West, continue to have a strong hold on 
authority despite their sovereignty being partially threatened by the challenge of non-
state actors.  Therefore, the outcome of the analysis may not be precise in, for example, 
the case where non-state actors are fully developed and have the capacity to interact with 
government and other counterparts, but have been controlled by the government; thus 
we cannot see the optimal pattern.  Therefore, recognising the background and the nature 
of the empirical case is important for the research.   
 
In order to ensure that the research objectives have been fulfilled and that the hypothesis 
has been tested, it is crucial to recapture the explanations and analyses that have been 
provided in previous chapters.  The next sections bring different aspects of the research 
together, the co-existence, the overlaps, and the interactions between the two worlds will 
then be discussed with recognition of theories proposed at the beginning of the research. 
 
THE STATE SPHERE 
Chapters 3 and 4 argue that despite the increase significance of the GCC States to 
Thailand, the nature of relations between the two sides has not been active compared to 
relations between Thailand and other regions in the world.  Identity, religion, global 
changes, and domestic politics are issues at stake.  The cases of unresolved constrained 
relations between Thailand and Saudi Arabia, and the domestic problem in the south 
have challenged the state.  Thailand‘s membership with the OIC only helped partially; 
this is because, as a non-Muslim state, Thailand could only be an observing member of 
the OIC, therefore it does not have the full rights that Muslim states enjoy in the OIC.  
This case shows that the Thai state has limited resources and means to resolve conflict 
and improve relations with Saudi Arabia and other GCC States.  Identity is one crucial 
question; the Thai state is being labelled as Buddhist state, it is difficult for the state to 
develop relations with the Muslim world, there in which lies the GCC States.  One 
cannot deny the dynamism within the state sphere.  In addition to key state-centric 
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mechanisms relevant to international relations, diplomacy, security and national interest, 
a large part of the dynamism within this sphere resulted from the challenge states 
encounter in the contemporary world.  Globalisation has facilitated telecommunications, 
transportation, and the proliferation of the media.  In a way, globalisation has challenged 
the Thai state with the threat of losing loyalty and marginal people, i.e. the Thai 
Muslims, whose loyalty that was once directly toward the state has shifted to the 
international Muslim society.  Conflict and pressure to the Thai state can potentially 
occur should state policies contradict with the interest of the international Muslim 
movement.  Palestinian issue has demonstrated itself as a cause that creates bonding 
among the international Muslim network, including Muslims in Thailand.   
 
The way that the Thai state has tried to engage more with the GCC States and the 
Middle East through institutional and regional relations shows that states adjust 
themselves to fit with the changing context of contemporary world.  Despite emergences 
of non-state actors, as well as new types of domestic problems, largely influenced by 
globalisations, states are able to find ways to accommodate and resolve those conflicts in 
order to maintain relations with other states.  States are seen to transform themselves in 
many ways, as well as seeking to group together to strengthen their durability.  The 
intergovernmental organisations, in this case OIC, have been useful sources that act as a 
―middleman‖ for states to interact.  It is a stage for states to enhance their relations and 
to clarify their positions in world politics.  In Thailand, the threat of losing cordial 
relations with the Muslim world during the southern violence, as well as the increased 
interactions of Muslims in Thailand and Muslims abroad through internets and rapid 
telecommunication have stimulated the state to embark on the new strategic plan for the 
diplomatic promotion of Thailand‘s relations with the Arab world; this can be seen 
through the development of the foreign ministry‘s Web site, www.thai2arab.com,  that 
promotes the relations with the GCC States.  Entering the OIC is also one way of 
developing closer relations with the GCC States; and increased trade and economic 
cooperation projects have also been the Thai state‘s attempt to develop greater relations 
with the GCC States.   
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THE NON-STATE SPHERE 
The findings in chapter 3 and 4 also suggest that the comparatively low level of 
interactions between Thailand and small GCC States is due to the lack of knowledge and 
interest about the region.  A lack of knowledge leads to a lack of interest in developing 
further relations.  In addition, the previous chapters point out that the interest in the GCC 
States and the Middle East fluctuates, depending on the government‘s policy as much as 
the expert of policy-makers and high-rank officials.  Differences in culture and religion 
make it difficult for the Thai state to be attracted in interacting with the GCC; and this 
perception is prevalent in the Thai government sector. 
 
The agendas discussed above are well related to one of the research questions.  As states 
find themselves having limited resources and means to improve relations, can non-state 
actors who do not have such constraints act as proxies or complement the role of states 
in international relations.  This question can be clarified by referring to Rosenau‘s 
explanation that states are bounded by the sovereign rules they have set for themselves; 
such rules, for example, include the nature of regime, identity, culture and alliances; in 
interacting with other states, a state has to comply with these key guidelines.  On the 
other hand, non-state actors are freer to act, they are free from strict sovereignty rules; 
and as Rosenau argues, their relationship with other agencies are less formal, and prone 
to a more temporary basis.  Unlike states, non-state actors have more capacity to 
negotiate, and develop deals with foreign counterparts, which can be foreign 
governments or other organisations.   
 
The answer to the research questions on the possibility of the increased role of Thai 
private sector associations involved with the Middle East and Muslim world in 
international affairs can be done through exploring the nature of the associations and 
measuring their capacity and willingness to be involved in the government-led 
international interactions.  Chapters 5 and 6 explored the cases of TITIA and WAMY.  
The observation of the two associations reveals that there has been progressive 
development in both associations since its establishment between 1996 and 2000; this 
can be seen in the diversity of activities, network and relations with overseas partners.  
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In the case of TITIA and WAMY, it is clear that the two organisations have their 
objectives clearly defined.  The objectives and the means to achieve them are largely 
self-contained, and require little government intervention.  Both organisations apparently 
try to bypass the government in running their organisations and activities.  While 
WAMY is financially sustainable and well supported by its headquarters; TITIA seeks 
financial support from members and external funding.  Its main source of funding comes 
from foreign organisations.  Similar to the state-centric sphere, there is high dynamism 
within the sphere of private sector associations.  Seeking funding, arranging activities 
and networking with members and potential partners are the major parts of the 
dynamism within this sphere.  The nature of interactions among these actors involves 
transnational and functional linkages.  Identity (being Muslims) and functional focus 
have facilitated TITIA and WAMY to interact with both domestic and overseas 
associations.  
 
The findings of interviews and participant observations in chapters 5 and 6 show that 
private sector associations that are used as case studies are less willing to become 
involved in international relations, which they consider to belong to the government 
sphere.  Different factors can explain why these organisations do not want to act as 
proxies.  In the case of WAMY, the financial independence and sufficient support it has 
received from its network and headquarters has made the connection with the 
government less necessary; the established relations with the headquarters overseas also 
make the international interaction with the GCC States redundant.  In the case of TITIA, 
the established network and previous success in organising international conferences and 
exhibitions with marginal support from the government has made contact with the 
governments less necessary.  TITIA, however, still needs financial support from its 
members, and external partners; in addition, with its linkage to other private sector 
associations, i.e. the Thai Chamber of Commerce, there is a greater chance that it will 
become involved with the government in conducting international relations with the 
GCC States.  To a certain extent, it appears that the level of eagerness a private sector 
association has in interacting with the government depends also on how much it seeks 
support from that government.   
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THE OVERLAPPING WORLDS 
In order to assess the plausibility that private sector associations can act as proxies for 
the Thai government or to help enhance existing relations, examining the overlapping 
worlds between the Thai government and the associations is useful.  The overlapping 
area is where the government and private sector associations, who are compelled either 
by legal or functional agendas, cross paths and interact with each other to fulfil their 
organisational goals.  The findings in the four chapters suggest that the overlapping of 
the two worlds is very rare; within this rarity the interactions occur more between the 
government and larger private sector associations. Both the government and private 
sector associations have their own rationale why they prefer to be contained in their 
independent world.    
 
In the case of non-state actors, the general outcome of the observation shows that these 
two associations are self-contained, have clear objectives and goals and are community-
oriented; such characteristics explain why these organisations are less keen in acting on 
the national level, becoming involved in international relations and interacting with the 
government.  There is also a common perception that international relations belongs to 
the state sphere, and private sector can contribute very little in enhancing what the state 
has done. Lacking attention, as well as being viewed with suspicious eyes, has 
discouraged private sector associations from making an effort to interact with the 
government.  The government bureaucratic system and lack of connections have also 
made it difficult for small private sector associations, as can be seen in this research, 
TITIA, to draw participation from the government in its activities.  In addition, past 
success in interacting with the overseas counterparts with marginal support from the 
government has encouraged the private sector associations to be self-contained.  Distrust 
and fear of being monitored also affect the motivation to interact with the government; 
this is because some associations, i.e. WAMY, have not been formally established in 
Thailand.   
 
On the government‘s side, interviewing both the government staff and the private sector 
association staff reveals the perception that international relations belong largely to the 
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state-centric world, and that private sector associations have a very small impact on the 
relations.  There is also the prevalent perception that private sector associations are 
profit-oriented and only seeking to fulfil their own goals, then these associations are less 
motivated to support the government.  In addition, there is a prevalent distrust of private 
sector associations over security agendas and national interests; this is because the 
government‘s tasks, particularly in terms of international relations, are regarded as 
highly sensitive, and there is high risk, particularly in terms of national security, in 
allowing greater participation of private sector associations in governmental projects.  
The outcomes of such perceptions lead to a little motivation on the government‘s part to 
incorporate private sector associations into government projects relevant to international 
relations.   
 
Therefore, the nature of the overlapped area between the government and the private 
sector associations is defined by the perceptions and characteristics of each world.  
Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States seem to have been claimed by the state as its 
sphere; and the state has managed to demark a boundary between itself and private 
sector associations.  In doing so, the Thai state uses legal bodies to limit how much 
private sector associations can intervene in international relations.  For the overseas 
private sector associations based in Thailand, the legal bodies used to enforce them are 
even more rigid.  It strictly imposes rules and restrictions on these associations, plus it 
places foreign private sector associations under close monitoring by different 
governmental units, including intelligence agencies and the foreign ministry.  National 
security and national interests are the main concerns the state uses to point out the 
rationale of the legal bodies.  In additional to using legal bodies to limit the private 
sector‘s involvement, in practice, the governmental units are less keen to cooperate or 
create a jointed project between the government and small private sector associations.  
The government‘s participating in events run by private sector associations is also rare; 
however, it is still possible to see the contribution of governmental units in some of the 
events.  
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THE BIFURCATED WORLD ENVIRONMENTS 
The environments in which the state and non-state spheres exist and interact have strong 
impact on the dynamism in each world and in the overlapping area.  Cultural and 
identity compatibilities are crucial issues in the universe of world politics.  In the case of 
Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States, culture and identity act as both barrier and 
potential supporter to the relations.  In the state sphere, non-Muslim identity, lacking of 
knowledge and cultural differences between Thailand and the GCC States have 
discouraged the motivation for states to engage in interactions.  At the same time, among 
the non-state actors, cultural understanding and shared Muslim identity have allowed 
greater potential for these associations to interact with overseas partners and with the 
GCC governments.  In the environment in which technology and telecommunication 
have facilitated transnational interaction and provided greater opportunity for 
transnational movement, the private sector associations can be good proxies for the 
government.  To assess the potential role of the non-state actors as proxies in Thailand‘s 
relations with the GCC States, therefore, cultural and identity compatibility are 
important determinants.  Furthermore, considering that in both Thailand and the GCC 
States, policy-making process is largely influenced by individuals; the assessment of the 
proxy question will also depend on the views of high-ranking policy makers and their 
connection to leaders of the private sector associations.   
 
Therefore, it can be seen that there is a symbiosis between the two spheres and the 
environment in which those spheres are embedded.  The environment defines and 
influences the nature of interactions between the two sides; and interactions also affect 
or re-construct the environment around it.  
 
HYPOTHESIS REVISITED—THE PROXY QUESTION 
Prior to the observation, the hypothesis had been proposed that private sector 
associations could become more involved or can act as proxies in Thailand‘s relations 
with the GCC States.  The hypothesis suggested that private sector associations in 
Thailand that have already been involved with the Middle East and the Muslim world 
are potential players to act as proxies for Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States; they 
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can stimulate more interactions and can take over some tasks that once belong to the 
state.  With less identity restraint, these associations should be able to act as proxies 
between Thailand and the GCC States.  With greater participation of private sector 
associations, the future of Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States therefore, could 
continue to grow.  
 
The outcomes of the research show that the hypothesised potential role of private sector 
as proxies in Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States is not very encouraging.   This is 
because there is no willingness from both the government and the private sector 
associations to take initiatives on the proxy option, nor has there been any potential of 
actual task sharing between the government and private sector associations. The 
observations of dynamisms within the two worlds and their interactions with each other 
have shown that neither side wants to cross paths.  The government is less motivated in 
allowing the private sector associations‘ involvement in international affairs and indeed 
in the wider aspect of government affairs.  The private sector associations also prefer to 
be contained in their own sphere, and are less willing to engage with the government and 
to act as proxies.  Such unwillingness is based on the associations‘ characteristics as well 
as the boundary that the government has created to prevent their intervention in state 
affairs.  Therefore, that private actor association can act as proxies for government must 
be answered carefully.  In theory, cultural and identity compatibility have made private 
sector associations suitable candidates for promoting greater cooperation and 
understanding between Thailand and the GCC States, both at government and private 
sector levels.  In reality, however, the observations have shown that the government 
does not support private sector associations to act as proxies.  The obstacles that have 
been created by the government have discouraged the associations for considering such 
role.  
 
PROXY QUESTION AND THE IMPLICATION FOR FUTURE THAILAND-
GCC STATES RELATIONS  
This research therefore suggests that private sector associations involving with the 
Middle East and the Muslim worlds have capacity to act as proxies for Thailand and 
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GCC States; this is due to their cultural and identity compatibility.  However the 
possibility that they can become proxies is hindered and conditioned by the government, 
who has limited the role and boundary of these private sector associations.  The threat of 
losing control over its foreign policy control and national security is significant factor 
that channels the government to act in such manner.  The private sector associations are 
less willing to act as proxies.  This is because their objectives and activities are 
domestically oriented and are not geared toward international relations; many 
restrictions and indirect barriers from the government also discourage these associations 
to intervene.   
 
This research views that the future of Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States will be 
heavily managed by the government.  This may not be that surprising when considering 
that sovereign states will continue to persist within the international system; thus the 
traditional sphere of state influence and international affairs will continue to be handled 
by states.  With the state continuing to play a significant role in international affairs, the 
nature of relationship between Thailand and the GCC States will not change from what 
it looks now, where trade and oil flow continue to define most of the relations.  Taking 
these factors away, there is not much motivation for the states to interact.  State actors, 
as this research shows, have not been able to substantially cultivate good knowledge of 
one another, neither have any cultural and social compatibilities been developed to 
prospect any improvements and initiatives in state relations.   So far, state agencies have 
not fully managed to induce more active and multi-channel relations. 
 
The possibility that there can be more active relations asides from trade; and where both 
Thailand and the GCC States can develop greater knowledge and a positive attitude 
among one another depends on support from non-state actors.  This research suggests 
that the influence of non-state actors in Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States will be 
subject to the government.  At present, the government does not facilitate the 
participation of private sector associations.  If the Thai government considers 
incorporating more private sector associations into the projects, as well as encouraging 
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them to be engaged in international relations, it may help in inducing these associations 
to help.   
 
In summary, the future outlook of Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States may 
continue to be viewed with the Two Worlds‘ model that shows the co-existence between 
state and non-state actors.  Despite the findings shown in this research that the 
government will continue to dominate the overall relations, non-state actors continue to 
emerge and grow, and they cannot be neglected within the analysis of Thailand‘s 
relations with the GCC States. However, the question whether this condition is only a 
transitional phase of the relations or whether it will persist depends largely on the 
change in the state‘s move586—whether it allows other actors to share the task and 
diversity the linkages.  For the time being, the separation between the government 
sphere and the non-state sphere continues to exist.  It is the overlapping area that may be 
changed; and it depends on the government whether it will allow a greater participation 
from private sector associations.  
 
 CHALLENGING THE CLAIM 
While the claim at the beginning of the research suggests that non-state actors will 
increase their role and become dominant actors in international relations between 
Thailand and the GCC States, the previous sections, hypothesis-revisiting and the 
answer to the key research question on the non-state actors‘ potential role as state 
proxies reveal otherwise.  From the findings, it is important to acknowledge the tension 
between empirical evidences of case studies and the claim that promotes the dominance 
of non-state actors in the relations.  While the claim suggests that the Muslim non-state 
actors may undertake tasks that once belonged to the state and would do better due to 
their connections, familiarity with culture, and identity compatibility, the findings show 
that the state has been able to enhance its capacity and adjust its perception it used to 
have regarding relations with the GCC States.   
                                                          
586
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world politics in Rosenau‘s Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity, pp. 453.   
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In addition to being able to regulate and limit the involvement of the non-state actors 
within the system, as can be seen from the function of the legal bodies that are able to 
demand compliance from non-state actors, the evidence of interactions between 
Thailand and the GCC States shows that the Thai state has constantly developed 
relations with the GCC States.  While the level of interactions with some GCC States 
has not been high, there has been constant development, particularly in terms of state-to-
state relations.   
 
Additional information on Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States following the period 
under study shows that after 2001, the relations between Thailand and the GCC States 
have largely been done through state relations; it shows, therefore, that the Thai state has 
constantly been developing its network with the GCC States.  
 
The development of Thailand‘s Islamic Banking sector is one of the examples that show 
the state‘s attempt to provide a foundation for improved economic relations between 
Thailand and the Muslim world.  As of 2007, the bank had an asset of only 12 billion 
baht, with 29 branches, 11 of which are in the five provinces of southern Thailand.  In 
the past, small number of branches, low asset, and lack of understanding of the nature of 
Islamic bank are the drawbacks of the bank.
587
  In 2009, the bank has developed so 
much with the state support that it offered to lend 50 billion Baht to Thailand‘s major 
public companies, including Thai Airways International) and PTT Exploration and 
Production (PTTEP); the fund will be raised in Malaysia by issuing Islamic bonds.
588
  
Many of the customers of the Islamic Bank of Thailand are Thai entrepreneurs who do 
business with their counterparts in the Middle East.  These counterparts prefer their 
financial transaction to be done with the Islamic Bank. 
 
In terms of trade, the Thai and the GCC States have been trying to increase the number 
of trade.  Table 18 shows that Thailand‘s exports to the GCC States have been increased 
almost four times between 1997 and 2007.  The level of imports also increases and 
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continues to be highlighted by oil purchase.  Oil has continued to rank among the top 
imported goods for Thailand.
589
  In 2008, the value of Thailand‘s world crude oil import 
was USD 30159.8 millions, of which USD 21877.8 million went to the GCC States;
590
 
thus almost 73% of Thailand‘s oil purchase comes from the GCC States.   
Table 18: Export Structure to the GCC States in Selected Years (USD Million) 
Type of Goods/year 1995 1997 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Agricultural 
products 124.4 65.2 69.6 90.7 144.4 387.6 
Agro-industrial 
products 62.6 73.2 112.5 148.5 212.6 270.7 
Industrial products 1,612.0 931.6 2,379.3 3,076.9 3,998.3 5,290.8 
Mineral and fuel 
products 0.9 30.8 62.2 35.6 20.9 107.1 
Others 10.1 16.7 50.4 65.5 49.8 n/a 
Total 1,810.0 1,117.5 2,674.0 3,417.2 4,426.0 6,056.2 
Source: Ministry of Commerce, Royal Thai Government. http://www.moc.go.th/. (Last 
accessed 2 October, 2009).  
 
As noted, oil trade continues to be the highlight of the interactions between Thailand and 
the GCC States; the GCC States continue to be the top sources for Thailand‘s crude oil 
import (see figures 31).  The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Qatar continue to be 
important sources of crude oil for Thailand.      
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590
 Ibid.  
Conclusion 
 - 350 - 
Figure 31: Top Ten Sources of Thailand's Crude Oil Import 2008 (by percentage 
share) 
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Source: Author-created diagram based on data from the Ministry of Commerce, Royal Thai 
Government. http://www.moc.go.th/. (Last accessed 2 October, 2009). 
 
The development in terms of Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States can also be seen 
in the increase in investment from the Arab side.  The Thai state has also come to 
recognise the significance of investment and funds from the GCC States.  The Ministry 
of Finance, in Feb 2009, established the Committee for Fund Raising According to 
Islamic Principles.
591
  The Thai Ministry of Finance is interested in Middle East funds 
because of the good liquidity and because they are relatively less affected by global 
economy.  Raising funds from these countries is also cheaper than raising funds from 
countries in the West (about 0.25-0.50%), while some countries in the region also offer 
benefits.
592
  According to the Office of Trade Policy, most of the Arab funds are 
invested in real estate, hotel, hospital and mega projects, by buying shares in the 
company or buying stocks in the stock market or through financial institutions.  So far, 
some of the significant investments include the investment from the Mubadala 
Development Company, which has acquired the Pearl energy, one of the most 
significant Southeast Asia oil and gas exploration and production companies.  Pearl 
energy‘s exploration portfolio includes a gross acreage of more than 135000 sq. km in 
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Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines.
593
  In 2007, the production from the 
three fields in the flagship Jasmine offshore field in the Gulf of Thailand, and in 
Indonesia had yielded a production rate of approximately 19000 barrels of oil per 
year.
594
  It is planned that in 2008, Pearl will drill 47 development wells to expand its 
exploration in the Jasmine oil field in Thailand.  Thus the Gulf of Thailand has become a 
significant investment opportunity for companies in the GCC States.
595
    
 
In addition, the Dubai Investment Group, a specialist in construction, real estate, and 
finance, had bought shares in Thailand‘s Thanayong PLC. In addition, the Depa United 
Group, based in Dubai, whose business in construction and interior design is the biggest 
in the Middle East, initiated a joint venture with Thailand Carpet Manufacturing PLC.  
In terms of real estate development, the IFA Hotels and Resort Group, and Istithmar 
Hotel Fze invested with the Raimond Laond PLC.  There has been the joint investment 
for hotel business in Sathorn Square project between Thailand‘s Golden Land Property 
Development PLC and Istithmar Hotel Fze. 
 
Investments from smaller companies and juristic persons from the GCC States have also 
become significant to the Thai economy; from the record of the Department of Trade 
and Business Development, Ministry of Commerce of Thailand, as of August 2008, 
there are 137 Arab Juristic persons, of 2370 million baths.  Investors from the UAE rank 
first, having invested 83% of the total value, meanwhile the Qatari investors rank second, 
having invested 11% of the total value.  Investors from different GCC states have 
different interests, thereby resulting in different kind of investments.  The UAE investors 
are interested in hotel business; while the Qatari investors are interested in entertainment.  
The investors from Saudi Arabia are interested in investing in firms, investors from 
Kuwait are interested in hospital business, investors from Oman are interested in 
entertainment and consulting firms, and investors from Bahrain are interested in logistics 
and transportation (see figure 32).   
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Figure 32: The Percentage of each GCC State's Investment in Thailand (from Total 
GCC Investment in Thailand), as of 2008 
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Source: Based on the information from the Office of Trade Policy, Ministry of Commerce  
https://otp.moc.go.th 
 
As for the investment from the Thai side, most of the investments have been in the field 
of medical services and hotel management.  Several private hospitals in Thailand have 
continued to expand their referral offices into more countries in the Gulf States, i.e. the 
Bumrunrad hospital, which has expanded the referral offices to Kuwait, the UAE, 
Bahrain, and Oman.
596
  The Dusit Dubai Hotel, which has been run under Thailand‘s 
Dusit group, continues to be popular among Arabs.  At the same time, a larger number 
of Thais and Arabs have opened Thai restaurants in the Gulf States.  
 
Two key reasons therefore suggest the supremacy of state relations within Thailand‘s 
relations with the GCC States.  One is that the state has been seen to improve its 
capacity and reduce the limit it used to have in order to exploit the benefit from 
interacting with the GCC States. The recent data demonstrates recognition of the greater 
significance of the GCC States to the global economy and to the Thai economy, as well 
as the way Thailand adjusted its policy and behaviour to develop further relations with 
the GCC States.  With the improved capacity, the suggestion of the need for non-state 
actors to fill in the gap where the state used to find limits is likely to be less valid.   
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Second, while it can be seen from the findings that private sector associations do have 
the capacity to increase their roles in Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States, their 
ability to be involved is still subjected to the Thai state; and several organisations still 
depend on the state‘s support in order to exist, therefore it may be fair to suggest that the 
Thai state still has strong control over these organisations; until the state allows it, these 
private sector associations cannot exceed the state in their relations with the GCC States.  
 
STATE SUPREMACY? 
The last section suggests the tension between the claim and the empirical findings. 
While the claim suggests the growth of private sector associations to exceed the role of 
the state in international relations between Thailand and the GCC States, the findings 
largely suggest the supremacy of the state in two manners. First, the state has developed 
its capacity to interact with the GCC States, thus making the suggested role of private 
sector associations as proxies redundant, and, second, the state has strong control over 
private sector associations. 
 
The findings therefore lead us to the final reflection on the nature of theoretical 
framework and the validity of theoretical concepts.  Earlier in this chapter different 
theoretical concepts were evaluated in terms of their utility in understanding 
international relations.  This part will discuss the implication of the findings to the value 
of the two key concepts that are the highlights of the argument, state-centrism and 
pluralism.   
 
According to the findings, the strength of the state in international relations between 
Thailand and the GCC States cannot be denied.  Such conclusion adds positive standing 
to state-centric view; it supports the claim over the resilience of the state and the 
theoretical concept supporting it.  This being said, it is important not to neglect the 
existence of emerging non-state actors.  Despite being controlled by the state, non-state 
actors continue to have some effects, both positive and negative, to Thailand‘s relations 
with the GCC States.  Therefore, pluralism is still a useful concept to be used along with 
state-centrism.   
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In summary, the future outlook of Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States may 
continue to be viewed using the combination of state-centrism and pluralism; with state-
centrism playing a role as the key theoretical concept due to the dominant role of the 
state within the relations. For the time being, the separation between the government and 
sphere and the non-state sphere continues to exist.  It is the overlapping area between the 
two spheres that continue to be the important question; it is up to the government 
whether it will allow a greater involvement of private sector associations.  
 
POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
While showing that the Thai state will continue to dominate Thailand‘s relations wit the 
GCC States, this research also suggests that private sector associations have the capacity 
to assist the Thai state in promoting and diversifying relations with the GCC States.  It 
shows that the factors that hinder these associations are the lack of support from the 
government and the lack of motivation from the associations themselves.  While the 
supremacy of the state is clear in the relations, the Thai state will benefit from more 
diverse channels of interactions, as well as from increased or regular trade and oil deal, 
if it has private sector associations assisting in the areas where the state has limits or is 
not familiar.  The research findings therefore suggest several courses of actions and 
changes which should be made:   
 
COURSES OF ACTION 
 The government should promote the consolidation of joint committee between itself 
and private sector associations.  The choice of private sector associations being 
selected into the committee should be based on, as noted, regional and functional 
expertise--in this case the GCC States, the Middle East and Islam--and not the 
familiarity with the government or the size. The joint committee provides advice to 
relevant government agencies in projects and initiatives with the GCC States.  So far, 
there has been some joint committee work between the government and the private 
sector associations, but the committee is temporary and less specific.   
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 A joint organisation between the government and the private sector association 
should be made available to provide information about business opportunity, 
businessmen and company profiles, as well as trade regulations between Thailand 
and the GCC States to individual Arab and Thai investors who are interested in 
investing or doing business in Thailand.  So far, the Export-Import Bank of Thailand 
(ExIm Bank), the Thai Chamber of Commerce and Ministry of Commerce have been 
providing such service.  However, these organisations are oriented toward larger 
companies and organisations; it is difficult for small investors and entrepreneurs to 
be served.  Individuals and small companies, lacking sufficient information on 
business and import-export regulations, are less motivated to do business in Thailand 
and likewise.  Unlike other countries--i.e. the EU, USA, Australia and East Asian 
countries--that have their own chambers of commerce in Thailand, Arab 
businessmen do not have agencies to provide information.  So far, aside from the 
Chamber of Commerce, TITIA, and their embassies in Thailand, there ware no 
organisations similar to chamber of commerce for the Arabs. 
 
 The government must participate and, if possible, coordinate in the initiatives or 
events organised by private sector associations, especially those of the GCC 
governments and Muslim international organisations like the OIC.   
 
 The government should examine into details the existence and nature of private 
sector associations involving with Muslims, the Middle East and the GCC States.  
The database on these associations allows the government to be aware of their 
information; in a way, it can indirectly monitor these organisations, at the same time, 
it can coordinate and gain a connection with the GCC States through these 
organisations.   
 
 The government, with support from the private sector associations, can initiate the 
inter-government cooperation program between Thailand and the GCC States.  
Functional cooperation can be established through using the expertise and focus of 
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the private sector associations, which already exist but lack the support of the Thai 
government.   
 
 More information on the GCC States and the relevant governmental agencies should 
be made available to the members of the publics.  Such will encourage greater 
knowledge about one another, leading to increased interactions among populations 
from the two sides. 
 
RECOMMENDED CHANGES 
 The government should examine more closely the existing regulations and 
limitations on private sector associations in Thailand. Changes should be made to the 
regulations that are too strict and impractical.  In the case of foreign private sector 
associations functioning in Thailand, the regulations applied to them must be 
considered on a case-by-case basis, as the establishment of these organisations from 
headquarters are based on different rules, thus documents and procedures required 
by the Thai government may be impossible for these organisations to comply with.  
Limiting too much involvement of these organisations means discouraging them 
from being involved in governmental projects, and from considering drawing 
government into their projects.   
 
 This research shows that there has been a development in non-state actors in 
Thailand.  The increased role of civil society in world politics is the phenomenon 
that will continue to grow; and the Thai government must not ignore such a fact.  
Therefore, the old perception that the government has to be in charge of all aspects 
of international relations must be adjusted toward a more task-share oriented fashion.   
 
RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
This research has attempted to answer questions on contemporary and future of 
Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States, with the focus on the role of non-state actors, 
considering the limits in space and time of the research, several other interesting aspects 
have not been touched upon.  Further research, using different empirical cases, or 
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different non-state actors, may be useful.  Therefore, it would be interesting if further 
studies can be undertaken in the following areas: 
 
First, if the debate on the involvement of Muslim private sector associations in 
Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States should be moved forward, it would be 
worthwhile to conduct a study to assess the involvement and role of the Muslim private 
sector associations in Muslim countries, preferably in ASEAN.  Such a project will 
provide a comparative study with this research that highlights the relationship between 
Muslim private sector associations and the Thai government and how much the 
government allows these organisations to be involved in Thailand‘s relations with the 
GCC States.  The proposed project can help answer the question over whether Islamic 
identity plays an important role in the relationship between the government and these 
Muslim private sector associations, and how much influence this identity can affect the 
amount of involvement and task sharing the government allows private sector 
associations in international relations with the GCC States.  If the result is not 
dramatically different, then the attention can be moved on to other factors, i.e. 
governmental mechanisms, domestic politics or the security agenda.   
 
Second, the development of non-state actors in Southeast Asia and Thailand has been a 
recent phenomenon; this research only focuses on one kind of non-state actors: private 
sector associations.  Other transnational non-state actors that would be worthwhile 
studying is the role of the Muslim transnational companies in Thailand‘s relations with 
the GCC States.  This recommendation is based on the field research and news survey 
between 2008 and 2009, where there have been more reports on the investments of 
companies from the Gulf in Thailand.  At the same time, there have been some 
investments or joint project between Thai companies and Gulf companies.  Focusing on 
these transnational companies can also provide a comparative case study to this research 
whose focus is on private sector associations.   
 
Third, it is worth examining further the long-termed trend of Thailand‘s relations with 
the GCC States.  As noted, the proposed model and conceptual framework are largely 
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influenced by the work of James Rosenau.  According to Rosenau, the bifurcated world 
can be either the transitional period or it can be a permanent condition of the world 
politics.  Rosenau offers four scenarios for the future shape of world politics, including:
 
597
  
 
 Global Society Scenario: This scenario offers the world politics closed to idealist 
perspective.  This is the case where the world politics is tied by the ―aspirations, 
procedural norms, and loyalties that are globally shared.‖598 
 Restored State-System: This scenario suggests the case that state or sovereignty-
bound actors re-emerge as dominant player in world politics again.  Under this case, 
states are successful in convincing to their citizens that there are no other units better 
suitable to serve them than states.  
 Pluralist Scenario: This scenario suggests the case in that non-state actors become 
dominant players over states.   
 Enduring-Bifurcation Scenario: This scenario suggests the continued bifurcation 
world politics in that, ―both sovereignty-bound and sovereignty-free actors would be 
sufficiently powerful to resist the other and thus to preserve their own autonomy, but 
neither would be powerful enough to subordinate the other.‖599   
 
Instead of applying Rosenau‘s prediction to the world politics, which is a macro 
structure, this prediction can be conveniently applied to the micro structure like 
Thailand‘s relations with the GCC States.  The further research can take into 
consideration the result of this research, which provides an account of Thailand‘s 
relations with the GCC States through the bifurcated world model; future studies must 
be done to seek additional factors that will channel the nature of relations, i.e. more 
research on identity, economic dependency or regionalism.   
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